For several days, Tissaphernes shadowed the Greeks as they marched, and harried them at any opportunity, particularly when they broke formation to cross a bridge or a river. The nature of these hit-and-run attacks was to inflict a constant stream of casualties upon the Greeks whilst sustaining almost none themselves. At one point, the Persians used their greater mobility to skirt around the Greeks and to occupy the heights of a pass through which the Greeks would need to march. Xenophon realized the potential difficulty and used the light troops in the army to dislodge the Persians, allowing the mercenary army to cross unhindered. The Greeks, showing frustration and a disrespect to the gods, mutilated the corpses of the enemies they had slain ‘in order that the sight of them might inspire the utmost terror in the enemy.’48
Once back on the plains, Persians continued to harry the Greeks. They inflicted casualties upon them as they were plundering what they could from the local areas through which they passed, more for food and water than for booty or slaves. The harrying attacks by the Persians were very effective and demonstrated a solid understanding of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each side; they also demonstrated that Tissaphernes had a sound understanding of infantry tactics.
Earlier in the march, before Cunaxa, we see several acts of insubordination and ill-discipline, but very few after the defeat, when they were united in a common cause of getting home safely. As noted above, they were aided in this by the removal of Clearchus and Menon. The army, however, was to undergo one further act of insubordination, albeit minor, when they were in something of a race to occupy a mountain pass. Xenophon narrates the tale: 49
Xenophon, riding along the lines upon his horse, cheered his troops forward: ‘My good men,’ he said, ‘believe that now you are racing for Greece, racing this very hour back to your wives and children, a little toil for this one moment and no more fighting for the rest of our journey.’ But Soteridas the Sicyonian said: ‘We are not on an equality, Xenophon; you are riding on horseback, while I am desperately tired with carrying my shield.’
This is a minor act of insubordination, but one which needed to be addressed, as, when troops are under stress and in constant danger, one belligerent individual can cause problems beyond what he otherwise would be capable of. Xenophon acted quickly and decisively: 50
When Xenophon heard that, he leaped down from his horse and pushed Soteridas out of his place in the line, then took his shield away from him and marched on with it as fast as he could; he had on also, as it happened, his cavalry breastplate, and the result was that he was heavily burdened. And he urged the men in front of him to keep going, while he told those who were behind to pass along by him, for he found it hard to keep up. The rest of the soldiers, however, struck and pelted and abused Soteridas until they forced him to take back his shield and march on. Then Xenophon remounted and, as long as riding was possible, led the way on horseback, but when the ground became too difficult he left his horse behind and hurried forward on foot. And they reached the summit before the enemy.
Xenophon demonstrates here a knack for leadership and an understanding of the psychology of the military mind that was no doubt invaluable to him throughout the march, probably even before he was elected to a formal position.
After an arduous march through the Armenian Mountains, the bedraggled mercenary army reached ‘the sea, the sea!’ at Trapezus. Their arrival was something of a surprise to the inhabitants of that city, and not a welcome one. Of the roughly 13,000 Greek mercenaries who had marched to Cunaxa, around 9,000 survived, an impressively high number given the battle, the constant harrying by Tissaphernes and the logistical difficulties they encountered.51
Now that they were in touch with the Greek world again, or at least the Black Sea fringes of it, the Greeks set about discussing their next course of action. Their first proposal was to ask the Spartan navarch, Anaxibius, to provide transportation for them back to Greece. Cheirisophus, a friend of the Spartan, was dispatched immediately in order to make the request.52 Once Cheirisophus had been dispatched, the assembly continued, with Xenophon addressing the men in order to formulate a plan B:53
‘Here is still another point to note. If we knew beyond doubt that Cheirisophus would bring back with him an adequate number of ships, there would be no need of what I am about to say; but since in fact that is uncertain, I think we should try to do our part by procuring ships here also. For if he does bring enough, then with those at hand here we shall have a more abundant supply to sail in, while if he does not, we shall use those which we have here. Now I see ships sailing past frequently, and if we can get the Trapezuntians to give us men-of-war and so bring these ships into port and keep them under guard, unshipping their rudders meanwhile, until we get enough to carry us, perhaps we should not lack such means of transport as we need.’ This proposal also was adopted.
This plan then, was to ‘borrow’ a penteconter from the citizens of Trapezus and to engage in some piracy on the Black Sea in order to capture some other ships (and their cargo, of course) with the intention of using them as transports to help move along the coast closer to the Greek mainland. Piracy and mercenary service were not that far removed from each other, so we should not be terribly surprised by this. The Trapezians were no doubt happy to loan them a ship, because the plan, if successful, would see them moving west along the coast and away from their city. After all, one ship was a small price to pay to rid themselves of 9,000 dangerous mercenaries who were taking every opportunity to raid the surrounding countryside in search of booty.54 Dexippus was entrusted with the captaincy of this penteconter, but he used it to sail himself and his crew out of the Black Sea and back to Greece, abandoning his comrades at the first opportunity.55 The Greeks still felt the plan was sound and borrowed a triaconter in order to retry the same policy. Selecting the captain and crew more carefully, they did manage to capture a number of smaller vessels, but nowhere near enough to transport the whole army.56 A third plan was therefore conceived.
