by Ian Smith
Things quietened down over the festive season, but early in the New Year we recommenced talks with the internal black leaders. The door was still open to Kaunda, and that message had been conveyed to him, but I doubted whether Nyerere and the truly dedicated communists would ever go along with a settlement based on the Anglo–American agreement of September 1976.
In my New Year’s message to the Nation on 31 December 1977, I made a number of pertinent points which reflected our situation:
The British have been trying to settle the Rhodesian problem in a manner which would best settle their own interests, rather than the interests of Rhodesia. Rhodesians have thus come to the conclusion that their best bet is to bring Rhodesians together around the settlement table, to the exclusion of outside interference. The talks are proceeding well and I believe all delegations will agree that we have made significant progress.
The basic position remains the same. In exchange for acceptance of the principle of majority rule, we are negotiating the inclusion in the constitution of those safeguards necessary to retain the confidence of our white people, so that they will be encouraged to go on living and working in Rhodesia and thus continue to make their contribution to the economic progress of the country.
We are seeking safeguards which will ensure that a future Government will not be able to abuse its power by resorting to actions which are dishonest or immoral. Things which are every bit as much in the interests of black people as white. For example, a justiciable Bill of Rights to protect the rights and freedom of individuals; independent courts free from outside interference and influence — provisions which will protect all people irrespective of race, colour or creed. There are standards and ethics, professional and others, which are important to maintain and guarantee. In too many countries in Africa we see people dying from starvation, preventable diseases, government organised murder gangs — these are things which acknowledge no barriers of race or colour.
I am sure it is unnecessary for me to remind you all of the agony and desperation of living under the threat of intimidation and violence — those tools of the terrorists. The need to maintain the standards and impartiality of our forces of law and order cannot be over-emphasised.
It is to protect all of these vital essentials that we are insisting on certain constitutional safeguards — important for all Rhodesians, black as well as white.
Finally, I would like to compliment all Rhodesians on the manner in which they cope with the problems which confront them, almost on a day-to-day basis, and a special word for those who live in security-sensitive areas, where the presence of danger always prevails. These wonderful people are a constant source of inspiration to us all.
Once again you will all join with me in offering grateful thanks to our magnificent security forces for enabling us to go on living not only in safety, but in hope for the future.
Let us hope that with 1978 a new era is about to begin. With goodwill, understanding and courage, we should grasp the opportunities open to us to end our dispute, to the benefit of all our peoples.
It was on that basis that we started talks in earnest. Those participating were Muzorewa, Gabellah (from Matabeleland), Chikerema, Ndabaningi Sithole, and the two Chiefs, Chirau and Kayisa Ndweni. I knew from past experience that time and patience would be required, because every time something unusual or unexpected arose, there would be an adjournment for them to consult their various committees or executives.
In the midst of this, in mid-January, an invitation arrived from the British to attend a conference in Malta to which they were inviting Nkomo and Mugabe and their followers — now working together as the Patriotic Front. This was clearly an attempt to divert attention from our internal negotiations, and I had no intention of falling for that.
The internal meetings went on day after day — sometimes due to problems with Sithole, sometimes with Muzorewa — but fortunately Gabellah was a stabilising influence there and Chikerema and the two Chiefs, Ndweni and Chirau, were consistent and stable. Sometimes there would be an adjournment for half an hour to an adjoining room, sometimes for the rest of the day for consultation. I told them of the invitation to attend the Malta conference, and of my refusal because of my commitment to our internal settlement. However, progress was slow.
On 19 January 1978, we were encouraged by a pleasant surprise: a message from Harold Hawkins, who had spoken to Scott, Britain’s ambassador in South Africa who had just returned from London, and said the feeling in Britain was that we should get on with our internal settlement. He wondered what was holding things up. It seemed that the British were not all that happy with the arrogant demands of the Patriotic Front. Moreover, the previous day in London the US ambassador told our representative that the Americans were not concerned over where the solution was produced, provided it was the correct solution. Interesting, we thought; maybe they were finally coming to their senses.
