•Weight of projectile: 92.4 lbs
The particulars of the mount 38L are: length, 14 feet; width, 5 feet 2 inches; weight, 7 1/2 tons; engine, 70 horsepower; maximum speed, 22 miles per hour.
The sketch above shows the following details:
(a) A fixed gun-house of not very thick plate
(b) A limited traverse of not more than about 4 degrees
(c) A spade on the rear of the hull that can be let down to take recoil stresses.
It is notable that in this case an equipment firing a 92-lb shell to a maximum range of 9,300 yards has been mounted on a hull weighing no more than 7 1/2 tons.
This is another case in which the Germans have utilized a standard field gun to make self-propelled artillery. A recent picture shows another 150-mm howitzer, the 15-cm sIG 33, on a German Mark II chassis with the gun on a special mounting built into the hull. There is a three-sided shield no higher than the normal tank, instead of the very high box-like structure for the self-propelled sFH 13.
New Axis Self-Propelled Guns
Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 18, Feb. 11, 1943.
Owing to the battlefield mobility of tanks, as well as to other factors, the towed antitank gun is not always an adequate antitank weapon. To supplement the towed gun, self-propelled antitank guns have been developed and organized into special units: for example, the U.S. tank-destroyer organizations. For a considerable period of time the Germans have shown a tendency to mount a large number of guns on self-propelled mounts, the calibers varying from 20 mm to 150 mm. Recently the following new German equipment of this type was reported to exist:
•German 37-mm AT gun on an armored personnel carrier;
•Russian 76.2 -mm gun on German Mark II tank chassis;
•Russian 76.2-mm gun on Czech light tank (38) chassis;
•German 75-mm tank gun (40) on German Mark II tank chassis;
•German 75-mm tank gun (40) on Czech light tank (38) chassis.
Of the above weapons, the first two are known to have been present in North Africa. Whether the last three have been issued to units is not known. The Germans are also reported to be developing 88-mm and 128-mm armored self-propelled guns.
The Italians are apparently still endeavoring to follow the Germans in the development of self-propelled weapons. It is reported that they now have a 90-mm self-propelled gun. While this gun is known to exist, it is not believed to have appeared yet in action. The Italian 75-mm self-propelled gun is reported to have proved not wholly successful, and it is thought that Italy does not possess sufficient resources to allow free improvisation on the German pattern.
New Self-Propelled Gun
Intelligence Bulletin, October 1943
In Russia the Germans are using a new armored self-propelled gun, which bears at least an outward resemblance to the Pz. Kw. 6, the German tank often referred to as the "Tiger." The new self-propelled gun (see fig. 1) mounts an 88-mm cannon in a fixed turret, and has an over-all weight of 70 tons. Its maximum speed is reported to be not more than 12 miles per hour.
Although the armor of the new weapon, especially the front armor, is said to be harder to pierce than that of the Pz. Kw. 6, the Russians have found the former easier to set afire. They have nicknamed it the "Ferdinand."
Figure 1a.—New German Heavy Self-propelled Gun (front view).
Figure 1b.—New German Heavy Self-propelled Gun (side and rear view).
A Russian staff officer makes the following observations regarding the performance of the "Ferdinand" on the Orel and Belgorod fronts, where the Germans, counterattacking, used a number of the new heavy weapons and Pz. Kw. 6's as battering rams in an attempt to force breaches in the Russian lines.
During one battle the enemy assaulted our positions with 300 heavily armored vehicles, among them were about 50 "Tigers" and "Ferdinands." While the battle was taking place along our forward positions, 12 of our own heavy self-propelled guns remained hidden in their earth fortifications. When about, 20 "Tigers" and "Ferdinands" broke through our forward lines, our self-propelled artillery moved out from their concealed positions in order to fire by direct laying. An ambush was prepared near the threatened area, and the pieces were camouflaged.
Fire against the German armor was commenced when the attacking vehicles were about 500 yards away from our cannon.
Our first rounds were successful. At 500 yards "Tigers" suffered gaping holes in their turret armor and side armor. At 300 yards we pierced their frontal armor, and blew their turrets clean off. Hits on the side armor at this range nearly split the vehicles in half. It was somewhat different with the "Ferdinands." Their armor—the front armor, in particular—was more difficult to pierce, but their tracks, suspension, and side and turret, armor were no harder to damage and destroy than those of the "Tigers." The Germans lost at total of 12 "Tigers" and six "Ferdinands."
In another battle the same heavy armor of the enemy was engaged by our ordinary medium artillery, which used both special and regular ammunition. Three of our pieces were emplaced to form a triang1e; they were reasonably far apart. This triangular disposition permitted unusually effective fire against "Ferdinands." Although the "Ferdinand's" fire is very accurate, its fixed turret does not permit it to shift its fire rapidly. When the gun is caught in a triangle, it is virtually helpless, because while it engages one cannon the other two take pot-shots at its vulnerable points. If the piece directly in front of a "Ferdinand" does not disclose its position by firing, the other two can usually dispose of the big gun with no loss to ourselves.
