by Ian Smith
The stumbling block remained: the bringing in of the new constitution, or as the British liked to refer to it, the return to legality. We had made our stand clear to Bowden in Salisbury, but obviously Wilson believed that he could push us further. We listened patiently, and would have helped if we could, but the British plan was absolutely unacceptable. It meant that we would dissolve our government and Parliament and hand over total control to Gibbs, the Governor, who would then ask me to form a new government, which he would expect to be more broad-based than my current government. It sounded reasonable and accommodating to everyone. But the factual position was that Gibbs, as the appointee of the British government, would take his orders directly from them. They could instruct him to ask anybody to act as prime minister and form a government, even Nkomo or Sithole, who were in restriction for their unconstitutional and terrorist activities. And having abdicated, I or the Rhodesian government would be powerless to do anything about it. Harold Wilson would be in complete control. To us, it was incomprehensible that anyone could make such a suggestion. Our plan was simple and logical: the British should carry out their test of acceptability on the new constitution, since they wanted this and we did not. Once that had been finalised our two Parliaments would legislate simultaneously to bring in the new constitution. I asked Wilson what the position would be if his test of acceptability failed, we having abandoned our current constitution, and the replacement, on which we had both agreed, rejected. Did he not accept that this would place Rhodesia in a disastrous situation? He claimed that there was an answer: we would negotiate a new constitution. I pointed out that this would necessitate us giving further ground to the extremists and we had no more ground to give. Clearly, this would put us on the slippery slope, at the whim of a British Government, which one day might be Conservative, the next Communist. I reminded him that never in our history had we been governed from London, that we had always enjoyed our own ‘responsible government’ with control in Salisbury. ‘What,’ I asked, ‘is your objection to our plan?’
He replied that he was unable to deal with an illegal government like ours, and it was therefore necessary for us to return to legality before he could recognise us and carry out the test of acceptability. I pointed out that he was negotiating with us at that very moment, although he had previously stated that he would never talk to me until I had restored constitutionality, so there was an obvious answer: keep up the good work and change his mind again. And second, Gibbs was still there, and in his eyes the only legal authority, so he could carry out his test through the good offices of Gibbs, and we would ensure our co-operation in making everything necessary to this test available.
As most people knew, Wilson was a master tactician, and if one avenue was closed to him, he swiftly moved to another. He returned to his commitment to the Commonwealth prime ministers, and said that my proposal would mean a breach of his undertaking to them. My reply was simple: Rhodesia could not be expected to pay the price for his mistakes. For good measure I reminded him that they had made that decision behind my back, without consulting me, in spite of the fact that I was leader of a Commonwealth country, so surely they could not now expect me to respect it.
Again, he quickly changed his tactic and reminded me that if we failed to agree, the matter would go to the UN, to the embarrassment of both himself and myself. I was unable to accept this, as both Conservative and Labour governments in Britain had emphasised on a number of occasions that our problem was an internal matter between our two countries, and that they would brook no interference from outsiders. Moreover, Britain could always exercise its veto at the UN.
Once again he found a way out. Circumstances had changed dramatically, he said, and Britain was faced with the possibility of the Commonwealth breaking up over the Rhodesian issue. We no longer had any friends in the world, he declared. But, I asked, was I not correct in saying that, at the prime ministers’ conference the previous month, Australia, Canada and New Zealand had been opposed to taking the matter to the UN? India believed it was a matter for Britain alone and a couple of the black leaders were indifferent. He seemed stunned for a few moments, so I went on: the option he was placing before us was UN sanctions, and there was much evidence indicating that this would place us in no more difficulties than obtained in our current situation. The alternative was for Rhodesia to sign its own death warrant — what would he do under those circumstances? There was no come-back from him.
The main problem was that time was running out, said Wilson, and we had to have finality within twenty-four hours so that he could take the decision back to his cabinet in London. I simply repeated what I had told Bowden in Salisbury, and told them all in that conference room that his proposal was unacceptable, but that I was prepared to take it back to my government in Salisbury to see if there was any change of opinion. At this point, Wilson got a bit warm under the collar, stating that he had been led to believe that I was attending the conference with full power to make a final agreement, and Morrice James, who was at the table, confirmed this. I think that I did raise my voice, for the first time at the conference, when I barked across the table at Wilson: ‘What could be more final than my answer, which is no?’ The thought of Harold Wilson, of all people, questioning my integrity was not something I found easy to accept. I asked for Gibbs and Beadle to be brought into the meeting, and without hesitating they both concurred that all along, going back to the meeting with Bowden in Salisbury, I had made it absolutely clear that the British terms for a return to legality were unacceptable. Wilson looked a bit like a pricked balloon. I strongly emphasised the point that, having arrived at agreement on the new constitution, we had solved the most difficult problem. To allow the thing to founder over the mechanics of implementation would go down in history as a dreadful blunder on the part of Wilson and his Labour government. At this, both Gibbs and Beadle nodded in agreement.
