In 1994 Benchellali made two trips to war-torn Bosnia, allegedly to transport humanitarian aid to local Muslims fighting Serbian and Croatian forces. He, along with two other men from Venissieux, was reportedly arrested by Croatian police and tortured while in detention.' 19 Upon his return to France, he was arrested by French authorities when he was found to be in possession of a weapon.120 These incidents made Benchellali even more radical and popular in the neighborhood, and his fiery sermons began to draw more worshipers. Benchellali was known to preach against the infidel governments of Israel, America, Russia, and also France, where Muslim women could not wear the veil in public offices and schools. In addition, Benchellali began to openly collect money for militants in several parts of the Muslim world, focusing his efforts on Russia's breakaway republic of Chechnya.
While Chellali Benchellali became one of the religious leaders of Venissieux, his three sons slowly embraced his radical worldviews. The eldest, Menad, was very popular in the neighborhood, a strong character who always flirted with extremes. According to childhood friends, Menad used to organize long soccer games and often wore Hugo Boss and other trendy clothes. He bragged about his intentions of marrying a Westernized Turkish girl in the neighborhood and frequented the most transgressive bars of Paris. But when he reached his mid-twenties, Menad completely changed, declaring that now he "possessed the truth" and denouncing France for not being an Islamic country. Menad began to travel to places such as Sudan, Syria, and England, always shrouding his activities in mys- tery.121 Between 1998 and 1999, Menad completed his formation as a fundamentalist by attending an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan.'22
Menad had clearly entered the world of radical Islam and began introducing other young Muslims from the neighborhood to it. "He knew how to entangle others and managed to win over the younger kids with his talk," recalled one Venissieux native. 121 One of Menad's first recruits was his twenty-year-old brother, Mourad. In June 2001, Mourad, along with his childhood friend Nizar Sassi, left Venissieux for Afghanistan's training camps, traveling with false documents provided by other men from the neighborhood linked to Menad.124 The adventure of the two ended a few months later, as they were both captured by US forces in Afghanistan and detained for more than three years in Guantanamo Bay.
Shortly after his brother's departure, Menad also left France and traveled to Afghanistan, arriving at al Qaeda's training camps once again. Menad became particularly skilled in the use of chemical substances, which he tested on animals.125 After the fall of the Taliban and the destruction of the training camps, Menad left Afghanistan and found refuge in the Pankisi Gorge, a mountainous and remote area of Georgia bordering Chechnya. His traveling partner was Mourad Merabet, an Algerian chemist who served as imam in another radical mosque of Venissieux.126 In the gorge, they continued their training in chemical warfare with Arab militants linked to Abu Musab al Zarqawi who had settled in the area. After a few months, they made their way back to Europe.127
Once back in France, Menad returned to his parents' apartment in Venissieux. There he continued his experiments with chemical substances, storing the results in Nivea Cream jars and small bottles. Allegedly, Menad wanted to produce botulin and ricin, deadly toxins he would have used in attacks in France and other European countries. In December 2002, after he had told some acquaintances he was ready to go to action, Menad Benchellali was arrested on the outskirts of Paris during a series of raids that netted a dozen Chechen-trained terrorists who were planning attacks in France. No chemical substances were found, but Menad did not hide his calling. "Chemistry," he said proudly to French interrogators, "is one of the components that each combatant needs to master as part of their paramilitary training."128
What seems particularly shocking to the public is the claim of French authorities that his entire family helped him in his endeavors. Menad's father Chellali, the imam, acknowledged that he was aware of his son's experiments. His mother admitted to giving him her kitchen utensils and allowing him to turn her sewing room into a makeshift laboratory. "I knew well that it was to make chemical bombs or something like that," she confessed to French magistrates, "but I didn't know the details."129 One of his sisters made shopping trips for him, buying castor oil and other products.130 In January 2004, after a yearlong investigation, Menad's father, mother, and younger brother Haled were charged with terrorist conspiracy, along with Mourad Merabet and other minor figures in the plot.13' His parents are accused not only of sheltering Menad while he was conducting his deadly experiments but also of financing his trip to the Pankisi Gorge. In fact, Menad's mother admitted that her husband had wired thousands of euros to Menad when he was in Georgia. 131
Clearly the Benchellalis are an extreme case, as few other Muslim families are likely to tolerate a makeshift laboratory in their home. Nevertheless, they illustrate a dramatic trend in most Muslim communities in Europe. Islamic fundamentalism is attracting more and more supporters, and one avenue of its spread is within families, as fathers teach it to their sons. The Benchellali children learned hatred for the infidels from their father, and so do thousands of other European-born Muslims.