Obviously it is not always possible for us to arrange a battery in a triangle. Therefore, we require the closest possible cooperation between the pieces of a battery and also between neighboring batteries.
Point-blank fire from our medium tanks in ambush armed only with the 45-mm cannon, has taken care of many "Tigers" and "Ferdinands," as have land mines, Molotov cocktails, and cannon fire from our fighter planes.
It is also reported that the circular hole in the rear of the "Ferdinand's" fighting compartment is extremely vulnerable. This hole provides room for the recoil and the ejection of shells. Russian observers state that grenades or Molotov cocktails thrown into this opening can put the vehicle out of action.
Note: As the Intelligence Bulletin goes to press, further information regarding the "Ferdinand" has been made available.
It is reported that the crews consist of six men: A gun commander (usually a lieutenant, who is either a tank man or in artilleryman), a gunner, a driver-mechanic, a radio operator, and two additional gun crew members.
"Ferdinands" are organized in battalions called "Heavy Tank-Destroyer Battalions." Each battalion consists of three gun companies, a headquarters company, a repair company. and a transport column. Each gun company consists of three platoons of four guns each. The company headquarters has three guns, making a total of 14 guns per company. The battalion headquarters company has two guns, a Pz. Kw. 3, and four motorcycles.
On the offensive, the battalion moves in two echelons. The first echelon consists of two companies abreast, with each company in line and with a 100-yard interval between guns. The second echelon consists of the third company, also in line. The distance between echelons has not been reported.
Although the gun itself is excellent, the mounting has certain pronounced defects. (1) The gun can fire only to the front, and is effective only when stationary. (2) Poor vision from the fighting compartment allows more maneuverable tanks and antitank weapons to get in close to the gun.
Notes on German Divisional Artillery
Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 6, August 27, 1942.
The organization of the German divisional artillery, like that of our own, includes three battalions of 105-mm. howitzers, which ordinarily operate in direct support of the three infantry regiments, and one medium battalion. The medium battalion is composed of 2 batteries of 150-mm. howitzers and 1 battery of 100-mm. guns, and operates in general support of the division. There is a
lso an infantry cannon company composed of six 75-mm. howitzers and two 150-mm. howitzers. In addition, in each armored and motorized division as well as certain assault infantry divisions, there is one armored assault artillery battalion composed of three 4-gun companies armed with self-propelled 75-mm. or 105-mm. howitzers.
In addition to this artillery there is in every division an artillery observation battalion which is composed of a sound-ranging battery and a flash-ranging battery (each separable into 2 independent platoons), a survey battery, a reproduction platoon, a signal platoon, and a meteorological section. This battalion works directly under the division artillery commander.
In general, the tactics and technique of German artillery are very similar to our own, but a recent report on cooperation between German artillery and other arms brings out several interesting divergences as well as some slight differences in emphasis.
All artillery orders are given orally at first; later those of the regiment and the division, particularly the latter, are confirmed and expanded in writing. The divisional artillery commander's order is not issued as an annex to the division order, but as a separate artillery order. Great stress is placed on the use of fragmentary and warning orders, and the Germans also emphasize that wherever possible orders should be given on terrain affording suitable observation rather than by reference to a map.
Counterbattery missions of the divisional medium artillery are heavily stressed. While counterbattery is primarily the task of the medium battalion, the other three battalions may often take over this function. The presence of the observation battalion is one of the reasons for emphasis on counterbattery as a divisional artillery function.
Great emphasis is also placed on the battalion as the fire-control unit, and the separation of the battalion into independent batteries to be used as attached artillery is never recommended except in extremely large sectors, or under very difficult terrain conditions such as thick woods.
In the preparation and conduct of fire, simplicity of technique is the goal. Generally a standard method is prescribed and followed, and variations are discouraged. This is typical of all German technique in that they deliberately adopt a simple method which will fit the large majority of cases, and consider that the gain in simplicity is more important than the loss of several highly refined techniques, each suitable for only a few complex situations. Reciprocal laying with the aiming circle is apparently the method most frequently used. It should be noted that this standardization of technique is in contrast to the general tactical doctrine of the Germans, which insists upon the uniqueness of each problem and the necessity for working out a complete and independent solution rather than applying a rigid prearranged formula.
Communications are normally by wire, and the use of radio is limited to periods of displacement. The one exception to this is the radio communication between observation posts and gun positions.
In preparation fires each battery normally covers one or more targets, each about 110 to 165 yards in width. At all times emphasis is placed on flexibility of fire plan and procedure, particularly by using irregular surprise fires on infantry and artillery, and on enemy command posts, as well as on the point of intended penetration.
The following table shows the maximum rates of fire consistent with efficient maintenance of materiel:
Except in unusual circumstances the artillery "reserve" consists of a large supply of ammunition rather than uncommitted units.
