(1) Pakistan should “use its best endeavours” to secure the withdrawal of the raiders – tribesmen and other Pakistani nationals from J&K;
(2) after fighting had ceased, India should withdraw its forces reducing them to the minimum level required for support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order; and
(3) for the purposes of pacification, the UN Commission could employ Pakistan troops but with the consent of India [italics added].
Pakistan immediately proposed an amendment to the last point to enable the administrator to deploy Indian or Pakistani troops at his discretion, i.e., without having to seek the consent of India. This proposal was defeated by seven votes to nil with four abstentions.* The 21 April resolution was not accepted by either India or Pakistan but both countries agreed to receive the commission and confer with its members.**
The charge of the Ismay–Scoones heavy brigade had been halted, even after they had broken through the Indian lines. However, little by little India was being made to compromise its stand.
The Soviet Union had taken no interest in the proceedings of the Security Council on Kashmir. Stalin had shown no interest in India after independence. He considered India still to be under British tutelage. Nehru then sent his sister, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, as ambassador to the USSR. She was not granted an audience with Stalin even once throughout her stay in Moscow.
Attlee’s greater flexibility towards India at this point of time may be attributed to the exploration going on, through Krishna Menon in London and Mountbatten in New Delhi, to find a formula that would enable India to remain a member of the British Commonwealth, despite the fact that it was committed under its Constituent Assembly resolution of 9 August 1946 to become a Republic. Mountbatten wrote to Patrick Gordon Walker on 27 February 1948: ‘I believe that you have it in your power to save India for the Commonwealth and to keep both India and Pakistan within the Anglo–US line-up if you can only persuade the Prime Minister and Noel-Baker to follow the line as agreed upon [i.e., not rubbing India the wrong way at the UN on Kashmir].’51
On 11 March 1948 Attlee, in a long private and personal letter to Nehru, put forward the case for India remaining in the British Commonwealth. Its central point was as follows:
We have now reached another stage in the development of the Commonwealth…for the British the content is always more important than names…. The functions of our King are very different from those of King Ibn Saud, but their titles are the same. The same incidentally applies to the term “Republic”. The actual position in Australia and New Zealand gives far more real freedom and democracy than the position in some of the South American Republics…I know how much you have at heart the unity of India. It will, I think, be of very material assistance in promoting this unity if India and Pakistan are both within the Commonwealth, and it will also help relations with Ceylon [now Sri Lanka] and Malaya, for in my view it is right and natural that India should increasingly take a leading part among the nations of Asia.52
Attlee then seeks Nehru’s ‘views on these high matters’. Nehru replied to Attlee on 18 April 1948 as follows:
It is his [Nehru’s] as also his colleagues’ desire that the association of India with the UK and the British Commonwealth of Nations should be close and intimate. He was more interested in the content – real friendship and cooperation – than merely a formal link. Indeed it is remarkable what Lord Mountbatten, and may I add Lady Mountbatten also, have done to remove many of the old causes of distrust and bitterness between India and England…. We are anxious not to come to any hurried decision and we hoped that the lapse of time would make it easier to decide. That decision was bound to be influenced by the events which preceded it. [Here was the rub]: Since the Indian Constitution will be drafted in the Hindi language…the words used in Hindi will not have the same historical background and associations which English words might have…I shall not say much more at this stage except to repeat the hope that India and England will be closely associated to their mutual advantage.53
The UNCIP delegation visited Pakistan and India in July 1948. At Karachi came the first ‘bombshell’, discloses Korbel, who was presiding over the commission at that stage. ‘Sir Zafrullah Khan [Pakistan’s delegate at the UN] informed the Commission that three Pakistani brigades were fighting on Kashmir territory since May.’54 It had been known for some time that Pakistani forces were operating in Kashmir but mediators could proceed only on the basis of admissions by parties.
If, in Karachi, the UNCIP members encountered distrust and tantrums, in Delhi they found disarray and imprecision. Some of the conflicting Indian views that Korbel came across in Delhi have been noted in Chapter 12. He further writes: ‘The Prime Minister told them that: “We do not insist upon the right of our Army to advance and occupy the territory which would be vacated by Pakistan. On the other hand there must not be a vacuum there and we shall be satisfied with the recognition of the authority of the State over all its territories and with the occupation of advanced positions important to us strategically and economically.”’ Korbel continues: ‘He [Nehru] revealed skepticism about a plebiscite and [as noted earlier] expressed the thought that we [India] would not be opposed to the idea of dividing the country between India and Pakistan’.55
The UNCIP recommendations were finalized in the form of a resolution on 13 August 1948.56 Taken together with the explanations given by the commission to the two sides, these may be briefly enumerated as follows:
(1) Ceasefire within four days after their acceptance;
(2) Withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Kashmir “as the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of J&K constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council” [thus the Pakistani withdrawal was sought not because Pakistanis had committed aggression but because they had lied about their presence in Kashmir];
(3) “The territory evacuated by the Pakistanis to be administered by the local authorities under the supervision of the UN Commission” [who would be the “local authorities”? Was the Azad Kashmir Government to be left in place?];
(4) “Withdrawal of the bulk of Indian forces in Kashmir to begin after the Commission had notified India that the Pakistani nationals had withdrawn and the Pakistani forces were being withdrawn” [italics added] [this clause indirectly recognized Indian sovereignty over Kashmir but to some extent equated Indian and Pakistani withdrawals, creating possibilities of misunderstandings on the issue, as happened];
(5) Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement, India would remain within the lines as existing at the moment of the ceasefire [thus the control over Gilgit and the Poonch– Muzaffarabad sector would not be handed over to India. A clarification was sought by India on this last proviso and the UNCIP replied that it had noted the point but a decision would be left to the commission to resolve. India did not pursue the matter further];
(6) Finally, both the Governments would affirm their agreement that the future of Kashmir would be determined in accordance with the will of the Kashmiri people.
