“We saw aerial maps and photos taken by reconnaissance planes”: Frank Dillon, letter to the author, August 18, 2017, and March 24, 2008.
“The briefing was thorough and included photos so detailed”: Frank J. O’Rourke, “Eyewitness: A Gliderman Across the Rhine.”
“The radio news commentator, Kaltenborn, said on the radio tonight”: Richard H. Haney, When Is Daddy Coming Home?, 119.
Chapter 8 Secret Destinations
Details of Steltermann’s OSS service are based on letters, orders, and period identification documents kindly provided by the Steltermann family, hereafter referred to as: Steltermann Collection.
“a secret operational mission to a secret destination”: Steltermann Collection (OSS orders dated January 21, 1945).
Rumor had it that in 1940 he carried his ailing Jewish father over the Pyrenees Mountains: Joe LaGattuta, interview with the author, January 5, 2004, and Robert Staub, OSS Personnel File.
Steltermann was also provided with a Wehrmacht driver’s license: OSS, “Cover Report 1–15 MAR 45,” and Steltermann Collection.
On March 11, he and Staub reported to the OSS office in Paris: OSS, “Covering Report 1–15 April 45.”
Private First Class David Doyle, assigned to the team in a support function . . . its surrounding grounds as “palatial”: David W. Doyle, True Men and Traitors, 59.
In addition to Steltermann and Staub, the eight other agents: OSS, “Covering Report 1–15 April 45.”
Specialist X First Class Leo Jungen assigned as a wireless operator: Ibid.
Captain Stephen Vinciguerra commanded the sixteen-man detachment: Ibid.
He’d served as an instructor for teams parachuting into occupied France: OSS, Stephen Vinciguerra, “Field Report from ETO.” Vinciguerra was awarded the Bronze Star for his service in Holland.
He’d spent the interim working with Ridgway’s corps: Ibid.
Vinciguerra had divided Algonquin’s agents into four teams of two: OSS, “Covering Report 1–15 April 45.”
This allowed for quicker processing of agent reports: OSS, “Strategic Services Detachments with the Army in the Field.”
Outfitted with standard US Army radios: OSS, “Covering Report 1–15 April 45.”
They’d then mingle with the inevitable flow of retreating civilians: David W. Doyle, True Men and Traitors, 59.
Team Student, the two French-speaking Belgians: OSS, “Covering Report 1–15 April 45.”
what the OSS called “tourists” drops: OSS, “HQ Seventh Army G-2, Strategic Services Section.”
The OSS had given up on infiltrating agents overland: Ibid.
Issued what captured German rations were available: OSS, “OSS Report for OSS/ETO, Continental Operations 10–31 MAR 45.”
conceal their German uniforms under olive-drab American mechanic coveralls: OSS, “Covering Report 1–15 April 45.”
pretending to be frantically escaping the Allied landings: David W. Doyle, True Men and Traitors, 60.
“My present schedule may prevent seeing you before you leave”: Letter from Ridgway to Miley, dated March 20, 1945, CMH, Miley Papers.
Eisenhower had released the 13th Airborne from VARSITY: Floyd Lavinius Parks Diary, March 10, 1945.
fog “so thick you could tack pin-up pictures to it”: Duxford Diary, 1942–1945, 23.
Ridgway opposed this option vehemently and recommended VARSITY be canceled: Floyd Lavinius Parks Diary, March 14, 1945.
Brereton overruled him: Ibid.
“forgets that he is dealing with men’s lives”: Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier, 28.
Ideal weather conditions for the drop: John C. Warren, “U.S. Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater,” 160.
“is not a pleasant month”: Ibid., 160.
Montgomery believed VARSITY critical enough: Ibid., 160.
Montgomery now wanted the two divisions to drop twelve miles farther east: Ibid., 160.
Brereton would rush an alternate plan, but only if: Floyd Lavinius Parks Diary, March 20, 1945.
The drop area near Erle was barely large enough to accommodate two divisions: FAAA, “Airborne Army Operational Reports, 1944–1945,” report dated March 14, 1945.
flak batteries was described as “a formidable issue”: Ibid.
distributed to Miley’s intelligence officers . . . who tucked them away: Kirk B. Ross, The Sky Men, 280.
“The pain was excruciating”: Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier, 26.
He spent the next several nights trying to sleep on the board: Ibid., 25.
