Third man: This is used by very smart people in Great Britain and America.53
Another member of the network also demonstrated keen interest in chemical substances. Ben Heni Lased, a Munich-based Libyan veteran of Afghanistan linked to the Frankfurt cell, was planning to carry out an attack in Strasbourg and thus finish the job started by the Frankfurt cell. Authorities believe that he intended to open a barrel containing some toxic material (probably a gas) at one of the two locations the cell had videotapedPlace Kleber or the city's cathedral. Returning to a previously chosen target is a common modus operandi of Islamic radicals. For example, after failing to damage the navy destroyer USS The Sullivans because the boat they had packed with explosives sank, al Qaeda operatives in Yemen decided to try again, and successfully hit the USS Cole. Even 9/11 could be considered a follow-up on a failed operation, as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center had been intended to topple the Twin Towers. Lased wanted to execute the operation thwarted by the Christmas raids.
Lased's plan was overheard by Italian authorities at the beginning of March 2001, when he stayed for a few days in Ben Khemais's thoroughly bugged apartment. In an emotional and long conversation, Lased expressed to Ben Khemais his frustration with the group's leadership: "I have made a decision, to fight them [the infidels], but unfortunately when you belong to a group you can't carry out operations by yourself, at least until you decide to sacrifice yourself [die as martyr], in that case the sheikhs think about it.... A decision must be made, I want to die as a mujahid, there is too much planning; I only ask to fight them, so that I don't have to answer to anybody. 114
Lased's impatience reaches new heights as he comments on the sloppiness of the Meliani cell in Frankfurt in leaving the surveillance tape of the Strasbourg targets inside their apartment. By the end of the conversation, Lased is begging Ben Khemais to intercede for him with the leaders of the group:
Talk to the sheiks, talk to them, and then I'll think about the rest. I don't need an army, but just two people, as long as they have brain and training, especially in the language [i.e., they know how to talk in code], the training must be based on this. They have to be committed and to go ahead without having anything to lose or to gain. Let me complete the operation.... I'll do it like the group in Germany, so at this point all I need is one person and a 10-liter barrel."
Lased was arrested in Germany in October 2001 on an Italian warrant. His words were a sign of things to come, as the Algerian network's interest in nonconventional weapons would grow in the following months.
THE FRENCH TRIAL
Because the bombing was supposed to take place in French territory and the Frankfurt cell had several links to France, in February 2001 Paris decided to start its own investigation. Even though no French official would admit it on the record, another reason for opening an independent case was the lack of trust in Germany's counterterrorism agencies and laws. Both European officials and the terrorists are well aware that Germany's laws on terrorism are among the most liberal in Europe. The trials (discussed in chapter 3) of Mounir El Motassadeq and Abdelghani Mzoudi, the two Moroccans who provided logistical support to Mohammed Atta and other 9/11 hijackers, clearly demonstrate that the German legal system currently cannot adequately deal with terrorism.
After 9/11, Germany's counterterrorism officials beseeched the parliament to reform the nation's security laws, but with little success. Frustrated by the legislators' failure to understand the problem, German law enforcement officials have sometimes resorted to inventive techniques against individuals who are known to be terrorists but cannot be seized under German laws. For example, in June 2003 German counterterrorism authorities were instrumental in the arrest-outside Germany-of a top al Qaeda operative, Christian Ganczarski. Ganczarski, a German citizen of Polish descent who had converted to Islam in his teens, spent several years in Germany and was even arrested in April 2003, though he was released soon thereafter. Ganczarski had fought in Afghanistan and he was believed to be in direct contact with Osama bin Laden; he was also suspected of having played a significant role in the April 2002 attack on a synagogue in Tunisia that killed twenty-one people, including twelve Germans. Ganczarski was the last person called by the suicide attacker, Nizar Nawar, before he drove a truck bomb into the synagogue.56
Nevertheless, high standards of proof and legal technicalities prevented German authorities from holding Ganczarski. After his release, the German militant traveled to Saudi Arabia, where he was briefly detained for an expired pilgrim visa and then, once again, released. On June 3, Ganczarski began his journey back to Duisburg, his hometown, and Saudi authorities informed their German counterparts they had put the thirtyseven-year-old convert, his wife Nicola (a German convert as well), and the couple's four children, on an Air France flight to Paris. Authorities in Berlin recognized that this was a perfect opportunity to catch Ganczarski and to end an embarrassing situation. They informed the French police of his movements and asked for their help. Upon his arrival at Paris Charles de Gaulle airport, Ganczarski was separated him from his family and arrested.57 He has been in French custody ever since. The Germans, knowing they could not detain Ganczarski but aware of his dangerousness, decided in effect to subcontract his arrest to French magistrates, whom they knew were in possession of far better legal tools to detain him.
