[10] Again, what armour, what defences does he possess for protection against these efforts such as both kings and generals have against a foe? What allies or bodyguards can he employ against them, unless it be words of wisdom and prudence? Whom else can he bid do sentry duty or trust to stand guard, or what servants can he employ? Is he not, on the contrary, obliged to hold this watch himself both night and day, with anxious thought and vigilance, lest, ere he is aware of it, he may be excited by pleasures or terrified by fears or tricked by lust or brought low by pain and so be made to abandon those acts which are best and most righteous, turning traitor to himself?
[11] βελτίστων καὶ δικαιοτάτων ἔργων προδότης αὑτοῦ γενόμενος; τῷ δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ἰσχυρῶς καὶ ἐγκρατῶς ἄρχοντι οὐ χαλεπὸν ἤδη καὶ συμπάντων ἀνθρώπων κρείττω γίγνεσθαι. ὁπόταν δὲ ταῦτα διεξίω περὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων, μηδείς με ἡγείσθω πρὸς τὸ σχῆμα ἀφορῶντα λέγειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὄνομα. οὔτε γὰρ τὸν οἶνον ἐκ τοῦ κεράμου κρίνουσιν οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες: πολλάκις γὰρ εὑρήσεις ἐν σπουδαίῳ κεράμῳ τὸν ἐκ τῶν καπηλείων οἶνον ἐξεστηκότα: οὔτε
[11] However, the man who administers this office with firmness and self-control does not find it difficult from then on to show himself superior even to the whole world.
But when I enter into these details regarding philosophers, let no one think I am speaking with a view to the outward appearance and the label. For as sensible men do not judge wine from the jar in which it is stored — for often you will find in an excellent jar the spoiled wine of the taverns — so also they do not judge the man of cultivation by his dress.
[12] τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν πεπαιδευμένον ἐκ τοῦ σχήματος. τοὺς μέντοι πολλοὺς οὐ θαυμάζω ἐξαπατᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου. τὸν γὰρ Ὀδυσσέα καὶ τὸν Ἶρον οἱ μνηστῆρες συνέβαλον διὰ τὸ σχῆμα ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντας. ἔφη δέ τις τῶν ὀλίγῳ πρότερον φιλοσόφων οὐ φαῦλον, τὸ Ἰσμηνίου τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀγανακτεῖν, τὸ καλεῖσθαι αὐλητὰς τοὺς τυμβαύλας, οὐ παντελῶς ὅμοιον ὄν, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. οὐ γὰρ βλάπτουσιν οὐδὲν οἱ τυμβαῦλαι τοὺς νεκροὺς οὐδ̓ ἐνοχλοῦσιν, τῶν δὲ προσποιουμένων φιλοσοφεῖν ἔνιοι καὶ πολλὰ χαλεπὰ ἐργάζονται.
[12] Yet I am not surprised that most men are deceived by such a thing as that. For example, the suitors pitted Odysseus against Irus because of their dress, supposing the two to be no different. But one of the philosophers who lived a short time ago has well said that it made Ismenias especially angry that the pipers at funerals should be called flautists, though that is not quite the same thing, it seems to me. For the pipers at funerals do no harm to the dead nor do they annoy them, whereas some of those who profess to be philosophers really do many grievous things.
[13] ἀλλὰ τοῦ γε ὄντως φιλοσόφου τὸ ἔργον οὐχ ἕτερόν ἐστιν [p. 97] ἢ ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων. ὅστις δὲ ὀκνεῖ τὴν αὑτοῦ πόλιν ἑκοῦσαν καὶ ἐπικαλουμένην διοικεῖν, οὐ φάσκων ἱκανὸς εἶναι, ὅμοιός ἐστιν ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὸ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα θεραπεύειν μὴ θέλοι, ἀξιῶν ἰατρὸς εἶναι, ἄλλους δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἰατρεύοι προθύμως ἀργύριον ἢ τιμὰς λαμβάνων, ὥσπερ ἐλάττω μισθὸν ὄντα ἑτέρου μισθοῦ τὴν ὑγίειαν, ἢ εἴ τις ἀξιῶν ἱκανὸς εἶναι παιδοτρίβης ἢ γραμμάτων διδάσκαλος ἀλλοτρίους μὲν παῖδας θέλοι διδάσκειν, τοὺς δὲ αὑτοῦ πέμποι πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν φαυλοτέρων, ἢ εἴ τις ἀμελήσας τῶν ἑαυτοῦ γονέων ἀλλοτρίους ἐθέλοι προτιμᾶν, οὓς ἂν αἴσθηται πλουσιωτέρους ἐκείνων
[13] However, the function of the real philosopher is nothing else than to rule over human beings. But if a man, alleging that he is not competent, is reluctant to administer his own city when it wishes him to do so and calls upon him, it is as if some one should refuse to treat his own body, though professing to be a physician, and yet should readily treat other men in return for money or honours, just as if his health were a smaller recompense than another kind; or again, it is as if some one who claimed to be an able trainer of athletes or a teacher of letters should be willing to teach the sons of others, but should send his own son to some one else of less standing; or as if some one who neglected his own parents should be ready to prefer the parents of others, provided he found them to be more wealthy or more distinguished than his own.
[14] ἢ μᾶλλον ἐνδόξους. οὔτε γὰρ δικαιότερον οὔτε μὰ Δία ἥδιον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπεριδόντα τοῖς μηδὲν προσήκουσιν ὠφέλιμον γίγνεσθαι. ῾οὐκοῦν τό γε ἀκόλουθόν ἐστι τοῖς λόγοις τούτοις ἄρχειν αὐτὸν βουλομένων ἡμῶν̓. ἀλλ̓ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι εἰ μή τι ἦν ἀδύνατον, οὐκ ἂν περιέμενον ὥστε ὑμᾶς ἀξιοῦν, ἀλλ̓ αὐτὸς ἂν ἠξίουν καὶ παρεκάλουν. ἓν γάρ τι καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τῶν καλῶν καὶ σωφρόνων, αὐτὸν παραγγέλλοντα καὶ χάριν εἰδότα τῆς χειροτονίας ἄρχειν τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθαιροῦντα μηδὲ ἄτιμον τὸ πρᾶγμα ποιήσαντα.
[14] For it is neither more righteous nor, by Heaven, more pleasant to disdain those who are related by ties of blood and then to be of service to those who are not relatives at all.
Very well, the conclusion to be drawn from these remarks is that the philosopher should hold office, since you wish it. However, you may be sure that, if there were not some insuperable obstacle, I should not be waiting to be asked but should myself be asking, yes, entreating you. For this too is a mark of those who are noble and sound-minded, that a man should rule his fellow citizens, himself announcing his candidacy and being grateful for his election instead of depreciating the honour, or even making it a dishonour.
[15] τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἀδύνατον ἐν τῷ παρόντι; ἐγὼ μὲν καὶ τἄλλα ἀξιῶ πιστεύεσθαι, ἐφ̓ ὧν λέγω: οὐδέποτε γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἐξηπάτησα, ὡς ἐγὼ νομίζω, ὑπὲρ οὐδενός: οὐδὲ πρότερον ἄλλως διανοούμενος εἶπον, ἀλλ̓ ἀεὶ πλείους ἀσχολίαι καταλιπεῖν μέχρι τοῦδε οὐχ ἑκόντα με κατέσχηκεν. τὸ δὲ νῦν οὐκέτι ἐγχωρεῖ σχεδόν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐμοὶ οὔτε ἴσως ὑμῖν ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἐμὲ διατρίβειν ἐνθάδε. ὥστε παραιτοῦμαι τὴν ψῆφον. ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἐδεήθη ἐξετάσεως, ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ πρότερον ἐν τῷ φανερῷ πάντες ἐψηφίσασθε, ὁπότε με ὑπενοήσατε βούλεσθαι, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ νῦν ἂν ἐποιήσατε. ἀλλ̓ οὐκ ἔχω οὕτως, ἀλλ̓ ἵνα μὲν ἄρξω, ἐπίσταμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔδει με παρακαλεῖν, ἵνα δὲ ἀφεθῶ, ὑπὲρ τούτου παρακαλῶν οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι. [p. 98]
[15] What, then, is the insuperable obstacle in
the present instance? I think I deserve to be believed in everything else whereof I speak — for in my opinion I have never deceived you in anything, nor have I in the past said one thing and meant another — yet I have always had too many engagements, and against my own inclination I have thus far been prevented from abandoning them. And now it is no longer possible at all, practically speaking. For it is not to my interest, and possibly not to yours either, that I should tarry here. Therefore I beg to decline my election. For I feel sure that I should not have had to submit to investigation, but that, just as previously you elected me unanimously by acclamation when you suspected I was willing to take office, you would have done the same now too. However, I am not so minded; but while I know that in order to hold office I should not have been obliged to call upon you, yet in order to be excused from holding office I am not ashamed to be calling upon you.