But the case of the Benchellalis also makes clear another troubling development. The network established by the family could count on dozens of supporters in the town of Venissieux. And after the arrests of the Benchellalis, hundreds of young men took to the streets of the neighborhood in protest. "We are treated like animals," some shouted. "We are in the basement of France." 133 That same anger was displayed after the death of Khaled Kelkal by those who rioted in Vaulx-en-Velin (located, like Venissieux, on the southeastern outskirts of Lyon) and is shown by thousands of young, disillusioned Muslims in the suburbs of Madrid, Rotterdam, Munich, or Zurich. Neighborhoods where unemployment is skyrocketing and the police are absent are the breeding grounds for terrorists. In the degraded Muslim ghettos of Europe, as the example of Menad Benchellali shows, one young man with charisma can attract dozens of his friends to radicalism, creating an almost impenetrable network based on childhood friendships, family ties, and religious fanaticism.
Finally, the story of the Benchellali family also sheds light on the role played by women in jihad. In the world of Islamic fundamentalism, women generally have only the ancillary function of pleasing and supporting the endeavors of jihadi men. Women, especially in Europe, might seem to have no reason to embrace the path of jihad, but for most of them it is not a choice. Many wives of Islamic fundamentalists living in Europe were given to their husbands in arranged marriages in which they had little or no say. Secluded at home, most are prevented by a mix of fear, ignorance, and respect for the family from rebelling and leaving. Aside from a few European women converts, almost no Muslim woman has found the courage to come forward and denounce her husband as a terrorist.
In some other cases, women are willingly supportive of their husbands' terrorist activities, sharing their militant views. Most Westerners view radical Islam as a strongly misogynistic ideology, yet some Muslim women strongly adhere to it and have joined the ranks of al Qaeda. And al Qaeda, always looking for new and diverse recruits, is happy to accept them. In the summer of 2004, for example, a Saudi-based group linked to al Qaeda launched a new online magazine only for women, al Khansa, with the intention of providing guidelines and suggestions for those whose husbands and sons are involved in jihad. The magazine proudly declared, "The blood of our husbands and the body parts of our children are our sacrificial offering," and it advised women on how to bring up their sons in the path of jihad and how to provide first aid. 114 But al Khansa also provided information on what kind of training women should undergo in order to prepare themselves for fighting in jihad. And in fact, women have directly participated in terrorist acts throughout the world. Chechen women, the infamous "black widows," have carried out a string of deadly suicide attacks inside Russia, including the simultaneous downing of two Russian jetliners in August 2004. Palestinian women, sometimes mothers, have repeatedly been used by various te
rrorist groups for suicide operations in Israel. And two fourteen-year-old female twins were recruited by a Moroccan terrorist group to carry out suicide attacks in a Rabat supermarket. 135
In March of 2003, al Qaeda publicly declared its interest in directly employing women in its operations: a self-described female mujahid claiming to be training female volunteers for al Qaeda declared in an interview with an Arab newspaper that the organization was "building a women's structure that will carry out operations that will make the U.S. forget its own name." 116 The FBI believes that several women have been recruited and trained to carry out attacks worldwide. One of them is Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani national and US-educated microbiologist; currently wanted by US authorities, she is believed to be a high-level al Qaeda operative. 117
Female bombers could be targeting Europe soon. Because women rarely attract the attention of immigration and law enforcement authorities, they are ideal for carrying out attacks. In May 2004, Italian authorities intercepted a conversation between Rabei Osman El Sayed Ahmed, a high-ranking al Qaeda member operating in Europe and the purported mastermind of the March 11 Madrid train bombings, and his young roommate. Ahmed's words provide a chilling insight into al Qaeda's activities and future plans:
Do you remember the woman who I told you about, do you remember? Her name is Hotaf. I have bad news, she was discovered, but there will be the victory of Islam. I am sorry, there are other women, but I am sorry for Hotaf. Do you know how Mouattaf trained her? She already trained her with many medical products. If they throw a stick it blows away an American neighborhood ... [inaudible] May peace be upon him [Mouattafl, may his soul rest in peace, but she [Hotaf] is not the first nor will she be the last, there is Fatiha, there is Amal, there is Palestine, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Kashmir, Pakistan, and Malaysia ... you just have to warn them and they come. There is Amal, Hanan, you just have to warn them; I am sorry the tactic of the first one did not work, she was discovered; now we have Amal, she is ready.... God is great.138
European authorities are faced with enormous challenges. As shown above, the profile of the Islamic radical operating on the Continent varies widely, ranging from the Muslim teenager from the suburbs to blue-eyed converts to a middle-aged woman microbiologist. To make their job more difficult, the Muslim communities are becoming ever more radicalized and hostile toward the native European populations; cooperation with authorities is therefore increasingly rare. Only a combination of aggressive law enforcement actions and improvements in socially and finan cially integrating its burgeoning Muslim population will enable Europe to make progress in its uphill battle against Islamic terrorism.
