by Ian Smith
Preparations were beginning for the coming election, although the Lancaster House deal was not yet formally ratified. At the security council meeting on the morning of 15 November we were informed of the South African move into our southern districts to assist in preparation for the election. There were three of their big Puma helicopters, a DC3 transport aircraft and in excess of 1,000 troops already in — they were certainly keeping to their agreement of backing Muzorewa to the hilt.
At our first caucus meeting since our return from Lancaster House, there was pretty straight talking right across the board, from the hawks on the right to the doves, who were probably more in the middle than to the left. In the end cool heads prevailed, and there was unanimous agreement that we had no option other than to go along with the Lancaster House outcome. After the collapse of the 1976 Pretoria agreement we had gradually been reduced to a position where we were no longer in control of our own affairs, and this had enabled the British government to manipulate the situation to fit in with their plans at Lancaster House. Pik Botha was in the wings, adding his support and encouraging Muzorewa to comply. The promises of both financial and material assistance made at the meetings with Muzorewa and David Smith proved to be a powerful lever. In addition the performance of Hector MacDonald at the conference was a significant factor which caucus found inexcusable. He had made a major contribution towards undermining Rhodesia’s position in London. Chris Andersen, our Minister of Justice, expressed his strong feelings over the inexplicable behaviour of our Chief Justice. He subsequently informed me that the other judges of the Appellate Division had expressed positive views in opposition to and condemnation of the stand MacDonald had taken at Lancaster House. If people are prepared to make a stand on principle and live with it, that is one thing. But in this case, once the whole sordid affair was in place, and Mugabe and his communist dictatorship installed, MacDonald cashed in his pension and associated benefits and beat a hasty retreat to live in a comfortable home on the coast of South Africa. At the end of our caucus meeting it was agreed reluctantly that a statement would be issued indicating our compliance with the agreement. Alec Moseley’s plea was: ‘Make it as unenthusiastic as you can.’
The stresses within the government of national unity continued. At the cabinet meeting on the morning of 20 November, Muzorewa lost control of himself and accused Rhodesian Front members of siding with Chikerema and others in order to undermine himself and the Lancaster House agreement. He now found himself in a position of uncertainty as to whether he would have the support in Parliament to pass the necessary legislation to implement the agreement. He exclaimed: ‘Everything is in a terrible mess!’
I did not think he was capable of rising to such heights of emotion. His outburst was totally misplaced, indeed destructive, and it was therefore necessary to bring him down to earth. I reminded him that the ‘mess’ we found ourselves in stemmed back to his entry into politics when he had led the campaign to reject the British government proposals from the Pearce Commission in 1972. Had that plan been accepted, I explained, we would by now have had responsible black majority government. Second, if he had accepted the British and American governments’ plan at the Geneva conference in 1976, that would have introduced immediate majority rule. Third, if he had succeeded in keeping his commitment to win over local black support and prevent further terrorist incursions during his tenure as Prime Minister, everything would have been under control and there would have been no need for a Lancaster House conference. And fourth, the fact that he had allowed Carrington and his accomplices to pull the wool over his eyes at Lancaster House was clearly his responsibility and it would be dishonest to suggest otherwise. The record showed clearly that he had allowed himself to be seduced into endorsing the agreement in conflict with the advice I had offered. I made the point that the kind of exercise we had just been through was totally sterile and could be of benefit only to our opponents. Why did he not put the question to a vote in order to ascertain the true position? He agreed, and found that there was unanimous support from the whole cabinet. After an embarrassing silence, he meekly commented: ‘This is a great achievement, a great day; I must thank all of you.’ The whole thing had been a dreadful misjudgement on his part, and did nothing to enhance his image among his cabinet colleagues — quite the reverse.
My diary gives the atmosphere of those dark days.
23.11.79 — Today’s Salisbury Herald is something to be remembered: ‘British are Great Apes,’ says Kaunda, ‘they are spineless hyenas.’ Previously he had referred to them as toothless bulldogs. