Pakistanis opposed them.91
The general unpopularity of the Pakistani Taliban is encouraging but hardly
sufficient grounds for comfort. The city of Karachi, Pakistan’s economic capital
and trading hub, is now home to hundreds of thousands of recent migrants from
the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. Their arrival has created opportunities
for the TTP to exploit the city’s wealth and to expand the scope of their fight
against the Pakistani state.92
Earlier, starting in the mid-2000s, a different movement of militants brought
a spike in nationwide violence. Hundreds of “Punjabi Taliban” fighters moved
from Pakistan’s heartland into the remote tribal areas along the Afghan bor-
der, where they joined forces with the Pashtun insurgents. By some accounts,
these new fighters were even more vicious and sophisticated than their tribal
colleagues.93 Perhaps because they originally hailed from more cosmopolitan
parts of the country, they had grander ambitions for their war against Islam-
abad, not to mention their struggle against India and the West.
The Punjabi Taliban’s linguistic and cultural ties to Pakistan’s much more
heavily populated heartland could open the door to a far more widespread
Islamist movement in Pakistan. Swathes of Punjab are already sympathetic to
these sorts of ideas. There, for instance, terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba
and its humanitarian wing, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, have won sympathy and new
recruits both for their hard-line ideology as well as their Hamas-like outreach
efforts through schools and clinics.
Pakistan’s New Extremists
Pakistanis typically point to the 1980s as the period when hard-line Islamist
groups first gained traction in their country. As explained in the next
91 Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 27, 2012, http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/27/pakistani-public-opinion-ever-more-critical-of-u-s/.
92 Declan Walsh and Zia ur-Rehman, “Taliban Spread Terror in Karachi as the New Gang in Town,” New York Times, March 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/world/asia/
taliban-extending-reach-across-pakistan.html?pagewanted=all& r=0.
93 Author interview with Pakistani expert, Islamabad, May 2010. See also Katja Riikonen, “Punjabi Taliban and the Sectarian Groups in Pakistan,” Pakistan Security Research Unit Brief Number 55, University of Bradford, February 12, 2010; Syed Saleem Shahzad, “The Gathering Strength of Taliban and Tribal Militants in Pakistan,” Pakistan Security Research Unit Brief Number 24, University of Bradford, November 19, 2007.
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54
No Exit from Pakistan
chapter, the military rule of General Zia energized a variety of Islamist groups,
including political parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, and granted them a
privileged place in the Pakistani state. That pattern of mainstreaming more
extreme ideologies did not die with Zia, but neither did it transform Pakistan
into “Talibanistan” overnight. Pakistan’s moderates (not to mention many
American policymakers) have comforted themselves with the observation that
even at their most successful moments, Pakistan’s Islamist politicians have
had trouble winning more than 10 percent of the national assembly. In addi-
tion, at least since Musharraf’s decision to align with Washington after 9/11,
Pakistan’s senior officer corps has been carefully scrutinized for possible radical
leanings.94
Even so, the trends in Pakistan are worrisome. Many close and longtime
observers of Pakistan perceive a general shift away from traditional religious
practices, including those rooted in a tolerant Sufi mysticism, and toward either
a Taliban-style view of Islam (particularly in the Pashtun areas of the country),
known as Deobandism, or a version of Sunni practice more in line with that
of the Saudis, known as Salafism, Ahle Hadith, or the more derogatory term,
“Wahhabi.” All of these schools are actually rather modern phenomena, reac-
tions to what their nineteenth-century founders considered heretical deviations
from the original meaning and rites of Islam.95
It is in this context of social and political ferment that Pakistan has wit-
nessed the rise of Al-Huda, a network of Islamist schools for women. Founded
in Pakistan in 1994 by Farhat Hashmi, the daughter of an Islamist party
(Jamaat-e-Islami) leader, the organization has over 200 “franchises” around
Pakistan.96 To the dismay of Pakistan’s liberals and hard-line Islamists alike, Al-
Huda is transforming the way many of Pakistan’s most influential women, par-
ticularly well-educated ones from the middle and upper classes, relate to their
faith.
Hashmi, who appears veiled in black with just a slit from her eyebrows
to the bridge of her nose, was born in Pakistan in 1957 but did her doctoral
work at the University of Glasgow. She has since relocated to Toronto where
she directs her expanding global organization. Despite her globetrotting ways,
Hashmi remains a household name in Pakistan, where radio stations broadcast
her sermons and she can easily draw thousands for her live appearances.97
94 Owais Tohid, “Pakistan Gradually Purges Army Extremists,” Christian Science Monitor, September 11, 2003, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0911/p10s01-wosc.html. See also
“Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A. Q. Khan, and the Rise of Proliferation Networks,”
International Institute of Strategic Studies, May 2, 2007.
