Central to Hitler’s plans was the attitude of Britain. Despite the warning signs, he had still not given up on London. A British alliance would be critical to balance the power of the United States, and British acquiescence was essential to his plans in central Europe, and for his projected war of conquest in the east. In late January 1938, Hitler met with the foreign secretary, Lord Halifax, at the Berghof and presented him with his demands concerning Austria, Czechoslovakia and Danzig; control over the latter was sought not as an anti-Polish gesture but in order to secure the port for the planned war on Russia. He was frank about his concern that, unlike Russia and the United States, Germany did not have enough space. The foreign secretary, who had mistaken Hitler for the footman on arrival, indulged the Führer by replying that all requests could be considered, but that any changes would have to be agreed peacefully.163 When Halifax praised Hitler for ‘preventing the entry of communism into his own country’, the translator, Dr Paul Schmidt, added–at any rate in the German protocol–‘that Germany could therefore with justice be regarded as the bulwark of the west against Bolshevism’, a much more comprehensive notion with far-reaching implications for the latitude he might enjoy on that basis. Hitler was notorious for hearing what he wanted to hear, and he seems to have come away with a greatly exaggerated sense of British understanding for his position.164
The Führer flanked these diplomatic efforts with a concerted domestic campaign. Repression, which had eased off for the first nine months of the year, now resumed in earnest. The main target was the Jews. Considerations of foreign policy, which had previously served to mitigate Hitler’s ferocity for fear of antagonizing the United States, now drove an escalation.165 On 5 November, the same day as the Hossbach meeting, all Soviet Jews were ordered to leave Germany within ten days; these he did not seem to view as potential hostages. Three days later, Goebbels opened the–long-planned–exhibition ‘The Eternal Jew’, the main thrust of which was directed against capitalism rather than Bolshevism. Right at the end of that month, Hitler told Goebbels that the Jews would have to be expelled from Germany altogether.166
14
‘England is the motor of opposition to us’
The Führer spent Christmas and New Year on the Obersalzberg. Returning to Berlin, Hitler threw himself back into work. On 12 January 1938, Hitler met the Polish foreign minister, Beck. Five days later, he spoke to the Yugoslav foreign minister, Stojadinović. Both men agreed that a Habsburg restoration was to be averted at all costs. Hitler turned up the heat against the Czechs in a speech on 20 February 1938 in which he demanded the right to protect German minorities in Europe, a marked change from his earlier policy. ‘Self-determination’ and even–in as many words–humanitarian intervention became frequent slogans.1 Despite Ribbentrop’s dispatch, Hitler also kept trying with Anglo-America. In early March 1938, he met the British ambassador, Henderson, who held out the prospect of a return of some of Germany’s colonies, either outright or under some form of joint management. Hitler showed little interest, proclaiming the colonial question as not yet ‘ripe for a solution’.2 The Führer also warned Henderson that that he would not tolerate British interference in the relationship between Germany and ‘tribally related countries or countries with a high proportion of ethnic Germans’, any more than London would accept his interference in Irish affairs. If Britain did meddle, Hitler added, ‘then the time had come at which we would have to fight’.3
The new tone was unmistakable. Britain was now the main obstacle. The Soviet Union, which had loomed relatively large for about a year in 1936–7, now receded in Hitler’s consciousness once more. As his remarks to Henderson indicated, he saw London’s nationality and imperial problems as an instrument which could be used to deter or contain British intervention in central Europe. Hitler’s speeches began to adopt the language of anti-imperialism. More importantly, in a sign that he had taken on board Ribbentrop’s demand for a global coalition against Britain, the Führer sought to deepen the relationship with Japan. On 20 February 1938, he finally announced that he intended to recognize the Japanese puppet-state of Manchukuo.4 This had been long delayed so as not to offend China, but now the common front against the British Empire had priority.5 When Hermann Kriebel, an old Nazi who had served as general consul in Shanghai came to warn Hitler against putting all his eggs in the Japanese basket, the Führer refused to receive him, remarking: ‘I don’t need him. He was over there and misjudges the situation. I wasn’t there, but my assessment is correct.’6
