[22] A. “But what have you to say to this: Do you not think that I could liberate myself?”
B. “Yes, if you should raise the money somewhere to pay your master with.”
A. “That is not the method I mean, but the one by which Cyrus freed not only himself but also all the Persians, great host that they were, without paying down money to anyone or being set free by any master. Or do you not know that Cyrus was the vassal of Astyages and that when he got the power and decided that the time was ripe for action, he became both free and king of all Asia?”
B. “Granted; I know it. But what do you mean by saying that I might become a slave?”
[23] ἐγένετο τῆς Ἀσίας ἁπάσης; Εἶεν: ἐμὲ δὲ πῶς φῂς δοῦλον ἂν γενέσθαι; Ὅτι μυρίοι δήπου ἀποδίδονται ἑαυτοὺς ἐλεύθεροι ὄντες, ὥστε δουλεύειν κατὰ συγγραφὴν ἐνίοτε ἐπ̓ οὐδενὶ τῶν μετρίων, ἀλλ̓ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς χαλεπωτάτοις. Τέως μὲν οὖν προσεῖχον τοῖς λόγοις οἱ παρόντες, ὡς οὐ μετὰ σπουδῆς λεγομένοις μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ παιδιᾶς: ὕστερον δὲ ἐφιλονίκουν, καὶ ἐδόκει ἄτοπον εἶναι, εἰ μηδὲν ἔσται εἰπεῖν τεκμήριον, ᾧ τις ἀναμφιλόγως διακρινεῖ τὸν δοῦλον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐλευθέρου, ἀλλ̓
[23] A. “I mean that great numbers of men, we may suppose, who are free-born sell themselves, so that they are slaves by contract, sometimes on no easy terms but the most severe imaginable.”
Now up to this point the audience paid attention to their arguments, under the impression that they were not made so much in earnest as in jest. Yet afterwards they fell to wrangling and were inclined to the opinion that it was a strange thing if it was going to be impossible for a man to cite any evidence by which the slave could be unequivocally distinguished from the free man, but that it would be easy to debate and argue about every individual case.
[24] εὐμαρὲς ἔσοιτο περὶ παντὸς ἀμφισβητεῖν καὶ ἀντιλέγειν. ἀφέντες οὖν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου σκοπεῖν καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου δουλείας ἐσκόπουν ὅστις εἴη δοῦλος. [p. 239] καὶ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς, ὃν ἄν τις ᾖ κεκτημένος κυρίως, ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι τῶν αὑτοῦ χρημάτων ἢ βοσκημάτων, ὥστε ἐξεῖναι αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι ό,τι βούλεται, οὗτος ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι δοῦλος τοῦ κεκτημένου. πάλιν οὖν ἠμφεσβήτει ὁ περὶ τῆς δουλείας ἀντιλέγων
[24] So they dropped their discussion about the particular man in question and his slavery, and proceeded to consider the general question: Who is a slave. And the consensus of their opinion was that when anyone gets possession of a human being, in the strict meaning of the term, just as he might of any item of his goods or cattle, so as to have the right to use him as he likes, then that man is both correctly called and in fact is the slave of the man into whose possession he has come.
Consequently, the man who had objected to being called a slave raised the further question as to what constituted the validity of possession.
[25] ό,τι ποτὲ εἴη τὸ κύριον τῆς κτήσεως. καὶ γὰρ οἰκίαν καὶ χωρίον καὶ ἵππον καὶ βοῦν πολλοὺς ἤδη φανῆναι τῶν κεκτημένων πολὺν χρόνον οὐ δικαίως ἔχοντας, ἐνίους δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν πατέρων παρειληφότας: οὕτως δὴ καὶ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἀδίκως κεκτῆσθαι. καὶ γὰρ δὴ τῶν κτωμένων εἶναι τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ξύμπαντα, οἱ μὲν παῤ ἄλλων λαμβάνουσιν ἢ χαρισαμένου τινὸς ἢ κληρονομήσαντες ἢ πριάμενοι, τινὲς δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοὺς παρὰ σφίσι γεννηθέντας, οὓς οἰκογενεῖς καλοῦσιν. τρίτος δὲ κτήσεως τρόπος, όταν ἐν πολέμῳ λαβὼν αἰχμάλωτον ἢ καὶ ληϊσάμενος, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἔχῃ καταδουλωσάμενος, ὅσπερ οἶμαι πρεσβύτατος ἁπάντων ἐστίν. τοὺς γὰρ πρώτους γενομένους δούλους οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐκ δούλων φῦναι τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ λῃστείας ἢ πολέμῳ
[25] For, he said, in the case of a house, a plot of land, a horse, or a cow, many of those who had possession had in the past been found to have held them for a long time unjustly, in some instances even though they had inherited the things from their fathers. In precisely the same way it was possible, he maintained, to have gained possession also of a human being unjustly. For manifestly of those who from time to time acquire slaves, as they acquire all other pieces of property, some get them from others either as a free gift from someone or by inheritance or by purchase, whereas some few from the very beginning have possession of those who were born under their roof, ‘home-bred’ slaves as they call them. A third method of acquiring possession is when a man takes a prisoner in war or even in brigandage and in this way holds the man after enslaving him, the oldest method of all, I presume. For it is not likely that the first men to become slaves were born of slaves in the first place, but that they were overpowered in brigandage or war and thus compelled to be slaves to their captors.
