55. Imarisio, "Vi Uccidero' come Al Zarkawi'."
56. As translated by Nesser Petter in "The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker-Religiously Motivated Violence or Islamist Terrorism in the Name of Global Jihad?" Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt, or FFI), February 2, 2004.
57. As translated by Petter in "The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker."
58. "Acht Arrestaties in Onderzoek Moord Van Gogh," De Telegraaf, November 3, 2004.
59. Rotella, "2 Held after Dutch Standoff."
60. "Netherlands Police Operation Ends with Arrest of Two Terrorist Suspects," AFP, November 10, 2004.
61. Richburg, "From Quiet Teen to Terrorist Suspect."
62. Among the individuals arrested in connection to the Hofstad group there are two Chechen men. One, Bislan Ismailov, was arrested in Tours (France) in May 2005. His fingerprints were found on a copy of Bouyeri's testament. The other Chechen, twenty-three-year-old Marat J., was arrested in southern Holland (Le Monde, May 27, 2005).
63. Anthony Deutsch, "Alleged Dutch Terror Network Case Starts," AP, February 7, 2005.
64. "Terror Arrests `Prevented' Attacks, Court Refuses Bail," Expatica, February 7, 2005.
65. "Dutch Minister Says Arrest of Terrorist Suspects May Have Prevented Attacks," Radio Netherlands, June 24, 2005. According to Dutch authorities, El Fathni purchased the ticket for Issar to fly to Syria, while another member of the group, Rachid Belkacem, drove the Syrian to the Brussels airport. Belkacem was arrested in London a few hours before El Fathni's arrest.
66. Dutch official, interview with the author, Amsterdam, July 2005.
67. Janny Groen and Annieke Kranenberg, "Van Onze Verslaggeefsters," Volkskrant, February 5, 2005.
68. "Radicale bekeerde moslima had afscheidsbrief," Algemeen Dagblad, July 24, 2005.
69. "Soumaya S. ontkent zoeken adressen politici," Reformatorisch Dagblad, August 4, 2005.
70. Dutch official, interview with the author, Amsterdam, July 2005.
71. Frankel, "From Civic Activist to Alleged Terrorist."
72. Sebastian Rotella and Douglas Heingartner, "Suspect in Slaying of Filmmaker Faces Terrorism Charges; Dutch Authorities Are Looking into Possible Links to International Militant Groups," Los Angeles Times, November 6, 2004.
73. "Van Gogh Murder Designed to `Terrorise Dutch Society,"' Expatica, January 26, 2005.
74. Petter, "The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker."
75. Imarisio, "Vi Uccidero' come Al Zarkawi'."
76. Petter, "The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker."
77. AIVD, 2003 annual report, p. 17.
78. AIVD report, "Saudi Influences in the Netherlands: Links between the Salafist Missions, Radicalisation Processes and Islamic Terrorism," January 2005, p. 5.
79. AIVD, "Saudi Influences in the Netherlands," p. I.
80. US Treasury Department, "Additional Al-Haramain Branches, Former Leader Designated by Treasury as Al Qaida Supporters Treasury Marks Latest Action in Joint Designation with Saudi Arabia," press release JS-1703, June 2, 2004, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/jsl703.htm.
81. AIVD, "Saudi Influences in the Netherlands," p. 4.
82. US Treasury Department, "Additional Al-Haramain Branches."
83. Andrew Anthony, "When Theo van Gogh Was Slaughtered in the Streets for His Attacks on Islamic Fundamentalism, It Was Also a Knife to the Heart of the Dutch Liberal Dream," Observer magazine, December 5, 2004.
84. "Moskee als Broeinest van Haat," Algemeen Dagblad, November 5, 2004.
85. Petter, "The Slaying of the Dutch Filmmaker."
86. "Radicale Imams Prediken Materlaarschap," Volkskrant, June 14, 2002.
87. Ian Johnson and David Crawford, "A Saudi Group Spreads Extremism in `Law' Seminars," Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2003.
88. "AIVD, Saudi Influences in the Netherlands," p. 4.
