[1] εἰκὸς μέν ἐστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ῥόδιοι, τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑμῶν ἐμὲ νομίζειν ὑπὲρ ἰδίου τινὸς πράγματος ἐντευξόμενον ὑμῖν ἀφῖχθαι: ὥστε ἐπειδὰν αἴσθησθε τῶν ὑμετέρων τι κοινῶν ἐγχειροῦντα ἐπανορθοῦν, δυσχερανεῖτε ἴσως, εἰ μήτε πολίτης ὢν μήτε κληθεὶς ὑφ᾽ ὑμῶν ἔπειτα ἀξιῶ συμβουλεύειν, καὶ ταῦτα ὑπὲρ οὐδενὸς ὧν σκεψόμενοι συνεληλύθατε.
The Thirty-first Discourse: The Rhodian Oration
It is reasonable to suppose, men of Rhodes, that the majority of you are thinking that I have come to talk to you about some private matter; consequently, when you perceive that I am attempting to set right a matter which concerns your own general interests, you will perhaps be vexed that I, who am neither a citizen nor have been invited to come here, yet venture to offer advice, and that too concerning no one of the subjects for the consideration of which you have assembled.
[2] ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὲν ὑμῖν ἀκούσασιν ἢ μηδὲν τῶν δεόντων ἢ περί τινος τῶν μὴ πάνυ ἀναγκαίων φανῶ λέγων, δικαίως ἂν ἀμφότερά φημι δόξειν, ἅμα εὐήθης καὶ περίεργος: ἐὰν δ᾽ ὡς οἷόν τε καὶ περὶ μεγίστου πράγματος, καὶ τούτου σφόδρα φαύλως ἔχοντος, ὥστε δημοσίᾳ τὴν πόλιν ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ διαβεβλῆσθαι καὶ πάντας ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦντας καθ᾽ ἒν τοῦτο δόξης οὐ προσηκούσης τυγχάνειν, εἰκότως ἄν μοι χάριν ἔχοιτε καὶ νομίζοιτε εὔνουν ἑαυτοῖς. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ μὴ πάνυ τις ὑμᾶς ἀγαπᾷ, τοῖς γε ἄλλοις οὐθὲν μέλει δήπου τῶν ὑμῖν τινα φερόντων αἰσχύνην ἢ βλάβην.
[2] But for my part, if after hearing me you find that the topic on which I am speaking is either inappropriate or not altogether urgent, I say that I shall be rightly regarded as both foolish and officious. But if you find that my topic is really of the greatest possible importance, and, furthermore, that the situation of which I speak is very bad indeed, so that the state as such is in evil repute on that account, and that you yourselves, one and all, though you bear a good reputation in everything else, in this one matter do not enjoy the general esteem to which you are entitled, you would have good reason to be grateful to me and to regard me as a true friend of yours. For it is evident that even if any person is not altogether content with you, the world at large, as you presumably know, cares not at all about those matters which may bring upon you some shame or injury.
[3] οὐκοῦν ἄτοπον, εἰ μὲν ἀργύριόν τις ὑμῖν ἐχαρίζετο ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, ξένος ἢ μέτοικος, τοῦτον μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἡγεῖσθε περίεργον, ὅτι μηδὲν προσήκειν δοκῶν ἐφιλοτιμεῖτο μηδ᾽ ὑμῶν ἀπαιτούντων: συμβουλεύοντος δέ τι τῶν χρησίμων δυσχερέστερον ἀκούσεσθε, ὃς ἂν μὴ τύχῃ κληθεὶς ἢ μὴ πολίτης ὑπάρχῃ; καίτοι χρημάτων μὲν οὔθ᾽ ὑμεῖς σφόδρα ἴσως ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῖσθε, καὶ μυρίους ἔστιν εὑρεῖν, οἷς μᾶλλον ἀφελοῦσι τῶν ὄντων συνέφερε: γνώμης δὲ ἀγαθῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεὶς ὁ μὴ δεόμενος [p. 220] ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον, οὐδ᾽ ὁ κάλλιστα πράττειν δοκῶν.
