Daniel S Markey

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by No Exit from Pakistan (pdf)


  homes. She and her husband are partners and proudly explain that the business

  is expanding. Their success is not unusual; small-time retailers are doing well in

  Pakistan’s cities. Despite the economy’s larger structural problems, Pakistan’s

  urban areas are growing rapidly enough that poor and lower-middle-class

  strivers can pull themselves up from poverty if they have a decent plan, work

  hard, and have access to capital. That potential for upward mobility opens

  peaceful and productive doors to a rising generation.

  Just sixty miles to the northeast, an even more revolutionary project is

  under way at Jassar farm, where owner Shahzad Iqbal believes he has figured

  out how to improve dramatically the milk yield of Pakistan’s 60 million dairy

  cows (the third largest herd on earth). Unfortunately, due to breeding, care, and

  environmental conditions, Pakistani cows now yield less than one-fifth the milk

  of their counterparts in the developed world. By importing bull embryos from

  outside Pakistan and raising them to stud, Iqbal hopes to engineer a massive

  genetic “upgrade” in the Pakistani bovine population. If successful, that would

  translate into a surge in milk production – and business opportunities – for the

  millions of Pakistani families that own cows.

  These innovative projects are risky. But what is encouraging, even inspiring,

  is that there are so many similar efforts in the works focused on improving

  healthcare, low-income housing, primary education, and agriculture across

  Pakistan.52 Many Pakistanis are working hard to improve their country, their

  lives, and the fortunes of their children. Some are making real progress and

  could, with access to greater resources and support, achieve transformative

  breakthroughs.

  Along the Grand Trunk Road, the ancient thoroughfare traversing South

  Asia that links Kabul to Calcutta, about an hour to the southeast of Islamabad

  is Gujjar Khan, a provincial town surrounded by villages. There on a hot,

  52 For an example of other efforts in the healthcare sector, see the Aman Foundation, http://

  amanfoundation.org/v2/wp-content/uploads/Aman%20Foundation%20-%20Corporate%

  20Profile.pdf; in low-income housing, see Saiban, http://www.acumenfund.org/investment/

  saiban.html; in education, see The Citizens Foundation, http://www.tcf.org.pk/TCFStory.aspx; in agriculture, see Microdrip, http://www.microdrip.pk/aboutus.html; in drinking water, see Pharmagen, http://www.acumenfund.org/investment/pharmagen-healthcare-ltd.html.

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  No Exit from Pakistan

  dusty day in May 2012, Khaleel Ahmed Tetlay surveyed the scene near a small

  irrigation reservoir. Low cliffs of a soft clay soil in various hues of brown

  flanked the water. Here and there, scrub brush dotted the hills, but for the

  most part the soil was untethered to the land, subject to wind erosion and

  heavy downpours during the rainy season. Tetlay asked several of the local

  farmers why the banks of the reservoir were barren. They explained that goats

  had nibbled away their plantings. “Ah, but this should be a challenge for you,

  to outsmart the goats,” Tetlay teased.

  In his sunglasses, FDNY baseball cap, and khakis, the mustachioed Tetlay,

  who studied agricultural economics in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s,

  stood apart from the bearded villagers in their traditional cotton tunics. But it

  was clear that he was very much in his element. He soon shifted the conversation

  to the farmer who was pumping water from the reservoir to water his fields.

  The man proudly explained how his crops were far better off than those of his

  neighbors who still depended upon infrequent rains. The mini-dam that made

  his irrigation possible was a project of the Rural Support Programmes Network

  (RSPN). The wisecracking, and in fact rather wise, Tetlay was RSPN’s chief

  operating officer.

  Tetlay left his job as an economist in Islamabad and joined the first of the

  Rural Support Programmes (RSPs) in the 1980s.53 The RSP was designed

  to help village communities identify and prioritize their needs, pool their

  resources, and identify and tap outside funds from the government and other

  donors to meet shortfalls. By nearly any measure, the model worked. Between

  1986 and 1997, infant mortality in the communities of the Northern Areas and

  Chitral where the RSP was active dropped from 162 per 1,000 to 33 per 1,000.

  From 1991 to 2001, real per capita income grew by an average of 84 percent.

  Over that same period, poverty rates dropped from about two-thirds to one-

  third of the population.54 Over time, the RSP model was replicated, with both

  private and state support, to encompass 108 of Pakistan’s 131 districts.

