by Ian Smith
Another problem for me was that some of my overseas political enemies were still propagating their lie that my plan was to frustrate a black takeover so that we could preserve white control, and they enjoyed an amazing amount of support from the communications media. Yet the record proved conclusively that from the time we made the agreement with Kissinger in Pretoria in 1976, all our efforts had been in the opposite direction. As we had pointed out on so many occasions, our problem was that some leading world countries had a guilt complex because of the part their ancestors had played in colonialism, and they jumped at every opportunity to use the white man in Africa as a sacrificial offering to salve their consciences. Into the bargain, because of our juxtaposition, Rhodesia’s problem was aggravated by South Africa’s apartheid policy. This washed off on to us and we had a constant running battle explaining to people that there was no connection and no similarity between our countries’ respective political systems. But our communist enemies did a good job of twisting the truth against us, and it was alarming to perceive how easily they succeeded in misleading people, even those who were unbiased and trying to make an honest assessment. And of course their task was facilitated by political leaders who were happy to join in the game of deceit and treachery in order to gain themselves some local political advantage.
The first week of June went reasonably well with the first cabinet and several committee meetings, and our agreement to include a sprinkling of experienced white ministers was clearly facilitating the process of transition for the new government. But we were immediately confronted with the bombshell of Carter’s decision, on Thursday 7 June, against removing sanctions. Our new Prime Minister, Muzorewa, came out with a strong condemnatory statement. Carter’s hypocrisy and rank dishonesty was unbelievable and unforgivable. He advanced the reason that the removal of sanctions would be to the prejudice of our country — an absolutely infantile argument which nobody could credit, as the truth was the complete reverse. It was obvious to any thinking person that he had only one objective in mind: winning himself black votes in the coming presidential election. Fortunately our supporters in Congress had reacted strongly against the decision, and even the Washington Post, well known for its left-wing leaning, had been critical. Unfortunately, it would have the effect of stimulating the terrorists, and set back our new government in its quest for peace. It was a dreadful example of the tremendous power wielded by leaders of powerful countries, who are prepared to abuse their power for their own selfish ends. Massive damage can be inflicted, sadly on smaller, weaker people, by unscrupulous demagogues who establish themselves in positions where they are able to exercise power without responsibility. Muzorewa, and his church authorities in the USA, had certainly been given to understand from Carter that sanctions were about to be lifted.
The wedding day of our son and his Norwegian bride in Oslo, was celebrated on 9 June. We drank a toast to their health and happiness. It was all we could do, because we had been given the message that our presence in Norway would be unwelcome. To have the ‘racist’ Smith on Norwegian soil was obviously unthinkable!
On 11 June, an interview with the new British representative in Rhodesia, Derek Day, tended to play down the significance of Carter’s action. Day accepted the desirability of recognition and said it was simply a question of tactics, and how to bring it about with the least provocation to the OAU. He hoped that we would allow time for their new Conservative government to settle down and prepare the ground.
To counter Carter, Muzorewa announced to the cabinet on the morning of 12 June that he had received an invitation to visit Washington in order to put over our case, and he thought it a good idea. I enquired from whom the invitation had come, and as I anticipated, it was from strong conservative supporters. As I explained, we did not have to worry about convincing those people, we had to concentrate on the uncommitted voter, people who would like to help us but needed the relevant information and facts. We could, I argued, actually put the moderate, middle-of-theroader against us by being seen to be too closely associated with the right wing. He smilingly accepted the point. Unfortunately he was a bit naïve, especially for one who had to move in the jungle of international politics.
The sense of urgency was lacking. At our security council meeting the next day, 13 June, the point was again stressed that our black cabinet ministers were not active enough as far as our amnesty plan was concerned: Zindoga was the only one to hold a meeting in the tribal trust lands. The rest were sitting back, enjoying life in their new positions. At my instigation we were to set up an amnesty directorate along the lines of our most successful election directorate in order to facilitate our safe-return policy. This was by far the most important task facing the new government, for if they failed in this, the whole government would fail. Unfortunately it was a field in which white ministers could not contribute. I asked for a weekly update in order to ensure that we kept up the pressure!
The meeting also discussed Muzorewa’s impending visit to South Africa to meet P.W. Botha and some of the South African Homeland leaders — evidently they believed he could assist and encourage in this area. The South Africans were developing the strategy of their Department of External Affairs of trying to bring our new government under their wing in order that they might control and direct our future policy as they had in the past with our government, by using security and financial assistance as a lever. Those of us with experience amplified the point and gave evidence to substantiate the fact that our current predicament was caused more than anything else by the South African government’s failure to abide by their commitments to us. Instead the South Africans further aggravated our position by continuing their flirtation with the front-line states and the British and US governments. We stressed the importance of Muzorewa keeping the ball in their court by reminding them of their obligation to deliver the goods in the security field, and also ascertain what efforts they were making to pressurise the USA and the UK to comply with their promises to remove sanctions and recognise us. What had South Africa done to impress on Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana the justification of our claim for recognition in view of the fact that we had complied with every demand made upon us? If those three independent countries in southern Africa, together with South Africa, presented a case to Britain and the USA of a plan to make a positive move in the interest of bringing peace to the whole region, it could tip the scales in our favour, we argued. A few of our black ministers made the suggestion that I should accompany Muzorewa, to make available to him the benefit of my experience. But that was quickly laughed out of court as I said: ‘In the last few years they have attempted to evade me even when I was Prime Minister, so there wouldn’t be much hope now!’