95 Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
96 Author interview with sociologist Faiza Mushtaq, Karachi, May 21, 2012; also Asma Khalid,
“Religious Schools Court Wealthy Women in Pakistan,” National Public Radio, April 5, 2010, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125570048.
97 Khalid, “Religious Schools Court Wealthy Women in Pakistan.”
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The Four Faces of Pakistan
55
At its core, Al-Huda promotes practices one might associate with today’s
Arab Gulf states. Women are taught (but not forced) to veil themselves, to
study Quranic texts rather than praying at Pakistan’s traditional shrines, and to
accept practices that more “moderate” Pakistanis consider outdated, including
polygamy. The fact that thousands of privileged, upper-class women are choos-
ing to study at Al-Huda schools poses a special threat to liberals, who expect
that with greater education and opportunity will also come a more progressive
outlook and less outward religiosity. Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy, a nuclear
physicist and one of Pakistan’s most iconoclastic voices on trends in education
and social practices, laments that Al-Huda members are, “in comparison with
students of earlier decades . . . less confident, less willing to ask questions in
class, and most have become silent note-takers. To sing, dance, play sports or
act in dramas is,
of course, out of the question for these unfortunates.”98
At the same time, Al-Huda is considered dangerous among Pakistan’s tradi-
tional – and all-male – clergy. They see that Hashmi is breaking down gender
barriers to Islamic scholarship and leadership. They question her academic cre-
dentials and preach against the idea that women should pray outside the home
or lead their own prayers.99 Al-Huda threatens their control over how religion
is taught. It offers women a certain type of power – gained from greater com-
fort and understanding of religious texts – previously held almost exclusively
by men.
From its far-flung organization to the fact that Hashmi’s veiled figure can
be seen preaching on the Internet seated behind a black laptop, Al-Huda is
stunningly modern in the way it transmits its illiberal worldview. Its mem-
bers are also sophisticated in their marketing and outreach efforts, consciously
seeking new ways to build Al-Huda’s “brand” in Pakistan and beyond. Al-
Huda’s hybrid identity is a testament to the fact that Pakistan, similar to many
other Muslim countries, is in the middle of a national debate not readily char-
acterized as liberal versus fundamentalist or modern versus traditional. New
social movements like Al-Huda are picking up whatever works and running
with it.
The Insider Threat
Another very different Islamist organization is also taking advantage of global
networks to assert itself in Pakistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT). Like al-Qaeda and
other radical Islamists, HuT’s goal is to create a new “Khalifah state to be an
98 Nahal Toosi, “In Pakistan, Islamic Schools for Women Thrive,” MSNBC, June 27, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37959628/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/t/pakistan-islamic-schools-women-thrive/.
99 For some of the most extensive scholarship on Al-Huda to date, see Fazia Mushtaq, “A Controversial Role Model for Pakistani Women,” South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, April 2010, http://samaj.revues.org/index3030.html.
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56
No Exit from Pakistan
example for the others and re-unify the Islamic world.”100 Unlike al-Qaeda,
however, HuT claims not to engage in terrorism. Yet, HuT also distinguishes
itself from Pakistan’s other Islamist parties by refusing to participate in demo-
cratic politics. Instead, its plan is to cultivate a following among small groups
of influential Pakistanis – especially army officers – who will overthrow the
existing order when the time is right.
Banned in Pakistan for its revolutionary ideology, HuT maintains its head-
quarters in the United Kingdom. There it takes full advantage of British pro-
tections on free speech and religion as well as direct access to recruits from
the country’s burgeoning population of young Muslim immigrants, both men
and women, many from South Asia. Like Al-Huda, HuT harnesses the global
telecommunications network to organize and spread its message. HuT is made
up of a secretive network of cells, rendering it difficult to know just how many
members it actually has. At the lowest levels, HuT is broken into groups of five
who receive anonymous calls to inform them of weekly meetings and may not
even know the identities of other cell members.101 Some claim that HuT’s total
size in Pakistan is in the low thousands, others suggest it may be far larger.
Around the world, HuT may have as many as 1 million members.102
Shortly after America’s 2011 bin Laden raid, the Pakistani army made a
disturbing and high profile set of arrests. A serving officer, Brigadier Ali Khan,
along with four junior officers, were charged with alleged HuT ties, spark-
ing rumors that they had planned to stage a coup at a time when the army
was feeling particularly vulnerable.103 Later that summer, several others were
arrested for their participation in HuT online activities.104 Looking back, it
appears that HuT was behind at least two other failed coup attempts as well as
an unsuccessful 2010 plot to attack Pakistan’s Shamsi airbase in Baluchistan,
100 “Manifesto of Hizb-ut Tahrir for Pakistan,” Hizb ut Tahrir Waliyah Pakistan, p. 3, http://www.hizb-pakistan.com/hizb/images/books/manifesto-english.pdf.
