4
No Exit from Pakistan
were to shift, it is conceivable that America would find new allies and partners
in Pakistani society.
Pakistanis are not, however, the only aggrieved party in this relationship.
A decade after 9/11, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship also has very few fans left
in Washington. In the corridors of U.S. power, from the White House and
State Department to the Pentagon and CIA, a gallows humor hangs over most
Pakistan policy debates. Best-laid plans and high hopes have been dashed too
often for anyone to champion costly new agendas.
Having spent billions of dollars in military and civilian assistance to
Pakistan, many representatives and senators have reached the conclusion, as
Gary Ackerman, a Democratic congressman from New York, put it in May
2012, that “Pakistan is like a black hole for American aid. Our tax dollars go
in. Our diplomats go in, sometimes. Our aid professionals go in, sometimes.
Our hopes go in. Our prayers go in. Nothing good ever comes out.”2
Whereas the Obama administration spent its first two years seeking a grand
transformation in the U.S. relationship with Pakistan, most of 2011 and
2012 were devoted to salvaging a minimal degree of cooperation. By early
2011, analysts in American government and academic circles began to con-
template how a total rupture in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship might look, and
whether, for instance, the threats posed by terrorists and Pakistan’s nuclear
arsenal could be contained within its borders if the official relationship turned
completely hostile. They conducted a range of “contingency planning exer-
cises” to assess how hypothetical crises in and around Pakistan might escalate
into full-scale wars.
Underneath those bloodless planning drills and calculations, passions ran
deep. Increasingly, Washington’s top policymakers felt a personal animus
toward Pakistan. After reading scores of incriminating intelligence reports and
experiencing firsthand the frustrations of dealing with Pakistani counterparts,
many concluded that Pakistan’s military and intelligence forces were guilty of
a cruel, immoral, and deceptive strategy that helped Afghan Taliban insurgents
kill hundreds of U.S. troops and made another major terrorist attack against
Americans and their allies more likely.
In addition to poisoning cooperation in the short run, such experiences
leave lasting scars. In the tumultuous years immediately after 9/11, American
officials tended to give their Pakistani counterparts the benefit of the doubt,
hoping that over time the relationship would mature and improve. A decade
later, the opposite is true. The generation of U.S. officers who served in the
Afghan war is likely to emerge from that conflict perceiving Pakistan as an
enemy more than an ally. Their views are already influencing policymakers
and legislators in Washington.
2 Ackerman, quoted in Richard Leiby, “Pakistan’s Power Crisis May Eclipse Terrorist Threat,”
Washington Post, May 27, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/pakistans-power-crisis-may-eclipse-terrorist-threat/2012/05/27/gJQAPhOSuU_story.html.
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No Exit
5
In May 2011, America closed the first chapter of the post-9/11 era by killing
Osama bin Laden. U.S. and allied leaders have resolved to withdraw the lion’s
share of their troops from Afghanistan in 2014. Frustration and disgust with
Pakistan shows little sign of abating. Perhaps now is the moment for the world’s
sole superpower to escape from this particular torment. The situation feels a
lot like the dramatic point in Sartre’s play when the living room door swings
open, offering his sinners the chance to make a run for it. Can’t America simply
leave Pakistan behind?
No. However appealing it might seem for America to wash its hands of
Pakistan, to move on and let Pakistanis, or someone else, pick up the mess,
it would be little more than wishful thinking to believe that neglecting the
challenges posed by Pakistan will make them go away. This is the essential
meaning of “No Exit.”
Unfortunately, this does not mean the United States has any easy solutions.
The situation is troubling and, in a deep sense, tragic. It requires Americans
to appreciate that some problems may be too big to solve, and yet still too
important to avoid.
mutual vulnerability
The U.S. experience of the twentieth century, from two world wars to the Cold
War, convinced most American policymakers that the world was shrinking.
One could no longer trust that the United States would be insulated by its
surrounding oceans from the repercussions of decisions in far-off places like
Berlin, Tokyo, or Moscow.
The twenty-first century has only accelerated the speed and density of global
interconnections. Threats of disease, climate change, economic crisis, terrorism,
and war routinely spill across countries and leapfrog continents. All countries,
including the United States, are vulnerable. By this logic, even though Pakistan
is on the other side of the world, America is not necessarily protected from
what happens there.