The declining relationship with Anglo-America made Hitler all the more determined to make Berlin a city to put Washington, and the capitals of other rival powers, in the shade.7 On 11 January 1938, Hitler instructed Speer to build a new Imperial Chancellery in the Vossstrasse to reflect the grandeur of the Third Reich. ‘Whoever enters the Imperial Chancellery,’ he remarked during a trip to the building site, ‘must have the sense of approaching the lord of the world.’8 That same month, Hitler issued his ‘Decree on the Reorganization of Berlin’. Shortly after that, on 28 January 1938, the plans for the new city of Germania were presented to the public. They involved a huge north–south axis, bookended with two massive railway stations. The Great Hall of the People was intended to be the largest indoor auditorium in the world, with space for 180,000 people and a dome sixteen times bigger than that of St Peter’s in Rome. It was clearly designed to dwarf the US Capitol. The artificial lake was surely a nod to the Washington reflecting pool as represented in the sketches by Speer’s close collaborator Rudolf Wolters. The massive triumphal arch, which Hitler intended to carry the names of the 1.7 million German First World War dead, was doubtless intended to overshadow the much smaller Arc de Triomphe in Paris. The regime press were suitably awe-struck, but the real audience was abroad. The New York Times, for example, wrote that Hitler’s project was ‘perhaps the most ambitious planning scheme’ of the age.9
Hitler’s interest in the remodelling of German cities went well beyond the imperial capital, to include Nuremberg, Augsburg, Weimar, Goslar, Bayreuth and especially Munich and Hamburg.10 In late February, he gave a speech on the remodelling of Germany’s cities. In late May 1938 he issued a decree on the planned monumental bridge across the harbour at Hamburg, which was intended to rival the San Francisco Golden Gate Bridge. Critics saw all these plans, especially the remodelling of Berlin, as evidence of hubris, even of insanity. Speer’s father, also an architect, famously remarked on seeing the plans for Germania that ‘you have gone completely crazy’. There was a lot in this. That said, Hitler’s main motivation was not megalomania, but insecurity, a desire to bolster shaky German self-esteem in order to prepare the nation for the struggle ahead. He planned such structures, Hitler told an audience of senior military men, not out of ‘megalomania’, but rather ‘because of the cold calculation that such mighty works were the only way of giving the [German] people self-confidence’.11
Nor had Hitler completely given up hope of winning the battle of consumption with Anglo-America. On his birthday, Ferdinand Porsche presented Hitler with a model of the planned new Volkswagen; the resulting photograph shows his face to be a picture of delight. Not long after, the Führer laid the foundation stone of the first Volkswagen factory.12 Its design consciously imitated that of the large American automobile works Porsche had visited during a fact-finding visit to the United States. But Wolfsburg was intended to be much more than just the ‘greatest German car factory’. It was to be, as Hitler explained in his accompanying speech, ‘a model German workers’ city’, with exemplary ‘social housing’ which would serve as a template for similar ventures elsewhere in the Reich. The huge residential apartment blocks housing the car workers and their families–a city of 90,000 inhabitants was planned–were laid out in a distinctly modern, even progressive style. The individual flats were large, being geared towards families with four children, and well appointed. There was central heating, warm water and various modern conveniences, including washing machines in the central laundri
es.13 This was the German dream-modernity Nazi style much as Hitler had envisaged in the 1920s.
In late January 1938, Hitler was suddenly engulfed by a crisis not of his own making.14 The Reichswehr minister, Werner von Blomberg, had recently remarried a much younger and socially lower-ranking woman.15 Concerned that this new union would be rejected by his brother officers, Blomberg turned to Hitler for support, telling him that his betrothed was a ‘typist’, and an ‘ordinary girl’ who had ‘a past’.16 The Führer, ever keen to break down class barriers in Germany, probably assumed that her ‘past’ simply referred to previous relationships, and spontaneously offered to act as witness at the wedding, which took place in some haste in mid January 1938. Soon after the nuptials, however, it transpired that Blomberg’s bride had a police record as a prostitute and as a model of pornographic photos. Göring presented the evidence, including the pictures, to Hitler later that month. It was entirely conclusive. The Führer’s outrage knew no bounds. He paced up and down the room, utterly shocked, muttering to himself and shaking his head. ‘If a German field marshal marries a whore,’ Hitler expostulated, ‘then anything is possible.’17 The Führer felt personally betrayed and misled by Blomberg. While he was happy to endorse marriage across traditional class lines, and was unworried by pre-marital sex, Hitler would never have allowed himself to be associated with pornography and prostitution. He feared becoming a laughing stock, especially abroad. There was no doubt in his, or anyone else’s mind, that Blomberg had to go.