[26] κρατηθέντας οὕτως ἀναγκασθῆναι δουλεύειν τοῖς λαβοῦσιν. οὐκοῦν οὗτος ὁ παλαιότατος τρόπος, ἐξ οὗ πάντες οἱ λοιποὶ ἤρτηνται, σφόδρα ἀσθενὴς καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχων ἰσχυρόν: ὅταν γάρ ποτε δυνηθῶσιν ἐκεῖνοι πάλιν ἀποφυγεῖν, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐλευθέρους εἶναι αὐτούς, ὡς ἀδίκως δουλεύοντας: ὥστε οὐδὲ πρότερόν ποτε δοῦλοι ἦσαν. ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐ μόνον αὐτοὶ ἀπέφυγον τὴν δουλείαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς δεσπότας κατεδουλώσαντο. κἀνταῦθα ἤδη, φασίν, ὀστράκου μεταπεσόντος ἅπαν γίγνεται τοὐναντίον τῶν πρότερον. εἶπεν οὖν τις τῶν παρόντων ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι μὲν αὐτοὶ ἴσως οὐκ ἂν λέγοιντο δοῦλοι, τοῖς δὲ ἐξ ἐκείνων γενομένοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις καὶ τοῖς τρίτοις κυρίως ἂν ἤδη προσήκοι τοῦ ὀνόματος. Καὶ
[26] So we see that this earliest method, upon which all the others depend, is exceedingly vulnerable and has no validity at all; for just as soon as those men are able to make their escape, there is nothing to prevent them from being free as having been in servitude unjustly. Consequently, they were not slaves before that, either. And sometimes they not only escaped from slavery themselves, but also reduced their masters to slavery. In this case, also, we have now found that ‘at the flip of a shell,’ as the saying goes, their positions are completely reversed.
At this point one of the audience interjected that while those men themselves perhaps could not be called slaves, yet their children and those of the second and third generations could quite properly be so designated.
[27] πῶς; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἁλῶναι ποιεῖ δουλεύειν, αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἑαλωκόσι μᾶλλον τούτου προσήκοι ἂν ἢ τοῖς ἐξ ἐκείνων: εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐκ δούλων γεγονέναι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐξ ἐλευθέρων ὄντες τῶν ἑαλωκότων [p. 240] οἱ μετ̓ αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἂν εἶεν οἰκέται. καὶ γὰρ
δὴ ὁρῶμεν ἐκείνους Μεσσηνίους, δἰ ὅσων ἐτῶν οὐ μόνον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
[27] “But how can that be? For if being captured makes a man a slave, the men who themselves were captured deserve that appellation more than their descendants do; and if it is having been born of slaves that makes men so, it is clear that by virtue of being sprung from those who were taken captive and were consequently free-born, their descendants would not be slaves. For instance, we see that those famous Messenians after the lapse of so many years recovered not only their freedom but their territory as well.
[28] τὴν χώραν ἐκομίσαντο τὴν αὑτῶν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡττήθησαν ἐν Λεύκτροις ὑπὸ Θηβαίων Λακεδαιμόνιοι, στρατεύσαντες εἰς Πελοπόννησον Θηβαῖοι μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων ἠνάγκασαν τήν τε χώραν τὴν Μεσσηνίαν ἀποδοῦναι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ ὅσοι ἦσαν ἀπ̓ ἐκείνων γεγονότες, δουλεύοντας πρότερον παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις, τοὺς Εἴλωτας λεγομένους, κατῴκισαν πάλιν εἰς Μεσσήνην. καὶ ταῦτα οὐδείς φησιν ἀδίκως πεποιηκέναι τοὺς Θηβαίους, ἀλλὰ παγκάλως καὶ δικαίως. ὥστε εἴπερ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος οὐ δίκαιός ἐστι τῆς κτήσεως, ἐξ οὗ πάντες οἱ λοιποὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσι, κινδυνεύει μηδὲ ἄλλος μηθεὶς εἶναι, μηδὲ τῷ ὄντι κατ̓ ἀλήθειαν δοῦλος λέγεσθαι.