[3] Is it not, therefore, very strange that, whereas if a man, a foreigner or a resident alien, were offering you a gift of money out of his own means, you would not consider him officious just because, although under no apparent obligation to do so, he was zealous on your behalf even though you did not demand it, and yet, if a man offers you useful advice, just because he happens not to have been invited to do so or is not a citizen you are going to listen with considerable vexation to whatever he has to say? And yet as for money, perhaps you are in no pressing need of it at the present moment, and, besides, thousands can be found to whom it would be a greater benefit to have taken away from them some of the money they have; but as for good advice, there is no one who does not stand in need of it at every moment and for every circumstance of life, even the man who is regarded as most successful.
[4] εἰ μὲν οὖν περί τινος τῶν προκειμένων ἔλεγον, οὐθὲν ἂν ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ τηλικοῦτον ὠφελεῖσθε: εἰκὸς γὰρ ἦν καὶ καθ᾽ αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς τὸ δέον εὑρεῖν σκοποῦντάς γε ἅπαξ: ἐπεὶ δὲ ὑπὲρ οὗ μηδὲ ζητεῖτε τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅπως ποτὲ ἔχει, τοῦτό φημι δείξειν αἴσχισταγιγνόμενον, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴην παντελῶς ὑμῖν χρήσιμον πρᾶγμα πεποιηκώς, ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ φανῶ ψευδόμενος; νομίζω δ᾽ ἔγωγε πάντα μὲν προσήκειν ἀποδέχεσθαι τῶν δι᾽ εὔνοιαν ὁτιοῦν λεγόντων καὶ μηδένα ὀχληρὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων, μάλιστα δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ῥόδιοι. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τούτου χάριν σύνιτε βουλευόμενοικαθ᾽ ἡμέραν, καὶ οὐ καθάπερ ἄλλοι δυσκόλως καὶ διὰ χρόνου καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων τινὲς εἶναι δοκούντων, ὅπως ὑμῖν ᾖ σχολὴ περὶ πάντων ἀκούειν καὶ μηδὲν ἀνεξέταστον παραλίπητε.
[4] Now if I were speaking about one of the questions which are before you, you would not be so greatly benefited by me, for you would be reasonably sure to arrive at the proper conclusion by yourselves if you were once to consider the problem. But since, in discussing the matter concerning which you are not even making any attempt at all to ascertain what the situation is, I assert that I shall prove that it is being most disgracefully managed, shall I not have done you an altogether useful service — that is, if I shall, indeed, prove not to be misrepresenting the facts? And what I think myself is, that it is right to welcome any man who, moved by a spirit of friendliness, has anything whatever to say, and to regard no such one as a nuisance, and especially, that you, men of Rhodes, should do so. For evidently the reason that you come together to deliberate every day and not, as other people do, reluctantly and at intervals and with only a few of you who are regarded as free-born being present, is that you may have leisure to hear about all matters and may leave nothing unexamined.
[5] ταυτὶ μὲν οὖν ἦν ἀναγκαῖον προειπεῖν, ὥστε τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος γενέσθαι: νυνὶ δὲ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ βαδιοῦμαι, τοσοῦτονὑπειπὼν, ὅτι μοι προσήκειν δοκεῖ πάντα μὲν πράττειν δικαίως καὶ καλῶς τὰ κατὰ τὸν βίον, ἄλλως τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ ποιοῦντας ὁτιοῦν, οὐ μόνον ἐπειδὴ τὰ κοινὰ ὑπάρχει φανερώτερα, ὧν ἂν ἕκαστος ἰδίᾳ πράττῃ μὴ δέον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι᾽ ἐκεῖνο ὅτι τὰ μὲν τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ἁμαρτήματα οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀποφαίνει τὴν πόλιν φαύλην, ἐκδὲ τῶν δημοσίᾳ γιγνομένων οὐχ ὃν προσήκει τρόπον ἀνάγκη δοκεῖν καὶ τοὺς καθ᾽ ἕνα μοχθηρούς.
[5] So much it was necessary to say by way of preface in order that you might understand the situation at the very beginning; and now I shall proceed to t
he subject itself, after simply adding that I think it is our duty to conduct all the affairs of life justly and honourably, and especially is it the duty of those who do anything in the name of the people; not only because official acts are more readily observed than private misdeeds, but also because, while the mistakes of persons in private station do not at once put the city in a bad light, improper action in public affairs inevitably causes every individual citizen to be looked upon as a knave.
