In September, police in Barcelona broke up a cell of ten Pakistanis, accusing them of providing logistical support to al Qaeda and other groups. According to Spanish authorities, the cell raised money by falsifying documents and selling drugs. More than one hundred eighty grams of heroin were discovered in the raids, together with radical Islamist tapes and 18,000 €.131 The group, which is believed to have sent money to the Pakistani militants who killed Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in 2002, also possessed videos showing details of two Barcelona high-rises commonly referred to as "Spain's twin towers." Investigators suspect the tapes were surveillance for future attacks.'32
The confirmation that Islamic terrorists were planning new attacks on Spanish soil came in October 2004, when a two-pronged police operation netted more than forty militants throughout the country. Spanish authorities reported that the group was planning to deploy a suicide bomber to drive a van loaded with five hundred kilograms of explosives inside the Audiencia Nacional, the country's most important criminal court, where all the cases related to Islamic fundamentalism are investigated and prosecuted. The men were charged with the attempted murder of four hundred people, the estimated average number of individuals who work and visit the building every day.133 Authorities also suspect that the group was planning an additional wave of suicide bombings aimed at the headquarters of the Popular Party, the Atocha train station, and the famous Santiago Bernabeu stadium, where more than one hundred thousand soccer fans attend each home game of Real Madrid.134
The group dismantled in the fall of 2004 bore striking resemblances to the cell that carried out the March 11 train bombings. Led by Mohammed Achraf, an Algerian who had taken up radical Islam in jail while serving two stints for credit card fraud between 1999 and 2002, the group was an odd mixture of drug dealers, document forgers, and experienced Islamic fundamentalists who had come together almost by chance in various Spanish prisons.135 The core of the group was patiently put together by Achraf between 2001 and 2002, when frequent fights between Spanish and Muslim inmates in the Salamanca prison led the latter to organize themselves in a group that named itself "Martyrs of Morocco." And like the Madrid train bombers, the Martyrs of Morocco began planning their deadly operation well before Spain became involved in the Iraqi war; investigators believe that the attack against the Audiencia Nacional was conceived in 2002.136
The history of the Martyrs of Morocco reveals how European prisons serve as a breeding ground for Islamic fundamentalism. In Salamanca, Achraf's constant and aggressive indoctrination radicalized scores of North African immigrants who had pursued a life of crime and "unbelief' in Spain, turning them into Islamic fundamentalists and volunteers for suicide operations. Achraf personally recruited dozens of Muslim prisoners, following their movements even after they had been released. According to Spanish authorities, Achraf kept meticulous tabs on his recruits inside and outside of jail, establishing a tight-knit network that covered various Spanish cities and jails. The men stayed in touch via personal contact, telephone, or e-mail, and Achraf and his lieutenants made sure to constantly correspond with recruits so that "their fundamentalist point of views would not be extinguished."13'
The Martyrs of Morocco also included some experienced jihadis, members of the Algerian GIA and GSPC who had operated in Spain for years. One of Achraf's closest helpers, for example, was Abdelkrim Bensmail, a GIA member who had been convicted in 1997 for terrorist activities; he was an associate of Allekema Lamari, one of the seven men who blew themselves up in Leganes.138 The combination of young disenfranchised Muslim criminals and hardened Islamic radicals, confined together for months in the harsh prison environment, proved to be explosive. By 2003, when Achraf was already out of Salamanca, the group was ready. "I give you the good news that I have formed a group of good brothers who are willing to die at any given moment for the project of God, they and we are only waiting to be released," he wrote to Said Afis, a twentythree-year-old Algerian who had originally been detained in Salamanca for theft. "We are yearning for this and we have the weapons and you will be with us."139
While the more experienced jihadis provided the cell with ideological support, the recruits put their criminal skills to use for their new cause. Thus the Mauritanian inmate Kamara Bidahima Diadie obtained the explosives from one of his contacts in the Spanish criminal under- world.140 Experienced forgers procured false documents and other felons committed additional crimes to raise money. Funds for the attacks were allegedly raised through robberies carried out in Switzerland, where Achraf had moved after his release from Salamanca.141 In a phone call intercepted by Spanish authorities a few months before the arrests, Achraf told one of his associates, "It's not a problem to find the money necessary to buy the explosives. There is plenty of it in Switzerland and we only have to take it from the infidels." 141
Authorities throughout Europe fear that the Martyrs of Morocco are a harbinger of things to come and acknowledge that prisons constitute fertile territory for the efforts of experienced recruiters. And while in Spain Muslims represent only 12 percent of the general penal population143-though low, a number still disproportionally higher than in the general population-in other countries the percentages are much higher; in France, they constitute more than half of those in prison. Recruiters know that inmates represent the perfect targets and exploit their weaknesses. According to Spanish authorities, the Martyrs of Morocco "focused on people sentenced for petty crimes who then are introduced to this extremist vision of Islam as a manner to expiate their sins, to reject a previous way of life, and which would purify them, in this case, through martyrdom." 144
September 11, 2001, brought about "a radical change in Muslim prisoners," observed Juan Figueroa, the vice president of the Spanish prison employees union. "After Sept. 11, the inmates radicalized.... Groups of hard-core Muslims began to form, and they pressured other Muslims." Information gathered about the Martyrs of Morocco triggered significant changes in the internal procedures of Spanish jails. Hundreds of radical Muslim inmates were either transferred or isolated, and prison guards were instructed to pay particular attention to the activities of Muslim inmates.141 But Spain is hardly the only Western country where fundamentalists operate undetected inside prisons. Indeed, this particular case featured terrorists detained in two other countries who were free to communicate and plot while behind bars.