[28] For when the Spartans were defeated at Leuctra by the Thebans, the latter marched into the Peloponnese supported by their allies, and not only compelled the Spartans to give back the Messenian territory, but settled in Messene again all the original Messenians’ descendants, the Helots as they were called, who had previously been in servitude to the Spartans. And not a man says that the Thebans therein acted unjustly, but all agree that altogether nobly and justly. Consequently, if this method of gaining possession, from which all the others take their beginning, is not just, it is likely that no other one is either, and that the term ‘slave’ does not in reality correspond to the truth.
[29] ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ᾖ λεγόμενος ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ δοῦλος, ὑπὲρ ὅτου ἀργύριόν τις τοῦ σώματος κατέβαλεν ἢ ὃς ἂν ἐκ δούλων λεγομένων ᾖ γεγονώς, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὅσπερ ἀνελεύθερος καὶ δουλοπρεπής. τῶν μὲν γὰρ λεγομένων δούλων πολλοὺς ὁμολογήσομεν δήπου εἶναι ἐλευθερίους, τῶν δέ γε ἐλευθέρων πολλοὺς πάνυ δουλοπρεπεῖς. ἔστι δὲ ὡς περὶ τοὺς γενναίους καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς. τούτους γὰρ οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὠνόμασαν τοὺς εὖ γεγονότας πρὸς ἀρετήν, οὐδὲν πολυπραγμονοῦντες ἐκ τίνων εἰσίν: ὕστερον δὲ οἱ ἐκ τῶν πάλαι πλουσίων καὶ τῶν ἐνδόξων ὑπό τινων
[29] “But perhaps it was not in this way that the term ‘slave’ was originally applied — that is, to a person for whose body someone paid money, or, as the majority think, to one who was sprung from persons who were called slaves, but rather to the man who lacked a free man’s spirit and was of a servile nature. For of those who are called slaves we will, I presume, admit that many have the spirit of free men, and that among free men there are many who are altogether servile. The case is the same with those known as ‘noble’ and ‘well-born.’ For those who originally applied these names applied them to persons who were well-born in respect to virtue or excellence, not bothering to inquire who their parents were. Then afterwards the descendants of families of ancient wealth and high repute were called ‘well-born’ by a certain class.
[30] εὐγενεῖς ἐκλήθησαν. τούτου δὲ σημεῖον σαφέστατον: ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀλεκτρυόνων καὶ τῶν ἵππων καὶ τῶν κυνῶν διέμεινε τὸ ὄνομα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶχε τὸ παλαιόν. ὁ γὰρ ἵππον θεασάμενος θυμοειδῆ καὶ γαῦρον καὶ πρὸς δρόμον εὖ ἔχοντα, οὐ πυθόμενος εἴτε ἐξ Ἀρκαδίας ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἔτυχεν ὢν εἴτε ἐκ Μηδίας εἴτε Θετταλός, φησὶν εὐγενῆ τὸν ἵππον αὐτὸν κρίνων. ὁμοίως δὲ ὃς ἂν ἔμπειρος ᾖ κυνῶν, ἐὰν κύνα ἴδῃ ταχεῖαν καὶ πρόθυμον καὶ συνετὴν περὶ τὸ ἴχνος, οὐθὲν ἐπιζητεῖ πότερον ἐκ Καρῶν τὸ γένος ἢ Λάκαινα ἢ ἀλλαχόθεν ποθέν, ἀλλά φησι γενναίαν τὴν κύνα: τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἐπ̓ ἀλεκτρυόνος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
[30] Of this fact there is the clearest indication: for in the case of cocks and horses and dogs the designation was retained, just as it had been applied to men in olden times. For instance, when one sees a spirited and mettlesome horse that is well built for racing, without stopping first to enquire whether its sire by any chance came from Arcadia or from Media or is Thessalian, he judges the horse on its own merits and says that it is ‘well-bred.’ And it is the same with any connoisseur of dogs: whenever he sees a dog that is swift and keen and sagacious in following the scent, he does not go on to enquire whether it is of Carian or Spartan or some other breed, but says that it is a ‘noble’ dog. And it is exactly the same in regard to the cock and the other animals.