  Over time, Pakistan’s RSPs have produced meaningful change. Standing

  alongside Tetlay at the irrigation reservoir was his junior colleague, Tariq

  Nazir. Quieter than Tetlay but quick to laugh, Nazir explained that he started

  53 Based in Pakistan’s remote, mountainous regions of Chitral and the Northern Areas (now Gilgit-Baltistan), the program was intended to serve the needs of a large community of Ismailis, an Islamic sect led by His Highness Prince Karim Aga Khan IV, believed by his followers to be a descendant and spiritual successor to the Prophet Muhammad. As part of his extensive philanthropic work the Aga Khan entrusted a pioneering development worker and former

  civil servant, Shoaib Sultan Khan, to try out a new model of community organization in the desperately poor region. Shoaib drew inspiration from his mentor, Dr. Akhter Hameed Khan, one of South Asia’s most famous grassroots organizers, advocates, and development scholars.

  At the core of their shared philosophy was the idea that poor people can do a great deal for themselves if mobilized and organized.

  54 Stephen F. Rasmussen et al., “Pakistan: Scaling Up Rural Support Programs,” pp. 3, 10–11, http://www.microfinancegateway.org/gm/document-1.9.25816/24216 file rural support.pdf.

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  America’s Options

  229

  his community organizing in the area nearly two decades earlier. Back then, the

  same villagers who confidently walked us through a budget briefing and a tour

  of their newly paved street were hardly able to sit together, much less to pool

  their resources toward a common aim. Now, he said, the local organizations

  and their elected representatives are able to manage just about any sort of

  project.

  The women of the community were also making strides. A bright-eyed group,

  young and old, gathered in a sparsely furnished room to explain their plans for

  digging a new well. In this part of the world, fetching water is women’s work.

  The women estimated that they each spent about four hours every day walking

  to and from the existing well. A new well would reduce that to mere minutes,

  with revolutionary implications for the daily life of half the village. When asked

  why the well had not been selected as the vill
age’s first project, Nazir replied

  it was probably because the men had organized before the women. “Now the

  women are catching up,” he added with a smile.

  The benefits of organizing are social and political as well as economic. On the

  drive back to Islamabad, Tetlay explained that the successful community orga-

  nizations represented a challenge to traditional rural politicians who, for gen-

  erations, have enjoyed virtually unquestioned authority to dispense or pocket

  development funds from the provincial and national government. Now, grass-

  roots leaders, including women, had a say in selecting development projects.

  At times, they could even circumvent politicians in soliciting money from the

  federal government and outside donors.

  So far, however, rural politicians have chosen mainly to avoid confrontation.

  Tetlay likened the situation to the rise of the social welfare state in the West.

  “Rather than allowing the workers to unite in proletarian revolution as Marx

  predicted,” he explained, “capitalism evolved. The capitalists met enough of

  labor’s demands to save their system. If Pakistani politicians are smart, they will

  do something similar.” Tetlay went on to observe that some communities were

  already planning town hall meetings before the next national elections, offering

  them an unprecedented chance to hold their local politicians accountable and

  to quiz their challengers.

  With their demonstrated capacity to improve economic conditions and to

  change political dynamics in rural Pakistan, the RSPs are but one example

  of an organization that would benefit from a U.S. strategy of comprehensive

  cooperation. This is where the United States may be able to tip Pakistan’s bal-

  ance. Since it is the direction of Pakistani society writ large that will ultimately

  determine the state’s stewardship of the nuclear arsenal, the numbers of mili-

  tants and extremists who choose to take up arms, and the nature of Islamabad’s

  relationships in the region as well as its global outlook, these issues are more

  than a matter of humanitarian concern.

  Of course, Pakistan’s innovative businesses and NGOs are only one piece

  of the development story. Decades ago, as mentioned in the Chapter 1, Wash-

  ington made massive investments in Pakistan’s infrastructure when it helped

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  230

  No Exit from Pakistan

  to build the Tarbela Dam. U.S. officials are well aware that Pakistan desperately

  needs more hydropower and better management of its water supply. New dams,

  power plants, and irrigation canals are massive and costly undertakings, but

  they are also precisely the sorts of projects that can transform a countryside

  and jump-start economies on a huge scale.

  To its credit, Washington has explored the idea of helping to finance the

  construction of Pakistan’s long-delayed Diamer Bhasha dam.55 That project, if

  successful, could represent a signature “made in America” contribution with

  tangible as well as political benefits. When complete, the dam would gener-

  ate 4,500 megawatts of electricity, roughly 1,000 more than the mammoth

  Tarbela.56 To date, financing challenges have slowed land acquisition, not to

  mention construction.57 Other political and diplomatic challenges await, but

  there is little question that Washington could tip the scales by its contributions

  and leverage with other international funders like the World Bank.58

  Aside from direct assistance, Washington has failed to capitalize on the

  potential economic benefits of freer trade or incentivized private sector invest-

  ment. Since 9/11, nearly every American report on policy toward Pakistan has

  advocated a reduction in U.S. tariffs on Pakistani-made textiles and garments.59

  The move would not hurt American consumers or producers. Nevertheless,

  Capitol Hill has never taken the issue seriously. By some estimates, congres-

  sional inaction has cost Pakistan well over a million jobs in volatile cities like

  Karachi.60 A decade of job losses of that magnitude, even in such an enor-

  mous city, is no small matter. If a Pakistan-only trade deal remains impossible,

  perhaps a South Asia-wide plan would win more congressional support. India

  might profit more from such an arrangement than Pakistan, but the only real

  losers would be low-cost Chinese manufacturers.