This single dislodged stone triggered a landslide. Hitler wanted to replace Blomberg swiftly and discreetly. His eye inevitably fell on the army chief, Fritsch, a plausible candidate who would be acceptable to the army. But the Führer was now on guard. He feared that Blomberg was only the tip of the iceberg, that the lid had been lifted on a senior officer corps where depravity was rife. Recalling earlier accusations of homosexuality against Fritsch, which he had discounted, Hitler immediately demanded that the file be reconstituted and the case reopened, before he would consider him for Blomberg’s succession. He questioned Fritsch personally. The meeting did not go well, primarily because Fritsch–in the interests of full disclosure–mentioned his friendly connections to some Hitler Youths, one of which had ended badly. Hitler was immediately suspicious, sensing a much larger and uncontainable scandal involving ever more boys. He was not willing to take chances, not least because homosexual activity was illegal and exposed culprits to the risk of blackmail. Hitler’s confidence in the army had been shattered. Fritsch, too, would have to go. In neither case was Hitler motivated by the desire to rid himself of opponents of the strategic vision he had laid out, or restated, in the Chancellery in November 1937. He could, after all, have sacked either man with a minimum of fuss at any point since then.
The Führer was now faced with a major headache. Firstly, he needed to find replacements for both Blomberg and Fritsch. The very fact that Hitler had to cast around for nominations, and consult more widely than he usually did, shows that he had not plotted the changes in advance. Secondly, the Führer had to think of a way of presenting the changes without the embarrassing truth becoming known. Hitler began with the succession to Fritsch. The army wanted General Gerd von Rundstedt, whom Hitler rejected as too old. His own preference was for Walther von Reichenau, the man with whom he had been in contact even before the takeover of power and who had been instrumental in getting the army to swear an oath to Hitler personally after Hindenburg’s death. The army, in turn, refused to wear a man widely regarded as a lazy and politicized careerist. In the end, Hitler settled on Walther von Brauchitsch, who committed himself ‘to bringing the army closer to the state and its ideas’.18
Replacing Blomberg was no less problematic. It was not just a question of finding a name, but also of defining the future of the role itself. There had long been voices calling for a reorganization of the structure of the German High Command. This was a good opportunity to effect a change. The initiative here did not come from Hitler, but from within the army, from Keitel and indeed from the retiring Blomberg, who urged the Führer to take over the supreme command of the army himself.19 Hitler abolished the position of Reichswehr minister and established in its place a ‘supreme commander of the Wehrmacht’–himself–and a High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), which would discharge the former ministerial functions of the Wehrmacht Office.20 Direct formal control of the armed services had now fallen into Hitler’s lap.
All that remained now was to communicate these changes to the country and the world at large. Astonishingly, word of the crisis had not leaked. Hitler decided to frame the new appointments as part of a general reshuffle which would change the narrative and give the world something else to talk about.21 So on 4 February 1938, Hitler announced the new military arrangements together with a raft of other measures. Most important among these was the replacement of Neurath at the Foreign Office by Ribbentrop. The effect of these changes was less dramatic than one might imagine, because Hitler was already in more or less complete control of the German military and foreign policy, and–leaving Fritsch aside–it would have been hard to imagine a more enthusiastic supporter of both National Socialism and Hitler’s strategy than the sacked Blomberg. What the whole episode did show however was the considerable skill with which the Führer could retrieve a very difficult situation and even turn it to his advantage.