Thanks to severe laws and a sophisticated intelligence apparatus that is widely considered the most effective in Europe at fighting Islamic terrorism, the French have been at the forefront of the war against al Qaeda on the Continent. It should therefore come as no surprise that the most comprehensive case against the Frankfurt cell was built by antiterrorism magistrates in Paris and not by German or British authorities. The investigative judges Jean-Louis Bruguiere and Jean-Francois Ricard opened an investigation into the thwarted Strasbourg attack in February 2001.58 Their patient and comprehensive work bore fruit in December 2004, when ten Islamic radicals were convicted in Paris for their supporting roles in the plot. These Algerians or FrenchAlgerians, netted by the French in separate operations or extradited from other European countries, constituted almost all the participants in the plot.
The most important man on trial in Paris was Mohammed Bensakhria, who was described by European security officials as one of bin Laden's chiefs of operations in Europe.59 The investigation of the Frankfurt cell revealed not only that Bensakhria had paid several visits to the apartments occupied by the members of the cell, as fingerprints proved, but that he was the group's leader and mastermind-in fact, he was the mysterious "Meliani" whom authorities in Germany were seeking. Bensakhria, who had learned the use of explosive devices in al Qaeda training camps around 1997, had left Frankfurt for Berlin shortly before the Christmas Day raids and made his way to the port town of Alicante, in southeastern Spain.60 In order to avoid the attention of Spanish authorities, Bensakhria lived in a van in a North African immigrant neighborhood of Alicante, maintaining an appearance of being extremely poor.61 Nevertheless, on June 22, 2001, Mohammed Bensakhria and an accomplice were arrested by Spanish police. According to intelligence sources, Bensakhria, who was found with a street map of Strasbourg when he was arrested, was in Alicante waiting for a courier to bring him false French documents.62
Spanish Interior Minister Mariano Rajoy touted the work of Spanish authorities and described Bensakhria as "one of the most wanted men pursued by western security services in recent months."63 But once again, the efforts of French counterterrorism officials were crucial, as the DST provided key information on Bensakhria to the Spaniards. Shortly after his arrest, Bensakhria was extradited to France.64 At the trial in Paris he was sentenced to ten years in prison.65 He, like the others, was accused of being a member of a "criminal association in connection with a terrorist act,"66 the usual catchall charge used by French magistrates.
Another of the men on trial was Slimane Khalfaoui, the man whom Beandali had asked to supply pressure cookers. Khalfaoui, described as an important member of al Qaeda in Europe
who had been wanted by authorities since 1996, had also trained in Qaeda's camps in Afghanistan with Ahmed Ressam, the millennium bomber, and was a veteran of the Bosnian war.67 Prosecutors called him one of the leaders of the group, and he was sentenced to ten years. Khalfaoui's lawyer, Isabelle Coutant- Peyre, said the convictions and sentences showed that French institutions were "racist, anti-Arab and Islamophobic."68 Another member of the cell tried in Paris was Yacine Aknouche, who was arrested in September 2000. Aknouche, like many involved in the Strasbourg plot, had undergone military training at a camp in the tribal area between Pakistan and Afghanistan, thanks to connections established by Abu Doha in London, and was an established member of the Algerian network. Aknouche, in fact, admitted knowing several men who made headlines in the months after 9/11. He told French authorities that while in London, he befriended the shoe-bomber Richard Reid and Zacharias Moussaoui, the alleged twentieth hijacker.69 Even though he denied any knowledge of the Strasbourg plot, Aknouche was sentenced to eight years.70
Six other suspects, who were alleged to have given logistical support to the plot by supplying false papers to other members of the group, were given lesser terms." The story of Meroine Berrahal, one of the six, demonstrates the centrality of the Algerian network in al Qaeda's activities in Europe. When he was arrested in February 2002, the veteran of Chechnya and Afghanistan was found with the mobile phone number of Nathalie Ben Mustafa, wife of Khaled Ben Mustafa, one of the French detainees in Guantanamo. Berrahal also had been in contact with Brahim Yadel, another French detainee in Gitmo, and with Djamel Loiseau, a Frenchman who was killed fighting US forces in Afghanistan. Berrahal, Loiseau, and Yadel had all been detained earlier in sweeps carried out by French authorities against members of the GIA that were suspected of planning an attack against the 1998 World Cup, the soccer championship held in France that year.