Wilson then asked if he could have a private discussion with Gibbs and Beadle, and so our team withdrew and had a cup of coffee and a talk among themselves. After about twenty minutes we were asked to return to the conference room. Gibbs and Beadle had obviously given Wilson the message, so he proposed, in somewhat subdued manner, that we should regard the proposals as a working document which we would refer to our respective cabinets for acceptance. He added that our reply should be a clear acceptance or rejection — either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ — and the British government for their part would do likewise. Sometimes he behaved like a normal adult, at other times like an adolescent trying to establish his authority. I simply replied that what they did was their affair, and that we would decide on our own action.
When we disembarked from the Tiger it was after midnight on Sunday 4 December. The ship had moved in close to the harbour, and as we looked up from our little boat below, it made a truly impressive picture. I saluted it, and said: ‘Thanks for the kindness and consideration you showed to us. Apart from the Labour Party politicians, it was a memorable and stimulating experience.’
Within a short while we had boarded the aircraft, and were on the long trek back home, landing at Salisbury around 8 p.m. I had a brief meeting with my cabinet, giving them a copy of the document which I had brought back, asked them to read and if possible digest it before retiring for the night, and told them we would meet again on the morrow to consider and decide.
It was 8.30 a.m. on Monday 5 December and the meeting was in our cabinet room. Before departing from the Tiger, Wilson had confessed his disappointment that he had not succeeded in convincing me, because the British believed that if I said ‘Yes’ my cabinet would follow, and likewise if I said ‘No’. Whereupon I gave an undertaking that I would deliberately refrain from expressing my views until my colleagues had expressed their feelings. I stuck to my word. First of all, I asked if there were any questions for clarification — there were a few. Then I encouraged discussin. At 12.30 we adjourned for lunch and reconvened at 2 p.m. The debate was deliberately rational and unemotional, and I advocated taki
ng the maximum time required. First one, then another, declared that they had firmly decided while others went on talking. We broke for a cup of tea and a stretch of legs. Finally, everyone had given his verdict. Opinion was unanimous. It was agreed that, while the constitutional proposals could be accepted, some with great difficulty, the terms for a return to legality were completely out of contact with reality and therefore destroyed any possibility of our accepting them. All that remained was the preparation of our statement, and this was ready soon after 6 p.m. I read it to the gathering of press and Rhodesians eagerly waiting for the news.
There was much evidence indicating that British public opinion was strongly on our side. The Conservatives lambasted Wilson in the Commons, where Alec Home made the telling point that, if Britain believed it necessary to invoke mandatory sanctions ‘because the constitution of a country falls short of the standards of democracy that we require, we should be at war with half the world today’. R.T. Paget, a Labour MP who was knowledgeable on African affairs, bitterly criticised Wilson, saying that he had ‘a remarkable capacity for getting himself distrusted’. He went on to say that ‘journalists on papers of every colour and opinion in Rhodesia all agreed that they could not find one person, including Welensky and Malvern, who thought the proposals were acceptable’. Enoch Powell MP did not mince his words: ‘We have now stood up in the face of the world, and told a big, black, bold, brazen lie. How Dr Goebbels would have relished that one.’
Then the constitutional lawyers got busy and proved that UN action to impose sanctions against Rhodesia was a violation of their own charter, and they quoted chapter and verse that utterly ridiculed their actions. As history has shown on a number of occasions, however, the UN is averse to allowing itself to be influenced by the truth. The great bulk of Britain’s newspapers criticised Wilson for his double standards in turning a blind eye to all those countries in Africa which had thrown their newly won independence constitutions out of the window and substituted one-party state dictatorships, while now declaring war on Rhodesia because ‘it desired to preserve the excellent constitution which had recently been agreed and implemented by the British and Rhodesian Governments’.
We challenged the UN on the point that if, as Britain maintained, Rhodesia was not an independent state, but a part of Britain, how then could Britain impose sanctions on itself? And conversely, if the UN imposed sanctions against Rhodesia, then we must be an independent state and thus have the right of hearing at the UN Security Council. We were not even given the courtesy of a reply! The case presented against us was a mischievous distortion of the truth. In an attempt to correct this, we invited the UN to send a commission of investigation to get the facts — we had nothing to hide. Again, there was no reply from this world organisation, with its charter promoting peace, justice, freedom and fair play.
By his actions Harold Wilson had demeaned Britain to a position where decisions affecting the mother country and the British Commonwealth were no longer made in the House of Commons, but by the African members of the Commonwealth. To the British people was left the dubious honour of meeting all the costs! And these mounted to hundreds of millions of pounds. Wilson spelt it out very clearly: sanctions were necessary to prevent a break-up of the Commonwealth. The African members, all those whose economies were in tatters and who practised the one-party state system, had given him that clear message. The other members, who truly practised the principles of the Commonwealth, had opposed sanctions. Britain alone was left carrying the baby, and this involved not only financing Zambia’s costs for flying in fuel, using sub-economic transport routes, importing commodities at more than double the price, subsidising the heavy loss on copper exported, but also Britain’s export and import losses, which were not inconsiderable.