The foregoing proposals, however unsatisfactory to India, were a setback for Pakistan. After the success Pakistan had recorded at the UN, at the time of the Ismay–Scoones offensive in early 1948, it had hoped that the world body would recognize the presence of its troops in Kashmir and displace Abdullah. Now the UNCIP was proposing that Pakistan withdraw its Army from Kashmir. Liaqat Ali Khan thereupon decided to approach Britain for help and played his major card. He offered a defence alliance with Britain. This factor he knew would move Attlee more than any argument on the merits of the Kashmir question. Walter Cawthorn, the Australia-born deputy commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army, was dispatched on a secret mission to London in September. Noel-Baker met the Pakistan envoy on 18 September 1948. During the meeting, Cawthorn explained to him that:
He had come to explore the possibility for joint defence arrangements with [the] UK as so
on as possible. Pakistan was greatly alarmed by the danger posed by communism. It was resolutely determined to play [its] part in collective defence against Russian aggression. Pakistan would move formally in the matter after Britain was agreeable for such a proposal.57
Thereafter, Cawthorn was received by Attlee, who after consulting the chiefs of staff, authorized the Commonwealth Relations Office to inform him orally that a formal proposal from Pakistan on this request would be welcome. London did not immediately respond to the Pakistani request for a military pact. However, Britain started to ship arms to Pakistan and agreed to press for an unconditional ceasefire by the Security Council in order to stop the Indian advance. Britain also agreed to work to bypass the UNCIP proposal for the withdrawal of Pakistani troops. It further decided to press India directly for a ceasefire. Britain evidently did not wish to enter into a military pact with Pakistan without the US also joining in. But
The beat was on,
The flags were out,
Th’animal moving
Towards the machan.
On 4 October 1948, Sir Paul Patrick of the Commonwealth Relations Office sent for the US chargé d’affaires in the UK and tried to impress upon him that ‘it might be better for Kashmir Commission Report never to be made public even though it is as even-handed as Department [of State] suggests’.58 Simultaneously, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the UK’s permanent delegate to the UN, took up the issue in Paris where that year the UN General Assembly was meeting. According to the US secretary of state’s telegram to Washington: ‘From his [Cadogan’s] remarks we gather Britain have in mind almost immediate action in SC…. With UNCIP meanwhile taking back seat.’59
Britain simultaneously explored the Mountbatten channel. On 8 October 1948, Sir Archibald Carter, the permanent undersecretary in the Commonwealth Relations Office, wrote to the former governor-general. By that time, Mountbatten had left India but Whitehall was aware of Nehru’s continuing contacts with him and Lady Mountbatten. Carter suggested that Nehru be brought round ‘to go back to his earlier idea of a partition of Kashmir, with the plebiscite confined to the Valley’.60 Carter knew that during his visit to England to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference, Nehru would spend some time with the Mountbattens at their country seat in Hampshire where he could be approached at leisure. In fact, Nehru spent four days relaxing in picturesque Broadlands. Though Mountbatten was busy in London most of the time, he did raise the matter with Nehru and wrote to Noel-Baker on 25 October:
I feel I can reassure you about India making war on Pakistan… India is now so strong (in Kashmir) that any question of their contemplating invasion of Pakistan territory [to offset Pakistan’s advantage in Kashmir] seems to be extremely remote; thus I do not see open warfare developing out of the present situation though I agree with you that it is highly desirable to bring even the present and unofficial war to an end as soon as possible.
Mountbatten had also raised with Nehru the Commonwealth issue, so dear to his heart:
I had already made it clear to Nehru that I was certain that he would have to make some concession to Commonwealth sentiment and Stafford [Cripps] came down with the idea of asking India to accept the King as the fountain of honour for the Commonwealth. Nehru gladly accepted this and in general expressed himself as most anxious to meet our sentimental difficulties, provided that in so doing he did not get a substantial vote against remaining in the Commonwealth from the Constituent Assembly.… Stafford and Krishna [Menon] drafted a memo on these lines to which Nehru agreed.61
Unknown to Nehru, Ernest Bevin and Noel-Baker, at the same time, were holding separate talks with Liaqat Ali Khan, the Pakistan prime minister, in London, on the likely communist threat. In these talks they informed the delighted Liaqat Ali Khan that ‘it was time to return the Kashmir question to the Security Council’62 (i.e., bypass the UNCIP). (The unsuccessful British push for an unconditional ceasefire at the United Nations and for the pigeonholing of the UNCIP proposals has already been mentioned earlier.)