The tenth Algerian who received a prison term (of six years) was Rabah Kadre. As mentioned above, at the time of the trial Kadre was in a British jail, having been arrested by Scotland Yard in November 2002 on suspicion of planning an attack in London. Kadre, along with two other men, was charged by British authorities with possessing "articles for the preparation, instigation and commission of terrorism acts." Reporters speculated that the three intended to carry out a chemical strike against the London underground system, possibly by releasing cyanide during rush hour.72 Cyanide is a substance that has attracted al Qaeda's interest, and camps in Afghanistan trained militants in how to disperse it as a poisonous gas in the air-conditioning system of a building with minimum risk to themselves. Ahmed Ressam, who was an associate of Kadre, admitted having learned this technique while at the Khaldun camp. 73 British authorities denied that the London underground system had been targeted by the group and stressed that the police had found no evidence that the men possessed any form of cyanide .71
The story about the alleged plot, which surfaced almost a year after the second wave of arrests related to the Frankfurt cell, was the first sign that the Algerian network had managed to survive the crackdown that hit it across Europe. After years spent behind the scenes as a recruiter and organizer, Kadre had decided to take direct action. That the plan might involve a chemical substance was an ominous sign of things to come. Following Bensakhria's arrest, a senior US counterterrorism official warned that the network "remains a threat even though we have arrested some of the ringleaders."75 The truth of his analysis was demonstrated first by Kadre's plan and then by the events of the months following his arrest, which proved to authorities throughout Europe that the Algerian network was far from dismantled.
NOTES
1. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Essid Sami Ben Khemais and others, April 2, 2001.
2. DIGOS (Divisioni Investigazioni Generali e Operazioni Speciali) report, "Al Muhajiroun 1," Milan, April 2, 2001.
3. The Frankfurt cell's leader took the name "Meliani" to honor a former commander in Mustafa Bouyali's Armed Islamic Movement who had been killed by the Algerian government.
4. DIGOS report, "Al Muhajiroun 1."
5. Ibid.
6. "A Jihad Warrior in London," Guardian, February 9, 2004.
7. DIGOS report, "Al Muhajiroun 1."
8. "A Jihad Warrior in London."
9. DIGOS report, "Al Muhajiroun 1."
10. Ibid.
11. Paul Harris, Burhan Wazir, and Kate Connolly, "Al-Qaeda's Bombers Used Britain to Plot Slaughter," Guardian, April 21, 2002.
12. DIGOS report, "Al Muhajiroun 1."
13. Ibid.
14. Harris, Wazir, and Connolly, "Al-Qaeda's Bombers Used Britain to Plot Slaughter."
15. Ibid.
16. DIGOS report, "Al Muhajiroun 1."
17. "Militant Admits French Bomb Plot," BBC, April 23, 2002.
18. DIGOS report, "Al Muhajiroun 1."
19. Harris, Wazir, and Connolly, "Al-Qaeda's Bombers Used Britain to Plot Slaughter."
20. DIGOS report, "Al Muhajiroun 1."
21. Verena von Derschau, "`They Will Burn in Hell'; Alleged Bomb Plotters Go on Trial in France," AP, October 6, 2004.
22. DIGOS report, "Al Muhajiroun 1."
23. "France Sentences 10 for Millennium Plot," AP, December 16, 2004.
24. "Four Convicted of Strasbourg Bomb Plot," Guardian, October 3, 2003.
25. "Militant Admits French Bomb Plot."
26. Erik Schelzig and Peter Finn, "Repentant Algerian Tells of Bomb Plot; Muslim Militant, `Horrified' by Sept. 11, Says His Target Was French Synagogue," Washington Post, April 24, 2002.