  Similarly, Congress has resisted calls to establish an “enterprise fund” for

  Pakistan that would extend loans and make equity investments in Pakistani

  55 Zafar Bhutta, “Raising Finance: U.S. Proposes Securitisation of Dam’s Assets,” Express Tribune, October 24, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/455906/raising-finance-us-proposes-securitisation-of-dams-assets/.

  56 Saeed Shah, “U.S. Support for Pakistan Dam Could Help Stem Flow of Bad Blood,”

  The Guardian, August 29, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/29/us-pakistan-dam-funding.

  57 “Potentially Electrifying,” Economist, October 19, 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/

  banyan/2011/10/new-dam-pakistan.

  58 Shahbaz Rana, “Diamer-Bhasha: WB Links Dam’s Funding to Indian Agreement,”

  Express Tribune, June 26, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/399281/diamer-bhasha-wb-links-dams-funding-to-indian-agreement/.

  59 See U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Independent Task Force Report No. 65 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2010), pp. 38–9, 48–50, and The Next Chapter: The United States and Pakistan, Pakistan Policy Working Group (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2008), p. 32.

  60 “2010: US Embassy Pushed for Pakistan Textiles in Free-Trade Agreement,” Dawn, June 7, 2011, http://dawn.com/2011/06/07/2010-us-embassy-pushed-for-pakistan-textiles-in-free-trade-agreement/.

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  America’s Options

  231

  businesses. Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, similar U.S. funds for

  the newly independent countries of Eastern and Central Europe encouraged

  business growth and, in most cases, the loans were repaid in full.61 In 2012,

  the U.S. embassy in Islamabad announced a new “Pakistan Private Investment

  Initiative,” intended to deliver many of the same benefits.62 Expanded versions

  of these sorts of programs would help to spur growth in Pakistan’s small and

  medium-sized businesses, which would in turn stimulate exports and create

  new jobs.63

  In short, U.S. assistance might be better used to assist Pakistani development,

  grow its economy, and contribute to the nation’s stability in ways that also

  serve the American interest. Many of these efforts would be smarter than

  channeling millions of dollars directly into the Pakistani government, where

  the money provides a budgetary cushion to politicians unwilling to raise taxes

  or charge market rates for power and, at the same time, becomes invisible

  to Pakistani citizens who are already so deeply skeptical about the value of


  American partnership.

  Finally, a comprehensive U.S. approach to cooperation with Pakistan offers

  the greatest diplomatic opportunity to support and encourage improved Indo-

  Pakistani ties, clearly the best way to stabilize Pakistan’s economy and society

  over the long run. By hitching its wagon to the giant Indian engine of growth,

  Pakistan’s massive population can claw its way out of poverty.64

  The history of American diplomatic efforts to mediate between India and

  Pakistan suggests that subtle encouragement and nurturing of Indian and

  Pakistani initiatives is more likely to pay dividends than public pressure. Wash-

  ington will never have enough influence to force either side to take conciliatory

  steps or to accept a settlement by diktat. Americans must recall that these are

  issues over which both Indians and Pakistanis have been willing to fight and

  die for decades.

  The name of the game, therefore, is quiet lobbying. In Pakistan, business-

  men are typically the most supportive voices for a normalized relationship

  with their Indian neighbors. Although in some sectors like pharmaceuticals

  61 For more on enterprise funds, see http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/showdoc.html?id=

  2364342.

  62 “New Investment Initiative Launches in Pakistan with Up to $80 Million of U.S. Funding,”

  Press Release, U.S. Embassy, Islamabad, September 14, 2012, http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/

  pr 091312d.html; and for background, see Dustin Cathcart, Meredith Gloger, and Aaron

  Roesch, “Recommendations for the Pakistan Private Investment Initiative,” John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, May 2012, http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/

  cache/documents/23643/2364342.pdf.

  63 See Polly Nayak, “Aiding without Abetting: Making U.S. Civilian Assistance to Pakistan Work for Both Sides,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011, p. 37,

  http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/WWC%20Pakistan%20Aiding%20Without%

  20Abetting.pdf.

  64 On the mutual Indo-Pakistani benefits of enhanced bilateral trade see, for instance, Sayem Ali and Anubhuti Sahay, “Pakistan-India Trade – Peace Dividend,” Global Research, Standard Chartered, June 7, 2012.

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