[2] Moreover, while the sensations of pleasure and of pain are common to all men — though some are enslaved by them to a smaller and some to a greater degree — the matter of opinion varies and is not the same for all. Thus it happens that some praise or blame this and some that, frequently acting at variance in this regard. For example, pain is experienced by both the Indian and the Spartan when they are wounded or burnt, as well as by the Phrygian and the Lydian; yet while the Indian and the Spartan refuse to flinch because they have been hardened to it, the Phrygian and the Lydian do flinch, because they are weak and not hardened. Again, while pleasure inevitably is experienced in sexual relations and in food and drink which are pleasurable, not only by the Ionian but also by the Thessalian, the Italian Greek, the Getan, the Indian, and the Spartan, yet some give no thought at all to such gratifications and do not seek to know any of them in the least, while the others would accept death as the price of obtaining a little more pleasure.
[3] ὀλίγῳ πλέον ἡσθέντες. τὸ οὖν τῆς δόξης ἔοικεν εἶναι παντοδαπώτατον καὶ πλείστη καὶ μεγίστη τούτου διαφορά. διά τε τοῦτο ἐν οὐδενὶ γένει τῶν ζῴων εὕροι τις ἂν τοσαύτην στάσιν οὐδὲ οὕτως ἐναντίον αὑτῷ τι γένος, οἷον ἵππων ἢ κυνῶν ἢ λεόντων ἢ βοῶν ἢ ἐλάφων, ἀλλὰ τρέφονταί τε ὁμοίως καὶ γεννῶσι καὶ τρέφουσι καὶ ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ὁρμῶσι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπέχονται τὰ ὅμοια. μόνῳ γὰρ
[3] Now apparently the matter of opinion is of every conceivable kind and the differences to be found in this matter are very numerous and very great. And it is because of this fact that in no breed of animals would one find so great dissension, nor would one find any breed so at variance with itself — take, for example, horses or dogs or lions or cattle or deer; on the contrary, animals that are alike behave alike in feeding, in begetting, and in rearing their young, and they have the same appetites and the same aversions. The reason is that in general they follow only what is pleasant and shun what is painful.
[4] ξυνέπονται ὡς τὸ πολὺ τῷ ἡδεῖ καὶ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν φεύγουσιν. ἄνθρωπος δὲ φύσει φρονήσεως μετέχων, ἀπολειπόμενος δὲ αὐτῆς διὰ φαυλότητα καὶ ῥᾳθυμίαν, δόξης καὶ ἀπάτης ἔνδοθεν μεστός ἐστι: καὶ πάντα ἀλλήλοις διαφέρονται, καὶ περὶ ἐσθῆτος καὶ στολῆς καὶ περὶ τροφῆς καὶ ἀφροδισίων καὶ περὶ τιμῆς καὶ ἀτιμίας, κατὰ ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει καθ̓ αὑτὸν ἕκαστος [p. 173] ἐσπούδακεν ὁ μὲν γῆν ὡς πλείστην κτήσασθαι, ὁ δὲ ἀργύριον, ὁ δὲ ἀνδράποδα, ὁ δὲ ξύμπαντα ταῦτα, ὁ δ̓ ἐπὶ τῷ λέγειν θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῶν ἄλλων πλέον δύνασθαι, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸ μόνον δεινὸς εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τὴν περὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐζήλωκεν, ὁ δὲ ἀπ̓ ἄλλου τινὸς ἰσχύειν, ὁ δὲ τρυφὴν ὡς πλείστην ἐπιτηδεύει.
[4] But the human race, which by nature partakes of wisdom, though it falls short of it through bad judgement and indifference, is inwardly full of opinion and self-deception. Moreover, men differ with one another in everything — in dress and apparel, in food and sexual pleasures, in honour and dishonour — according to nations and cities. And similarly also with the city, each one has his own individual ambition — one to obtain as much land as possible, another silver, another slaves, another all these things together, another to be admired for his eloquence and by this means to have greater power than his fellows, another strives merely to be clever and to achieve experience in politics, another to have influence for some other reason, another to indulge in luxury to the fullest extent.