The reports from Harold Hawkins consistently emphasised the fact that their Foreign Ministry had openly demonstrated its opposition to, indeed resentment of, our success in including some white content and influence in the new Zimbabwe Rhodesia government. From the beginning they resented the concept of a national government, because, while it was one thing to have a few whites around the verges, especially good civil servants to ensure sound administration, to have them in ministerial positions where they would be able to make available their experience of past contacts and agreements with the South Africans was a bitter blow. Their first expression of concern was at the inclusion of twenty white seats in the Parliament. But far worse was the agreement to include white ministers in the executive. This led to their frantic attempts to gain support for their plan to force me to stand down. So their dream of being able to work with and manipulate a ‘virgin’ government, which had no experience of South Africa’s shady history of the past five years, was shattered. It was our hope that Muzorewa’s meeting with P.W. would be able to expose all of this intrigue and introduce a bit of honesty into our dealings.
On 15 June, after only two weeks of the new order, Chikerema came to tell me that the die was cast — on the morrow, they were making public their break with Muzorewa. They had heeded my
advice, but in view of Carter’s negative decision their patience had run out. Moreover, they were being branded as weak and leaderless. I hoped that they would act with dignity and avoid recrimination and abuse, and present constructive alternatives. On his recent trip to London Chikerema said that he had met some of Margaret Thatcher’s ministers; they had assured him that the principle of our independence had been accepted and their estimate was that by August we would receive recognition. Nkomo, who was in London at the same time, was confronted by a situation where no airline would allow him to travel on their aircraft because of the shooting down of a Rhodesian airliner. Eventually a friend accommodated him with a lift! This friend recounted to Chikerema that Nkomo had confided in him that he was making a plan to break away from the Russians. He never had been and never could be a communist, and the problem was to find a way out of his jam.
On Wednesday 20 June, Muzorewa sent Gaylard to consult me. Our police had caught three CIA agents spying, and had also discovered that they were operating in South Africa and Kenya. They had confessed and were at present locked up. Flower had been in touch with the CIA and they were pleading for their release. The CIA argued that if we made the arrests public and prosecuted the agents, it would embarrass the USA and lead to a rupture of the favourable conditions which had developed. A retired general, an old associate of Flower and a close friend of Carter, personally assured Flower that Carter had made a deal with our friends in the Senate — Senators Helms, Hayakawa and the others — that Congress was also about to lift sanctions and Carter would not use his veto. This would enable Carter to disentangle himself from his commitment to his black supporters. It was a fortunate stroke of fate, which had played into our hands, providing we did the right thing and turned it to our advantage. Gaylard thought it would be safe for us to release the spies on condition that, if the Americans did not produce the goods, we would publicise the affair. I disagreed because such a course would lose us the initiative. I argued: who in the world would believe our story, if we had no bodies to prove our case? It appeared to me that our best tactic would be for us to initiate a visit by Muzorewa to the States, and thence to Britain, and while there he could show great reasonableness by making an agreement with Carter to solve his predicament. After all, Carter would be making no concession in view of the resolution passed by his Congress, while Muzorewa could magnanimously agree to the release of the spies. The sooner the visit took place the better. Gaylard agreed and went off to put the plan to Muzorewa. This was indeed manna from Heaven, and should not be frittered away. It would be, however.
Progress was being made. On 26 June, I could record in my diary:
The first week in Parliament went well with good speeches from some of the new black members. The only thing which raised some interest was Muzorewa’s trek by ox-wagon through the city to take up occupation of the Prime Minister’s Residence. It was given headline prominence in The Herald with a big photograph of the new Prime Minister sitting on his throne, dressed up looking like a colourful rooster, and a bantam at that, sitting on a replica of the ox-wagons used by the Pioneer Column when they occupied the country in 1890. I cringed and closed my eyes. Muzorewa and his ancestors had not even invented a wheel by the time the white man arrived — like most thinking people, I wondered what he was trying to portray. Sadly, his judgement has been so wrong in so many cases, in the eyes of black people as well as whites. It just does not help, especially with all the other problems before us.
On 3 July, Rowan Cronjé reported back to me after a trip to South Africa, where he said there was general concern at the turmoil within the National Party and a growing disillusionment among the public. A new president had to be elected to replace Vorster, compelled to resign because of his implication in the ‘Information Scandal’. It was generally expected that Lourens Muller would get the vote until the day before the election when he and P.W. had a difference of opinion which led to a flaring of temper, resulting in P.W. changing course and Marais Viljoen replacing Muller. Cronjé was surprised at the growing strength of feeling and division in the National Party between verligte (liberal) and verkrampte (conservative) and at the open discussion of the need for realignment in South African politics.