[31] ζῴων. οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐπ̓ ἀνθρώπων οὕτως ἔχοι ἄν. ὥστε [p. 241] ὃς ἂν ᾖ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καλῶς γεγονώς, τοῦτον προσήκει γενναῖον λέγεσθαι, κἂν μηθεὶς ἐπίστηται τοὺς γονέας αὐτοῦ μηδὲ τοὺς προγόνους. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ οἷόν τε γενναῖον μὲν εἶναί τινα, μὴ εὐγενῆ δὲ τοῦτον, οὐδ̓ εὐγενῆ ὄντα μὴ ἐλεύθερον εἶναι: ὥστε καὶ τὸν ἀγεννῆ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη δοῦλον εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ δὴ εἰ τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ τὸ τῆς δουλείας ἔθος ἦν ἐπί τε ἵππων λέγεσθαι καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνων καὶ κυνῶν, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλους μὲν γενναίους εἶναι ἐλέγομεν, ἄλλους δὲ ἐλευθέρους, οὐδὲ ἄλλους μὲν δούλους, ἄλλους δὲ
[31] Therefore it is clear that it would be the same in the case of a man also. And so when a man is well-born in respect to virtue, it is right to call him ‘noble,’ even if no one knows his parents or his ancestors either.
“But,” you will object, “it is impossible for anyone to be ‘noble’ without being ‘well-born’ at the same time, or for one who is ‘well-born’ not to be free; hence we are absolutely obliged to conclude that it is the man of ignoble birth who is a slave. For surely, if it were the custom to use the terms freedom and slavery with reference to horses and cocks and dogs, we should not call some ‘noble’ and others ‘free,’ nor say that some were ‘slaves’ while others were of ‘ignoble’ birth or breed.
[32] ἀγεννεῖς. ὁμοίως δὴ καὶ ἐπ̓ ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἄλλους μὲν εἰκός ἐστι γενναίους καὶ εὐγενεῖς λέγειν, ἄλλους δὲ ἐλευθέρους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς αὐτούς, οὐδὲ ἄλλους μὲν ἀγεννεῖς καὶ ταπεινούς, ἄλλους δὲ δούλους. καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀποφαίνει ὁ λόγος οὐ τοὺς φιλοσ
όφους μεταφέροντας τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν.
[32] “In the same way, then, when we are speaking of men, it is not reasonable to call some ‘noble’ and ‘well-born,’ and others ‘free’; but we should make no distinction between the two classes. Nor is it reasonable either to say that some are of ignoble birth and mean, and that others are slaves.
“In this way, then, our argument shows that it is not the philosophers who misuse the terms but the common run of ignorant men, because they know nothing about the matter.”
THE SIXTEENTH DISCOURSE: ON PAIN AND DISTRESS OF SPIRIT
ΠΕΡΙ ΛΥΠΗΣ.
THE SIXTEENTH DISCOURSE: ON PAIN AND DISTRESS OF SPIRIT
This Discourse, given in the form of an address (διάλεξις), would seem also to belong to the period of Dio’s exile, because it was then that he needed the comfort which this discourse gives. He teaches the Stoic doctrine that since there are so many things in life to hurt us, we should fortify our spirits so as to be insensible to them.
Von Arnim (Leben und Werke, ff.) draws attention to the fact that this Discourse, just like Discourses 14, 17, 24, 27, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, and 80, begins by mentioning a common fault of ordinary men in order to combat it.
[1] Τὸ μὲν ὑφ̓ ἡδονῆς κρατεῖσθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς αἰτίαν ἴσως ἔχει: κηλούμενοι γὰρ καὶ γοητευόμενοι παρὰ ταύτῃ μένουσι: τὸ δὲ λύπῃ δεδουλῶσθαι παντελῶς ἄλογον καὶ θαυμαστόν. ὀδυνώμενοι γὰρ καὶ βασανιζόμενοι τῇ χαλεπωτάτῃ πασῶν βασάνῳ μένομεν ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν ἐλευθεροῦντα ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀπαλλάσσοντα τῆς ἀλγηδόνος οὐ προσιέμεθα. καίτοι τί μὲν ταπεινότερον ἀνδρὸς λυπουμένου; τί δὲ οὕτως αἰσχρὸν θέαμα; καθικνεῖται καὶ γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ τοῦ σώματος τὸ πάθος καὶ τοῦτο συστέλλει καὶ σκυθρωπὸν
Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom Page 238