NOTES
1. Burhan Wazir, "Essex Boys Sign up for `Holy War,"' Observer, February 24, 2002.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Dean M. Kelley, Why Conservative Churches Are Growing: A Study in Sociology of Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
5. Paul Wells, "Joining the Enemy," National Post, December 10, 2001.
6. Sebastian Rotella and David Zucchino, "Response to Terror," Los Angeles Times, October 21, 2001.
7. Craig S. Smith, "Europe Fears Islamic Converts May Give Cover for Extremism," New York Times, July 19, 2004.
8. "Frenchman Jailed for Terror Ties," BBC, May 25, 2004.
9. Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe; The Afghan-Bosnian Network (Oxford: Berg, 2004), pp. 188-89.
10. Hal Bernton, Mike Carter, David Heath, and James Neff, The Terrorist Within, monograph of the Seattle Times, June 23-July 7, 2002, chap. 5. http:// seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/nation-world/terroristwithin/chapter5.html
11. Ibid.
12. Kohlmann, Al-Qaida's Jihad in Europe, p. 95.
13. Press conference with presidential aide Sergei Yastrzhembsky, Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, December 24, 2003.
14. David Crawford, "German's Path to Death in Chechen Rebel Camp Puzzles Investigators," Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2004.
15. Craig S. Smith, "Europe Fears Islamic Converts May Give Cover."
16. Official DIGOS (Divisioni Investigazioni Generali e Operazioni Speciali, Divisions for General Investigations and Special Operations), report al Mohajiroun 3, November 21, 2001, Milan, pp. 35-36.
17. Sebastian Rotella, "Al Qaeda's Stealth Weapons," Los Angeles Times, September 20, 2003.
18. "Three Get Life in Morocco Trial," BBC, September 19, 2003.
19. Rotella, "Al Qaeda's Stealth Weapons."
20. Alberto Samona', "Preso 1'attentatore di Allah, e' un Italiano conver- tito," Libero, July 18, 2002.
21. Piotr Smolar, "Ruddy Terranova, orphelin, delinquant, bagarreur et amoreux, a decouvert le Coran en prison," Le Monde, May 4, 2004.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Rotella, "Al Qaeda's Stealth Weapons."
26. Smith, "Europe Fears Islamic Converts May Give Cover."
27. "Cellule Islamiche attive in Italia," Corriere delta Sera, March 3, 2005.
28. Wazir, "Essex Boys Sign up for `Holy War."'
29. Peter Finn, "Unlikely Allies Bound by a Common Hatred," Washington Post, April 29, 2002.
30. Justin Sparks, "Freed Terrorist Vows He'll Fulfill Suicide Mission," Times, February 8, 2004.
31. Inside 9-11: What Really Happened, by the reporters, writers, and editors of Der Spiegel magazine, trans. Paul DeAngelis and Elisabeth Kaestner (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002), p. 198.
32. Ibid., p. 199.
33. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 164.