Before Dexippus absconded, Xenophon also proposed marching west if the piracy plan failed, but did not press the matter: 57
‘Now it seems to me,’ he continued, ‘that if perchance this plan also shall fail to provide us with enough ships, we must turn to the roads, which we hear are difficult to travel, and direct the cities that are situated along the sea to repair them; for they will obey, not only from fear, but also from the desire to be rid of us.’ At this the soldiers set up a shout, saying that they did not want to go by land. And Xenophon, realizing their foolishness, did not put any proposal regarding this matter to vote, but persuaded the cities to repair the roads voluntarily, urging that they would be rid of the army the more quickly if the roads should be made easy to travel.
The failure of the piracy plan left the Greeks with little choice, and they marched west through hostile territory attacking mountain passes and fortresses as and when they needed to, in order to secure their passing. 58 After capturing the outer city of one particularly difficult mountain fortress, Xenophon ordered:59
Tolmides the herald to proclaim that whoever wanted to get any plunder should go in. At that many proceeded to rush into the gates, and the crowd that was pushing in overcame the crowd that was tumbling out and shut up the enemy again in their citadel. So everything outside the citadel was seized and carried off by the Greeks, and the hoplites took up their position, some about the ramparts, others along the road leading up to the citadel.
Xenophon then decided the fortress itself was impregnable, and the march west was resumed. Wherever they went they were not greeted as fellow Greeks, but as brigands; hardly surprising given their tendency to plunder everything in their path.
After passing the city of Sinope, and with the army and its commanders becoming increasingly desperate, Xenophon proposed an idea which he knew would have been unpopular. He suggested founding a colony at some defensible location along the coast and settling there. 60 Seeing an opportunity, two of the Greeks, Timasion and Thorax, secretly sent
a message to the neighbouring towns of Sinope and Heraclea telling them of Xenophon’s plan. They were not overjoyed at the prospect of the Greeks settling nearby and offered what could be called a bribe to the two Greeks if they could persuade them to move the army away from their territory. There was a heated debate amongst the assembly as they discussed founding a colony, or moving on towards Greece; the debate soon became heated and all semblance of order and discipline disintegrated. A court was set up ad hoc and three of the generals were tried and given minor fines. The situation calmed as Cheirisophus returned from his mission to Anaxibius.61
The mission had been largely a failure, however. He returned with only one warship and no promise from Anaxibius of more to follow. The only vague hope was that the Spartan had offered to employ the surviving men once they had successfully returned to Greece. This would have been cold comfort given that a return to Greece was their objective, not a step along a longer path. The arrival of the emissary of the 10,000 was an inconvenience to the Spartans. They were temporarily at peace for the first time in years, and hiring thousands of mercenaries would have put some of their neighbours on edge, particularly the Persians; it was not worth the risk. Further to this, of course, they probably did not have the financial means to do so. The vague promise of future employment could easily be rescinded if the mercenary army ever did actually make it back to Greece.
The Greeks had suffered set back after set back, but almost every day they were getting closer to home. The thoughts of some of the mercenaries turned to what they would be taking home by way of booty to show for their privations, and it was very little. There are numerous examples of the mercenaries conducting plundering operations throughout the march, and especially on the route back to the Black Sea, but without a regular paymaster they would have needed that income to purchase supplies. Much of the raiding was probably with the intention of securing food anyway, rather than plunder. The promise and expectations they had at the outset of the campaign had proven utterly unfounded, but that was the risk of mercenary service if you were on the losing side.
To this point on the return journey, the mercenary army had been content to have several generals, and to replace them as and when required. This was no doubt a hangover from the method by which they were recruited, having been raised as several mercenary armies brought together for a specific purpose. That ethos was reduced with the removal of Clearchus and Menon, as suggested earlier, and now the assembly of the army concluded that they would be better off with a single leader, rather than several. 62
They came to the conclusion, therefore, that if they should choose one commander, that one man would be able to handle the army better, whether by night or day, than a number of commanders–that if there should be need of concealment, he would be better able to keep matters secret, or again, if there should be need of getting ahead of an adversary, he would be less likely to be too late; for, thought the soldiers, there would be no need of conferences of generals with one another, but the plan resolved upon by the one man would be carried through, whereas in the past the generals had acted in all matters in accordance with a majority vote.
The army turned to Xenophon to fill that role, and he was officially approached by a group of junior commanders with the proposal. Xenophon was at first inclined to accept, and notes the personal glory and prestige that it could bring:63
As for Xenophon, he was inclined on some accounts to accept the command, for he thought that if he did so the greater would be the honour he would enjoy among his friends and the greater his name when it should reach his city, while, furthermore, it might chance that he could be the means of accomplishing some good thing for the army.