101 Ed Husain, The Islamist (London: Penguin, 2008), p. 96.
102 Simon Ross Valentine, “Fighting Kufr and the American Raj: Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Pakistan,”
Pakistan Security Research Unit Brief Number 56, University of Bradford, February 2, 2010, http://www.hizb-pakistan.com/hizb/images/books/manifesto-english.pdf.
103 In retrospect, it is difficult to tell whether it was the Brigadier’s HuT affiliation or his outspoken criticism of the army’s cooperation with the United States that landed him in jail. See “Brigadier Ali Khan: Pakistan’s Dissenting Army Officer,” BBC, June 23, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/world-south-asia-13873188; Kamran Yousaf, “Alleged HuT Links: ‘Brigadier Ali
Likely to Be Released Soon,’” Express Tribune, June 29, 2011, http://tribune.com.pk/story/
198538/alleged-hut-links-brigadier-ali-likely-to-be-released-soon/. That said, rumors persist that the Brigadier told colleagues that he was actively planning to help turn Pakistan into a Caliphate and was in league with air force officers who would bomb a meeting of Pakistan’s top officers and open the door to a coup. See “Brigadier Ali Wanted to Establish Caliphate: Witness,” Pakistan Today, March 7, 2012, http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/03/07/
news/national/brigadier-ali-wanted-to-establish-caliphate-witness/.
104 Zia Khan, “Agencies Struggle to Dismantle Hizb ut-Tahrir Network,” Express Tribune, August 8, 2011, http://tribune.com.pk/story/226503/agencies-struggle-to-dismantle-hizb-ut-tahrir-network/.
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The Four Faces of Pakistan
57
which at the time was thought to be the main Pakistani launch site for U.S.
drones.
HuT is a modern and viciously intolerant organization. Founded in the
early 1950s in East Jerusalem, it is also a foreign transplant into Pakistani soil.
HuT’s Palestinian founder broke with Egypt’s famous Muslim Brotherhood
because he considered the Brotherhood not militant enough.105 HuT is active
in many parts of the Muslim world. In late 2011, the government of Bangladesh
claimed to have foiled a coup plot by over a dozen mid-ranking officers who
were HuT members.106 The group’s focus on Pakistan is relatively recent and
intensified only after the country’s 1998 nuclear tests, when HuT sent ten senior
members to Pakistan hoping to spark a revolution so that the new caliphate
would be born as a nuclear power.107 British HuT members also managed
to recruit several Pakistani army officers during their training at Sandhurst
military academy, but in 2003 the men were arrested by the Musharraf regime.
In February 2013, as part of a wider campaign to win influence with Pakistan’s
rising generation, HuT activists showed up in force at a meeting of youth
leaders
hosted by Oxford University.108
Naveed Butt, HuT’s Pakistan-based spokesman, graduated from the Univer-
sity of Illinois and worked for Motorola. He is no turbaned Talib. He is easy
to find on the Internet, where he presents a modern and sophisticated image,
sporting a short beard and Western-style suit as well as the dark spots on
his forehead common to Muslims who prostrate themselves frequently. Butt’s
English is impeccable, and everything about him seems tailored specifically to
reach a target audience within the Pakistani military. His January 2011 “Open
Letter to Pakistan Armed Forces” begins with the exhortation: “Oh, officers of
Pakistan’s armed forces! You are leading the largest and the most capable Mus-
lim armed forces in the world. . . . You must move now to uproot Pakistan’s
traitor rulers.”109 In May 2012, Butt was allegedly arrested by the ISI outside
105 The single best available publication on HuT in Pakistan is Muhammad Amir Rana, “Hizbut Tahrir in Pakistan: Discourse and Impact,” Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, October 2010.
106 “Army Foils Coup Plot aAgainst Hasina,” BDNews24.com, January 19, 2012, http://bdnews 24.com/details.php?cid=2&id=216375&hb=top; “Former Bangladesh PM Accused of December 2011 Coup Attempt,” ANI Dhaka, February 14, 2012, http://www.rediff.com/news/
report/former-bangladesh-pm-accused-of-december-2011-coup-attempt/20120214.htm.
107 Maajid Nawaz is a major source for information about HuT activities. Now reformed, Nawaz was once a member of the organization but has since founded the Quilliam Foundation, a counterterrorism think tank that receives significant support from the British government.
One of his colleagues and co-founder is Ed Husain, now a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. As cited earlier, Ed wrote his own book detailing his experiences as an Islamist. See Ed Husain, The Islamist.
108 Murtaza Ali Shah, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir Targets Pakistanis on Orders of Global Leaders,” The News, February 28, 2013, http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13–21279-Hizb-ut-Tahrir-targets-Pakistanis-on-orders-of-global-leaders.
109 “Open Letter to Pakistan Armed Forces (English): Naveed Butt (HT. Pak. Media rep.),”
January 30, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lHoTte3yFtQ.
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Daniel S Markey Page 13
