— But you cannot give an instance of a king who is in bonds.
[21] Dio. No king of men, perhaps, and yet the King of the Gods, the first and eldest one, is in bonds, they say, if we are to believe Hesiod and Homer and other wise men who tell this tale about Cronus, and indeed he does not receive this treatment unjustly from a personal enemy, but from one most just who loved him dearly, who evidently treats him thus because it is fit treatment for a king and profitable to him. [22] But they do not know this and would never imagine that a beggar or a prisoner or man without repute was once king, although they hear that Odysseus, for all his being a beggar and begging of the suitors, was none the less a king and the owner of the house, while Antinous and Eurymachus, whom Homer named ‘kings,’ were miserable and unfortunate wretches. But this, as I said, they do not know, and as badges of royalty they clothe themselves with tiaras and sceptres and crowns so that none may fail to know that they are kings; just as, I imagine, owners mark their cattle to make them easily distinguishable. [23] This undoubtedly is the reason why the King of the Persians ordained that he alone should wear his tiara upright; and if anyone else did this, he straightway ordered his execution, in the belief that it was not good or advantageous that in the midst of so many myriads of people two men should wear tiaras upright; but that he should have his mind upright [24] and that no one should have greater wisdom than himself, for this he had no concern. So I fear that just as in those days there were such symbols of royalty as we have described, so now also there ought to be similar badges to mark the free man, and that he ought to walk abroad wearing a felt skull-cap, else we shall not be able to distinguish between the free man and the slave.
THE FIFTEENTH DISCOURSE: ON SLAVERY AND FREEDOM II
This Discourse, just like the preceding one, deals with the distinction between freedom and slavery, and for the same reasons may be assigned to the period of Dio’s exile or later. Dio begins by reporting an informal debate on this question between two men, who from §§ , 5, and [7] we may suppose were Athenians. At the end of their debate Dio in § 24 gives the reasoned opinion of the audience that when one human being gets lawful possession of another with the right to use him as he likes, then the second man is the slave of the first. After this the question is raised as to what constitutes valid possession.
The first speaker (indicated by the letter A) is just such another man as the slave Syriscus in the Epitrepontes of Menander. Both are voluble aggressive debaters with a wealth of illustrations drawn from mythology and tragedy to enforce their points.
From an examination of Diogenes Laertius 2.31, 6.1, 6.4, 6.15 it has been inferred that Dio drew from Antisthenes for this Discourse. See Wegehaupt, op. cit., p-65.
The Fifteenth Discourse: On Slavery and Freedom II
Recently, I assure you, I was present when two men were disputing at great length about slavery and freedom, not before judges or in the market-place, but at their ease at home, taking a long time about it; and each of the two men had a considerable number of warm adherents. For they had been debating other questions before that, as is my impression; and the one who was worsted in the debate, being at a loss for arguments, became abusive, as often happens in such cases, and taunted the other with not being a freeman. Whereupon the first very gently smiled and said:
[2] A. “But how can you say that? Is it possible, my good friend, to know who is a slave, or who is free?”
B. “Yes, it certainly is,” replied the other. “I know at any rate that I myself am free and that all these men here are, but that you have no lot or share in freedom.”
At this some of those present laughed, and yet the first man was not one whit more abashed, but just as gallant cocks are aroused at the blow of their masters and take courage, so he too was aroused and took courage at the insult, and asked his opponent where he got his knowledge about the two of them.
[3] B. “Because,” said he, “I know that my father is an Athenian, if any man is, while yours is the slave of so-and-so,” mentioning his name.
A. “According to this, then,” said the first man, “what is to prevent me from anointing myself in the Cynosarges along with the bastards, if I really am the son of a free-born mother — who is, perhaps, a citizen into the bargain — and of the father whom you mention? Have not many women who are citizens, embarrassed by the scarcity of eligible men, been got with child either by foreigners or by slaves, sometimes not knowing the fact, but sometimes also with full knowledge of it? And of the children thus begotten none is a slave, but only a non-Athenian.”
[4] B. “Well, in your case,” he rejoined, “I myself know that your mother is a slave in the same household as your father.”