Yet, even if world is shrinking, some places matter more to the United States
than others. As an extreme example, in the late 1990s, a brutal war started
in the Congo. Neighboring states were sucked into the conflict that brought
death, displacement, and destruction to millions of Africans over the subse-
quent decade. The suffering went almost entirely unnoticed in Washington.
One can debate the morality of this fact, but it is necessary to recognize that
states are typically moved to action by what they perceive to be their own
interests. That may or may not lead them to make sacrifices for humanitarian
or altruistic purposes. In Pakistan’s case, tens of millions of people suffer from
poverty, disease, and violence, but none of this necessarily compels the United
States to do anything about it.
On close examination, however, it is clear that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship
is one of mutual vulnerability. Each side has the potential to threaten the other’s
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6
No Exit from Pakistan
interests, even vital ones. This is true in spite of their many other differences in
power, wealth, culture, and history.
Pakistan’s Vulnerability
Pakistanis, who crave a respite from the exhausting trials of America’s post-
9/11 campaign against terrorism, find themselves trapped in a humiliating
position of dependence upon the United States. Islamabad is addicted to U.S.
assistance dollars, whether in the form of grants, projects, or loans. Similarly,
Pakistan’s military jealously guards its supply of American-made weapons and
<
br /> spare parts, especially its sixty-three F-16 fighter jets, aircraft that rival some
of the best in neighboring India’s arsenal.
Even if Pakistan were somehow to free itself from these crutches, it would
still confront a global economy in which the United States remains the most
influential player. It would still confront a regional security environment in
which the United States maintains the most powerful military. Unlike nearby
China or Russia, Pakistan lacks sufficient strength, wealth, or easily exploited
natural resources to insulate itself from American influence.
Pakistanis old enough to recall the 1990s will remember that at the end of the
Cold War when relations with the United States took a nosedive, the country’s
friendships with China and Saudi Arabia failed to save it from a decade of
terrible economic and political turbulence. The country cycled through a series
of ineffectual and weak governments and ran up an astronomical debt along
the way. Today, Pakistan is having an even harder time getting its house in
order. This makes the country more vulnerable to outside pressure and more
dependent on outside aid.
As has been the case for decades, and as explained at greater length in the
second chapter of this book, Pakistani society is dominated by a small, elite class
of feudal land barons and industrialists, usually in collusion with the most pow-
erful institution of the land: the army. Together, these power brokers have sup-
pressed radical change, but more and more they are besieged along two fronts.
A relatively small but vocal and violent segment of society favors revo-
lutionary change. These radicals – terrorists, militants, and their ideological
sympathizers – who cloak themselves in the garb of Islam, do not enjoy much
popular appeal. They are, however, able to intimidate the masses. Some of
the most radical voices in Pakistan have also enjoyed the active support of the
state, including in the military and intelligence services. Armed, trained, and
indoctrinated in the black arts of insurgency and terrorism, these groups now
make terrifyingly sophisticated adversaries. It is not surprising that Pakistan’s
leaders often choose to temporize, negotiate, or at best divide and conquer
these extremists rather than to tackle the whole of the problem at once.
Unfortunately, that piecemeal approach also betrays weakness and ambiva-
lence. It has undermined, at times fatally, Pakistanis who might otherwise
stand up for a more moderate or progressive society. It fosters an atmosphere
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No Exit
7
of fear and conspiracy. That, in turn, discourages the sorts of investments
and entrepreneurial activity that could jumpstart the underperforming econ-
omy. Most worrisome, it increases the chance that the guardians of Pakistani
national security, including those within the nuclear weapons program, will be
compromised from within their own ranks. The greatest threat to Pakistan’s
stability comes not from the prospect of violent conquest – a virtual impossi-
bility in the face of the army’s size and overwhelmingly superior firepower –
but from confusion, deterioration, or division within the army itself.
Aside from violent and revolutionary forces of change, Pakistan also faces
the pressures and opportunities afforded by massive population growth. By
mid-century, Pakistan will almost certainly join India, China, and the United
States among the world’s four most populous nations. Pakistan’s cities are
growing fastest of all, and the country’s young urbanites are already demanding
change. Not surprisingly, their main concerns are jobs and education. Thus far,
Pakistan’s sclerotic political system has done rather little to meet these needs,
but the tide may yet turn. Tens of millions of young Pakistanis are coming of age
in a world saturated with new tools of communication and social mobilization,
like cell phones and interactive media. These tools may open the door to popular
political participation in ways that are entirely new to Pakistan.