Hitler now pressed ahead with his plans for Austria. Despite the increased urgency, his aim was not immediate occupation. That would simply have been too risky, and it was unnecessary. Hitler’s aim was to neutralize Austria as a threat to his southern flank and to cook the Austrian government slowly in a pot, rather than causing the whole vessel to boil over. This was consistent with the ‘evolutionary’ approach Hitler and Schuschnigg had agreed on in July 1936. Following the discovery of another putsch plan by some radical Austrian Nazis, the Austrian chancellor, Schuschnigg, came to Berchtesgaden on 12 February, trying to reaffirm Hitler’s support for the more moderate Austrian Nazis. The German dictator, however, could prepare for this encounter, through information provided by Austrian Nazis, having received in advance a detailed briefing on how far Schuschnigg was prepared to go. It was a tense meeting, at which Hitler browbeat his interlocutor into granting an amnesty for Austrian Nazis and appointing some prominent Nazis to key positions in the government.22
Hitler still favoured an evolutionary solution in Austria, though, and told Austrian Nazis that a violent confrontation should be avoided if at all possible. The Führer, in short, was at pains to prevent a repetition of the events of 1934. The Austrian Nazis, however, continued their demonstrations, seeing the appointment of a Nazi sympathizer, Seyss-Inquart as interior minister, as a clear go-ahead. In response, Schuschnigg suddenly announced on 9 March 1938 that he would hold a referendum on the future status of Austria within four days. The wording of the question and the modalities surrounding the organization of the vote, especially the plan to exclude voters under the age of twenty-four, many of whom were Nazis, made clear that it was directed against any Anschluss.
Hitler was caught completely off-balance. His strategy had caused the pot to boil over after all. The choice was stark. On the one hand, if he allowed the referendum to go ahead, and if–as seemed likely–it resulted in a victory for Schuschnigg, then the subsequent absorption of Austria would be much more difficult. On the other hand, if he attempted another coup, or even invaded outright, Hitler risked another catastrophic failure and perhaps Italian or other great power intervention. The Führer reacted quickly. A day after Schuschnigg’s announcement, he instructed the Wehrmacht to prepare for the occupation of Austria within forty-eight hours. He stressed that this was not to be a ‘war against a fraternal people’, and should therefore be given the appearance of ‘a peaceful invasion which has been welcomed by the people’. That said, resistance was to ‘be ruthlessly broken through force of arms’.23 The operation had to be improvised as there had been no detailed prior planning.
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ssolini’s attitude would be critical. Rome had previously signalled that it might accept an internal Nazi solution, but Hitler had no mandate for a full-scale invasion and there was no time to get one, nor could he risk being refused. On balance, he told Goebbels, he thought that Italy and Britain would ‘do nothing’.24 So the Führer simply informed Mussolini on 11 March in a letter that was delivered in person by his go-between Philipp of Hesse that it was his ‘irrevocable decision’ to ‘restore peace and order in my native land’; one of the concerns cited was fear of a Habsburg restoration.25 He did not wait for the reply. Nor did the Austrian Nazis, who staged demonstrations throughout the country on 11 March. There was also increasing pressure from Berlin on Schuschnigg to call off the referendum and resign, which he did later that day. The Austrian Army was ordered not to resist a German entry, and at midnight, Seyss-Inquart was appointed as the new chancellor. Despite these developments, Hitler gave the order to invade.
In the early hours of 12 March 1938, the first Wehrmacht and German police units crossed the Austrian border. Later that afternoon, Hitler followed suit, via his birthplace Braunau am Inn, pressing on without stopping to Linz. While in the city, he asked Hofrat Adolf Eigl about Dr Bloch, of whom he retained a good memory. Hitler also visited the graves of his parents at Leonding. He signed the Anschluss into law, adding 6.7 million inhabitants to the Reich at a stroke. The next day, Hitler entered Vienna to a tumultuous welcome. On the following day, with Unity Mitford at his side, he proclaimed the Anschluss from the balcony of the Hofburg. The confirmation of the Anschluss law by plebiscite (in Austria as well as the old Reich) on 10 April was just a formality.
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