A. “Very well!” said the first man, “Do you know who your own mother is?”
B. “Why certainly; a citizen born of citizens, who brought to her husband a pretty good dowry too.”
A. “Could you actually take your oath that you are the son of the father of whom she says that you are? Telemachus, you know, did not care at all to insist in support of Penelope, the daughter of Icarius, who was regarded as a very chaste woman, that she spoke the truth when she declared that Odysseus was his father. But you, not only in support of yourself and of your mother, would take oath apparently, if anyone should bid you, but in regard to any slave woman as to who the man was by whom she was got with child, such a slave woman as you say that my mother was. [5] Pray, does it seem to you impossible that she should have been got with child by some other man, a freeman, or even by her own master? Do not many Athenian men have intercourse with their maidservants, some of them secretly, but others quite openly? For surely it cannot be that every Greek is superior to Heracles, who did not think it beneath him to have intercourse even with the slave woman of Iardanus, who became the mother of the kings of Sardis. [6] And further, you do not believe, as it seems, that Clytemnestra, the daughter of Tyndareüs and the wife of Agamemnon, not only lived with Agamemnon, her own husband, but also, when he was away, had relations with Aegistheus, and that Aeropê, the wife of Atreus, accepted the advances of Thyestes, and that many other wives of distinguished and wealthy men in both ancient and modern times have had relations with other men and sometimes have had children by them? But she who you say was a maidservant was so scrupulously faithful to her own husband that she would not have had relations with any other man! [7] And further, in regard to yourself and me as well you asseverate that each of us was born of the woman who is reputed to be and is called his mother. And yet you might name many Athenians, and very prominent ones too, who turned out later not only not to have been the sons of the father but not even those of the mother to whom they were attributed, having been supposititious children of unknown origin who had been reared as sons. And such incidents you yourself are constantly seeing exhibited and described by the writers of comedy and in tragedies, but nevertheless you go on in the same old way, making positive statements about yourself and about me, as if you knew for a certainty the circumstances of our birth and the identity of our parents. [8] Do you not know,” he continued, “that the law permits anyone to bring an action for libel against the man who slanders without being able to adduce any clear proof of his statements?”
B. And the other man replied, “Yes, I know that freeborn women often palm off other persons’ children as their own on account of their childlessness, when they are unable to conceive children themselves, because each one wishes to keep her own husband and her home, while at the same time they do not lack the means to support the children; but in the case of slave women, on the other hand, some destroy the child before birth and others afterwards, if they can do so without being caught, and yet sometimes even with the connivance of their husbands, that they may not be involved in trouble by being compelled to raise children in addition to their enduring slavery.”
[9] A. “O yes, certainly,” the first man replied, “if you make an exception of the slave girl of Oeneus, the bastard son, as he alleged, of Pandion. For Oeneus’ h
erdsman, who lived at Eleutherae, and that herdsman’s wife, so far from exposing their own children, took up other people’s children whom they found by the roadside, without having the least notion whose children they were, and reared them as their own, nor at any time afterwards were they willing to admit that they were not their own. But you, perhaps, would have abused both Zethus and Amphion before their identity became known, and would have taken solemn oath that the sons of Zeus were slaves.”
[10] B. Then this opponent laughed very ironically and said: “Aha! is it the tragic poets to whom you appeal as witnesses?”
A. “Yes indeed,” said the other man, “for the Greeks have confidence in them; for whomsoever these poets exhibit as heroes, to them you will find all Greeks offering sacrifice as heroes, and you may see with your eyes the shrines which the people have erected in their honour. And in the same manner consider, if you please, the Phrygian woman, who was the slave of Priam, who reared Alexander on Mount Ida as her own son after taking him from her husband, who was a herdsman, and raised no objection to her rearing a child. And Telephus, the son of Augê and Heracles, they say was not reared by a woman but by a hind. Or do you think that a hind would have more compassion on a babe and desire to rear it than a human being would if she happened to be a slave? [11] Come now, in Heaven’s name, if I should go so far as to admit to you that my parents are those whom you say they are, how can you know that they are slaves? Or were you really sure who their parents were, and are you ready to take your solemn oath in regard to each of them also that both were born of two slaves — they and their progenitors back to the very beginning — all of them? For it is clear that if any member of a family is free-born, it is no longer possible rightly to regard his descendants as slaves. And it is impossible, my good sir, that from all eternity, as the saying is, there should be any race of men in which there have not been countless numbers free and not fewer than these in number those who have been slaves; and indeed, tyrants and kings and prisoners and branded slaves and shopkeepers and cobblers and all the rest such as are found in the world of men, so that among them you have had experience of all the occupations, all the careers, all the fortunes, and all the mischances. [12] Or do you not know that the reason why the poets trace the families of so-called heroes directly back to the gods is simply that the character in question may not be investigated further? And quite the majority of them men say are sprung from Zeus, in order that they may not have their kings and the founders of their cities and their eponymous heroes getting into predicaments of the kind that are regarded among men as disgraceful. Consequently, if it really is with men as we and others wiser than we claim, you can have no greater share in freedom on the score of family than any one of those who are regarded as out-and-out slaves — unless, of course, you too make haste to trace your own ancestry back to Zeus or Poseidon or Apollo — and I no greater share in slavery.”
[13] B. “Well then,” said the other, “let us drop all this about family and ancestors, since you think it is so difficult to determine; for it is quite possible that you will turn out to be just like Amphion and Zethus, and like Alexander the offspring of Priam. But as for you, your own self, we all know that you are in a state of servitude.”
