The above numbers of course do not include the death toll of Afghans, which dwarfs the number of foreign soldiers. Nor does it include the number of wounded, many grievously, which is several times larger than the number of dead. Thus, despite these losses and the supreme sacrifices they represent, and despite the direct involvement of the militaries of the U.S. and other nations, and despite the sophistication and advanced military technology brought to bear, the old maxim “the graveyard of empires” continues to apply to Afghanistan. The land is still hard, the enemies found there are still tough, and military victory remains difficult and fleeting.
But the question remains: “Was it worth it?” Certainly the destruction of al-Qa’ida’s sanctuary in Afghanistan, from which the worst attack in history against the U.S. homeland was planned and directed, was a required action. It had to be done. But as noted previously, this was accomplished very early on, certainly by the end of 2002, if not sooner, when the cost in American lives was only a fraction of the number it has reached in the years since. If the same question were asked at that point, when al-Qa’ida had been routed and was no longer active in Afghanistan, then it would be much easier to say, “Yes, it was worth it. A few courageous men died, but it was the price that had to be paid.” But we did not stop after our goal was obtained. To give a satisfactory answer to the original question, we have to answer the additional questions of why did we stay and why so long? For it was in our lingering in Afghanistan that our greatest costs accrued.
After our initial success, and by ours I mean the U.S. and its allies, most notably the Afghans, there was clearly a need and opportunity to help get Afghanistan on its feet after many decades of war. I personally agreed with U.S. policy makers at the time that we could not simply walk away from Afghanistan as soon as our counterterrorism objective was accomplished. A stable and peaceful Afghanistan was seen as the best way to keep al-Qa’ida from regrouping in some remote corner of the country and emerging to again threaten the U.S. homeland. Afghanistan needed time to get its political house in order and to establish a functioning government, including a professional security service and military. The U.S. made the decision to help in this regard by committing additional combat troops and government advisors, and investing in the infrastructure of the country.
Although all of this went against President George W. Bush’s declaration that Afghanistan would not become a nation-building exercise, the path the U.S. undertook was not an unreasonable one. It made sense as a strategy, and as we have noted, significant achievements can be cited with much of the credit due to the policy of continued U.S. involvement. It has not, however, resulted in peace. The Taliban is still in business, conducting conventional attacks and suicide operations with regularity, and perhaps most concerning, the presence of ISIS, the new al-Qa’ida, is on the rise.
So if the strategy of continued U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was sound, why after all these years has it not resulted in a peaceful and stable country? I believe there are many factors responsible for this. One of the primary ones was the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the results of which undermined our efforts in the critical early years in Afghanistan by shifting the U.S. focus, as well as resources, towards Iraq. This no doubt boosted the morale of the Taliban and other enemies in Afghanistan. More tangibly the shift caused a slow down of critical programs intended to help establish the new Afghan government and secure the country. In effect our efforts in Afghanistan went into a hold pattern. The result has been a much longer and protracted U.S. involvement in the country. The delays in implementing programs also allowed the Taliban to reconstitute itself as a potent insurgent force. Aiding and abetting in this new rise of the Taliban was the decision to stop supporting local militias, and the “warlords” that led them, before effective government security forces could be established, trained, and deployed. With the militias losing power, the Taliban was able to fill the vacuums that were created and reassert itself in many areas of the country. The U.S. responded ultimately to the rise of the Taliban by increasing combat forces by tens of thousands. But the damage had been done. Afghans lost confidence in the ability of their government to protect them, and the number of U.S. and allied dead and wounded rose dramatically.
But there were still other consequences for Afghanistan flowing from the U.S. decision to invade Iraq. ISIS, born out of the disintegration of the Middle East that stemmed from the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein, is reported to have a presence in Afghanistan. An unintended consequence of our actions, no doubt, but a consequence nonetheless. The only positive thing that can be said about this development is that for now at least, ISIS and the Taliban appear to be competitors and not allies, unlike al-Qa’ida and the Taliban. Let’s hope this competition continues, as should their relationship improve, it could be the determining factor on how long the U.S. maintains a potent military force in Afghanistan.
So, has it been worth it? Sadly, I believe for the reasons laid out above, many of the lives lost and people wounded in Afghanistan could have been avoided if the U.S. had not invaded Iraq. In the interest of full disclosure, it was an invasion I did not support at the time. But does that mean the human sacrifice and treasure spent in Afghanistan has not been worth it? I think that depends on how and when the ongoing Taliban insurgency is resolved.