THE FIFTIETH DISCOURSE: REGARDING HIS PAST RECORD, SPOKEN BEFORE THE COUNCIL
ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΕΡΓΩΝ ΕΝ ΒΟΥΛΗΙ.
THE FIFTIETH DISCOURSE: REGARDING HIS PAST RECORD, SPOKEN BEFORE THE COUNCIL
This Discourse is really earlier in date than Or. , though the interval between the two is presumably very brief. In the one Dio disclaims the ambition to become archon, announcing his intention to leave Prusa (50.7), in the other he declines that office in an election already in progress, referring to his departure as to an event of the immediate future (49.15). The projected journey is referred to briefly also in the opening sentence of Or. . A possible explanation of the reason for the journey and for the repeated postponement of it is suggested in the Introduction to Or. .
Our Discourse affords no sure clue as to the reason for the meeting of the Council. It may have been a regular session of that body, though we learn (§ 10) that Dio had been charged with having interfered with its convening. At all events the setting for this defence of his past record was highly dramatic. The presiding officer must have been his own son (τὸν υἰὸν τοῦτον, § 5), to whose recent election as archon Dio seems to refer at the close of Or. . Dio himself was a member of the Council, for in § 10 he is at some pains to explain why he has not been in attendance upon earlier sessions.
Arnim argues with some plausibility that, when on a previous occasion Dio had declined election as archon, he had engineered the substitution of his son for that position. We do not know the precise age of the son at the time of his election, but the reference to his inexperience (Or. 48.17) leads us to suppose that he was young for the highest office in the state, and that supposition is confirmed by the concluding sentence of the present Discourse as emended by Capps. What more natural, then, than that Dio’s enemies should have spread the report that the son was merely a cat’s paw for the father, and that, while evading the responsibilities of office, Dio was exercising all its prerogatives — πάντα ἁπλῶς νομίζουσι τὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν γνώμην, § 10? Against that rumour Dio offers the favourite Greek argument of probability, pointing to his previous record and claiming that it would be inconsistent, especially for one of his age, to refrain from exercising the prerogatives of a member of the Council, while at the same time trying to usurp the functions of its presiding officer. The fact that shortly thereafter he was put up as a candidate for that office suggests either that his arguments or his flattery or both had silenced the opposition or else that his foes were really a very small minority. There is in these Bithynian addresses abundant testimony to his popularity and influence at Prusa.
[1] Ἐγὼ καὶ πρότερον μὲν ὑμᾶς ἠγάπων, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ἦν τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἐπιεικῆ καὶ οὐκ ἀνόητον τὸ φρονιμώτατον στέργειν τῆς πατρίδος καὶ βεβαιότατον: τὸ δὲ ὑμῶν ἄλλους προτιμᾶν ὅμοιον ὥσπερ εἴ τις φιλόπολις εἶναι λέγων ταῖς οἰκίαις μὲν ἥδοιτο καὶ τοῖς ἐργαστηρίοις τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὴν δὲ ἀγορὰν καὶ τὸ πρυτανεῖον καὶ τὸ βουλευτήριον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἱερὰ ἀμελέστερον ὁρῴη, ἢ νὴ Δία εἴ τις Λακεδαιμονίων τὸ μὲν πλῆθος ἐφίλει, τοὺς δὲ βασιλέας καὶ τοὺς ἐφόρους καὶ τοὺς γέροντας ἠτίμαζε τοὺς σωφροσύνῃ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέροντας καὶ δἰ οὓς ἅπασα ἡ πόλις
The Fiftieth Discourse: Regarding his Past Record, spoken before the Council
My friends, I admired you even ere this, as indeed it was to be expected that a man of fairness and no fool would cherish that element in his native city which is most sensible and trustworthy; on the other hand, to rank others ahead of you is as if a man who professed to be patriotic were to delight in the private houses and workshops in his city, but to regard with more indifference the market-place, the town-hall, the council-chamber, and the other sacrosanct places; or as if, by Heaven, a Spartan were to be fond of the common people, but were to hold in low esteem the kings and ephors and elders, men by far superior to all others in prudence, men by whose efforts the city as a whole was being preserved.
