[The men recite verses of the Quran. After a few minutes they start insulting Italy and America again.]
Ciise: How come these people [the Italians] are not ashamed of themselves? Whatever they [the Americans] ask them they do it.
Merai: The Americans are like masters for them. Believe me, even if they ask me something about the Americans I tell them that they are both of the same race. Enemies. They are the masters and you are the dogs. Where they tell you to go, you go. Devils. They are afraid of the Americans, we are not.
[The men keep insulting the Americans and then they recite Quranic verses.]
Merai: Do you know the hymn of jihad against the Americans?
Ciise: Yes!
Merai: Of the sheik Abu Faisal. Come on, let's recite it together!
[The men recite the hymn of jihad.]
Merai: We have freedom and we go to paradise, but they will have only troubles. Come on, brother, we will have paradise! We did not lose a day. We learned many things.
Ciise: But generally, when they arrest two, do they put them together?
Merai: No!
Ciise: And how come they put us together?
Merai: They probably arrested a lot of people and everything is full.
Ciise: Weird ...
Merai: Oh, brother, nothing is wrong, we are just waiting for the Foreigners' Office. They run a check and then you can go. They didn't find anything, they found 1,500 euros that were at home and the watch, that's it. There is nothing. What do you think they'll do to you? If it were something big they would have evidence, we would not be together.
Ciise: I'm anxious to know what is going on. You tell me that generally they keep them separate?
Merai: I have been caught only by the Foreigners' Office, there are no problems.
Ciise: I don't know. We'll see.
As they talk, the different personalities of the two militants emerge. While Merai shows a level of self-confidence and arrogance that borders on the ridiculous, the more experienced Ciise is more level-headed. Merai, blinded by his hatred, does not realize the seriousness of their situation; Ciise asks the right questions, as he understands that their plans have been discovered. But neither realized the danger of speaking so openly, and their words made the prosecutors' job easier.
As Italian authorities began to question the men and gather more information, they came across unsuspected but chilling links. Magistrates realized that both Ciise and Daki had connections to the German city of Hamburg, where they had lived and had befriended some of the key members of the Hamburg cell-a group of Muslim men who used to worship at the same radical mosque, some of whom participated in the attacks of 9/11. These participants included not just three of the four pilots of the planes hijacked on 9/11-Mohammed Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, and Ziad Jarrah-but many others who shared in the planning or provided aid. Some of these men, such as the key planner Ramzi Binalshibh and Said Bahaji, left Germany in the days before the attacks, while others remained in Hamburg. German authorities have investigated more than one hundred men who they believe had varying levels of connection to the Hamburg cell, but only two, Mounir El Motassadeq and Abdelghani Mzoudi, have been tried for their involvement in the plot (see chapter 3).
In the wake of the attacks of 9/11, Hamburg came under worldwide scrutiny, as officials and media wondered how a wealthy, quiet German city could produce such a large group of radicals willing to take part in a heinous terrorist act. Hamburg became a case study in failed integration and successful jihad recruitment. As investigators, journalists, and social scientists uncovered more information on how the Hamburg cell was formed, they realized that its constituent elements could be found in any European city.