“a glider pilot in Texas once asked me to fly with him”: Bob Hope, I Never Left Home.
the constant exposure of the gliders’ wood and fabric to rain: George A. Larson, “European Theater of Operations Post War Review of Airborne Operations,” 27.
low wing load, which gave them a higher glide ratio: Air Forces Manual No. 3, Glider Tactics and Technique, 3.
“It’s all right to fly a box car, but why fly it sideways?”: James E. Mrazek, Fighting Gliders of World War II, 103.
the cargo area had a heavy-duty, honeycombed plywood floor: Gerard M. Devlin, Silent Wings, 62.
gliders “ended up against fences, stone walls, or trees”: “Development of the Glider,” 43.
pilots called for the installation of escape panels: 441 TCG, “Interrogation Check Sheets, Glider Pilots of the 441st TCG, 99th TCS.”
Operation MARKET GARDEN had required using 90 percent: John C. Warren, “U.S. Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater,” 73.
Normandy, where 97 percent of the gliders: Ibid., 98.
In many cases, fabric had been ripped off the fuselage in great chunks: Milton Dank, The Glider Gang, 163.
only 281 of the 2,000 gliders: Gerard M. Devlin, Silent Wings, 281.
“present production of gliders is insufficient”: FAAA, “Outgoing Messages, 1 FEB—13 MAR 45.”
At this stage the gliders battled for priority: George A. Larson, “European Theater of Operations Post War Review of Airborne Operations,” 27.
took a well-trained team almost 250 man hours to reassemble a single CG-4A: Martin Wolfe, Green Light!, 179.
Brereton ordered troop carrier units to curtail training flights: Floyd Lavinius Parks Diary, February 9, 1945.
Troop Carrier Command confirmed in mid-March that their inventory: John C. Warren, “U.S. Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater,” 158.
“only in emergencies will there be but one rated pilot in the glider”: 51 TCW “Standard Operating Procedure for Gliders.”
“Each co-pilot’s seat was occupied by an airborne trooper”: James M. Gavin, Airborne Warfare, 38.
The Air Force had enough pilots to put two in each cockpit: John C. Warren, “U.S. Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater,” 152, and Gerard M. Devlin, Silent Wings, 246.
“called us out, and when we were all lined up”: Zane Winters, “The Last Glider Mission, Part 1,” 9.
During MARKET GARDEN, hundreds of disorderly pilots: David P. Schorr, “Operation Varsity,” 25.
“They got into Brussels, most of them, and that was it”: Donald Pinzel, interview with the author, September 20, 2003.
“liability” . . . “not believe there is anyone in the combat area more eager”: Gerard M. Devlin, Silent Wings, 279.
The pre-mission briefings, deemed as “unsuitable”: John C. Warren, “U.S. Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater,” 153.
“amorphous mass, almost without organization”: Ibid., 153.
“all glider pilots should be given intensive combat training”: Air Forces Manual No. 3, Glider Tactics and Technique, 4.
“short and relatively sketchy”: John C. Warren, “U.S. Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater,” 73.
caused by constantly transferring glider pilots from squadrons: Ibid., 196.
“a coherent and continuous training program of their own”: Ibid., 196.
“We were
bitter about the up-rootings”: W. D. Knickerbocker, Those Damn Glider Pilots, 4.
The curriculum included 75 hours of weapons training: IX TCC, “Ground Training for Glider Pilots.”
squadron commanders and key personnel had already been briefed: John C. Warren, “U.S. Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater,” 171.
an Army ordnance depot outside of Paris to scavenge armor plating: William B. Breuer, Storming Hitler’s Rhine, 229.
Notes on using P-51 external tanks’ nose cones for C-46 para-packs: IX TCC, “Activities Final Phase,” 11.
the majority of gliders would be equipped with the chutes: Ibid., 15.
Griswold nose notes: Ibid., 15.
Corey Skid notes: John C. Warren, “U.S. Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater,” 72, and Gerard M. Devlin, Silent Wings, 125.
Personal survival equipment continued to flow in daily from supply depots: IX TCC, “Activities Final Phase,” 48.
The division’s parachute maintenance personnel: 507 PIR, “Field Order No. 1, Inclosure No. 3A.”
“It was psychologically comforting to feel it”: John Magill, We Led from the Sky, 68.