[6] ὁποῖοι γὰρ ἂν ὦσιν οἱ πλείους ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ, τοιοῦτον φαίνεται καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἦθος: τὰ γὰρ τούτοις ἀρέσκοντα ἰσχύει δήπουθεν, οὐχ ἕτερα. μάλιστα δ᾽ ἂν φαίην ἔγωγε τοῖς καλλίστοις καὶ σεμνοτάτοις οἰκεῖον εἶναι χρῆσθαι προσέχοντας:παρ᾽ οἷς γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀμελεῖται, καὶ κακίαν τινὰ ἐμφαίνει τῆς πόλεως τῶν τε ἄλλων οὐδὲν οἷόν τε ἐπιτηδείως πράττεσθαι.
[6] For in a democracy the character of the majority is obviously the character of the state, since it is their will, surely, and no one else’s, that prevails. And I myself would venture to say that it is especially fitting that the majority should scrupulously observe the noblest and most sacred obligations; for in the state where such considerations are neglected, such neglect even reveals a sort of vicious defect in the body politic and no other matter can be properly administered.
[7] καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἐξῃρημένων, ἃ δεῖ μέγιστα ἡγεῖσθαι, τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδέν ἐστι κάλλιον οὐδὲ δικαιότερον ἢ τιμᾶν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ τῶν εὖ ποιησάντων μεμνῆσθαινομίζω μηδὲ λόγου δεῖσθαι: καίτοι καὶ τὸ συμφέρον οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐν τούτῳ τις ἂν ἴδοι. τοὺς γὰρ σπουδαίους ὄντας περὶ τοὺς εὐεργέτας [p. 221] καὶ τοῖς ἠγαπηκόσι δικαίως χρωμένους πάντες ἡγοῦνται χάριτος ἀξίους καὶ βούλοιτ᾽ ἂν ἕκαστος ὠφελεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν: ἐκ δὲ τοῦ πολλοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς εὐνοοῦντας καὶ συμπράττοντας, ὅταν ᾖ καιρός, καὶ πόλις πᾶσα καὶ ἰδιώτης ἀσφαλέστερον διάγει.
[7] Furthermore, if we except the honours which we owe the gods, which we must regard as first in importance, of all other actions there is nothing nobler or more just than to show honour to our good men and to keep in remembrance those who have served us well — that is my opinion and needs no argument; and yet one may most clearly see in the principle also a practical advantage. For those who take seriously their obligations toward their benefactors and mete out just treatment to those who have loved them, all men regard as worthy of their favour, and without exception each would wish to benefit them to the best of his ability; and as a result of having many who are well-disposed and who give assistance whenever there is occasion, not only the state as a whole, but also the citizen in private station lives in greater security.
[8] ταῦτα τοίνυν ἡγεῖσθε, ἄνδρες Ῥόδιοι, πάνυ φαύλως παρ᾽ ὑμῖν ἔχοντα καὶ τῆς πόλεως οὐκ ἀξίως, τὰ περὶ τοὺς εὐεργέτας λέγω καὶ τὰς τιμὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐκ ἀρχῆθεν ὑμῶν οὕτω τῷ πράγματι χρωμένων: πόθεν; τοὐναντίον γὰρ ὥσπερ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα τῶν ὑμετέρων διαφερόντως ἄν τις ἀποδέξαιτο καὶ θαυμάσειεν, οὕτω μοι δοκεῖτε καὶ τιμῆς μάλιστα προνοῆσαι: γνοίη δ᾽ ἄν τις εἰς τὸ τῶν εἰκόνων πλῆθος ἀπιδών: μοχθηροῦ δὲ ἄλλως κατεσχηκότος ἔθους ἔκ τινος χρόνου, καὶ μήτε τιμωμένου λοιπὸν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν μηδενός, εἰ βούλεσθε τἀληθὲς εἰδέναι, τῶν τε πρότερον γενναίων ἀνδρῶν καὶ περὶ τὴν πόλιν προθύμων, οὐκ ἰδιωτῶν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλέων καί τινων δήμων ὑβριζομένων καὶ τὰς τιμὰς ἀποστερουμένων.
Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom Page 260