89. Rotella and Heingartner, "Suspect in Slaying of Filmmaker Faces Terrorism Charges."
90. AIVD, "Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands; from Incident to Trend," December 2002, pp. 31-32.
91. Justin Sparks, "Muslim Mole Panics Dutch Secret Service," Times (London), November 14, 2004.
92. Gareth Harding, "Netherlands on Edge after Slaying," UPI, December 2, 2004.
93. "Ex-Terror Suspect Accused of Assault," Expatica, April 8, 2005.
94. "Mohammed B. Is de Held," Amsterdams Stadsblad, March 16, 2005.
95. Notes taken by the author during the trial.
96. Andrew Higgins, "Van Gogh Killing `Highlights Risk from HomeGrown Terrorists,"' Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2004.
APPENDIX: ISLAMIC
EXTREMISM IN EUROPE
TESTIMONY OF
LORENZO VIDINO
Before the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats
"Islamic Extremism in Europe" April 27, 2005
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice-Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity today to discuss the threat posed to Europe by Islamist extremism.
The deadly train bombings that killed almost two hundred commuters in Madrid on March 11, 2004, shocked most Europeans, as the attacks represented the first massive strike by Islamist terrorists on European soil. The Madrid bombings, nevertheless, did not surprise security officials on both sides of the ocean, as the intelligence community was well aware that it was just a matter of time before Europe, one of the terrorists' favorite bases of operations, could become a target.
Over the last ten years, in fact, Europe has seen a troubling escalation of Islamist terrorist and extremist activities on its soil. This disturbing phenomenon is due to a combination of several factors and chiefly to:
• lax immigration policies that have allowed known Islamic radicals to settle and remain in Europe,
• the radicalization of significant segments of the continent's burgeoning Muslim population, and
• the European law enforcement agencies' inability to effectively dismantle terrorist networks, due to poor attention to the problem and/or the lack of proper legal tools.
Given these premises, it should come as no surprise that almost every single attack carried out or attempted by al Qaeda throughout the world has some link to Europe, even prior to 9/11. A Dublin-based charity provided material support to some of the terrorists who attacked the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Part of the planning for the thwarted millennium bombing that was supposed to target the Los Angeles international airport was conceived in London. False documents provided by a cell operating between Belgium and France allowed two al Qaeda operatives to portray themselves as journalists and assassinate Ahmed Shah Massoud, the commander of the Afghan Northern Alliance, just two days before 9/11. And, as we well know, the attacks of 9/11 were partially planned in Hamburg, Germany, where three of the four pilots of the hijacked planes had lived and met, and from where they received extensive financial and logistical support until the day of the attacks.
After 9/11, as the al Qaeda network became less dependent on its leadership in Afghanistan and more decentralized, the cells operating in Europe gained even additional importance. Most of the planning for the April 2002 bombing of a synagogue in the Tunisian resort town of Djerba that killed twenty-one mostly European tourists was done in Germany and France. According to Moroccan authorities, the funds for the May 2003 Casablanca bombings came from Moroccan cells operating between Spain, France, Italy, and Belgium. And cells operating in Europe have also directly targeted the Old Continent. Only after 9/11, attacks have been either planned or executed in Madrid, Paris, London (in at least four different circumstances), Milan, Berlin, Porto, and Amsterdam.
However, while investigations in all these cases revealed that different cells operating throughout Europe were involved in the planning of the operation, the role of these cells extends beyond the simple planning or execution of attacks. European-based Islamists raise or launder money, supply false documents and weapons, and recr
uit new operatives for a global network that spans from the United States to the Far East. Within the last decade, their role has become essential to the mechanics of the network. It is, therefore, not far-fetched to speak of Europe as "a new Afghanistan," a place that al Qaeda and others have chosen as its headquarters to direct operations.