Our problem, however, was to bring sense into our discussions. The Africans were taking turns at being difficult, trying to extract additional concessions. I continued to urge patience because I knew they were playing to an outside gallery where it was an advantage to be able to claim they were driving a hard bargain. There was no way our discussions would be kept confidential. But things got even worse when some Africans attempted to go back on positions which had been laid down in documents, and I had to call this to their attention. The two Chiefs became very angry, and on one occasion they exploded, with Chirau saying that they condemned two-faced politicians who could not keep their word. Ndweni made the point that the Chiefs were the true leaders of their people, unlike the politicians, and that therefore they could be trusted. Their looks conveyed their absolute contempt at those to whom their words were directed. They urged the politicians to have courage and cease being afraid of the consequences of being truthful.
After the meeting, the two Chiefs spoke to me privately, asking if it would not be possible to abandon those who did not have the courage of their convictions. Regrettably, I replied, it was not practical politics, and they accepted this. Maybe, they said, they would be murdered, but that was their life — they would join the other Chiefs who had gone that way. We agreed we would leave that decision to God. Rhodesia needed leaders who were strong and dedicated — we had been chosen to lead, and we would get on with it. I can work and die with people like that.
Friday 27 January was a particularly bad day, with Muzorewa and his team proving inconsistent. I clearly detected the influence of Muzorewa’s white advisers. All the other black delegations attacked UANC (Muzorewa) for going back on their word. It was even suggested that henceforth we institute a plan that would avoid the predicament of parties reneging on agreements made. There were strong words about dealing with people who were so openly duplicitous, and that, if this was the standard of behaviour we could expect from potential leaders, it was a sad reflection on the future of our country. With that Muzorewa jumped to his feet, saying that he was not prepared to be insulted and was therefore walking out. He and his other delegates stomped out together. The other black delegates believed it was an orchestrated performance for use in appealing to the gallery. It was certainly not one of our better days. We decided to adjourn until after the weekend.
I spent the next day, Saturday 28 January, catching up on my affairs and was having a quiet evening at home with my family when the phone rang. It was Jack Gaylard, to pass a message on from General Peter Walls to the effect that his South African counterpart, General Malan, had contacted him to say that he had received a message from Pik Botha indicating their government’s deep concern at the news that there had been a breakdown in our negotiations, and that as a result they wanted Malan to plan the removal of certain military equipment from Rhodesia. The news had been passed to them by Muzorewa, with whom they were in private contact. I could not believe my ears — to think that they would descend to this kind of diabolical Machiavellian scheming in order to pressurise us! Gaylard was not surprised, because Br
and Fourie had informed Hawkins that morning that Vorster was upset over the news of the breakdown. To compound the whole sordid affair, I could not credit that they would be surreptitiously dealing with one of the black leaders behind my back, instead of maintaining an honest straightforward approach with our government; at least we should have been given the opportunity to state our side of the case. Gaylard also informed me that in reply to his query as to whether Foreign Affairs were the evil geniuses behind this kind of treachery, Hawkins had given him an unequivocal reply: Vorster was the mastermind and driving force. This was made clear by Brand Fourie, who was always the bearer of messages, and into the bargain it was obvious that the Minister of Defence would not accept such an instruction unless it had the authority of the Prime Minister. Malan had made it clear to Walls that the South African Defence Force were unhappy at having to do the dirty work on behalf of others.
We had enough problems dealing with some of these local chaps, without our friends to the south adding fuel to the fire. If Muzorewa knew, I thought, that he had the support of the South African government, it would encourage him to dig his heels in even further. I could not credit that the South Africans were so naïve that they were unable to comprehend what they were doing, siding with the odd man out, when the rest of us were ready to move forward. This was yet another bungling interference in something which clearly they did not understand. And Vorster would still be claiming publicly that he had no intention of trying to pressurise us or interfere in our internal affairs!