In order to secure greater effect against personnel in the open, ricochet fire is deliberately sought by use of delayed fuse. With light howitzers ricochet is believed to be always obtainable up to an angle of impact of 270 mils, and usually obtainable up to 360 mils. The adjustment is secured with quick fuse, and fire for effect is conducted with delayed fuse. If for any reason the ricochet fire does not prove effective, fire for effect is continued with quick fuse.
The Germans believe in a "lone gun", placed at a sufficient distance from the rest of the battery so as to appear to be an entirely different position. This gun is used for harassing fire, fire against high targets, determination of weather corrections, and finally to deceive the hostile observation as to the true position of the battery.
It is essential that supported infantry commanders be generally familiar with the characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of artillery in order to secure most effective cooperation. They must understand: that the effectiveness of artillery depends to a great extent on the neutralization of enemy artillery, and that consequently some of the fire must be employed on counterbattery missions; that the ammunition supply is limited, and the laying of heavy concentrations on important areas means a loss of fire on less important ones; that the artillery should engage only those targets which justify its heavy fire; and finally that unnecessary or too hasty requests divert artillery from its principal missions and destroy mutual confidence.
One factor which insures that infantry commanders will be familiar with artillery capabilities and limitations is the presence of the infantry cannon company in the infantry regiment. This cannon company's presence also has several other effects. First of all, it settles the problem of the accompanying gun. Second, artillery is relieved of many small but difficult direct-support missions and is released for its larger missions. Third, and most important, it lessens the artillery-infantry gap which liaison officers are intended to bridge, since it means that the liaison is not between two distinct and separate units of artillery and infantry, but rather between the regular artillery of the supporting battalion and an infantry unit which already has organic artillery weapons. There is coordination of fire plans as well as mutual observation by the cannon company and the artillery. Also the divisional observation battalion lends its assistance the infantry cannon company.
It is essential that the infantry regimental and battalion commanders assist their cooperating artillery commander by continually informing him of the infantry plan of action, the infantry's progress, and its need for artillery support.
Infantry company, battalion, and regimental commanders are made "artillery minded" by being constantly trained to rely on artillery support to the utmost.
A very important function of the infantry is to seize and hold the forward locations necessary for artillery observation, thereby facilitating the artillery support. Likewise, the infantry should be informed of the positions of the artillery forward observers, observation posts, and command posts.
Finally, the closest support between the two arms is secured by having forward artillery observers operate with the advance infantry units. Forward observers with pack radio sets are believed to be the only effective means of obtaining satisfactory observation. Sets are used both by individual batteries and by battalions, and quite often the battery commander himself will act as forward observer, particularly at the beginning of an engagement when he is not familiar with the terrain. Alternate positions for all observation posts are stressed, and, as one of our observers reports "It is impossible to exaggerate the emphasis German doctrine puts on movement of observation posts and improvement of observation."
COMMENT: In summation the above article points out the following noteworthy features of German divisional artillery:
1. Early counterbattery fire by divisional artillery.
2. Use of battalion as a unit.
3. No set pattern for fire plan in preparations.
4. Ricochet fire.
5. Use of roving gun for registration, harassing fire, and deception.
6. Education of commanders of supported units as to value of—
a. Neutralizing enemy artillery.
b. Conservation of ammunition for important missions.
c. Necessity for observation.
7. Close support through forward observers with advanced infantry, rather than through liaison detachments with supported unit commander.
Observations on German Artillery Tactics
Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 31, August 12, 1943.
A recently returned American officer reports that in North Africa the Germans frequently made a practice of firing a few salvoes from a battery; then, moving out, about the time the American forward observers had the position taped. Our own guns would plaster the observed position only to find that the enemy guns, apparently on self-propelled mounts, opened fire from some other point.
An extremely clever trick was reported to have been turned by a German tank unit upon which a British 25-pounder (88 mm) battery was attempting to adjust. After the first salvo hit at some distance from the tanks, a second was fired which apparently fell wide, and the third salvo went wider; the forward observer was frantic.
This is what had happened: the German tanks had timed the first salvo from the report to the instant of burst, which can be done with a low-velocity piece such as the 25-pounder, and fired a salvo from their own guns so that their own shells burst on the ground some distance away from the tanks at the same moment when the battery's shells struck. The forward observer was attempting to correct his own fire from German shell bursts.
The most dangerous German artillery fire was not from HE bursting on impact, but HE time fuze air bursts, and ricochet fire. In this latter type of shelling, the projectiles would strike the ground and ricochet upward, bursting over the heads of the troops.
A rather surprising percentage of the German shells were duds. Whether this was caused by defective fuzes, or for the reason that the projectiles were AP, used when the supply of HE had been exhausted, was not known.
Deceptive German Artillery Methods
Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 33, September 9, 1943.
In the following article translated from a recent issue of the "Red Star", some German methods of counteracting Russian sound and flash reconnaissance are examined. For a description of similar tactics see Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 31, p. 15.
German Artillery in Combat Page 2
