Many believe that France has the legal system that is best suited to this problem. Based on the Napoleonic tradition of vesting ample powers in magistrates and strengthened by tough antiterrorism legislation during the 1980s, the French penal code provides investigating judges with legal tools beyond those available in any other Western country. The wave of terrorist attacks carried out throughout France by the Algerian Armed Islamic Group in 1995 motivated the French government to find better ways to fight Islamic terrorism. In their wake, Interior Minister JeanLouis Debre solemnly declared: "We are at war. It is the war of modern times, and I will tell you that the government is determined to win that war and will make no concessions."24
In France individuals can be detained for up to ninety-two hours before charges are filed, a practice that appalls civil rights advocates. When French magistrates suspect that an individual is linked to terrorism but do not have enough evidence to go to trial, they can jail him for up to three and a half years using a catchall and intentionally vague charge, "association with terrorists." The long detention, which has no parallel in other European countries, is intended to give the magistrate the time to obtain evidence needed to prosecute the suspect. Moreover, it can be based simply on intelligence and not necessarily on evidence admissible in court.
These harsh provisions are just part of France's aggressive attitude toward Islamic terrorism. Taking advantage of the strict laicism of the French constitution, authorities have no qualms in scrutinizing places of worship-something that other European countries and the United States are reluctant to do. Authorities closely monitor more than forty mosques nationwide,25 sending undercover agents to tape Friday sermons and to mingle with known radicals. Using a network of informants established over more than twenty years, the French keep close tabs on the country's large Muslim community. And while most European countries desperately need more qualified Arabic translators, France boasts specialists skilled even in the various Algerian and Moroccan dialects. In addition, France is quick to expel imams who have preached violence or racial hatred, and authorities often detain suspected terrorists for common crimes. Giles Leclair, the director of France's domestic intelligence, makes no secret of his agency's determination to use every trick to stop terrorists: "Sometimes, of course, we can bring some trouble in the personal life, but I think it's better to make trouble for some people for one day and avoid 200-300 people from dying in a blast."26
Ironically, the French, who have been among the loudest critics of the methods used by the United States in its war on terror, employ counterterrorism measures that make the US PATRIOT Act look soft. Yet they have set off scant public outcry. Most of the criticism comes from the lawyers of those charged with "association with terrorists." The lawyer of David Courtailler, a French convert sentenced to four years in prison on that charge, expressed their shared complaint: "He has really been convicted for what he may have been able to do, not for what he has done."27 Alain Marsaud, a former magistrate and a member of France's parliament, has an answer for the critics of France's terror laws: "This is con sidered by some to be an attack on the liberty of individuals and I agree totally. But it stops the bombs. There has to be a balance between individual liberty on one hand and the efficiency of the system to protect the public on the other. In an ideal world, I would choose the first, but this is not an ideal world, and when dealing with Islamic extremists we have to be brutal sometimes."28
However one views France's attitude toward Islamic terrorism, it is anomalous on a continent where respect for civil rights still takes precedence over achieving more security. Consider the different treatments received by the European detainees released from Guantanamo Bay. In most countries, the men were immediately released on their return home, and often they became media darlings. In Sweden, the local government is even helping a former detainee sue the US government for his detention.29 In France, in contrast, they were detained under the usual charge-association with terrorists-as soon as they set foot on French soil.30 In effect, the French government, despite its public criticism of the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, took precisely the same action as the Americans: they held the French suspects without accusing them of a specific crime.
Adding to the paradox, the United States' closest ally in its war on terror, Great Britain, is known to take an extremely soft line toward the Islamic terrorists operating on its soil; indeed, on occasion its levels of tolerance border on masochism. The United Kingdom has always taken pride in its tradition of tolerance and respect of free speech-commendable characteristics that have long attracted thousands of refugees, dissidents, and activists who were unjustly persecuted in their countries of origin. But over the past twenty years, the country has also attracted hundreds of radical Islamists, who have exploited Britain's freedoms to continue their jihad against the secular governments in their home countries and, in a second phase, against the West. Even when radicals began preaching and plotting attacks against the United Kingdom, the British government decided not to change its policies.
It should therefore come as no surprise that Britain, unlike France, welcomed home the four Muslim men who were released from Guantanamo Bay in January 2005. One of them, Moazzem Begg, has since fre quently appeared on television talk shows and is reportedly working on a memoir.31 Similarly, the British government's consistent refusal to extradite terror suspects, not only to Middle Eastern countries that have the death penalty but also to other European countries, is predictable. France, for example, has been unsuccessfully fighting with London for almost a decade over the extradition of Rachid Ramda, whom the French accuse of masterminding the deadly 1995 bombings of the Paris metro system.