Over the weekend there was much coming and going and talking, and feelings within the UANC ran so high that, at one stage, a couple of them had to be separated to prevent them coming to blows. I had a representation late on Sunday 29 January from some responsible and trustworthy white people who had been trying, from the background, to guide Muzorewa. They were deeply concerned at the walk-out, and assured me that certain white members of the UANC team were the culprits. These people were attempting to cause a breakdown of our talks as part of their plan to bring Nkomo and Mugabe back into the negotiations. The problem, my informants felt, was Muzorewa’s lack of decisiveness. They were satisfied that he acknowledged his mistake in walking out — the problem now was to help him save face while climbing down. They were seeking my concurrence and co-operation.
It was obvious to me that if either Muzorewa or Sithole walked out completely, this would play into the hands of the British and their terrorist protégés. When we held our meeting, however, on Monday afternoon, 30 January, I was confronted by an exceptionally strong wave of resentment from the other black delegations. They said that we could not allow any delegation to believe that they had a right of veto, or that, by simply walking out, they could hold up proceedings. During the weekend, they had received messages that Muzorewa was claiming that he was standing alone in fighting for the rights of blacks, while the other black leaders were conniving with the government. This, they claimed, was not only dishonest but also cowardly, for as we all knew it was merely a show in order to placate the extremists.
They were, of course, right, but for the reasons already mentioned it was important for me to pour oil on the troubled waters and urge tolerance and restraint. I made no attempt to convince them that they were wrong — clearly, they were not. My efforts were directed at convincing them of the rewards of succeeding in producing a settlement involving all the internal parties, and of how a failure would be a cause of rejoicing among the terrorists, our mutual enemies. I told them of the information which came from impeccable sources that the British government had infiltrated the UANC, from which vantage point they were plotting to frustrate our settlement, and of how their task was facilitated because of Muzorewa’s vacillation and inability to make positive decisions. The problem of defusing the situation was not easy, but in the end they agreed to accept my reasoning and philosophy. We adjourned sine die pending information from the UANC.
We called another meeting on Wednesday afternoon, 1 February, and Muzorewa and his followers arrived. They spent a great deal of time attempting to vindicate their action, but it rang hollow. The other delegations did not pull their punches and Muzorewa looked a bit like the proverbial cornered rat, trying to defend and protect himself. I began to feel some sympathy for him, knowing that he was being used as a tool by the unscrupulous British. Finally, it was made absolutely clear that everyone else had endured more than enough of their humbug, and we adjourned until the next day to give them the opportunity to reconsider their stand.
The talk of the town on Thursday morning, 2 February, was that Muzorewa had been subjected to strong criticism for his inconsistency. Even some of his close friends were threatening to change their loyalties to one of the other parties if he continued in this manner. At the afternoon’s meeting the UANC delegation was more relaxed and friendly, and Muzorewa requested permission to submit a new paper which placed their position before the conference. He hoped this would receive our consideration. Everyone agreed. There was the clear advantage of having this on the record and thus making it more difficult for him to change ground. A short discussion ensued, with a few questions of clarification on the paper, and then there was general agreement on a long adjournment over the weekend to enable delegates to relax and reflect.
We met again on the afternoon of 7 February, but made no progress. The UANC were obviously still suffering from a guilty conscience over their blunder, and were nit-picking over details in an effort to avoid getting to grips with the main problem. They continued this for the next few days, and I became concerned at the strength of criticism against Muzorewa. At one point he offered, as a reason for wanting time off, his wish to offer prayers for the poor people who were being killed in Mozambique in our security forces’ raids. He was promptly subjected to a terrific broadside from the other delegations, accusing him of praying for terrorists in Mozambique while the innocent locals in his own country, including women and children, were being murdered every day by terrorists. He was asked: did he not understand that what we were trying to do was to negotiate a settlement and end the war and the killing? As Muzorewa was looking harassed and depressed after a few days of consistent hammering, I was genuinely concerned that he might break down and resort to some irrational action, as he had done previously. So once again I recommended a long weekend break.
