by Ian Smith
On 25 November it was announced that Lord Pearce, a distinguished British judge, would be chairman of the commission. Sir Maurice Dorman, the former Governor-General of Malta, and Sir Glyn Jones, the former Governor of Nyasaland, were the two deputy chairmen. Lord Harlech, the former British Ambassador to the United States, was the fourth member. Harlech caused us some concern, as I was informed that his recent record of service in Washington had not actually covered him in glory, and accordingly he was not rated very highly. Meanwhile, the black extremists had reorganised themselves under the banner of the newly formed African National Council (ANC) with the same leaders in positions of authority, but they had introduced an astute new ruse to cover up the old faces, who were still tainted by association with the intimidation and petrol bombing. They brought in Abel Muzorewa, the first black man ever to have been made a bishop in Rhodesia, and made him the leader of the new party, thus giving themselves a much more acceptable face of respectability.
We had agreed with the British that the Pearce Commission would begin work the first week in December and complete the task before Christmas, as dilly-dallying would play into the hands of the mischief makers bent on sabotaging the agreement. Our people waited anxiously for news of the arrival of the British team; all the plans on our side had been completed, the programme agreed, transport, accommodation and back-up services arranged. We sent reminders through the British Embassy in Pretoria, but still there was no confirmation. Frustration was building up. Eventually the message came: the British had decided, in view of the approach of Christmas and the festive season, that they would postpone their arrival until after the New Year. I received a few cutting comments: ‘Obviously the work of the Foreign Office — some of us have been suspicious of their commitment to the task all along! ‘This made me recall that, after signing the agreement with Alec Home, members of our secretariat had mentioned that the British Foreign Office in general were out of step with Home on the Rhodesian question.
Meanwhile, our opponents were taking advantage of the delay, making all the running while we did nothing to counter their campaign. This was because we had agreed with the British that we would maintain a position of neutrality in order to eliminate criticism that government was abusing its position in order to influence people unfairly. However, if one plays according to the rules of the game, while the others break all the rules and resort to underhand tactics, regrettably, it does not guarantee success — certainly not in the game of politics.
Once the commission started its work of holding meetings with Africans to ascertain their views on the settlement, it was clear that the African nationalists had established their cells in all the districts. Leading agitators travelled ahead of the commission, from meeting to meeting, orchestrating the opposition. Fortunately, we were told, the commissioners could see through this and, at the level of the officials, the information was that the test was going favourably.
Suddenly, Harlech flew back to London — most unusual in the middle of such an important exercise. We wondered why, but were told it was for personal, family reasons. At the same time a request to see me came from Lord Pearce, and this was arranged. He thought it desirable to put me in the picture, and simply wished to say that so far things seemed to be going according to plan and that he did not anticipate any problems. I expressed surprise at Harlech’s sudden departure, but he simply replied that it was a family matter and that his absence should be of short duration. However, our report from Rhodesia House in London did not tie up with this, as Harlech had been to see Prime Minister Heath. After his return from Britain, moreoever, our reports indicated a distinct change in the attitude of the British, who now started making negative predictions about the outcome. A member of our cabinet office staff, an immigrant from Britain, who had developed good relations with one of the British team, broached this sudden and obvious change. His contact conceded the point, but said that at his level, which was some way down the scale, he was unable to fathom the reason for it.
To cut a long story short, the commission finished its work on 12 March 1972, and when its report was eventually published in May it stated that, while the majority of Europeans were in favour of the proposals, the majority of black people were not. We were sad, indeed sickened, at the farcical nature of the whole thing. As the truth came out, bit by bit, it made one realise the impossible position in which Rhodesia was placed, no matter what government was in power in Britain. Alec Home was as disappointed and frustrated as I was, and the same applied to our supporters at Westminster and generally throughout the world, but sadly there were more powerful forces working in the British government, which had contrary ideas, as I shall explain.
First of all, let me deal with the complete farce surrounding the test of acceptability. I recall dealing with this during one of my discussions with Harold Wilson at ‘Independence’ in October 1965 when I explained to him how ridiculous it was to expect to obtain any indications of the views of our black people through such an exercise. I gave him the reasons I have already mentioned: they had never in their lives cast a vote in any election or referendum for the simple reason that it had never been part of their culture or way of life. Even if we concluded an agreement, all our efforts could land on the rocks through our bungling, allowing the terrorists, through their well-known methods of intimidation, to stampede innocent and unwary people into making decisions which they did not comprehend. Wilson was cool and completely at ease over the problem, saying he understood my point completely, but that we had to satisfy the rest of the world, and that this was why the test of acceptability was concocted. However, he assured me quietly and firmly, in between puffs at his pipe, that if we made an agreement I need have no fears about the test of acceptability.