The Hamburg cell was an explosive mixture of individuals who happened to gather at the same place, the al Quds mosque. Most of the worshipers at the mosque were lonely young immigrants from Muslim countries who had come to Germany for work or study. Some were unskilled laborers, but many were the sons of their country's upper middle classes who had come to Hamburg to study at the city's prestigious technical universities. Most of them were not, by Muslim standards, particularly religious when they arrived at Hamburg; they saw the al Quds mosque more as a place where they could meet other young men from the Middle East and feel at home than as a place of worship. But the mosque was also the meeting place of a small group of older men who had dedicated their life to jihad. Revered by other Muslims for their battlefield experience and driven by their extreme commitment, these men viewed recruiting youths for the cause of Allah as their duty. The seasoned jihadis know their ideal targets are young men living in a foreign society very different from that of their home country, often at its margins, unable to adapt to their new reality, and easily influenced by the words of charismatic figures. One of the key figures at the al Quds mosque was a Moroccan imam, Mohammed Fazazi, who gave weekly sermons at the mosque and whose tapes were watched by radicals throughout Europe. Fazazi strongly believed that democracy and Western values must be rejected by Muslims living in the West, who should respect only their own Quranic laws. He often preached that European countries were conducting a war against Islam and that "smiting the head of the infidels" was the duty of all Muslims, mandated by God.32 Fazazi, who left Hamburg before 9/11, is believed to be the spiritual leader of the Moroccan terrorist group Salafia Jihadia and is serving a thirty-year sentence in a Moroccan prison for his role in the Casablanca attacks.33
Mohammed Daki, the Moroccan who had been tasked to provide Ciise with a document, knew some of the key members of the Hamburg cell well and admitted to worshiping at the al Quds mosque. Like most of the members of the cell, he had come to Hamburg to study. Among those he befriended were Said Bahaji, Mounir El Motassadeq, and Ramzi Binalshibh. In fact, he had allowed Binalshibh to claim to be living at his home address in Hamburg between 1997 and 1998, a connection that led German authorities to question him in the wake of the attacks of 9/11.34 Ciise's link to Hamburg was also strong, though not as recent (Daki had left the city only a few weeks before his arrest in Italy). He had lived in Germany from 1991 until October 1999, when he moved to Great Britain, and while in Hamburg he had worshiped at the al Quds mosque and befriended the same group as Daki. According to witnesses questioned by German authorities, Ciise became a close associate of Ramzi Binalshibh, with whom he often watched videos about Chechnya and talked about religion. Ciise became friendly as well with the hijacker Mohammed Atta and a Yemeni named Mohammed Rajih, whom German authorities have also investigated for terrorist ties. In 1998 Ciise's apartment in Hamburg was raided by German police, who found forged Italian documents, proving the role of Italian cells in supplying false documents to militants worldwide.35
Even though Ciise and Daki lived in Hamburg at the same time and had common acquaintances, they never crossed paths in Germany. Their meeting in Reggio Emilia was orchestrated by another Hamburg resident-the mysterious Abderrazak, whom Ciise had frantically called on his first day in Milan. Though Italian authorities at first did not know who the man was, Daki's interrogation and information gathered from their German counterparts enabled them to identify him as an Algerian whose full name was Abderrazak Mahdjoub. Daki confessed that while in Hamburg he had become acquainted with Abderrazak, who had instructed him to give Ciise the documents he needed. The investigation revealed that Abderrazak was in fact the head of operations in Europe for the al Tawheed recruiting network and that he was working closely with Mohammed Loqman, the Ansar al Islam leader in Munich, and Mullah Fouad, the network's operational chief in Syria.36
In Abderrazak's story, we see the evolution of al Qaeda in Europe after 9/11. After other key operatives had left Hamburg shortly before 9/11, Abderrazak became one of the most important militants operating in the city. Starting from remnants of the old network, now crippled, he built connections with a new group, Ansar al Islam, and redirected the activities of the Hamburg cell toward a new goal. Under his guidance, several members of the Hamburg cell with ties to th
e planners and executors of 9/11 were now directing their efforts toward recruiting militants to fight American forces in Iraq. Indeed, investigators found that Abderrazak himself had led a group of Muslims from Hamburg to Syria on March 20, 2003, the day after the first American bombs fell on Baghdad. While in Damascus, Abderrazak met with Mullah Fouad, probably to better coordinate their activities. When he took Ciise's phone call from Milan's Central Station, Abderrazak was, in fact, in Damascus with Mullah Fouad and the two made calls together to militants in Italy, urging them to help Ciise with whatever he needed.31 The old (Hamburg) and the new (Ansar al Islam) were cooperating to fight their common enemy, the United States.