Magill noticed that the veterans preferred to pack extra ammunition: Ibid., 68.
officers ordered the troopers to tie the packets to the front of their helmets: David P. Schorr, “Operation Varsity,” 15.
bright yellow silk triangular signal panels: James P. Lyke, “The Operations of the 17th Airborne Division in the Crossing of the Rhine River, 24 March 1945,” 28.
the panels could be worn as a scarf, tied over a helmet, across the back: W. D. Knickerbocker, Those Damn Glider Pilots, 215.
instructed to wear theirs looped over one shoulder: 194 GIR, “Field Order No. 1, 194 Glider Infantry,” Enclosure No. 3C.
he cut the last one down the middle and shared it with his platoon sergeant: Frank Dillon, letter to the author, March 24, 2008.
“Hither-Thither”: Greg Forster, “Biggest Wartime Drop,” 44.
Tongue-twisting passwords are discussed by Sergeant Jake McNiece on page 79 of his autobiography, The Filthy Thirteen (Casemate, 2003).
confined conditions of the former German airfields hindered ground crews: IX TCC, “Activities Final Phase,” 24.
Anti-aircraft guns ringed each airfield: Ibid., 25.
“A few spurts of gunfire were heard”: Michael N. Ingrisano, Valor Without Arms, 118.
On the night of March 21, and again at dawn: Ibid., 123.
Montgomery grew increasingly nervous: Pierre Clostermann, The Big Show, 155.
nose-mounted oblique cameras: William Green, Famous Fighters of the Second World War, 117.
Allied radar stations couldn’t fix its echo accurately: Pierre Clostermann, The Big Show, 181.
Tempest, with a max speed of 435 mph: William Green, Famous Fighters of the Second World War, 105.
Details of the “rat code” missions can be found in Pierre Clostermann, The Big Show, 181.
“DUST MEANS DEATH”: Brian Jewell, Over the Rhine, 14.
German gunners turned Xanten’s church tower: Ibid., 14.
“dummy supply points, parks of inflated rubber vehicles”: James P. Lyke, “The Operations of the 17th Airborne Division in the Crossing of the Rhine River, 24 March 1945,” 15.
Brereton and his Airborne Army staff “definitely disapproved” of the tactic: Floyd Lavinus Parks Diary, February 27, 1945.
smoke generators, built by the Standard Oil Company: “Invisible Oil Afforded Screen,” Stars and Stripes.
billow continuously from sunrise on March 21: Brian Jewell, Over the Rhine, 15.
they taped routes for mustering infantry: Ibid., 15.
“a mixed blessing”: Ibid., 15.
Chapter 9 “Satanic plan of annihilation”
The troops closest to the riverbanks donned gas masks: “Interrogation Report from Gen Meindl and Major General Fiebig,” 1.
Apart from causing discomfort and frustration, the smoke didn’t particularly alarm: Ibid., 2.
“purely a case in which the territory most suitable for AFVs”: Ibid., 2.
Germany could achieve a stalemate: James Lucas, Kommando, 203.
drafted over 500,000 new recruits for national service: Toby Thacker, Joseph Goebbels: Life and Death, 282, and Peter Longerich, Goebbels: A Biography, 643.
“Roosevelt and Churchill Agree to Jewish Murder Plan!”: Michael R. Beschloss, The Conquerors, 144.
“The German people must realize that we are engaged in a life and death struggle”: Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, 342.
“satanic plan of annihilation” and “aim of these conditions, inspired by the Jews”: Ibid., 342.
“giant potato patch”: Michael R. Beschloss, The Conquerors, 144.
“The conviction that Germany had nothing to expect from defeat but oppression and exploitation”: Ibid., 171, and excerpt from “New Journal of Zürich,” unknown date from December 1944, found on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morgenthau_Plan.
“worth thirty divisions to the Germans”: Michael R. Beschloss, The Conquerors, 172.
“The struggle for the very existence of our people forces us to seize any means”: Robert M. Edsel, The Monuments Men, 250.
“all types of bridges, tracks, roundhouses, all technical installations”: Ibid., 273.
Organized into company-sized units of sixty to seventy-five men (and following description of Volkssturm troops and their armament, etc.): XVIII Corps (ABN), “Periodic Reports,” interrogation report of captured Volkssturm troops, dated March 27, 1945 (Annex No. 2 to G-2 Periodic Report No. 4).
Goebbels claimed his home district alone: Toby Thacker, Joseph Goebbels: Life and Death, 284.