I often thought back to this discussion, and it was clear that there was nothing dishonest about this approach. The fact of the matter was that our two governments were constitutionally responsible for making the decision, and if we made this in all honesty, believing it was in the best interests of the country, then it would be irresponsible to allow some extraneous force to deflect us. The difference in this case was that I had made the agreement with Alec Home, Foreign Minister, not with the Prime Minister, Heath. And he had different ideas, as I was to learn in a report from our ambassador in London. Heath was completely engrossed in obtaining British entry to the EEC, but his problem was securing majority support in the House of Commons, as the Labour Party were opposed to entering the Common Market, as were a faction of the Conservatives. The obvious tactic was to gain the support of the Liberals, who were fence-sitting on the question, but they had made it clear that they were unhappy about the Rhodesian agreement, which was contrary to the wishes of the OAU. If this did not go through, they would be happy to support an agreement on the Common Market. Hence the sudden visit to London by Harlech, his meeting with Heath, and the subsequent dramatic change of course by the Pearce Commission.
A classic example of ‘Perfidious Albion’. How could anyone condone Heath’s action in selling Rhodesia down the river, especially after his Foreign Minister, Home, had pinned his flag to the mast? To raise the hopes of Rhodesians, both black and white, to such heights of expectation, and then nonchalantly pull the rug out from under their feet, was callous and unforgivable. If we were not faced with Harold Wilson and the Labour Party using Rhodesia as a pawn in order to appease the OAU, it was Ted Heath and the Conservatives using us as a bargaining chip in order to win votes in the House of Commons.
One can imagine the frustration, indeed the fury, which built up in the minds of Rhodesians when they learned that the reason for the rejection of our agreement hinged on the desire of the British government to join the EEC. Those of us who understood what was taking place under the test of acceptability were unable to condone the hypocrisy of the operation.
Apart from the fact I have already pointed out, that the vast majority of our black people were unable to comprehend what was taking place, the commission had seen less
than 5 per cent of our black people — and yet they were prepared to submit a report purporting to represent the views of 100 per cent! At one of the meetings, before the procedure began, the leader of those attending rose and stated that they were not interested in the commission, ripped apart the explanatory paper which had been handed around, and all those present got up and walked away. On a number of occasions, before the people had completed asking their questions, they were informed that time had run out and that the meeting had to be drawn to a close. This simply added more confusion to an already confused picture. I was interested to read a comment by Lord Coleraine, a well-known authority on African affairs, to the effect that whether the Pearce Commission returned a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer, it was entirely worthless as a test of opinion. That was the awful truth, and showed clearly that Rhodesians were not the only ones who scoffed at the farce that had taken place! But the result for Rhodesia was a tragedy.
The report of the Pearce Commission was debated in our Parliament on 6 June 1972. Referring to the test of acceptability, I said: ‘The Rhodesian government has consistently maintained that if agreement was reached on a government-to-government basis the fifth principle [test of acceptability] would be superfluous.’ From the minutes of the 1971 meetings it was clear that the British team regarded the test as an unfortunate encumbrance which should be cleared out of the way as soon as possible, and they believed it could produce only the correct answer. In fact, it produced the wrong answer for Alec Home, but the right one for Ted Heath.
The absolute fraud of the Pearce Commission Report became all the more obvious when I received a report during the early months of 1973 (April–May) that Bishop Muzorewa, who had led the campaign for the ‘No’ vote during the test of acceptability, was now conceding his mistake, and thinking about reopening the matter with me. I duly received a message in July and we met in August. On his arrival at my office he presented a memorandum outlining his thoughts, which stated, inter alia:
I believe a settlement is still possible if we could establish a mutual and genuine spirit of goodwill and trust. The 1971 proposals were rejected by the Africans on the understanding and belief that they did not have faith in the Government to honour the terms of the proposals. We believe that if our requests are genuinely honoured and implemented this would be the cornerstone of a new dimension of racial unity in the building up of the Rhodesian Nation which is a desire which we wish to achieve. Our fears can only be removed by the Government in a written and pledged statement of assurance and guarantee. If these are genuinely furnished by the Government, we, the African leaders to whom trust has been given by our people, would accept the proposals and would request Her Majesty’s Government and the Rhodesian Government to implement them forthwith.
This created no problems for us, because we were simply being asked to reiterate assurances which we had given on many previous occasions. We produced and signed a joint statement:
The Prime Minister and Bishop Muzorewa met on 17th August, 1973 to discuss the question of the constitutional settlement. The Prime Minister gave Bishop Muzorewa a solemn undertaking on behalf of the Government of Rhodesia that if the 1971 proposals for a settlement are ratified, they will be fully honoured by the Government. Bishop Muzorewa accepted the undertaking and stated that he had complete trust in the Prime Minister. In these circumstances Bishop Muzorewa in his capacity as President of the African National Council gave an undertaking that he accepted the 1971 proposals for a settlement, and that he would urge the British Government, on behalf of the African people, to implement the proposals.
