[35] περιμάχητα, ἐλαττόνων αὐτῶν δεήσεσθε: ὅταν δὲ ἐληλυθότες ἦτε ἐπ᾽ ἄκρον ἀρετῆς, οὐδενός: καὶ οἰκίας μικροτέρας καὶ ἀμείνους οἰκήσετε, καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτον ὄχλον θρέψετε ἀνδραπόδων ἀργῶν καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν χρησίμων. τὸ δὲ πάντων παραδοξότατον: ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν [p. 189] εὐσεβέστεροι καὶ ὁσιώτεροι γένησθε, τοσούτῳ ἐλάττων ἔσται παρ᾽ ὑμῖν ὁ λιβανωτὸς καὶ τὰ θυμιάματα καὶ τὰ στεφανώματα, καὶ θύσετε ἐλάττους θυσίας καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἐλάττονος δαπάνης, καὶ τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος τὸ νῦν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν τρεφόμενον πολὺ ἔλαττον ἔσται, καὶ ἡ ξύμπασα πόλις, ὥσπερ ναῦς κουφισθεῖσα, ἀνακύψει τε καὶ πολὺ ἔσται ἐλαφροτέρα καὶ ἀσφαλεστέρα.
[35] and when you have reached the summit of virtue, not at all. And the houses in which you live will be smaller and better, and you will not support so great a throng of idle and utterly useless slaves and — the most paradoxical thing of all — the more god-fearing and pious you become, the less frankincense and fragrant offerings and garlands there will be among you, and you will offer fewer sacrifices and at less expense, and the whole multitude that is now being supported in your city will be much smaller; while the entire city, like a ship that has been lightened, will ride higher and be much more buoyant and safer.
[36] ταὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ Σίβυλλαν εὑρήσετε μαντευομένην ὑμῖν καὶ Βάκιν, εἴπερ ἀγαθὼ χρησμολόγω καὶ μάντιε ἐγενέσθην. ὡς δὲ νῦν τὰ παρόντα διάκειται, χρημάτων ἕνεκα πλήθους, ἃ πάντα πανταχόθεν εἰς ἕνα τοῦτον ἤθροισται τὸν τόπον, τρυφῆς ἐπικρατούσης καὶ πλεονεξίας, ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ὥσπερ εἰ τὴν τοῦ Πατρόκλου πυρὰν κοσμήσας ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς πολλῶν μὲν ξύλων, πολλῶν δὲ σωμάτων καὶ ἐσθῆτος, ἔτι δὲ πιμελῆς τε καὶ ἐλαίου πρὸς τούτοις, παρακαλεῖ τοὺς ἀνέμους σπένδων καὶ θυσίας ὑπισχνούμενος ἐλθόντας ἐμπρῆσαί τε καὶ ἀνάψαι.
[36] These same pronouncements you will find were made both by Sibylla and by Bacis, it if be true that the two of them proved to be good soothsayers and seers. But as your possessions are now, on account of the great amount of wealth, all of which has been collected from all the world into this one place, luxury and covetousness being prevalent, the situation is similar to that in which Achilles, after heaping high the pyre of Patroclus with many logs of wood, with many coverlets and garments, and also with fat and olive oil in addition, summons the winds, with libations and promise of sacrifices, to come and set it afire and burn it.
[37] τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα οὐχ ἧττόν γε πέφυκεν ἐξάπτειν τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὕβριν καὶ ἀκολασίαν. οὐ μέντοι ἔλεγον ὡς χαλεπὸν αὐτοῖς παιδευθῆναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τἄλλα, ἔφην, οὐδενὸς βελτίους πρότερον ὄντες ὅσα ἐβουλήθητε ῥᾳδίως ἐμάθετε: λέγω δὲ ἱππικὴν καὶ τοξικὴν καὶ ὁπλιτικήν.
[37] For such possessions as yours are no less likely to kindle the wanton spirit and licentiousness of human beings.”
I did not, however, maintain that it was difficult for them to become educated, “for,” said I, “although you have hitherto been no whit better thanº other men, you learned easily enough all the other things that you wished.” I refer to horsemanship, archery, fighting in heavy armour . . .
THE FOURTEENTH DISCOURSE: ON SLAVERY AND FREEDOM I
ΠΕΡΙ ΔΟΥΛΕΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΑΣ Α.
THE FOURTEENTH DISCOURSE: ON SLAVERY AND FREEDOM I
Dio begins this Discourse by saying that the majority of men do not know the real difference between slavery and freedom, and after examining the question for some time, finally, in § 18, states his own view that freedom is the knowledge of what is allowable and what is forbidden, while slavery is the opposite. Then, identifying the free man with the king, he proceeds to prove the paradox that the king, or free man, may be such although he is kept in prison or suffers other seeming indignities.