The problems that Britain faces in combating terrorism on its soil are epitomized by the chaos that characterized the government's attempts to draft more effective antiterrorism legislation in the wake of 9/11. In December 2001, Britain passed the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act, which allowed the government to indefinitely detain foreign terror suspects without charge or trial. The law, which de facto suspended the right to fair trial guaranteed by the charter of the European Union, was harshly criticized by human rights advocates and members of Prime Minister Tony Blair's own party.32 The British government was extremely careful not to abuse its enormous new powers; only ten foreign terrorists, deemed the most dangerous in the country, were held under the act's provisions in Belmarsh, the country's maximum-security prison. Among them were Abu Qatada, a Palestinian described by Spanish authorities as "al Qaeda's ideologue in Europe," and a handful of Algerian terrorists involved in plots to carry out attacks in France and England.
Because the law could be applied only to foreign nationals, many British citizens who were involved in terrorist organizations faced no legal barriers to continuing their activities even after 9/11. The British public was outraged at the case of Hassan Butt, a twenty-two-year-old British Muslim born in the grimy town of Luton. Butt publicly bragged about his endeavors as terrorist recruiter, claiming that he had persuaded hundreds of British Muslims to fight alongside bin Laden and the Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11: "I have helped to bring in at least 600 young British men. These men are here to engage in jihad against America and its allies.... That there are so many should serve as a warning to the British government. All of them are prepared to die for the cause of Islam." In December 2002, the Mirror, a wide-circulation British tabloid, published pictures of Butt brandishing a loudspeaker and inciting a crowd of young men waving the black flag of the Taliban during a rally in Lahore, Pakistan.33 Despite his activities and his not-so-veiled threats against the British government, Butt was allowed to return to England undisturbed. There he was contacted by a reporter from the Mirror and agreed to be interviewed for the price of £100,000. When the reporter informed British counterterrorism officials of the meeting and asked them if they wanted to interview Butt themselves, their response was shocking: "I know this sounds ridiculous," said a detective from the antiterrorist squad. "But we can't ge
t involved. All our checks, all our intelligence, show that he is not wanted for any offences in the UK."34 Since recruiting for a terrorist organization operating outside of Britain-even an organization that was battling British troops in Afghanistan-was not a crime and the new law applied only to foreigners, Butt was free to roam the streets of Luton.
But the harshest attacks on the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act came from those who deemed it inhuman, not from critics of its loopholes. On December 16, 2004, after two years of legal controversy and political debates, the Law Lords, the country's highest legal body, ruled that the law was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. They set a ninety-day deadline for the release of the ten men detained at Belmarsh under the law's provisions, allowing the government three months to devise new legal measures to deal with them.35 In January 2005, the Blair government introduced the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, new legislation that attempted to correct the legal flaws of the earlier act while maintaining its substance. For the next two months, a fiery debate raged over the proper balance between Britain's traditionally unconditional respect of civil rights and the new need for security.
Opponents of the bill, most of whom were members of Blair's Labour Party, argued that the legislation was "un-British,"36 stressing that in barring prisoners' access to a judge it went against eight hundred years of legal tradition. Supporters of the bill pointed to the unprecedented threat that Islamic terrorism posed to the country: "The main opposition to the bill is from people who simply haven't understood the true horror of the terrorism we face," said Sir John Stevens, former commissioner of London's Metropolitan Police. "For the safety of the vast majority, occasionally we will have to accept the infringement of the human rights of high-risk individuals."37 But by February, sixty-two Labour members of Parliament had staked out positions against the bill, heightening the battle.38 As the days went by, the embarrassing prospect that the ten men detained in Belmarsh could be the beneficiaries of this political infighting drew nearer. On March 11, the first anniversary of the Madrid train bombings, the front pages of British newspapers lambasted their politicians for failing to reach a compromise that would keep Abu Qatada, who was considered the spiritual leader of the men who carried out the Madrid attacks, securely in prison.39
On March 11, after a thirty-hour session-one of the longest in British parliamentary history-the new antiterror legislation was passed. The law allows authorities to monitor the movements of suspected terrorists, who can be required to wear electronic tags, to stay at home for twelve hours a day, to refrain from using computers or cellular phones, and to have only preapproved meetings.40 As the exhausted members of Parliament headed home, eight of the ten Belmarsh detainees were released on bail and put under the new "control orders" created by the new legislation. Had the agreement been reached just a few hours later, some of Europe's most dangerous terrorists would have walked out of prison free.
Less than four months later, London was hit by terrorism. According to British authorities, on the morning of July 7, 2005, four suicide bombers almost simultaneously detonated four rucksacks full of explosives on three Tube trains and a double-decker bus, killing more than fifty people. Exactly two weeks later, in a clumsy attempt to copy the July 7 attacks, four individuals attempted to detonate more bombs on other trains and buses but were unable to cause a proper explosion. The investigation revealed that the July 7 suicide bombers, the first ever to strike on European soil, were three British-born Muslims of Pakistani origin, while the fourth was a Jamaican-born naturalized British citizen. The second group of attackers was made up of successful asylum-seekers from var ious East African countries who had lived in the UK for more than a decade. Britain was under attack from within, as all men had radicalized and, in all likelihood, conceived the plot, inside their very own country.