It looked as if, after all our misfortunes and setbacks, things were coming right, and that the truth of what our people believed in and hoped for was emerging. As a matter of interest, after the debate on the Pearce Commission Report I received a personal message from Alec Home commiserating with me and suggesting that my best way forward would be to make an agreement with the responsible black leaders within the country.
14
The Loss of Mozambique,
Vorster and Détente in 1974–5
While we had been attempting to settle with the British, our African nationalist opponents in ZANU had taken advantage of the crossing of the Zambezi River in the Tete Province of Mozambique by FRELIMO, the Marxist party, in its armed rebellion against the Portuguese. The presence of FRELIMO along our long north-eastern frontier meant that ZANLA, the armed wing of ZANU, had safe havens in Mozambique from which to penetrate the adjacent tribal areas and then the white farming areas of Centenary and Mount Darwin. In late December 1972, ZANLA launched its first hit-and-run attack on a white farmhouse, wounding the young daughter of the farmer, Marc de Borchgrave. This began a pattern of such incidents, which included the use of landmines in the roads, and meant that we had to deploy more troops and commit more resources to defeating the campaign of terror. For the moment, we were able to contain the threat to the north east, and then we began to get on top of it.
All was not yet in the clear in late 1973 with regard to securing an agreement with responsible leaders within Rhodesia. I was informed that Muzorewa was having problems with some of the more recalcitrant members of his executive; they were trying to extract more concessions, working under orders from the extremists ensconced in Lusaka. I sent a message suggesting that the Bishop come and talk to me. He requested an immediate increase in black representation in Parliament which, he thought, would satisfy the demands of his ‘wild boys’, and we agreed on an extra six seats. He went away satisfied. The haggling within his party, however, went on. I could see that we were getting into the normal routine that the communists have perfected: extract as much as you can, take it away and tuck it under your belt, and then find a pretext to come back and ask for more.
Muzorewa was caught in the middle: he supported the agreement with us, but lacked experience and political acumen. The old seasoned leaders were able to mould him to their wishes.
Then, suddenly, a new dramatic factor entered the scene: the revolutionary change of Government in Portugal after the left-wing military coup on 25 April 1974, which enabled the terrorist elements in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam to persuade the ANC in Salisbury to hold their hand on the premise that Angola and Mozambique were about to be handed over to the locals, and that this would change the whole situation. In time I received a message from Muzorewa to say that the executive of the ANC had rejected our agreement.
In Parliament on 19 June 1974, I said: ‘Mr Speaker, for the second time in history I have succeeded in doing what was expected of me, and for the second time the other party to the agreement has reneged.’
I was maintaining contact with the Bishop in the hope that we could still find a solution. However, there was a problem of which I was aware, and which Muzorewa had mentioned as an aggravating factor: a group of extreme left-wing liberals, white people, were encouraging the reactionary forces of the ANC in their opposition to Muzorewa coming to an agreement with me. They claimed that their support among the white electorate was growing and that if they were returned as the next government they would support their friends in the ANC. This was monstrous deception, as they did not even hold a single seat in our Parliament, and were clearly motivated by self-interest as opposed to the welfare of their country.
We had enough problems dealing with a two-faced British government and communist-inspired terrorists who were doing their utmost to destabilise our black people, without a small faction of white self-seekers trying to throw spanners in the works for their own self-aggrandisement. In order to call their bluff, and at the same time let the whole world know how Rhodesians felt, we decided on a general election, and this was held on 30 July 1974. Once again the Rhodesian Front had a clean sweep and won every ‘A’ roll seat. Everyone now knew where they stood, and the dissident whites who had been sniping at us from the sidelines were ignominiously defeated.
About this time South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, decided to visit Hastings Banda of Malawi, and en rou
te broke his journey to spend a night with me. We talked at length, covering the whole political spectrum, and he was at pains to explain to me his belief that a number of countries to our north were prepared to talk and help in solving the problems of southern Africa. These were the first signs of his new détente policy of reaching an accommodation with black Africa, which was going to dominate his thinking in the years immediately ahead. I encouraged him in his line of thinking, and assured him of our support and co-operation. However, the changed circumstances in Mozambique were to be regretted, as a communist regime in power there, under the thumb of Nyerere, would not assist us. I had received a message from powerful forces in Mozambique, both military and civilian, indicating their opposition to the revolutionary changes in Lisbon, and their desire to prevent a handover in Mozambique. Their plan was to take over Mozambique south of the Zambezi, with the co-operation of South Africa and Rhodesia, and form a kind of federation. To me it sounded attractive, with Beira continuing as the main port for Rhodesia and Lourenço Marques for Johannesburg and the Rand complex. The people north of the Zambezi could make their own plan with Malawi, as they were a discrete part of the country, which historically had close links with Malawi. The people in Mozambique assured me that Mozambicans in general would welcome such a plan, and the initial approach to our two governments would come from Mozambique, so there could be no suggestion of unwarranted interference from South Africa and Rhodesia.