There followed a week of posturing and procrastination with the UANC in almost continuous session, messages from their supporters in Britain and USA urging them to agree. One of their strong supporters from America, who had been a generous contributor to their finances, arrived on the scene, and after a number of consultations, I decided the time was ripe to make the final attempt. Two members of the UANC executive had informed me that they had given Muzorewa the message that if he failed to sign the agreement, they would walk out on him. I made it clear that we had been more than generous in the patience and time we had given them — indeed, there were some who complained that we had gone too far, and were displaying weakness. Accordingly, I warned, if at the next meeting the UANC continued their obstruction, the other parties would continue without them.
The plan worked and, at our meeting on 15 February, Muzorewa had no hesitation in offering his acceptance of the draft agreement. After going through the formalities of tying up a number of loose ends, we emerged on to the front lawn where a large number of press and TV reporters had gathered. They received the good news with enthusiasm, and there was much talking.
There had been no further representation from the South Africans following their outburst after Muzorewa’s walk-out. I had asked Gaylard to contact Olivier, the South African Ambassador, and give him the facts, and also remind him that the problems we were now facing were caused by the Anglo-American agreement of September 1976 which we accepted, under duress, because of pressure from Vorster. Gaylard assured me that Olivier, a very sensible and down-to-earth person who was highly respected in Rhodesia, conceded his embarrassment at what had taken place, and was happy to convey our
message. That seemed to have quietened them down, but I wondered for how long.
The next couple of weeks were taken up by the constitutional experts and the secretariat in translating our agreement into legal terminology. This proved to be more difficult than anticipated. Once again Muzorewa was the main obstructionist, trying to insert some of his ideas that had previously been rejected. Fortunately two members of his negotiating team, Chikerema and Gabellah, were a constant source of help in bringing things back to sanity. Two others who were more on the periphery, Stanlake Samkange and Enock Dumbutshena, obviously intelligent and constructive, made valuable contributions. Once again, tolerance and patience were needed.
I was concerned about the pressure on the two Chiefs, which was aggravated by the delay in finalising our agreement. Kayisa Ndweni reported that the influence of Nkomo and ZAPU was gaining ground in Matabeleland, based on the belief that division among the Matabeles could only rebound to their detriment in the final analysis. I suggested that he arrange a meeting with Nkomo and plan to bring the Matabeles together — this was their only hope. He agreed enthusiastically, and I offered what help we could give. Chirau’s problem was more complicated because the Shona speakers were divided into a number of factions. He had received threatening letters, and one of his strongest supporters had been killed by terrorists.
David Smith visited Pretoria to put Vorster in the picture. Vorster preferred talking to him and it was a relief for me to avoid the face-to-face meeting. He told David that while he was sympathetic to our problems in the negotiations, a number of his ministers were showing impatience. He supported the economic assistance we were receiving from South Africa but, he warned, his economic ministers were beginning to question this. David indicated, however, that we had known for some time that Vorster was in the driving seat on the Rhodesian question. Harold Hawkins had assured David Smith that, from his contacts with ministers — and there were many — they were not informed on the Rhodesian situation. Still, David reported to me that he got the feeling that Vorster was becoming less starry-eyed over his détente dreams. He was particularly critical of the facility with which some of his black friends changed their minds. My comment to David was that we were constantly facing similar problems with our white friends! But our main predicament was the fact that they were unable to comprehend that we were holding the line against terrorism and communist encroachment, not only in our own interests, but for the benefit of all of those who believed in preserving Western civilisation in southern Africa. Any aid which they gave us, I felt, would help to relieve their burden, and would be cheap at the price. We agreed that there did not seem to be much hope of hammering that one home.