[5] τούτων μὲν οὖν, ὅπερ ἔφην, οὐδὲν ἄν, ὡς εἰκός, ὀρθῶς πράττοιεν οὐδὲ οἱ τὰ κράτιστα δοκοῦντες ἐπιτηδεύειν. οὐ γὰρ εἰδότες τὸ βέλτιον ἢ τὸ χεῖρον ἢ τὸ συμφέρον αἱροῦνται οὐδέν. ὅστις δ̓ ἐπεθύμησε φρονήσεως καὶ διενοήθη πῶς χρὴ ἐπιμεληθέντα αὑτοῦ καὶ παίδευσιν τίνα παιδευθέντα γενέσθαι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν πολλῶν, τοῦτον ἐγώ φημι φύσεώς τε χρηστῆς τυχεῖν καὶ τύχης ὁμοίας. ἐλπὶς γὰρ ζητοῦντα καὶ παιδευόμενον ἐξευρεῖν τὸ δέον καὶ πρὸς τί ὁρῶντα καὶ τί βουλόμενον πάντα τὰ ἄλλα χρὴ
[5] Now, as I was saying, in no one of these pursuits, in all likelihood, would even those who are reputed to be best in their line carry it on successfully. For, not knowing what is better or what is worse or what is advantageous, they exercise no choice at all. But he who has desired wisdom and has given thought to how he should look after himself and what education he should receive in order to become a good man and superior to the masses, he, I say, has been blest with a good character and with a corresponding fortune besides. For there is hope that, if he investigates and receives instruction, he will discover what is required and with what aim and purpose he should carry on and regulate all else.
[6] πράττειν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν. ὁ δὲ τοῦτο συνεὶς ἅπαντα ἂν ἤδη καλῶς διαπράττοιτο καὶ τὰ μείζω δοκοῦντα καὶ τὰ σμικρότερα: καὶ εἴτε ἱππικῆς ἐπιτηδεύοι ἀγωνίαν εἴτε μουσικῆς εἴτε γεωργίας ἐπιμελοῖτο εἴτε στρατηγεῖν ἐθέλοι ἢ ἄρχειν τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἢ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κοινὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράττειν, καλῶς ἂν πάντα ποιήσειε καὶ περὶ οὐδὲν ἂν σφάλλοιτο. ἄνευ δὲ τούτου καθ̓ ἕκαστον μὲν τῶν ἔργων ἐνίοτε αὑτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φαίνοιτο ἂν κατορθοῦν: οἷον εἰ γεωργῶν ἐπιτυγχάνοι περὶ τοὺς καρποὺς ἢ ἱππεύειν ἐμπειρότερος εἴη ἢ τὰ κατὰ μουσικὴν ἱκανῶς γιγνώσκοι ἢ ἀγωνιζόμενος δύναιτο τῶν ἀντιπάλων κρατεῖν, τὸ δὲ σύμπαν ἁμαρτάνοι ἂν πρὸς οὐδὲν
[6] But he who understands this would from that moment be successful in all things, both those which are thought to be more important and those which are thought to be less; and whether he were to follow horse-racing or to devote himself to music or to agriculture, or if he should wish to be a general or to hold the other offices or to conduct the other public business in his city, he will do everything well and would make no mistakes in anything. However, without this understanding, while in each of his labours he might sometimes seem both to himself and to his neighbours to be successful — for instance, if as a farmer he were to be fortunate with his crops, or if he were to have more than ordinary acquaintance with the handling of horses, or if he were to have fairly good knowledge of music, or if in athletic contests he could overcome his competitors — still on the whole he would fail, since he would be working at these things to no good end nor in such a way as to derive benefit.
[7] ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲ ὥστε ὠφελεῖσθαι ταῦτα ἐργαζόμενος. οὔκουν δυνατός ἐστιν εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὥσπερ οὐδ̓ εὐπλοῆσαι δύναταί τις οὐκ εἰδὼς ἔνθα πλεῖ, μάτην δὲ ἄρτι ἐν τῷ πελάγει φερόμε
νος, νῦν μὲν ὀρθῆς [p. 174] πλεούσης τῆς νεώς, ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, νῦν δὲ ἀποκλινούσης, καὶ νῦν μὲν οὐρίου φερομένου τοῦ πνεύματος, πάλιν δὲ ἐναντίου. χρὴ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐν λύρᾳ τὸν μέσον φθόγγον καταστήσαντες ἔπειτα πρὸς τοῦτον ἁρμόζονται τοὺς ἄλλους: εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδεμίαν οὐδέποτε ἁρμονίαν ἀποδείξουσιν: οὕτως ἐν τῷ βίῳ ξυνέντας τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδείξαντας πέρας πρὸς τοῦτο τἄλλα ποιεῖν: εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνάρμοστον αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκμελῆ τὸν βίον εἰκός ἐστι γίγνεσθαι.
[7] Therefore he is incapable of being prosperous, just as one cannot make a successful voyage if one does not know whither he is sailing, being carried along aimlessly on the sea, his ship at one moment sailing a straight course, should fortune so decree, but the next moment yawing, at one moment with the wind astern, the next with it dead ahead. Nay, just as with the lyre musicians first set the middle string and then tune the others to harmonize with that — otherwise they will never achieve any harmony at all — so with life, men should first come to understand best and then, having made this their goal, they should do everything else with reference to this; otherwise their life will be out of harmony and out of tune in all likelihood.