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN EUROPE
The foundations for this security disaster were laid in the 1980s, when many European countries either granted political asylum or allowed the entrance to hundreds of Islamic fundamentalists, many of them veterans of the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets facing persecution in their home countries. Moved by humanitarian reasons, for decades countries like Britain, Sweden, Holland, and Germany have made it their official policy to welcome political refugees from all over the world. But blinded by their laudable intentions of providing protection to all individuals suffering political persecutions from autocratic regimes throughout the world, most European countries never really distinguished between opponents of dictatorships who wanted to spread democracy and Islamic fundamentalists who had bloodied their hands in their home countries with heinous terrorist acts. As a consequence, some of the world's most radical Islamists facing prosecutions in the Middle East found not only a safe haven but also a new convenient base of operation in Europe.
Many European governments thought that, once in Europe, these committed Islamists would have stopped their violent activities. Europeans also naively thought that, by giving the mujahideen asylum, they would have been spared their murderous wrath. All these assumptions turned out to be completely wrong. In fact, as soon as they settled on European soil, most Islamic radicals exploited the Continent's freedom and wealth to continue their efforts to overthrow Middle Eastern governments, raising money, and providing weapons and false documents for their groups operating in their countries of origin.
And it was in Europe that Islamic radicals from different countries converged and forged strategic alliances. Originally intending only to fight the secular regimes of their own countries, top members of various Islamist terrorists groups, drawn to the radical mosques of Europe, joined forces with their colleagues who all adhered to the same Salafi/Wahhabi ideology and shared the common dream of a global Islamic state. It was between London and Milan, for example, that the strategic alliance between Algerian and Tunisian terrorist groups was conceived. Europe, along with al Qaeda's Afghan training camps, was the place where bin Laden's project of "global jihad" came to realization, as various Islamist groups progressively abandoned their local goals and embraced al Qaeda's strategy of attacking America and its allies worldwide.
Moreover, the mosques and networks established by radicals who had been given asylum played a crucial role in what could be considered Europe's biggest social and security problem, the radicalization of its growing Muslim population. Europe is facing monumental problems in trying to integrate the children and grandchildren of Muslim immigrants who have come to the continent since the 1960s. Dangerously high percentages of second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants live at the margins of European societies, stuck between unemployment and crime. While they hold French, Dutch or British passports, they do not have any attachment to their native land, feeling like foreigners in their home countries.
"After things didn't work out with work, I decided to devote myself to the Koran," explained an Islamic fundamentalist interviewed by the German magazine Der Spiegel.
As they perceive themselves with no economic future, trapped in a country that does not accept them and without a real identity, many young European Muslims turn to their fathers' religion in their quest for direction. While some of them find solace in their rediscovered faith, others adopt the most belligerent interpretation of Islam, embarking on a holy war against their own country. According to a French intelligence report, radical Islam represents for some French Muslims "a vehicle of protest against-problems of access to employment and housing, discrimination of various sorts, the very negative image of Islam in public opinion."
Whether this troubling situation is due to the European societies' reluctance to fully accept newcomers or on some Muslims' refusal to adapt to new customs is hard to say.
Nevertheless, given the burgeoning numbers of Muslim immigrants living in Europe, currently estimated between fifteen million and twenty million, the social repercussions of these sentiments are potentially explosive.
While it is true that the situation in the immigrant suburbs of many European cities is dramatic and that it is difficult for the children of Muslim immigrants to emerge in mainstream European society, the popular paradigm that equates militancy with poverty is simplistic and refuted by the facts. An overview of the European-born Muslim extremists that have been involved with terrorism, in fact, shows that many of them came from backgrounds of intact families, with financial stability and complete immersion in mainstream European society. The example of Omar Sheikh-the British-born son of a wealthy Pakistani merchant who attended some of England's most prestigious private schools, led a Pakistani terrorist group and was jailed for his role in the beheading of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl-shows that the causes of radicalization are deeper for many individuals.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that young, disaffected Muslims living at the margins of European societies are the ideal recruits for terrorist organizations. The recruitment takes place everywhere, from mosques to cafes in Arab neighborhoods of European cities to the Internet. As in the United States, European prisons are considered a particularly fertile breeding ground for radicalism, a place where young men already prone to violence can be easily turned into terrorists. In France, for example, where unofficial estimates indicate that more than 60 percent of the inmates are Muslims (while Muslims represent only 10 percent of the total French population), authorities closely monitor the activities of Islamic fundamentalists, aware of the dangers of the radicalization of their jail population.