That day I had to deal with the recognition issue as I also saw Lord Harlech, who was visiting from Britain. He assured me that Thatcher and Carrington were going for recognition, in weeks not months, and that world opinion was moving our way. There was only one snag which worried them: the war did not seem to be ending as decisively as predicted. I pointed out that, if the British had the courage of their convictions, the whole thing would fall into place; the continuing refusal to recognise us was feeding the hopes of the terrorists. There were clear signs, I said, that both Kaunda and Machel were desperate for a settlement. He agreed completely. I pointed out that, if the USA removed sanctions, Britain’s problem would virtually be solved — therefore Carrington should be encouraging the Americans. I told Harlech that we had heard a story that Carrington was actually working in the contrary direction, and I hoped that this was some insane figment of the imagination. He was happy to assure me that the Conservatives would be neither so mad nor so devious. Harlech’s report to Carrington, however, would simply lead to Britain turning its back on the recognition of Muzorewa’s government.
Muzorewa visited the United States, meeting Carter at Camp David on 10 July, and then went on to London. He was back on 14 July and thereafter I had a long and interesting discussion with one of the officials who had accompanied him. I asked if Bob Nicholson was once again in control of their security. The answer was in the negative, as I had been classified as a much higher security risk, and it seemed correct, as there were no demonstrators or other security problems. These had obviously been the result of the United Nations declaring me a ‘danger to world peace’! I was told that Muzorewa’s performances were reasonable, some better than others. But the Americans’ behaviour left much to be desired, and the State Department were as devious as ever. The day Muzorewa was scheduled for an afternoon appointment with Carter, a lunchtime meeting with the Press Club had been arranged. At mid-morning, however, they sent a message asking him to stand by for a 1 p.m. departure, forcing a cancellation of his meeting. Eventually they took off at 4 p.m., and the crew informed our people that there had never been any doubt all day that the ETD was 4 p.m. So their contact in the State Department had succeeded in frustrating an important meeting at the Press Club and annoying people who had made plans to attend, some coming from considerable distances. When our people requested that a couple of our team from information and the press accompany the Prime Minister, they were informed that there was insufficient accommodation on the helicopter, when in fact there were six spare seats on the flight.
The visit to London was far more friendly (except for Callaghan, by then the leader of the opposition) and successful, and Muzorewa had worthwhile interviews with people from Europe, New Zealand and Australia, the latter strongly critical of their Prime Minister, Fraser, who had deviated from his election promises and was accused by his own party of being a turncoat.
After his return Muzorewa informed us that he had received the necessary undertaking from Carter to release the three American spies. Muzorewa added that Carter was obviously an honest man who would abide by his word, but needed a little time to make his plans. I was deeply distressed that we had thrown away this powerful bargaining counter. Sadly, as history records, Muzorewa’s faith and trust were misplaced. He was out of his depth in the midst of all these international political sharks. Carter reneged on his undertaking to remove sanctions, and never even attempted to explain his reasons to Muzorewa.
The internal situation was demanding attention and on 10 July it was my duty to inform cabinet that, at our last meeting with Nat JOC, the security chiefs had expressed concern over statements by certain black ministers indicating sympathy for the few missionaries who had been deported for supporting terrorism — I hoped it was not necessary for me t
o point out that the main target of the terrorists was Muzorewa and his cabinet colleagues. Obviously, our white serving men were not prepared to go on risking their lives eliminating terrorists if government was going to roll out the red carpet for their collaborators. Happily there was positive and unanimous endorsement, and a call for a public statement to be made to this effect.
Security matters were taking on a new urgency as the terrorists began to take heart from the failure to secure recognition. On 17 July our security council report to cabinet pulled no punches in stressing the ineffectiveness of this government in dealing with the terrorist threat — their complacency and comfortable confinement to the capital city was attracting much criticism. The amnesty committee had not yet got off the ground — they were waiting for the Prime Minister’s broadcast to kick it off. Admittedly, he had only just returned from his visit to the USA, which seemed then to have been successful. But it is so easy to find excuses for not getting things done.
I had a long discussion with Muzorewa on 2 August, stressing the seriousness of our situation, and warning him that we were not gaining ground. If anything, the reverse was true, I said, and the longer we procrastinated the weaker would be our negotiating base at any constitutional conference. Moreover, as a member of the government security council, I was satisfied that he was getting an equally strong message from the security commanders. I was relieved to hear him concede that he had come to the conclusion that a conference in London was our best bet. He also made the point that it would strengthen his position for a visit he was planning to Britain and the USA.
Four days later, on Monday 6 August, at the Commonwealth conference in Lusaka, Margaret Thatcher reneged on her promise of recognition under pressure from Nigeria and Australia and set another course with a new commitment to an all-party conference in London.