THE SIXTY-NINTH DISCOURSE: ON VIRTUE
ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΕΤΗΣ.
THE SIXTY-NINTH DISCOURSE: ON VIRTUE
The theme of this Discourse is the doctrine that the virtuous life is the happy life. Dio bemoans the fact that most men give their whole attention to the so-called practical pursuits to the neglect of their spiritual well-being and development. Striving to attain success in any number of material enterprises, they miss true happiness through their failure to see that character is its sure foundation. Without good character laws are of little avail, and happiness is the gift of the gods, who are not inclined to favour ignorance and inattention to the needs of the soul. It is interesting to find Dio here expressing the belief that those who would commit a crime but are prevented from so doing through fear are as guilty as those who actually yield to the temptation.
[1] Ἄπορόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἄλλα μὲν ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ θαυμάζουσιν, ἄλλων δὲ ἐφίενται καὶ περὶ ἄλλα ἐσπουδάκασιν. ἐπαινοῦσι μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, πάντες καὶ θεῖα καὶ σεμνά φασιν ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ συλλήβδην ἀρετὴν πᾶσαν. καὶ οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται τοιούτους εἶναι ἢ γεγονέναι ἢ ἐγγύς, θαυμάζουσι καὶ ὑμνοῦσι: καὶ τοὺς μέν τινας θεούς, τοὺς δὲ ἥρωας ἀποφαίνουσιν, οἷον Ἡρακλέα καὶ Διοσκούρους καὶ Θησέα καὶ Ἀχιλλέα καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἡμιθέους λεγομένους. οἷς ὃν ἂν ὅμοιον ὑπολαμβάνωσιν, ἕτοιμοί εἰσιν ἅπαντες ἐκείνῳ πείθεσθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν, ὅ,τι ἂν προστάττῃ, καὶ βασιλέα καὶ ἄρχοντα ἀποδεικνύναι ἑαυτῶν καὶ τὰ σφέτερα ἐπιτρέπειν , ὅν ἂν σώφρονα καὶ δίκαιον
The Sixty-ninth Discourse: On Virtue
It seems to me a fact hard to explain, that people praise and admire one set of things yet aim at and have seriously pursued a different set. For instance, virtually all praise and refer to as “divine” and “august” such things as valour and righteousness and wisdom and, in short, every virtue. Moreover, whomever they believe to be, or to have been, characterized by such virtues, or nearly so, him they admire and celebrate in song; and certain ones they represent as gods and others as heroes — for example, Heracles, the Dioscuri, Theseus, Achilles, and all the demigods, as they are called. And whomever they suppose to be like those beings they one and all are ready to obey and to serve, no matter what orders he may give, and they are ready to appoint as their king and ruler and to make the guardian of their possessions any man whom they suppose to be really prudent and righteous and wise and, in a word, a good man.
[2] καὶ φρόνιμον ὄντως ὑπολαμβάνωσι καὶ ἁπλῶς ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν. ὥστε ταύτῃ μὲν οὐκ ἄν τις αὐτοῖς μέμψαιτο ὡς οὐκ αἰσθανομένοις ὅτι σεμνόν τι καὶ τίμιον καὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἄξιον χρῆμα ἀρετή: ἐπιθυμοῦσί γε μὴν πάντων μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαθοὶ γενέσθαι καὶ πράττουσι πάντα πρότερον ἢ ὅπως σωφρονήσουσι καὶ φρόνιμοι ἔσονται καὶ [p. 175] δίκαιοι καὶ ἄνδρες σπουδαῖοι, καλῶς μὲν αὑτῶν δυνάμενοι προΐστασθαι, καλῶς δὲ οἶκον οἰκῆσαι, καλῶς δὲ ἄρξαι πόλεως, εὖ δὲ πλοῦτον ἐνεγκεῖν, εὖ δὲ πενίαν, εὖ δὲ προσενεχθῆναι φίλοις, εὖ δὲ συγγενέσι, δικαίως δ̓ ἐπιμεληθῆναι γονέων, ὁσίως δὲ θεραπεῦσαι
[2] Therefore in this respect no one could censure them as not perceiving that virtue is something august and precious and all-important; yet they really desire any and every thing in preference to becoming good, and they busy themselves with everything in preference to the problem of becoming self-controlled and wise and righteous and men of merit, competent to govern themselves well, to manage a household well, to rule a city well, to endure well either wealth or poverty, to behave well toward friends and kinsmen, to care for parents with equity, and to serve gods with piety.