27. "Four Convicted of Strasbourg Bomb Plot."
28. "A Jihad Warrior in London."
29. Schelzig and Finn, "Repentant Algerian Tells of Bomb Plot."
30. Piotr Smolar, "Dix Islamistes Seront Juges a 1'Automne puor un Projet d'Attentat a Strasbourg," Le Monde, July 7, 2004.
31. "Four Convicted of Strasbourg Bomb Plot."
32. Harris, Wazir, and Connolly, "Al-Qaeda's Bombers Used Britain to Plot Slaughter."
33. DIGOS report, "Al Muhajiroun 1."
34. Ibid. TATP was also used by shoe bomber Richard Reid in his attempt to blow up the Paris-to-Miami flight. Richard Reid had close ties to the Algerian network, and it is likely that the people who supplied him with TATP had learned how to use it in the same al Qaeda camps where the members of the Frankfurt cell did.
35. Interview with Italian intelligence official, Rome, February 2004.
36. DIGOS report, "Al Muhajiroun 1."
37. Ibid.
38. Abu Qatada was released after a few days of detention, only to be arrested again in October 2002.
39. "3 Accused of Plot to Make Bioweapon," Chicago Tribune, February 27, 2003.
40. DIGOS report, "Al Muhajiroun 1."
41. Ian Burrel, John Lichfield, and Robert Verkaik, "Manchester Police Killing: Islamists-Warning Signs of Algerian Terror Cells as Early as 1994," Independent, January 16, 2003.
42. DIGOS report, "Al Muhajiroun 1"; "France Seeks Arrest of a Man Detained in Suspected British Subway Plot," AFP, November 30, 2002.
43. Maryann Bird, "A Poisonous Plot," Time, January 20, 2003.
44. "France Seeks Arrest."
45. "French Court Convicts Group in Strasbourg Christmas Market Bomb Trial," AP, December 16, 2004.
46. Indictment of Sami Essid Ben Khemais and others, Tribunal of Milan, April 2, 2001.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Maaroufi wrote an article for the March 2001 issue of the Al Nahda publication L'Audace in which he claimed that the information on the attack against the US Embassy in Rome was false and had been fabricated by the Tunisian government in order to discredit its opponents in the eyes of the US government.
50. Belgian intelligence report, January 15, 2002.
51. Raphael Minder, "Al-Qaeda Network Highlighted as Belgian Terror Trial Ends," Financial Times, October 1, 2003.
52. Sentence against Sami Essid Ben Khemais and others, Tribunal of Milan, February 22, 2002.
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br /> 53. Indictment of Sami Essid Ben Khemais and others, Tribunal of Milan, April 2, 2001.
54. DIGOS, "Investigation Al Muhajirun 2," October 5, 2001.
55. Ibid.
56. Giles Tremlett, Rory McCarthy, Luke Harding, Julian Borger, John Aglionby, Michael Howard, and John Hooper, "One Year On; The Hunt for al-Qaida," Guardian, September 4, 2002.
57. Uli Rauss and Oliver Schroem, "Osamas Deutscher General," Stern, August 4, 2005.
58. Smolar, "Dix Islamistes Seront Juges a 1'Automne puor un Projet d'Attentat a Strasbourg."
59. James Graff, "Safety in Numbers; the Attack on America Had Forced the E.U. to Pool Intelligence Resources and Bolster Security," Telegraph, June 24, 2001.
60. Smolar, "Dix Islamistes Seront Juges a 1'Automne puor un Projet d'Attentat a Strasbourg."
61. "Spain Arrests Bin Laden Associate," AP, June 22, 2001.
62. Ahmed Rashid, "Hunt for Algerians to Foil Bin Laden Attack on G8 meeting," Telegraph, July 13, 2001.
63. Alan Fram, "Bush Wants 18,4B More for Defense," AP, June 22, 2001.
64. "Four Convicted of Strasbourg Bomb Plot."
65. "French Court Convicts Group."
66. Smolar, "Dix Islamistes Seront Juges a l'Automne puor un Projet d'Attentat a Strasbourg."
67. "France Seeks Arrest."
68. "French Court Convicts Group."
69. Smolar, "Dix Islamistes Seront Juges a 1'Automne puor un Projet d'Attentat a Strasbourg."
70. "French Court Convicts Group."
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