There was one more important adverse effect on Britain’s economy. If they could resort to such vindictive action against Rhodesia for what were so obviously devious reasons, then there were red lights flashing on the horizon for South Africa, at that time Britain’s largest trading partner. The South Africans embarked on a deliberate policy of trade diversification, which led to Britain losing many of the trade benefits which it had previously enjoyed with South Africa — another price Britain had to pay for Wilson’s policy of appeasement.
The drift towards double standards continued to accelerate year after year, and today it has reached a state where it can truly be said that the Commonwealth is the biggest political fraud in the world. Its charter underlines parliamentary democracy and the freedom and justice associated with it, but the majority of its members have become one-party dictatorships, where there is no freedom and no justice.
Footnote
*Comprising the service chiefs, the police and the Central Intelligence Organisation.
12
Renewed Settlement Efforts
in 1968: HMS Fearless
With the coming of the New Year, 1967, we made an assessment of our position. While we were coping with sanctions better than most had anticipated, they were a hindrance and we would have preferred them out of the way. We were planning to reduce the tobacco crop because the stockpile was above our normal target. This was unwelcome news, because tobacco was our largest foreign exchange earner, and our biggest employer of labour. We initiated a scheme to encourage and assist tobacco farmers to diversify into other crops. Nevertheless, our balance of payments position was healthy, and there was positive economic development covering a broad spectrum of activities, with considerable investment noticeable in the mining field. While our trade with Britain had decreased, the void had been rapidly filled by France, Japan, Germany, Italy and a number of smaller countries. Our motor assembly plants had their supplies from Britain and USA cut off, but these were immediately taken up by France and Japan. Our sanctions busters were in their full stride, thriving on the problems and opportunities which presented themselves.
I recall an occasion which truly warmed my heart. We have in Rhodesia, in fact in my own home town of Selukwe, one of the finest-quality deposits of chrome ore in the world. It is owned and mined by one of the big American consortia, but because of sanctions they were now denied the right to make shipments to their smelting plants in the USA. Fortunately, because of its high quality, we had no difficulty in disposing of it. One of our top sanctions breakers brought in a report to say that they had traced a number of consignments of Selukwe chrome to the USSR, and had discovered that the Russians were selling an inferior grade of their chrome to the USA at double the price they were paying us for the quality chrome. Such was the price the Americans had to pay for allowing the British socialist government to seduce them into joining the sanctions war.
This was not all: most of our transport, tractors and other farming machinery, heavy earth-moving equipment, came from the USA. That was also cut off, and ever since we have obtained our requirements elsewhere; no harm was done to Rhodesia, but obviously American industry lost markets. Is it not fair comment for me to say that US taxpayers’ money was being used to subsidise countries in Africa which had espoused the communist philosophy of one-party state dictatorship, to the detriment of one small country, Rhodesia, which was a staunch supporter of the free world and the free enterprise system, and which had always fought alongside Britain and America in the struggle to preserve democratic freedom and justice? I have never found a US politician who could justify those decisions.
Unfortunately, there was a gradual increase in the number of terrorist incursions into Rhodesia. Sadly, the main target of the terrorists was black people, simple, unsophisticated peasant farmers who did not comprehend what was happening, but were forced at the point of a gun to provide food and shelter and political support. One of the highly respected senior Matabele leaders, Chief Sigola, sent an invitation to the Secretary General of the UN to visit Rhodesia, in which he said:
Rhodesia is a peaceful country; there is no war here. The talk of the overseas people is the only thing that could cause a war here. Our only trouble is from
terrorists who come with bombs from Russia and China, communist countries with no freedom of speech or opposition parties. We plead with you to come and visit us in our country to see for yourself what a peaceful country it is. Why should the UN, which is made to keep the peace, come and interfere with us in this country where we are already so peaceful. In our Sindebele language we say: ‘You cannot have two bulls in one paddock.’ We have our bull in this country, which is our Government. We do not wish to be ruled or interfered with by anyone else.
Needless to say, there was not ever the courtesy of a reply.
From the black opposition Members of Parliament there was strong condemnation of the terrorists. One made an appeal ‘to every citizen to take up arms and defend the country from foreign infiltrators who are killing for the sake of killing, and robbing poor defenceless elderly people’. Another thought that ‘the terrorist infiltration was a British trick to give them an excuse for invading Rhodesia’, and another stated that ‘while the opposition had differences with the government, we are one as a nation of Rhodesia, and in the maintenance of law and order’. Yet another believed that ‘Wilson should protest to Zambia on behalf of the African people whom he states he is championing’.
In my turn I lodged a protest with the British government, accusing them of condoning the Zambian government’s action in harbouring terrorists operating against Rhodesia. I stressed that the main target of the terrorists was innocent blacks, who were being tortured, maimed in a most barbaric manner, and killed in order to enforce their subjugation. We knew that the British Embassy in Lusaka was completely in the picture, and on the evidence available to us they were not only condoning, but actually conniving with Kaunda in promoting this unholy business. But when it suited Wilson he ignored us, and by contrast when he wanted to use us he turned on the charm.