[2] ἐσῴζετο. ὅπου καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, οἳ μάλιστα ἀνθρώπων ἐδημοκρατοῦντο καὶ πλεῖστον ἔνεμον τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ δημοτικοῖς, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὕτως ἐγένετο θρασὺς δημαγωγός, οὐδὲ Ὑπέρβολος ἐκεῖνος ἢ Κλέων, ὥστε τὸν Ἄρειον πάγον ἢ τὴν βουλὴν τοὺς ἑξακοσίους ἀτιμότερον τοῦ δήμου νομίζειν. εἰ δὲ συνεχῶς μέμνημαι Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων, συγγνώμην ἐχέτωσαν οἱ πάνυ δριμεῖς, ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων παραδειγμάτων ὑμᾶς ἀξίους κρίνω, καὶ πρὸς Ἕλληνας, ὡς οἶμαι, διαλεγόμενος οὐκ ἄλλων τινῶν μᾶλλον
[2] Again, take the Athenians, who had the most democratic government in the world and gave the most numerous privileges to the masses and the people’s party; they never had any demagogue, not even the notorious Hyperbolus or Cleon, so audacious as to regard the Areopagus or the Council of the Six Hundred with less reverence than the common people. But if I am continually referring to the Spartans and Athenians, let the carping critics pardon me, because I am judging you worthy of such comparisons and because in addressing Greeks, as I take to be the case, I deem it appropriate not to refer to any others than Greeks of the first rank.
[3] ἡγοῦμαι πρέπειν μνημονεύειν ἢ τῶν ἄκρως Ἑλλήνων. τῆς δ̓ οὖν εὐνοίας τῆς πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ τῆς πίστεως ἐκεῖνο ὑμῖν γιγνέσθω τεκμήριον, ὅτι μήτε ἑταιρείᾳ τινὶ πεποιθὼς μήτε συνήθεις ἐξ ὑμῶν ἔχων τινὰς θαρρῶν εἰσέρχομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, καὶ νομίζω μηδενὸς ἔλαττον ἂν ἔχειν, δῆλον ὅτι τῇ κοινῇ φιλίᾳ πεπιστευκὼς καὶ τῇ πρὸς ἅπαντας εὐνοίᾳ, μή γε ἰσχυρὸς ἢ φοβερὸς εἶναι δοκῶν ἢ βουλόμενος ὡς διὰ τοῦτο θεραπεύεσθαι. εἰ δὲ ἠλέουν τοὺς δημοτικούς, ὅτε ἦσαν ἐλεεινοί, καὶ καθ̓ ὅσον οἷόν τε ἦν ἐπικουφίζειν ἐπειρώμην, οὐθέν ἐστι τοῦτο σημεῖον τοῦ πρὸς ἐκείνους ἔχειν οἰκειότερον: ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀεὶ τὸ κάμνον θεραπεύομεν καὶ πλείονα ποιούμεθα πρόνοιαν ποδῶν ἢ ὀφθαλμῶν, ὅταν οἱ [p. 99]
[3] However that may be, let this be your evidence of my goodwill toward you, as
well as of my trust in you, that I come before you with assurance neither because I rely upon some political club nor because I have among you some familiar friends; moreover, I believe I should stand as high with you as any man, obviously because I have based my confidence upon my friendship toward all and my goodwill toward all, and not upon my being elected to be an influential or formidable person or seeking to be favoured for such a reason. On the other hand, if I did pity the commons at the time when they were subjects for pity, and if I tried my best to ease their burdens, this is no sign that I am on more friendly terms with them than with you. We know that, in the case of the body, it is always the ailing part which we treat, and that we devote more attention to the feet than to the eyes, if the feet are in pain and have been injured while the eyes are in sound condition.
[4] μὲν ἀλγῶσι καὶ πεπονθότες ὦσιν, οἱ δὲ ὑγιαίνωσιν. εἰ δὲ εἶπον ἐλεεινοὺς τοὺς δημοτικούς, μηδεὶς ὑπολάβῃ λέγειν με ὡς ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἔπασχον, ὁπότε καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ ἰατρῶν τεμνομένους ἢ καομένους, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πάσχοντας ταῦτα, ἐλεοῦμεν, καὶ δακρύουσιν ἐπ̓ αὐτοῖς καὶ μητέρες καὶ πατέρες, εἰδότες ὠφελουμένους. ὃ δὲ ἔφην, ὅτι καὶ πρότερον ὑμᾶς ἠγάπων πρὶν ἢ πεῖραν ἱκανὴν εἰληφέναι τῆς διανοίας, νῦν γε ὀμνύω τοὺς θεοὺς ὑμῖν ἅπαντας, ἦ μὴν ἔγωγε τὴν βουλὴν οὐ μόνον ἀξίαν τιμῆς κρίνω καὶ φιλίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ θαυμάζω τὴν ἰσχὺν ὑμῶν καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ
Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom Page 329