After the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference Liaqat Ali travelled to Paris (where the UN Security Council was meeting) and raised the bogey of the communist threat in his talks with the Americans. (I am unaware whether or not he was encouraged to do so by Bevin.) On his very first call on George Marshall, the US secretary of state, on 29 October, he straightaway hinted at a defence alliance against the communist powers. The following telegram to Washington gives the gist of Marshall’s conversation with the Pakistani prime minister:
After exchange of pleasantries, Liaqat commenced conversation by saying that he wished, besides having opportunity to meet Secretary, to discuss strategic position in Middle East and the world. He reviewed great difficulties Pakistan has encountered in becoming established. Citing vast refugee problem, economic difficulties and relations with India, particularly in Kashmir, he declared it unthinkable that Pakistan could fall prey to communism since (a) the latter was contrary to tenets of Muslim religion, in respect of democratic ideals, property ownership and individual position; (b) States outside communist orbit should fully know that communist ideology was oppressive in extreme. Pakistan was anxious to maintain stand against communist infiltration. Liaqat then said frankly that since the United States was strongest most powerful among free nations, it…should strengthen Middle Eastern Areas economically and militarily. Turning to India–Pakistan relations, Liaqat Ali termed Indian attitude towards Pakistan as hostile, adding, “Pakistan had been struggling to obtain peaceful settlement” in Kashmir.63
The secretary of state spoke to Liaqat Ali Khan at some length to explain American policy to build up Europe, which he called a ‘nerve centre’. He declared that the US was also planning to help the Near East. Regarding communism and USSR policy he said that ‘he was glad to know of Pakistan’s attitude’. Marshall also observed: ‘One very important way by which the states outside Police States’ orbit [carefully avoiding the word communist] could strengthen themselves would be to settle all their major difficulties quickly and peacefully.’ In this connection he expressed the hope that the Kashmir question ‘would be settled in conformity with UN principles’. Finally, he remarked that the US had not been able to ship arms to India or Pakistan while Kashmir was the point of friction.64
According to Zafrullah Khan the meeting had gone off rather well.
In November 1948, the Indian Army had crossed the Himalayan range at Zojila and also raised the one-year-old siege of Poonch. The latter development had caused serious concern in Karachi – and London – for it could lead to Pakistan losing the entire Poonch– Muzaffarabad strip. On 18 November 1948, Attlee, while replying to Liaqat Ali Khan’s SOS for help, affirmed: ‘I am taking action to do anything I can to secure the halting of any offensive that may be taking place.’65 Having failed to budge the Americans, Attlee now put his faith in British diplomats and soldiers, who had stayed behind in India and Pakistan, to stop the Indian offensive.
General Archibald Nye had taken over as the UK high commissioner in Delhi from Terence Shone. He had been the deputy chief of staff to Churchill during the war. Also, he was an accomplished soldier-diplomat. On 22 November 1948, General Nye called on Nehru. In his report to the Commonwealth Relations Office on his conversation with the Indian PM, he has stated:
‘He [Nehru] gave me opportunity to give him my views on Kashmir situation which I did as follows:
The nature of the country was such that it was not possible for either side to drive the other out of Kashmir; indeed, in these conditions unless the morale of one side broke, no really substantial advance could be made by either side. Moreover…attacks would be costly in human life. (Neither Commander-in-Chief need have any fears so long as he was required to act on the defensive.) Pakistan forces were on the whole far better placed than Indian forces because their communications were short…and not vulnerable.
But even if my military appreciation was wrong, still there was no military solution to the Kashmir problem, for, even
if Indian forces were able to clear Kashmir entirely of Pakistan forces (the proposition which I reiterated seemed to be out of the question) there is nothing to prevent the tribesmen from coming back whenever they wished, and it was unthinkable that India would maintain for an indefinite period immense forces in Kashmir against such a contingency. It followed therefore there is no military solution to the Kashmir problem; only a political one…. He [Nehru] was very thoughtful, a trifle gloomy, but did not dispute anything I said; indeed by questions and comments gave the impression that he agreed.
If Nye had stopped here, his statement could have been taken as disinterested advice. However, his report continued:
There is one other relevant point which I did not mention to him…but which I am arranging to be fed into him from other and more professional sources. It is this. There are signs that the morale of the troops of the Indian Army is beginning to wear a little thin. The first flush of enthusiasm has subsided. Troops have been fighting for a long time, including one winter and the prospect of another winter does not appeal to them very much…. The great majority of the troops of the Indian Army have never operated in such trying conditions…(they) have little or no enthusiasm on the Kashmir issue. Due to the very rapid promotions in the Indian Army and to the inexperience of their Regimental Officers and in particular the Commanding Officers…leadership is lacking. I hope by making these various representations to Nehru, that it will be possible to bring home to him that there is no military solution to this problem.66
On the original of this inward telegram to London somebody in Whitehall wrote the word ‘Nonsense’ opposite where the prowess of the Indian Army was questioned. This comment could have been made only by an Englishman, military or civilian.
The Shadow of the Great Game Page 42