The Discourse is very informal. Dio speaks in his own person up to the beginning of § 11 and then from that point on discusses the question with another. This would seem to put the Discourse in the period of Dio’s exile, when according to the confession in the Thirteenth Discourse his informal teaching of moral philosophy began and probably was chiefly carried on.
This Discourse along with the Fifteenth is our chief source for knowledge of the Stoic doctrine that the wise man alone is free. It is also found stated in the pseudo-Philonic treatise Περὶ τοῦ πάντα σπουδαῖον ἐλεύθερον εἶναι (Every good man is free), in Cicero’s Paradoxa Stoicorum, Plutarch’s Περὶ εὐγενείας (On Nobility of Birth), and in Epictetus, Diatribe 4.1. All these passages may be derived from one common Stoic source as Kaibel says (see Hermes, vol. 23, 1888, , n3), if not from some Cynic earlier still. At least O. Hense (Rheinisches Museum, vol. 47, 1892, ff.) shows that, in the treatise falsely ascribed to Philo, Bion’s Περὶ δουλείας (On Slavery) was used.
[1] Οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐπιθυμοῦσι μὲν ἐλεύθεροι εἶναι μάλιστα πάντων, καί φασι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὴν δὲ δουλείαν αἴσχιστον καὶ δυστυχέστατον ὑπάρχειν, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ὅ,τι ἐστὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον εἶναι ἢ ὅ,τι τὸ δουλεύειν, οὐκ ἴσασιν. καὶ τοίνυν οὐδὲ ποιοῦσιν οὐδέν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὅπως τὸ μὲν αἰσχρὸν καὶ χαλεπὸν ἐκφεύξονται, τὴν δουλείαν, ὃ δὲ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς πολλοῦ ἄξιον εἶναι, κτήσονται, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ταῦτα πράττουσιν ἐξ ὧν ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας διατελεῖν δουλεύοντας τὸν ἅπαντα
The Fourteenth Discourse: On Slavery and Freedom I
Men desire above all things to be free and say that freedom is the greatest of blessings, while slavery is the most shameful and wretched of states; and yet they have no knowledge of the essential nature of this freedom and this slavery of which they speak. And, what is more, they do practically nothing whatever to escape the shameful and grievous thing, which is slavery, and to gain what they consider to be valuable, that is, freedom; but on the contrary, they do the things which result in their continuing in slavery all their lives and never attaining to freedom.
[2] χρόνον καὶ μηδεπώποτε ἐλευθερίας ἐπιτυγχάνειν. πλὴν τούτους οὐκ ἄξιον ἴσως θαυμάσαι ὅτι οὔτε ἑλεῖν οὔτε φυλάξασθαι δύνανται ὃ τυγχάνουσιν ἀγνοοῦντες. εἰ γοῦν ἐτύγχανον ἀγνοοῦντες πρόβατον καὶ λύκον ὅ,τι ἐστὶν ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν, ὅμως δὲ ἡγοῦντο τὸ μὲν ὠφέλιμον καὶ κτήσασθαι ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν καὶ ἀσύμφορον, οὐκ ἂν ἦν θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν, εἰ τὸ μὲν πρόβατον ἐφοβοῦντο καὶ ἔφευγον ἐνίοτε ὡς λύκον, τὸν δὲ λύκον προσίεντο καὶ ὑπέμενον, νομίσαντες πρόβατον: ἡ γὰρ ἄγνοια τοι
αῦτα ἐργάζεται τοὺς οὐκ εἰδότας καὶ ἀναγκάζει τἀναντία φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν ὧν βούλονται
[2] However, we should perhaps feel no surprise that these men are unable either to get or to avoid the thing of which they happen to be ignorant. For instance, if they happened to be ignorant as to what a sheep and a wolf are respectively, but nevertheless thought that the one was profitable and good to get while the other was harmful and unprofitable, it would not be at all surprising if they feared the sheep and fled from it at times as though it were a wolf, but let the wolf approach and awaited its coming, thinking to be a sheep. For ignorance has this effect upon men who lack knowledge, and forces them to flee from and to pursue the opposite of what they desire to flee from and to pursue, and of what would be to their advantage.