Swiss authorities admitted that Achraf, the leader of the group, had been allowed to make phone calls and send uncensored e-mail while detained in a Zurich facility before the November arrests. Though he was being held for immigration violations, he was known to Swiss intelligence as a suspected terrorist; yet he was able to continue preparing for the attacks while in custody. In fact, because of his good conduct and the overcrowding of the detention facility, Achraf was scheduled to be released a few days after the plot was discovered.146
Even more shockingly, Spanish authorities discovered that Achraf had received letters from Mohammed Salameh, who is serving a life sentence in the Supermax, America's most secure federal prison, for his part in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. He wrote several times to Achraf, wishing him luck in his future endeavors. "Oh God!" wrote Salameh in February 2003. "Make us live with happiness, make us die as martyrs, may we be united on the Day of Judgment." 141 Behind the bars of the West's most secure jails, the old guard was symbolically passing on the baton to a new generation of Islamic terrorists.
NOTES
1. Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (Forsvarets Forksningin- stitutt, or FFI) "FFI Explains al Qaida Document," March 19, 2004.
2. Ibid.
3. "Spanish Diplomat Killed in Iraq," CNN, October 9, 2003.
4. "Spanish Agents, Japanese Diplomats Killed in Iraq," CNN, November 29, 2003.
5. Lawrence Wright, "The Terror Web," New Yorker, January 17, 2005.
6. El Mundo special report, "11-M. Masacre en Madrid," http://www .el-mundo.es/documentos/2004/03/espana/atentados 11 m/index.html.
7.
Wright, "The Terror Web."
8. El Mundo, "11-M. Masacre en Madrid."
9. Wright, "The Terror Web."
10. El Mundo, "11-M. Masacre en Madrid."
11. "Quien os Proteges de Nosotros?" El Mundo, March 12, 2004.
12. El Mundo, "11-M. Masacre en Madrid."
13. Ibid.
14. Casimiro Garcia-Abadillo, 11-M. La Venganza (Madrid: La Esfera de los Libros, 2005), pp. 115-19.
15. Spanish Ministry of the Interior, Actividad Antiterrorista, Summary of Anti-Terrorist Activities, 2004, pp. 113-14.
16. Keith B. Richburg, "Five Held in Madrid Blasts; Tape Asserts Al Qaeda Responsibility," Washington Post, March 14, 2004.
17. El Mundo, "11-M. Masacre en Madrid."
18. "Al Qaeda `Claims Madrid Bombings,"' BBC, March 14, 2004.
19. "Transcripcion del video en el que Al Qaeda reivindica el 1-M," El Mundo, March 14, 2004.
20. Wright, "The Terror Web."
21. El Mundo, "11-M. Masacre en Madrid."
22. Elaine Sciolino, "Following Attacks, Spain's Governing Party Is Beaten," New York Times, March 15, 2004.
23. Indictment of Reda Zerroug and others, Audiencia Nacional, Madrid, January 14, 2005.
24. Indictment of Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, Juzgado Central de Instruc- cion n. 005, Proceeding 35/2001, Madrid, September 17, 2003.