A. “What,” said the first man, “do you think that all those who are in a state of servitude are slaves? But are not many of these, although free men, yet held unjustly in servitude? Some of them have already gone before the court and proved that they are free, while others are enduring to the end, either because they have no clear proof of their freedom, or else because those who are called their masters are not harsh with them. [14] Consider, for instance, the case of Eumaeus, the son of Ctesias, son of Ormenus: he was the son of a man who was altogether free and of great wealth, but did he not serve as a slave in Ithaca in the households of Odysseus and Laertes? And yet, although he could, time and again, have sailed off home if he had so wished, he never thought it worth while. What, did not many Athenians among those made prisoners in Sicily serve as slaves in Sicily and in the Peloponnese although they were free men; and of those taken captive from time to time in many other battles, some only for a time until they found men who would ransom them, and others to the very end? [15] In the same period too, even the son of Callias was thought to have been in servitude a long time in Thrace after the battle in which the Athenians suffered a defeat at Acanthus, so that when he escaped afterwards and reached home he laid claim to the estate left by Callias and caused a great deal of trouble to the next of kin, being, in my opinion, an impostor. For he was not the son of Callias but his groom, in appearance resembling that boy of Callias who did lose his life in the battle; and besides he spoke Greek accurately and could read and write. — [16] But there have been innumerable others who have suffered this fate, since, even of those who are in servitude here at the present time Iº firmly believe that many are free-born men. For we shall not assert that any Athenian who is free-born is a slave if he has been made a prisoner in war and carried off to Persia, or even, if you like, is taken to Thrace or Sicily and sold like a chattel; but if any Thracian or Persian, not only born there of free parents but even the son of some prince or king, is brought here, we shall not admit that he is a free person. [17] Do you not know,” he continued, “the law they have at Athens and in many other states as well, which does not allow the man who was born a slave to enjoy the rights of a citizen? But the son of Callias, if he actually did escape from captivity on that occasion, after reaching home from Thrace, even though he had spent many years there and had often been scourged, no one would think it right to exclude from Athenian citizenship; so that there are occasional instances where the law too denies that those who have been unjustly in servitude have thereby become slaves. [18] In heaven’s name, I ask you, what is it that I do of which you have knowledge, or what is it that is done to me, which justifies your saying that you know that I am in a state of slavery?”
B. “I know that you are being kept by your master, dance attendance upon him, and do whatever he commands; or else you take a beating.”
A. “According to that,” said the first man, “you can make out that sons also are the slaves of their fathers; for they dance attendance upon their fathers, often, if they are poor, walking with them to the gymnasium or to dinner; and they without exception are supported by their fathers and frequently are beaten by them, and they obey any orders their fathers give them. [19] And yet, so far as obeying and being thrashed are concerned, you can go on and assert that the boys who take lessons of schoolmasters are likewise their servants and that the gymnastic trainers are slave-masters of their pupils, or those who teach anything else; for they give orders to their pupils and trounce them when they are disobedient.”
B. “Indeed that’s true,” replied the other, “but it is not permissible for the gymnastic instructors or for the other teachers to imprison their pupils or to sell them or to cast them into the mill, but to slave-masters all these things are allowed.”
[20] A. “Yes, but perhaps you do not know that in many states which have exceedingly good laws fathers have all these powers which you mention in regard to their sons, and what is more, if they wish to do so, they may even imprison or sell them; and they have a power even more terrible than any of these; for they actually are allowed to put their sons to death without any trial and even without bringing any accusation at all against them; but still none the less they are not their fathers’ slaves but their sons. And even if I was once in a state of slavery in the fullest sense of the term and had been a slave justly from the very beginning, what is to prevent me now,” he continued, “from being just as free as anybody else, and you in your turn, on the contrary, even if you most indisputably were the son of free parents, from being an out-and-out slave?”
[21] B. “For my part,” rejoined the other, “I do not see how I am to become a slave when, in fact, I am free; but as for you, it is not impossible that you have become free by your master’s having emancipated you.”
A. “See here, my good fellow,” said his antagonist, “would nobody get his freedom unless emancipated by his owner?”
B. “Why, how could anybody?” asked the other.
A. “In the same way that, when the Athenians after the battle of Chaeronea passed a vote to the effect that those slaves who would help them in the war should receive their freedom, if the war had continued and Philip had not made peace with them too soon, many of the slaves at Athens, or rather, practically all of them, would have been free without having been emancipated one at a time by their respective masters.”
B. “Yes, let that be granted — if the state is going to free you by taking official action.”
[22] A. “But what have you to say to this: Do you not think that I could liberate myself?”
B. “Yes, if you should raise the money somewhere to pay your master with.”
A. “That is not the method I mean, but the one by which Cyrus freed not only himself but also all the Persians, great host that they were, without paying down money to anyone or being set free by any master. Or do you not know that Cyrus was the vassal of Astyages and that when he got the power and decided that the time was ripe for action, he became both free and king of all Asia?”
Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom Page 28