The cloth bands, worn around the left bicep, bore the words “Deutscher Volkssturm”: IX TCC, “Field Order No. 5 for Operation Varsity, Annex 1,” 10.
reported to Wehrmacht quartermasters who supplied them, as stocks allowed: Heinrich von Luettwitz, XLVII Panzer Corps, 34.
their equipment and training were inadequate to operate independently: IX TCC, “Field Order No. 5 for Operation Varsity, Annex 1,” 11.
“The Volkssturm battalion of the 18th Regiment consisted of five companies”: Rudolf Langhaeuser, 6 Paratroop Division, 1.
“useless old dodderers”. . . Wesel’s district commander ordered a squad of eight Volkssturm to guard his personal car: XVIII Corps (ABN), “Periodic Reports,” interrogation report of captured Volkssturm troops, dated March 27, 1945 (Annex No. 2 to G-2 Periodic Report No. 4).
he cautioned them to the possibility of airborne troops landing among their positions: “Alertness Against Airborne Landings,” translated enemy document dated March 4, 1945, captured by the 17th Airborne, found in XVIII Corps (ABN), “Periodic Reports.”
“According to the English system of security”: Heinz Fiebig, “The 84th Infantry Division During the Fight from Reichwald to Wesel,” 16.
He did, however, ensure that combat engineers constructed both actual and dummy minefields . . . Artillery survey teams also preregistered: TM-E 30-451, Handbook on German Military Forces, 53, and James Gavin, Airborne Warfare, 66.
Observation posts, often manned by Volkssturm troops, were set up to provide: TM-E 30-451, Handbook on German Military Forces, 53.
alternate signals such as the use of red and white flares or sirens were instituted: Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 3, Section III (November 1943), War Department, Military Intelligence Division, 20, and “Defense Against Airborne Landings,” dated February 17, 1945, translated document captured by the 17th Airborne, found in XVIII Corps (ABN), “Periodic Reports.”
“The commanding general has ordered our highest degree of alertness”: “Alertness Against Airborne Landings,” translated enemy document, dated March 4, 1945, captured by the 17th Airborne, found in XVIII Corps (ABN), “Periodic Reports.”
“The gun position was worked on, ammunition storage was made”: Peter Lonke, The Liberators Who Never Re
turned, 66.
To supplement the fixed anti-aircraft positions: Charles MacDonald, The Last Offensive, 302.
400 guns of various calibers: Ibid., 302.
Crews positioned their guns: Richard J. Giziowski, The Enigma of General Blaskowitz, 386.
“I stripped the entire Ruhr District of its defensive weapons”: Gene Sprenger, Who Was Who—German General Officers, 1946, 30.
He was not “particularly impressed” by what he saw . . . “left relatively undisturbed”: Interrogation Report on Major General Fiebig, 6th Airborne Division, “Report on Operation Varsity,” Appendix D.
“with sufficient vigor or determination”: Ibid.
“Through very active fighter bomber activity the enemy tried”: Heinz Fiebig, The 84th Infantry Division During the Fight from Reichwald to Wesel, 17.
“targeting of German anti-aircraft weapons made the use of airborne soldiers obvious”: Justin L. C. Eldridge, Defense on the Rhine.
“Many dogs are the rabbit’s death”: Peter Lonke, The Liberators Who Never Returned, 66.
an anti-airborne Kampfgruppe—battle group—positioned adjacent to the expected landing areas: “ULTRA Interceptions,” February 26, 1945. Kampfgruppe Karst only reached a maximum head count of 4,000.
Each combat team contained its own artillery: POW interrogation report dated March 26, 1945, found in 194 GIR, “Misc. Varsity Documents.”
every man would participate in the maximum effort: “Defense Against Airborne Landings,” dated February 17, 1945, translated document captured by the 17th Airborne, found in XVIII Corps (ABN), “Periodic Reports.”
Some platoons were issued bicycles to reduce their reaction time: POW interrogation report dated March 26, 1945, found in 194 GIR, “Misc. Varsity Documents.”
Hitting the parachutists before they could consolidate: TM-E 30-451, Handbook on German Military Forces, 53.
“[Allied] preparations of forces on the mainland”: “ULTRA Interceptions,” March 18, 1945.
Kesselring advised Blaskowitz to place his units in a state of alert: “ULTRA Interceptions,” March 18, 1945.
“I tried to sleep at our gun position”: Peter Lonke, The Liberators Who Never Returned, 66.
Four Hours of Fury Page 45