25. Wright, "The Terror Web."
26. "Coping with the Past," Guardian, July 28, 2004.
27. Italian intelligence officer, interview with the author, Milan, March 2005.
28. Giles Tremlett, "Supporters Desert Aznar as Spaniards Reject Conflict," Guardian, February 18, 2003.
29. David Sharrock, "The Accidental Premier," Times (London), September 19, 2004.
30. Garcia-Abadillo,11-M. La Venganza, p. 120; Zougam is quoted in Tim Golden, Desmond Butler, and Don Van Natta Jr., "Suspect in Madrid Carnage Not an Unknown," New York Times, March 22, 2004.
31. Keith Johnson, John Carreyrou, David Crawford, and Karby Leggett, "Islamist's Odyssey: Morocco to Madrid, a Bomb Suspect Grew Radicalized," Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2004; Spanish Ministry of the Interior, Actividad Antiterrorista, pp. 113-14.
32. Spanish Ministry of the Interior, Actividad Antiterrorista, pp. 113-14.
33. Wright, "The Terror Web."
34. Johnson et al., "Islamist's Odyssey."
35. Indictment of Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas.
36. Ibid.; Keith Johnson, David Crawford, and Craig Karmin, "Spain's Bomb Probe Traces Web of al Qaeda Links," Wall Street Journal, March 16, 2004.
37. Johnson et al., "Islamist's Odyssey."
38. Garcia-Abadillo, 11-M. La Venganza, p. 119.
39. Ibid., p. 116.
40. Peter Finn and Keith B. Richburg, "Madrid Probe Turns to Islamic Cell in Morocco," Washington Post, March 20, 2004.
41. Tim Golden and Don Van Natta Jr., "Suspect in Madrid Was under Scrutiny in 3 Countries," New York Times, March 17, 2004.
42. Johnson et al., "Islamist's Odyssey."
43. Mark Townsend, John Hooper, Greg Bearup, Paul Harris, Peter Beaumont, Anthony Burnett, Martin Bright, Jason Burke, and Nick Pelham, "The Secret War," Observer, March 21, 2004.
44. Golden and Van Natta, "Suspect in Madrid."
45. Spanish Ministry of the Interior, Actividad Antiterrorista.
46. Indictment of Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas.
47. Sebastian Rotella, "Terrorists at the Table; Islamic Militants in Europe Blend Political Sophistication and Crude Violence to Influence Events, as the Bombings in Madrid Show," Los Angeles Times, March 6, 2005.
48. Spanish Ministry of the Interior, Actividad Antiterrorista, p. 122.
49. Garcia-Abadillo, 11-M. La Venganza, p. 259
50. "Bomb Found on Spain Rail," BBC, April 2, 2004; Spanish Ministry of the Interior, Actividad Antiterrorista, p. 122.
51. Garcia-Abadillo, "11-M. La Venganza," pp. 258-64.
52. Ibid., p. 265.
53. Wright, "The Terror Web."
54. Garcia-Abadillo, "11-M. La Venganza," p. 262.
55. Wright, "The Terror Web."
56. El Mundo, "11-M. Masacre en Madrid."
57. "Inferno Terror Threat to Spain," CBS News, April 5, 2004.
58. EFE, March 10, 2005; Giles Tremlett, "Madrid Bombers Planned More Attacks: Video Found in Flat of Dead Terrorists Gave Ultimatum," Guardian, April 9, 2004.
59. Wright, "The Terror Web."
60. Garcia-Abadillo, 11-M. La Venganza, p. 265.
61. Wright, "The Terror Web."
62. Mar Roman, "Madrid Terror Suspect Left a Goodbye Note for His Family Saying He Wanted to Become a Martyr," AP, February 16, 2005; for the authorities' view of his role, see Spanish Ministry of the Interior, Summary of Anti-Terrorist Activities, 2004.
63. El Mundo, "11-M. Masacre en Madrid."
64. Tremlett, "Madrid Bombers Planned More Attacks."
65. "Coping with the Past," Guardian, July 28, 2004.
66. Spanish Ministry of the Interior, Actividad Antiterrorism, p. 121.
67. Garcia-Abadillo, 11-M. La Venganza, p. 132.
68. James Graff, "Morocco: The New Face of Terror?" Time, March 21, 2005.
69. Garcia-Abadillo, 11-M. La Venganza, pp. 132-33.
70. Ibid., p. 133.
71. Graff, "Morocco: The New Face of Terror?"
72. Sebastian Rotella, "Jihad's Unlikely Alliance," Los Angeles Times, May 23, 2005.
73. "Cinco de los Terroristas del 11-M Estaban Fichados y Varios Fueron Vigilados y Filmados por la Policia," El Pais, April 18, 2004.