German authorities believe that a few weeks into the conflict, Abderrazak and the other men from Hamburg attempted to cross into Iraq in order to join the fighting against US forces. Reportedly, Abderrazak and four other militants were arrested by Syrian authorities, held in a Damascus hotel for forty days, and released on May 20. Two days later the men made their way back to Europe. Abderrazak and his top lieutenant, a French citizen named Naamen Meziche who had lived in the German city for a few years (and received benefits from the local government), returned to Hamburg. Meziche, who used to regularly attend services at the al Quds mosque, had married the daughter of the mosque's imam, Mohammed Fazazi. He was a friend of some of the 9/11 hijackers and worked as a baggage handler at Hamburg Airport with the only two men charged in Germany with involvement in the attacks, El Motassadeq and Mzoudi.38 Meziche was, like Abderrazak, another example of the old al Qaeda network being incorporated into the new organization.
Because Abderrazak and Meziche had committed no crime under German law, local authorities had to let them back into the country, and they continued their activities undisturbed in Hamburg. Another member of the group that had been arrested in Syria, Abdellahi Djaouat, settled in the Spanish coastal town of Lloret de Mar. Djaouat, a professional judoka who had been convicted in France for drug-related offenses, began working as a bouncer in a local club run by fellow Algerians and kept a low profile.39 Nevertheless, Spanish authorities, aware of Djaouat's ties to extremists, began monitoring his phone conversations. Djaouat stayed in contact with several radicals in Spain and with Abderrazak in Hamburg, whose telephone was also bugged.4o
A joint Spanish and German investigation determined that Abderrazak and Djaouat were likely planning an attack for the month of August. Specifically, they intended to bomb tourist facilities on Spain's Costa del Sol during the peak of the summer season, when the beautiful coastal towns are crowded with thousands of European vacationers. The attack, perhaps a forerunner of the March 11 attacks in Madrid, was meant to punish Spain for its support of the US invasion of Iraq.41 Spanish authorities also discovered that Djaouat was involved in a string of robberies and had trafficked in drugs with another Algerian, Samir Ait Mohammed. Authorities believe that the profits of these illegal activities were laundered through clothing shops in the Spanish city of Bilbao. The businesses were owned by Samir and Farid Mahdjoub-the younger brothers of Abderrazak. The Mahdjoubs in Spain apparently funneled money to their older brother in Hamburg, closing the complicated web of links between the two countries.42 Another man allegedly involved in the Lloret cell is Hedi Ben Youssef Boudhiba, a forty-five-year-old Tunisian man. Boudhiba's ties are astonishing and show the extent of the Algerian network. Spanish authorities accuse him of being part of a cell that helped some of the 9/11 hijackers from Spain.4" Boudhiba left Hamburg a few days before 9/11 and reached Istanbul. He later returned to Europe, and authorities believe he moved between Spain, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. His picture was found on a fake Portuguese passport in the apartment of Kamel Bourgass, the ricin-maker sentenced to life for the killing of Manchester police officer Stephen Oake. Boudhiba, who is currently fighting extradition to Spain from London's Belmarsh jail, had also a role in Abderrazak's efforts to send fighters from Europe to Iraq.44
On July 25, 2003, police in Hamburg arrested Abderrazak, whom they considered the mastermind of the operation; a few days later, Spanish police detained Djaouat in Lloret de Mar. The news of Abderrazak's arrest was received with understandable satisfaction in Italy. Immediately on discovering who the mysterious Abderrazak was, Italian authorities had transmitted the information they had collected on him and his network-evidence that he was the leader of Ansar al Islam's recruiting efforts in Europe-to their German counterparts, hoping to thereby trigger his arrest. Abderrazak's detention came for different reasons, but the Italians were nonetheless pleased. Yet their happiness soon turned to shock: on August 27, after exactly a month of detention, Abderrazak was released by German authorities for lack of evidence on his involvement in the plot to attack tourist resorts in Costa del Sol. Officials in the Italian parliament and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a formal complaint about Germany's move, which was interpreted as lack of cooperation in the war on terror.