He also considered the possible negative impact on the reputation he had already gained if he assumed command and was unsuccessful. To help him decide, he made sacrifice to Zeus, and then addressed the assembly to reject the proposal. He did, however, recommend that they elect Cheirisophus to the position.64 Cheirisophus was what might be called a typical Spartan, and one of the worst choices that the assembly could make. Clearchus had been unpopular, but that was as nothing next to Cheirisophus. The assembly initially rejected the idea, but they were persuaded by Xenophon, and he was duly elected.65
After Cheirisophus addressed the assembly, allaying their fears somewhat, the army set off in the direction of Heraclea, a Greek city and a colony of Megara. ‘Here the Heracleots sent to the Greeks, as gifts of hospitality, three thousand medimni of barley meal, two thousand jars of wine, twenty cattle, and a hundred sheep.’66 The gift was accepted, but a proposal was made by one of the mercenaries that they should try to extort 3,000 Cyzicene staters (the local currency) from the citizenry, while others suggested a figure of 10,000 and nominated some of their captains to carry the threat to the city. Some of the Greeks in the army were unhappy with any attempt to blackmail or make threats against fellow Greeks, but they were shouted down or ignored, and the attempt was made. 67 The inhabitants listened to the demand and asked for time to consider it. They used this time wisely to gather local citizen farmers into the safety of the walls and to move the marketplace too; protecting as much of their property as they were able and preparing for a siege. 68
The mercenaries had been outmanoeuvred by the Heracleans, who where, in short order, prepared for a siege. Once the city gates were closed, the mercenaries had little hope of carrying by force a well-defended city; they were utterly devoid of siege equipment and short on supplies, and we can only imagine that their basic equipment was hardly in pristine condition any more. Coupled with this, of course, would have been exhaustion and very low morale. The setback before the walls of Heraclea was the final straw for the army. The nationalist feelings of the Arcadians and Achaeans, contained for months, came to the fore and they: 69
proceeded to band themselves together, under the leadership particularly of Callimachus the Parrhasian and Lycon the Achaean. Their words were to this effect, that it was shameful that Peloponnesians should be under the command of an Athenian and a Lacedaemonian who contributed no troops to the army, and that the hardships should fall to themselves and the gains to others, all despite the fact that the preservation of the army was their achievement; for it was, they said, the Arcadians and Achaeans who had achieved this result, and the rest of the army amounted to nothing (in truth more than half the army did consist of Arcadians and Achaeans); if they were wise, therefore, they would band together by themselves, choose generals from their own number, make the journey by themselves, and try to get a little good out of it.
The Arcadians and Achaeans elected ten new generals from among their own men and, with the remaining 4,000 mercenaries from those regions of Greece, they set off themselves to make their own way home. Xenophon made great efforts to keep the remaining 4,100 mercenaries together, but ultimately failed. Thus, 1,400 hoplites and 700 peltasts followed Cheirisophus, and the remaining 1,700 hoplites and 300 peltasts followed Xenophon. 70
The 4,000 Arcadians reached the area of Bithynia and began plundering the land. The native tribesmen, however, gathered together and counterattacked the mercenaries and inflicted severe casualties upon them. They were only rescued by the arrival of Xenophon’s arms, who were marching along the same road the Arcadians had taken. Soon after the army broke up, Cheirisophus was killed, and his army was almost leaderless. After the difficulties of the Arcadians, the army reunited at Calpes Limen.71 Here, they were in a difficult position in a no-man’s land between Heraclea to the east and Byzantium to the west, and still a full day’s journey by trireme from the latter. There were no settlements of any kind in this region, be they native or Greek, and the Bithynian Thracians who occupied the area were notoriously hostile to any Greeks they found. 72
The army was delighted to be back together as a unit; they had discovered that, however bad their situation, they were stronger together than apart. Xenophon goes to great lengths to describe the surrounding terrain and presents a picture of an area that was not quite para
dise, but certainly very palatable. Xenophon evidently tried to push for the founding of a colony, as he had done once before, with similar results. Remaining in hostile territory was not a prospect welcomed by the Greeks; all they wanted was a successful return home with some booty to show for it. Xenophon was insistent and refused to allow the army to progress until the omens were right, evidently hoping they would change their minds; they did not. 73 The delay did allow the mercenaries to conduct raiding missions in the surrounding areas, as was now usual practice.
While the Greeks were delayed and engaged in plundering raids, the Spartan harmost, Cleander, arrived accompanied by two ships, and Dexippus, the man who had abandoned the army at Trapezus. 74
It so chanced that the army was out foraging when he arrived, while certain individuals had gone in quest of plunder to a different place in the mountains and had secured a large number of sheep; so fearing that they might be deprived of them, they told their story to Dexippus, the man who slipped away from Trapezus with the fifty-oared warship, and urged him to save their sheep for them, with the understanding that he was to get some of the sheep himself and give the rest back to them. So he immediately proceeded to drive away the soldiers who were standing about and declaring that the animals were public property, and then he went and told Cleander that they were attempting robbery. Cleander directed him to bring the robber before him. So he seized a man and tried to take him to Cleander, but Agasias, happening to meet them, rescued the man, for he was one of his company. Then the other soldiers who were at hand set to work to stone Dexippus, calling him ‘The traitor.’ And many of the sailors from the triremes got frightened and began to flee toward the sea, and Cleander also fled.
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