[3] καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων. φέρε δὴ σκεψώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι οἱ πολλοὶ ἐπίστανται περὶ ἐλευθερίας καὶ δουλείας σαφές. ἴσως γάρ τοι μάτην αὐτοὺς αἰτιώμεθα, οἱ δὲ παντὸς μᾶλλον ταῦτα ἴσασιν. εἰ οὖν ἔροιτό τις αὐτοὺς ὅ,τι ἐστὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον εἶναι, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως τὸ μηδενὸς ὑπήκοον, ἀλλὰ πράττειν ἁπλῶς τὰ δοκοῦντα
[3] Come then, let us consider whether the majority of men really have any clear knowledge about freedom and slavery. For it is quite possible that we are criticizing them without good reason, and that they know well what these are.
Now if one were to ask statement what the nature of freedom is, they would say, perhaps, that it consists in being subject to no one and acting simply in accordance with one’s own judgement.
[4] ἑαυτῷ. τὸν δὲ τοῦτο ἀποκρινάμενον ἐάν τις ἐπερωτᾷ, εἰ ἐν χορῷ χορευτὴν ὄντα μὴ προσέχειν τῷ κορυφαίῳ μηδὲ ὑπήκοον εἶναι αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ̓ ᾄδειν τε καὶ ἀπᾴδειν, ὅπως ἂν αὐτῷ ἐπίῃ, τοῦτο καλὸν οἴεται εἶναι καὶ ἐλευθέριον, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον τούτου, τὸ προσέχειν [p. 228] καὶ πείθεσθαι τῷ ἡγεμόνι τοῦ χοροῦ, καὶ τότε ἄρχεσθαι καὶ παύεσθαι ᾄδοντα ὁπόταν ἐκεῖνος κελεύσῃ, αἰσχρὸν εἶναι καὶ δουλοπρεπές,
[4] But if one were to go on and ask the man who made this answer whether he thought it a fine thing, and worthy of a free man, that when he is a member of a chorus he should not pay attention to the leader nor be subject to him, but should sing in tune or out of tune just as he took the notion, and whether he thought the opposite course, namely, to pay attention and obey the director of the chorus and to begin and to stop singing only at his command, was shameful and slavish, I do not think that he would agree.
[5] οὐκ ἂν οἶμαι ὁμολογοῖ. οὐδὲ εἴ τις ἐρωτήσειε, πλέοντα μὴ φροντίζειν τοῦ κυβερνήτου μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἅττ̓ ἂν ἐκεῖνος εἴπῃ, εἰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐλευθέριον οἴοιτο: οἷον κελεύσαντος καθῆσθαι ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ νηί, ἂν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐπίῃ, κἂν κελεύσῃ ἀντλεῖν ποτε ἢ συνέλκειν τὰ ἱστία, μήτ̓ ἀντλῆσαι μήθ̓ ἅψασθαι τῶν κάλων, οὐδὲ τοῦτον εἴποι ἂν ἐλεύθερον οὐδὲ ζηλωτόν, ὅτι πράττει τὰ δοκοῦντα
[5] And again, if one were to ask whether he thought it was characteristic of a free man, when a passenger on board a ship, to pay no attention to the captain and refuse to carry out whatever orders he should give; for instance, to stand erect in the ship when ordered to sit down, simply if he took a notion to do so; and if he were on occasion ordered to bale or help hoist the sails, neither to bale nor lay hold of the ropes; this man, too, he would not call free or enviable, because he does what seems best to himself.
[6] αὑτῷ. καὶ μὴν τούς γε στρατιώτας οὐκ ἂν φαίη δούλους εἶναι, διότι ὑπήκοοί εἰσι τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, καὶ τότε ἀνίστανται ὁπόταν ἐκεῖνος προστάξῃ, καὶ σῖτον αἱροῦνται καὶ ὅπλα λαμβάνουσι καὶ παρατάττονται καὶ ἐπίασι καὶ ἀναχωροῦσιν οὐκ ἄλλως ἢ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ κελεύσαντος: οὐδέ γε τοὺς κάμνοντας, ὅτι πείθονται τοῖς
[6] And surely one would not call soldiers slaves because they are subject to their general’s orders and spring to their feet the moment he gives a command, and partake of food and lay hold of their weapons and fall in and advance and retire only at their general’s order. Neither will they call persons who are sick slaves because they must obey their physicians.
[7] ἰατροῖς, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο φήσουσι δούλους εἶναι: καίτοι οὐ σμικρά γε οὐδὲ ῥᾴδια πείθονται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν ἐνίοτε προστάττουσι: κἂν δόξῃ ποτὲ τῷ ἰατρῷ τὸν κάμνοντα δῆσαι, παραχρῆμα ἐδέθη, κἂν τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι, καυθήσεται καὶ τμηθήσεται ἐφ̓ ὅσον ἂν ἐκείνῳ δοκῇ: ἐὰν δὲ μὴ πείθηται, πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῷ ἰατρῷ συναγωνιοῦνται, οὐ μόνον οἱ ἐλεύθεροι, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις οἱ τοῦ νοσοῦντος οἰκέται αὐτοὶ καταδοῦσι τὸν δεσπότην, καὶ τὸ πῦρ κομίζουσιν, ὅπως καυθήσεται, καὶ τἄλλα ὑπηρετοῦσιν.