But, as usual, German authorities' hands were tied. Abderrazak's attempt to go to Iraq and his recruiting efforts were not crimes under German law, and no charges for those acts could possibly have been filed against him. Heino Vahldieck, the head of the security agency for the state of Hamburg, attempted to justify his country's inaction: "If he said, `I'm going to Iraq to kill nonbelievers,' we would have arrested him, but if he says he's going to support his brothers, we can do nothing."45 And while German jurists debated the differences between "supporting the brothers" and "killing unbelievers" (at a time when Abderrazak's "brothers" were indeed "killing unbelievers" in Iraq), Abderrazak walked free in the streets of Hamburg.
Abderrazak's case exemplifies a problem common across Europe. In many countries, the high threshold of evidence needed to press charges often prevents authorities from charging known terrorists unless they are caught in the final stages of preparing an attack. On occasion, militants with proven connections to terrorist groups have been recorded talking about their desire to "die as martyrs" and "kill the infidels." But until a specific target is mentioned or a weapon is found, all authorities can do is keep a close watch on the would-be martyrs.
And finding legal justification to detain militants who have either trained or fought abroad is even more difficult. Most European countries do not punish individuals who join terrorist groups or guerrilla bands outside their borders. Therefore, hundreds of European Muslims who fought and trained in such places as Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Bosnia were able to return to their home countries without being charged with any crime. In some cases their experience in jihad made them targets of surveillance from intelligence agencies, which tracked their movements on their return to Europe. But today, hundreds of battle-hardened jihadis are living on the Continent and there is still nothing authorities can do to detain them. Though the events of 9/11 spurred some countries to legislative reform, others have retained a system that hampers their ability to take firm action-as the helplessness of German authorities in Abderrazak's case illustrates.
Abderrazak's legal uncertainties ended in November 2003, when Italian authorities, despairing of the possibility that Berlin would act, officially charged him and issued an international warrant for his arrest. On November 28, German police took him into custody in Hamburg; on March 19, Abderrazak was extradited to Italy, where he is expected to stand trial. As happened in the Ganczarski case (discussed in chapter 5) and in many others, the German legal system proved itself to be incapable of dealing with the threat of Islamic terrorism and had to be rescued by another country.
NOTES
1. Deposition of Shadi Abdallah, Federal High Court, Karlsruhe, Germany, November 18, 2002.
2. ABC News, March 28, 2005; Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2004.
3. Jonathan Schanzer, "Ansar al Islam: Back in Iraq," Middle East Quarterly 11, no. I (Winter 2004).
4. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Muhamad Majid and others. November 25, 2003.
5. Ibid. Abu Taisir's real name is Abdal Hadi Ahmad Mahmoud Daghlas; he is a Jordanian national who has
reportedly married a relative of Zarqawi's.
6. Christopher Dickey, "Jihad Express," Newsweek, March 21, 2005.
7. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Merai and others. March 31, 2003.
8. The mention of Abu Qatada, al Qaeda's spiritual leader in Europe in the 1990s, underscores that this new organization contains individuals who have had a key role in Europe for years.
9. The man is probably referring to the Sahabah mosque in Vienna, an important stronghold of the Egyptian Gamaa Islamiya that played a key role during the war in the Balkans. Austrian authorities have been investigating it for years.
10. Tribunal of Milan, indictment of Merai and others.
11. Indictment of Nasr Osama Mustafa Hassan, Tribunal of Milan, June 23, 2005.
12. Tribunal of Milan, indictment of Merai and others.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Merai's real name is El Ayashi Radi Abdel Samie Abu El Yazid; he was born in Egypt on January 2, 1972.
17. Tribunal of Milan, indictment of Merai and others.
18. Ibid.
19. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Muhamad Majid and others.
20. Ibid.
21. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Mohamed Daki, April 4, 2003.
22. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Muhamad Majid and others.
23. Ibid.
24. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Mohamed Daki.
25. Ibid.
26. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Muhamad Majid and others.
27. Stefano Dambruoso, Milano Bagdad: Diario di un magistrato in prima linen nella lotta al terrorismo islamico in Italia (Milan: Mondadori, Milan, 2004), p. 53.
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