Officials, who estimate that three hundred militants are active in the Paris prisons alone, have seen cases of radicals who seek to get arrested on purpose so that they can recruit new militants in jail.
Similarly, in Spain, where one in ten inmates is of Moroccan or Algerian descent, Islamic radicals have been actively recruiting in jail for the last ten years. In October of 2004, Spanish authorities dismantled a cell that had been planning a bloody sequel to the March 11 Madrid bombings, intending to attack the Audiencia Nacional, Spain's national criminal court. Most of the men, who called themselves "The Martyrs of Morocco," had been recruited in jail, where they had been detained for credit card fraud and other common crimes and had no prior involvement with Islamic fundamentalism.
CURRENT TRENDS OF TERRORISM FINANCING IN EUROPE
If the European criminal underworld provides an excellent recruiting pool, crime also constitutes a major source of financing for terrorist organizations. Islamic terrorist groups operating in Europe have resorted to all kinds of crimes to finance their operations, including robberies, document forging, fraud, and the sale of counterfeited goods. But more alarming is the fact that Islamist groups have built strong operational alliances with criminal networks operating in Europe.
Over the last few years, Islamic terrorists have been actively involved in one of Europe's most profitable illegal activities, human smuggling. The GSPC, a radical Algerian Islamist group operating in the desert areas of North Africa, is actively involved in smuggling large groups of SubSaharan migrants across the desert and then to Europe, where the group can count on an extensive network of cells that provides the illegal immigrants with false documents and safe houses. In 2003 German authorities dismantled a network of Kurdish militants linked to Ansar al Islam, the terrorist group led by Abu Musab al Zarqawi that is battling US forces in Iraq. The Kurdish cells had organized a sophisticated and profitable scheme to smuggle hundreds of illegal Kurdish immigrants into Europe, raising hundreds of thousands of dollars. Considering that, on averag
e, a migrant pays about $4,000 to his smugglers and that around half a million illegal immigrants reach Europe every year, terrorist groups have all the reasons to get involved in the human smuggling business.
Likewise, the terrorists' use of drug trafficking is also considered a particularly serious problem by European authorities, which believe that terrorist organizations have infiltrated around two-thirds of the $12.5 billion-a-year Moroccan hashish trade.
Evidence from recent terrorist operations reveals that profits from drug sales have directly financed terrorist attacks. According to Spanish authorities, Jamal Ahmidan, a known drug dealer and one of the operational masterminds of the Madrid train bombings, obtained the two hundred twenty pounds of dynamite that were used in the attacks in exchange for sixty-six pounds of hashish. And Ahmidan also flew to the island of Mallorca shortly before March 11 to arrange the sale of hashish and Ecstasy, planning to use the profits for additional attacks. The scheme is not new to Moroccan groups, which have used profits from the drug sales to finance the thwarted attacks against American ships in Gibraltar in 2002 and the Casablanca bombings.
European authorities are confronting criminal activities with relative success, but are facing an uphill battle when they have to prove the links to terrorism. Severe evidentiary requirements and the secretive nature of terrorism financing have prevented Europeans from effectively tackling known networks that financed terrorist activities. The most commonly used legal tool, the designation as a "terrorism financier," has had only modest results. In fact, since the various terrorism financing resolutions allow authorities only to freeze the bank accounts of suspected terrorism financiers, businesses, residential and commercial properties belonging to the designated individual cannot be touched.
The case of Youssuf Nada and Ahmed Idris Nasreddin is illustrative. Nada and Nasreddin operated a bank, Bank Al Taqwa, and a network of companies between Italy, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and the Bahamas. The US Treasury Department, which designated Al Taqwa and both men as terrorism financiers in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, claims that, since its foundation in 1988, Al Taqwa financed groups such as the Palestinian Hamas and the Algerian GIA. Moreover, according to the Treasury Department, Al Taqwa provided funding to al Qaeda until September of 2001 and granted a clandestine line of credit to "a close associate of Usama Bin Laden." European authorities have also designated the bank and the two financiers, but with scant results.
Al Qaeda in Europe Page 39