[7] And yet the orders which they obey are neither insignificant nor easy to carry out, but at times they order them to do without both food and drink; and if the physician decides at any time to bind the patient, he is straightway bound; and if he decides to use the knife or cautery, the patient will be burned and cut to the extent that the physician decides is best. And if the sick man refuses to obey, all the household will help the physician to cope with him, and not the free alone, but often the sick man’s domestics themselves bind their master and fetch the fire that he may suffer cautery, and give any other assistance.
[8] μὴ οὖν οὐ φῂς ἐλεύθερον εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ἀηδῆ ἑτέρου κελεύοντος ὑπομένει; οὐ γὰρ δήπου τὸν Περσῶν βασιλέα Δαρεῖον οὐκ ἂν ἔφης ἐλεύθερον εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ καταπεσὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵππου ἐν κυνηγεσίοις, τοῦ ἀστραγάλου ἐκχωρήσαντος, ὑπήκουε τοῖς ἰατροῖς ἕλκουσι καὶ στρεβλοῦσιν αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα, ὅπως καταστήσεται τὸ ἄρθρον, καὶ ταῦτα Αἰγυπτίοις ἀνθρώποις: οὐδ̓ αὖ Ξέρξην, ὁπηνίκα ἀναχωρῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ χειμαζόμενος ἐν τῇ νηὶ πάντα ἐπείθετο τῷ κυβερνήτῃ καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου γνώμην οὐκ ἐπέτρεπεν αὑτῷ οὐδὲ νεῦσαι οὐδὲ μεταβῆναι. οὔκουν τὸ μηδενὸς ἀνθρώπων ὑπακούειν οὐδὲ τὸ πράττειν ὅ,τι ἄν τις ἐθέλῃ ἐλευθερίαν ἔτι φήσουσιν εἶναι. [p. 229]
[8] You do not say, do you, that this man is not free because he endures many unpleasant things at another’s command? Surely you would not have denied, for instance, that Darius, the King of the Persians, was a free man when, after suffering a fall from his horse in a hunt and dislocating his ankle, he obeyed the surgeons while they pulled and twisted his foot in order to set the joint, and that too alt
hough they were Egyptians. Nor, to take another instance, would you have denied that Xerxes was a free man, when on his retreat from Greece a storm arose and he while aboard the ship obeyed the captain in everything and would not permit himself against the captain’s judgement even to nod or to change his position. Therefore they will not persist in maintaining that rendering obedience to no man or doing whatever one likes constitutes freedom.
[9] ἀλλ̓ ἴσως ἐροῦσιν ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ αὑτῶν συμφέροντι ὑπακούουσιν, ὡς οἱ πλέοντες τῷ κυβερνήτῃ καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται τῷ στρατηγῷ, καὶ οἱ κάμνοντες δὲ τῷ ἰατρῷ διὰ τοῦτο πείθονται. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλ̓ ἄττα προστάττουσιν οὗτοι ἢ τὰ συμφέροντα αὐτοῖς. οἱ δέ γε δεσπόται τοῖς δούλοις οὐ ταῦτα ἐπιτάττουσιν ἃ ἐκείνοις
[9] But perhaps they will counter by saying that these men obey for their own advantage, just as people on shipboard obey the captain and soldiers their general, and that the sick for this reason give heed to their physician, that they prescribe nothing but what is for the advantage of their patients. But masters, they will assert, do not order their slaves to do what will benefit them, but what they think will be of profit to themselves.
[10] συνοίσει, ἀλλ̓ ὅπερ αὑτοῖς οἴονται λυσιτελεῖν. τί δή; ἆρά γε συμφέρει τῷ δεσπότῃ τὸ τεθνάναι τὸν οἰκέτην ἢ νοσεῖν ἢ πονηρὸν εἶναι; οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον οἶμαι τό τε ζῆν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ χρηστὸν εἶναι. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα φανεῖται καὶ τῷ οἰκέτῃ συμφέροντα: ὥστε καὶ τῷ οἰκέτῃ ὁ δεσπότης οὐδὲν ἧττον, ἄνπερ ἔχῃ νοῦν, τὰ συμφέροντα ἐκείνῳ προστάξει: ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται συμφέρειν.
Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom Page 234