If nothing else, it should be clear at this point that the Taliban as a political and military force in Afghanistan is not going away. To defeat it militarily would require far more combat forces than the U.S. and its allies are likely willing to commit, especially after so many years of war. This being the case, a negotiated peace between the Taliban and the Afghan government that includes the participation of the U.S. is the only possible solution. America’s primary goal in any such negotiation should be that no matter what form the resulting government takes, all parties to the settlement agree that no foreign extremist elements will be allowed to operate in Afghanistan. If they try to do so, the government, including any Taliban elements, will pursue them. Beyond this, all other issues and provisions should be up to the Afghan participants.
If, in the relative near future, an acceptable agreement is struck that ends the insurgency, brings peace and unity to Afghanistan, and guarantees that no extremists can gain sanctuary in the country and become a threat to the U.S. and its allies, then the answer to the question of “Has it been worth it?” is yes. Even as hard as those costs are to accept. If however, the Taliban insurgency continues with no end in sight, and particularly if ISIS is able to establish itself in Afghanistan and become a threat to the U.S., then no, it hasn’t been worth it, and we will have squandered the huge sacrifices that were made on a lost cause.
Acknowledgments
I would never had been inspired to write this story were it not for the brave and determined service I witnessed in Pakistan and southern Afghanistan by the members of the CIA and Special Forces teams that participated in the campaign to capture Kandahar in 2001. The patriotism and professionalism of Foxtrot and Echo teams, and ODA-583 and ODA-574 were extraordinary, and I will forever cherish the memory of the events of that special time.
I also wish to recognize the critical support provided by the U.S. Air Force’s 20th Special Operations Squadron and other U.S. military air support to the southern Afghanistan campaign without which success would have been doubtful. Additionally, I would be remiss not to acknowledge the men and women at CIA’s Counterterrorist Center/Special Operations Group whose hard work in supporting our efforts from afar played an important role in making the campaign a success.
While the writing of a book is largely a solitary task, the help of others in making it better is indispensable. In this regard I owe my thanks to several people who read the manuscript and provided constructive criticism and encouragement. These include, Chuck Bertsch, Greg Gillam, Meg G., “Tomas,” and Mike H. Additionally, I owe a special thanks to my wife who brought her considerable editorial talents to bear as well.
To my publisher, Theodore P. Savas,
and Editorial Director Steven Smith, as well as the rest of the crew at Savas Beatie, I am deeply appreciative for the interest, time, and attention that have been given to the publication of my memoir.
Despite the help of others in producing this book, any errors or inaccuracies are my own.
Duane Evans is a former CIA officer with field tours on four continents including serving as Chief of Station, the CIA’s most senior field position. He is the recipient of the Intelligence Star for valor and the Career Intelligence Medal. Prior to joining the Agency, Duane was a US Army Special Forces and Military Intelligence officer. A graduate of New Mexico State University, he is also the author of the acclaimed espionage novel North From Calcutta.
Photo Gallery
1980. Ft. Bragg, NC. 313th MI Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division, following the promotion of battalion officers to 1st lieutenant. Author and his wife are the second couple from right.
The author (ca. 1980) on the “Green Ramp” about to board a C-130 for a parachute drop.
December 1981: Author (left) during “Robin Sage” exercise of the Army Special Forces Officer’s Qualification course.
Special Forces unit formation, 1982. The author is the first man in second file.
Top and bottom photos: Members of Foxtrot, ODA 583, and Afghan fighters make preparations for a road march from Shin Naray Valley base camp.
Author with Shin Naray Valley in background.
November 2001: Foxtrot team and ODA 583 preparing to depart base camp in Shin Naray Valley, Kandahar Province.
Shirzai’s fighters observe US airstrikes in Kandahar Province near Takhteh-Pol.
The author just minutes after the capture of Takhteh-Pol village.
Shirzai’s fighter raising the Afghan national flag immediately following the capture of Takhteh-Pol from Taliban government forces.
November 2001: Inspection of captured Taliban tank by Afghan leader Gul Agha Shirzai, accompanied by a combat controller. The author is standing on the tank.
Foxtrot team’s command post, Takhteh-Pol village.
Late November 2001: The author in the vicinity of Takhteh-Pol village, Kandahar Province.
Members of Foxtrot in defensive position at roadblock on Highway 4 east of Takhteh-Pol.
Author (left) with “Hank,” the ODA 583 team leader, at the Governor’s Palace in Kandahar shortly after its occupation.
Rigged explosives discovered in the roof of the Governor’s Palace in Kandahar.
Stacked explosives after being removed from the roof of the Governor’s Palace.
Foxtrot in Kandahar Page 19