After the July attacks the country and, finally, its elite, realized the seriousness of the threat the Blair government and top security officials had been warning of for years. On August 5, a month after the first bombings, Tony Blair unveiled his government's renewed agenda to tackle Islamic extremism in Britain. Blair began his speech with a not-so-veiled attack against its critics: "The anti-terrorism legislation of course passed in 2002 after September 11th was declared partially invalid, the successor legislation hotly contested. But for obvious reasons, the mood now is different, people do not talk of scare-mongering. "41 Downing Street's new proposals are harsh and signal a strong break with the past: "Let no one be in doubt," said a determinate Blair, "the rules of the game are changing." Under the new proposed measures, individuals linked to terrorism or "fostering hatred, advocating violence to further a person's beliefs, or justifying or validating such violence" will be sent back to their countries of origin. If that country does not have the death penalty and guarantees that the alleged terrorist's rights will be respected, deportation will be very quick. "Cases such as [above-mentioned] Rashid Ramda," said Blair, "wanted for the Paris Metro bombings ten years ago, and who is still in the UK whilst France seeks extradition are completely unacceptable." But the new measures proposed by Blair also include deportation to countries with the death penalty: "The circumstances of our national security have self evidently changed, and we believe we can get the necessary assurances from the countries to which we will return the deportees, against their being subject to torture or ill treatment contrary to Article 3 [of the European Convention on Human Rights]. We have now concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with Jordan [home country of Abu Qatada], and we are close to getting necessary assurances from other relevant countries."42
Blair's proposals include also the closure of radical mosques and bookshops, banning extremist groups such as al Muhajiroun and Hizb ut Tahrir, and making justifying or glorifying terrorism a criminal offence. Known foreign extremists will be either deported or denied entry. British radicals will be stripped of their citizenship, if naturalized, or put under stringent control orders if British-born. The Blair government is also thinking of using another legal tool to punish British nationals who engage in extremist activities. In the aftermath of the London attacks some wellknown radical figures made outrageous statements. Omar Bakri, the leader of the al Muhajiroun movement, was taped by an undercover journalist from the London Times while allegedly referring to the July 7 suicide bombers as "the fantastic four" and declared his joy over the attacks .41 Hassan Butt, the above-mentioned Briton and former al Muhajiroun member whom British police could not even interview, said in an interview to Prospect magazine that only Muslims who have sought refuge in Britain are bound by an Islamic covenant not to attack country. As for British-born Muslims, Butt said: "Most of our people, especially the youth, are British citizens. They owe nothing to the government. They did not ask to be born here; neither did they ask to be protected by Britain."44 Signaling the end of Britain's patience with this kind of rhetoric, authorities are examining the possibility of charging radical Muslim preachers who hold British passports with treason under existing legislation.
Blair's proposals, if accepted, would impress a major change to Britain's attitude toward Islamic radicalism. While opposition is not as stiff as it was in previous occasions, various forces immediately criticized the new proposed measures. Several Muslim organizations claimed that they would alienate large parts of the Muslim community. Members of the Left and human rights organizations accused them of limiting basic rights such as free speech. And Amnesty International derided Blair's announcement that his government was making agreements with several Middle Eastern countries like Jordan on the respect of human rights of individuals to be deported, describing this kind of conventions with such countries as "not worth the paper they are written on."45
But while political opposition is inevitable but could be overcome, the biggest challenges to Blair's measures might come from the law. According to most legal analysts, some of the key provisions are severely incompatible with both the British Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Hum
an Rights. And while the British government can obviate to its incompatibility with the former by amending it (something Blair has already vowed to do if necessary46), the problems with the European Convention appear almost insurmountable, as the only possible way to derogate from it is to deratify the whole convention, de facto withdrawing the country's membership in the Council of Europe, a move no European government is even remotely likely to make.47 Moreover, even if the measures are passed, prosecutors will find significant difficulties in making their cases in court, especially in free speech cases.
The struggle Britain is facing to set definitive rules illustrates the difficulties that most European countries are experiencing in balancing security and individual rights. The debate over how best to fight terrorism will likely last for years to come. Even though politicians may have different views from country to country about precisely what measures should be taken, there is widespread awareness that something has to be done. Other European countries besides Britain have also changed their laws after 9/11 to better address the new problem. One area on which the new laws are focusing is excessive bureaucracy, which all the European countries agree is one of the biggest obstacles to effectively fighting terrorism. Intelligence officials often must wait for weeks to receive a judge's authorization to tap the phone of a suspect, delays that may prevent them from obtaining valuable information. International terrorism, by its nature, operates fast. In some cases, terrorists enter the country they have targeted only a few days before carrying out their attack, and the inability to take swift action against them could be fatal.
Al Qaeda in Europe Page 12