74. Graff, "Morocco: The New Face of Terror?"
75. Garcia-Abadillo, 11-M. La Venganza, p. 134.
76. "Cinco de los Terroristas del 11-M."
77. Spanish Ministry of the Interior, Summary of Anti-Terrorist Activities, 2004.
78. Garcia-Abadillo, 11-M. La Venganza, p. 118.
79. Johnson et al., "Islamist's Odyssey."
80. Garcia-Abadillo, 11-M. La Venganza, pp. 136-39; "Spain Holds alQaeda Finance Suspect," BBC, April 23, 2002.
8 1. Sebastian Rotella, "Jihad's Unlikely Alliance."
82. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Rabei Osman Ahmed El Sayed and others, June 5, 2004.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. H. Gude, J. Hufelschulte, E. Kallinger, T. Staisch, C. Sturm, "The Trail of a Preacher: Suspected Mastermind of Madrid Attacks Lived in Germany for Years as Rejected Asylum-Seeker," Focus, June 14, 2004. Accessed via Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).
90. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Rabei Osman Ahmed El Sayed and others.
91. Ibid.
92. Gude et al., "The Trail of a Preacher."
93. Craig Whitlock, "A Radical Who Remained Just out of Reach; Suspect in Madrid Attacks Moved Freely in Europe," Washington Post, November 14, 2004.
94. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Rabei Osman Ahmed El Sayed and others.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. "Al Qaeda's New Front," Frontline, PBS, January 25, 2005, http:// www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/.
98. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Rabei Osman Ahmed El Sayed and others.
99. "Al Qaeda's New Front."
100. "`El Tunecino' Empezo a Pensar en la Guerra Santa ante de los Aten- tados del I1-S," EFE, January 24, 2005.
101. Keith Johnson and David Crawford, "Madrid Bombing Suspect Is Key al Qaeda Liaison," Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2004.
102. Garcia-Abadillo, 11-M. La Venganza, pp. 142-44; Rotella, "Terrorists at the Table."
103. Johnson and Crawford, "Madrid Bombing Suspect."
104. Indictment of Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas; Garcia-Abadillo, 11-M. La Venganza, pp. 142-44.
105. Wright, "The Terror Web"; "Cinco de los Terroristas del 11-M."
106. Wright, "The Terror Web."
107. Garcia-Abadillo, 11-M. La Ven
ganza, pp. 142-44.
108. Johnson and Crawford, "Madrid Bombing Suspect."
109. "Cinco de los Terroristas del 11-M"; Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Muhamad Majid and others.
110. Sebastian Rotella, "Al Qaeda Fugitive Sought in Bombings," Los Angeles Times, April 14, 2004.
111. "Syrian Brothers Led Madrid Train Bombings," Reuters, August 2, 2005.
112. "La mujer del imputado del 11-M que se afili6 al PSOE denunci6 en 2003 que queria cometer atentados," El Mundo, July 28, 2005.
113. Two weeks after the Madrid train bombings, police searched Mouhannad Almallah's apartment and found sketches of New York's Grand Central Terminal. Consequently, federal and local authorities tightened security inside and around the busy railroad terminal.
114. Indictment of Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas.
115. "Report: FBI Finds Link Between 9/11, Madrid Bombers," Reuters, November 11, 2004.
116. US State Department, "Secretary of State Colin L. Powell Authorizes Reward," press release, November 18, 2004; Italian intelligence officer, interview with the author.
117. "La Policia Sigui6 a el Tunecino Hasta Poco Dias Antes del 11-M," El Mundo, October 6, 2004.
118. Garcia-Abadillo, 11-M. La Venganza, pp. 144-45.
119. Rotella, "Jihad's Unlikely Alliance."
120. Spanish Ministry of the Interior, Summary of Anti-Terrorist Activities, 2003.
121. "La filiere espagnole," Maroc Hebdo International, September 12-18, 2003, http://www.maroc-hbdo.press.ma/MHinternet/Archives-571/html-571/ lafiliere.html.
122. Spanish Ministry of the Interior, Actividad Antiterrorista.
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