Nonviolent, evolutionary change might be the best possible way to unclench
the grip on power enjoyed by Pakistan’s traditional, repressive elite. For the
moment, however, the country’s reformers – young and old – are not up to the
task. They lack experience and viable allies that can compete in the rough-and-
tumble world of Pakistani politics and still remain true to their goals. Pakistan’s
current crop of reformers is also decidedly inward-looking, which limits its
ability to benefit from external support, whether from America or elsewhere.
In short, Pakistan is vulnerable. Its traditional ruling classes and the military
are still strong enough to ward off the immediate prospect of revolution or
collapse, but the state is stressed by population growth, hamstrung in its reform
efforts, and plagued by violence and terror. Change, whether revolutionary and
violent or evolutionary and peaceful, looms on the horizon. It is impossible to
know when and how the balance of power will tip away from those Pakistanis
who favor continuity and toward those who favor change, but all the warning
signs are in place.
America’s Vulnerability
Americans yearn for the sense of safety that was lost on 9/11 when terrorists
turned New York’s twin towers to ash. At that time, more al-Qaeda operatives
lived in Pakistan than any other country. Washington’s first concern when
dealing with Islamabad remains the vulnerability of the American people to
threats based on Pakistani soil.
Dealing with Pakistan is no straightforward affair. Anyone who claims oth-
erwise has not been paying attention. Pakistan is neither completely aligned
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8
No Exit from Pakistan
with America, nor completely opposed. Some of America’s frustrations with
Islamabad result from what Pakistan does, others from what Pakistan seems
incapable of doing.
The mixed experience of Pakistan’s counterterror cooperation with the
United States since 9/11 provides one illustration of the point. Some of the
greatest American successes in the fight against al-Qaeda, like the arrest of
9/11 organizer Ramzi bin al-Shibh in 2002, came through cooperation with
Pakistani authorities.3 On other occasions, like the raid on Osama bin Laden’s
compound in May 2011, Washington chose to act unilaterally, fearing that its
plans might be compromised if Pakistani officials were informed. In even more
troubling circumstances, the United States and Pakistan have worked at cross-
purposes. U.S. officials are, for instance, fully convinced that Pakistan employs
some terrorist groups as proxy fighters in Afghanistan and India. These groups
have American blood on their hands.
Nor is terrorism the only security challenge that the United States has in
Pakistan. Prior to 9/11, and again increasingly as al-Qaeda’s ranks have been
decimated in the years after 2007, many U.S. officials view securing Pakistan’s
nuclear program as their top concern. Pakistan is expanding its nuclear arsenal
and investing in new ways to launch warheads against neighboring India,
including tactical (very short range) missiles. Aside from their implications for
regional stability, these developments make the program more complicated and
more difficult to secure. They also raise the potential costs of internal disorder
or a hostile revolutionary turn.
Other American policymakers, focused intently on the endgame of the
Afghan war, see Pakistan’s role as critical to determining whether Afghanistan
emerges as a weak but stable state or reverts to bloody civil war fueled by the
enmities of neighboring powers.4 Of course, Pakistan’s regional significance
does not end in Afghanistan. Looking ahead to the future – a difficult and
speculative business to be sure – Pakistan’s most important role is likely to
be the one it plays in the geopolitics of Asia, spanning from the energy-rich
Persian Gulf and Central Asian states to the thriving economies of the Far East,
especially that of China.
Faced with multiple concerns, there is a natural temptation to reduce the
challenge of Pakistan to a single issue, to seek a bottom line about what matters
to the United States most of all. This impulse to prioritize is admirable and
necessary in the context of any single policy decision. But addressing only one
of the challenges America faces in Pakistan would not be sufficient, and a
3 David Rhode, “Karachi Raid Provides Hint of Qaeda’s Rise in Pakistan,” New York Times, September 15, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/15/world/threats-responses-karachi-karachi-raid-provides-hint-qaeda-s-rise-pakistan.html?ref=ramzibinalshibh.
4 For a comprehensive study of Afghanistan’s regional context, see Ashley J. Tellis and Aroop Mukharji, eds., “Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/regional approach.pdf.
Daniel S Markey Page 3