34. Inside 9-11: What Really Happened, p. 199.
35. Smith, "Europe Fears Islamic Converts May Give Cover."
36. Dominik Cziesche, Georg Mascolo, Sven Roebel, Heiner Schim- moeller, Holger Stark, "As If You Were at War," Der Spiegel, March 22, 2004. Accessed via FBIS.
37. Dietmar Loch, "Boyhood of a Terror Suspect," Guardian, October 11, 1995.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Frank Viviano, "Killing Exposes France's Racial Divide," San Francisco Chronicle, October 27, 1995.
41. Milton Viorst, "The Muslims of France," Foreign Affairs, September/October 1996, p. 78.
42. Erich Inciyan, "Un Terrorisme d'un Nouveau Genre," Le Monde, September 29, 1995.
43. Viviano, "Killing Exposes France's Racial Divide."
44. "Bomb Explodes, Vehicles Torched in Unrest over Terrorist's Death," AP, October 4, 1995.
45. "La Mort en direct de Khaled Kelkal," Le Monde, September 30, 1995.
46. Amy Barrett, "Youth Riots Spread, Police Probe Bombing Suspect's Killing," AP, October 3, 1995.
47. "Bomb Explodes, Vehicles Torched in Unrest over Terrorist's Death."
48. Barrett, "Youth Riots Spread."
49. Viviano, "Killing Exposes France's Racial Divide."
50. Ibid.
51. Robert S. Leiken, Bearers of Global Jihad? Immigration and National Security after 9/11 (Washington, DC: Nixon Center, 2004), p. 48.
52. Testimony of Robert S. Leiken before the US House of Representatives, International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights, June 16, 2004, http://wwwc.house .gov/international-relations/I 08/leiO6l6O4.htm.
53. Steven Erlanger and Chris Hedges, "Terror Cells Slip through Europe's Grasp," New York Times, December 28, 2001.
54. Ibid.
55. Loch, "Boyhood of a Terror Suspect."
56. Spanish Ministry of Interiors, Summary of Anti-Terrorist Activities, 2004.
57. Renwick McLean, "Spanish Prisons Provide Pool of Recruits for Radical Islam," New York Times, October 31, 2004, p. 18.
58. Dutch intelligence official, interview with author, The Hague, June 2003.
59. "Profile: Omar Saeed Sheikh," BBC, July 16, 2002.
60. Alex Hannaford, "The Toughest Boy in School," Guardian, February 23, 2005.
61. Ibid.
62. "Profile: Omar Saeed Sheikh," BBC, July 16, 2002.
&
nbsp; 63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Hannaford, "The Toughest Boy in School."
66. "Explosives Find in UK Terror Raid," CNN, March 30, 2004.
67. Selcan Hacaoglu, "Fertilizer Bombs Favorite Terrorist Weapon, but U.S. Not Joining EU, Turkey in Restricting Sales," Time, April 14, 2004.
68. Crawley, a commuter town in West Sussex, was home to Yasir Khan, one of the British men killed in the fall of 2001 while fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. Khan was also raised in a middle-class Pakistani family and played cricket.
69. William Tinning, "He Was Not Political. He Wanted to Play Cricket for England," Herald, April 1, 2004.
70. Ibid.
71. Erik Schelzig and Peter Finn, "Repentant Algerian Tells of Bomb Plot," Washington Post, April 24, 2002.
72. Ibid.
73. Desmond Butler and Don Van Natta Jr., "Threats and Responses; Terror Network; Al Qaeda Informer Helps Investigators Trace Group's Trail," New York Times, February 15, 2003.
74. Ibid.
75. Federal Court of Karlsruhe, Interrogation of Shadi Abdallah, April 24, 2002.
76. Ibid.
77. Cziesche et al., "As If You Were at War."
78. Dirk Laabs and Terry McDermott, "The World; Column One: Prelude to 9/11," Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2003.
79. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 163.
80. Inside 9-11: What Really Happened, p. 199.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Dirk Laabs and Terry McDermott, "Prelude to 9/11," Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2003.
84. Ibid.
85. Loch, "Boyhood of a Terror Suspect."
86. Stefano Dambruoso, Milano Bagdad: Diario di un magistrato in prima linen nella lotta al terrorismo islamico in Italia (Milan: Mondadori, 2004), pp. 94-98.
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