[3] θεούς. ἀλλ̓ οἱ μέν τινες περὶ γεωργίαν πραγματεύονται, οἱ δὲ περὶ ἐμπορίαν, οἱ δ̓ ἐπὶ στρατείαν ὁρμῶσιν, οἱ δ̓ ἐπ̓ ἰατρικήν, οἱ δὲ οἰκοδομικὴν ἢ ναυπηγικὴν ἐκμανθάνουσιν, οἱ δὲ κιθαρίζειν ἢ αὐλεῖν ἢ σκυτοτομεῖν ἢ παλαίειν, οἱ δὲ ὅπως δεινοὶ δόξουσι περὶ τὸ εἰπεῖν ἐν δήμῳ ἢ δικαστηρίῳ τὴν πᾶσαν σπουδὴν ἔχουσιν, οἱ δὲ ὅπως ἰσχυροὶ ἔσονται τὰ σώματα. καίτοι τοὺς ἐμπόρους μὲν καὶ γεωργοὺς καὶ στρατιώτας καὶ ἰατροὺς καὶ οἰκοδόμους καὶ κιθαριστὰς καὶ αὐλητὰς καὶ παιδοτρίβας, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς λεγομένους ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς πάνυ ἰσχύοντας τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀθλίους καὶ δυστυχεῖς
[3] But some busy themselves with farming, some with trading, some are devoted to military affairs, some to the medical profession, some acquire a thorough knowledge of carpentry or of shipbuilding, some of playing the lyre or the flute or of shoemaking or wrestling, some devote their whole attention to gaining a reputation as clever speakers in Assembly or in law-court, some to becoming strong in body. And yet the traders, farmers, soldiers, physicians, builders, lyre-players, flautists, athletic trainers, yes, and the orators, as they are called, and those who have great strength of body — all these one would find to be pitiable and unfortunate in many, or indeed in almost all, instances.
[4] τοὺς πολλοὺς ἂν εὕροι τις ἢ μικροῦ δεῖν ἅπαντας. ἂν δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ἔμφρων γένηται καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἱκανοὶ ὦσι τά τε αὑτῶν πράγματα ὀρθῶς πράττειν καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, τούτους ἀνάγκη καὶ εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν, νομίμους ἄνδρας γενομένους καὶ �
��γαθοῦ δαίμονος τυχόντας καὶ φίλους ὄντας τοῖς θεοῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλους μὲν φρονίμους εἰκὸς εἶναι, ἄλλους δὲ ἐμπείρους τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων, οὐδὲ ἄλλους μὲν τἀνθρώπεια ἐπίστασθαι, ἄλλους δὲ τὰ θεῖα, οὐδὲ ἄλλους μὲν εἶναι τῶν θείων ἐπιστήμονας, ἄλλους δὲ ὁσίους, οὐδὲ ἄλλους μὲν ὁσίους, ἄλλους δὲ θεοφιλεῖς: οὐδὲ ἕτεροι μὲν ἔσονται θεοφιλεῖς, ἕτεροι δὲ εὐδαίμονες. οὐδὲ ἕτεροι μέν εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι ἄφρονες, ἕτεροι δ̓ ἀγνοοῦσι τὰ καθ̓ αὑτοὺς πράγματα: οὐδὲ οἵ τὰ σφέτερα πράγματα ἀγνοοῦσι, τὰ θεῖα ἴσασιν: οὐδὲ οἱ φαύλως περὶ τῶν θείων ὑπειληφότες οὐκ ἀνόσιοί εἰσιν. οὐδέ γε τοὺς ἀνοσίους οἷόν τε φίλους εἶναι θεοῖς,
[4] On the other hand, if their soul becomes rational and their mind really good, and if they are able to manage successfully their own affairs and those of their neighbours too, these men will necessarily also lead happy lives, having shown themselves to be law-abiding, having obtained a good genius to guard them, and being dear to the gods. For it does not stand to reason that one set of men are wise and another set versed in human affairs, nor yet that some are conversant with human affairs and some with affairs divine, nor that some men have knowledge of divine things and others are pious, nor that some are pious and others dear to the gods; nor will a separate group be dear to the gods and another group be favoured by fortune. Nor is there one class of men who are fools but another class ignorant of their own affairs; nor are those who are ignorant of their own affairs informed about things divine; nor are those who have formed mistaken opinions about things divine free from impiety. And surely those who are impious cannot be dear to the gods nor those who are not dear to the gods be other than unfortunate.
Delphi Complete Works of Dio Chrysostom Page 352
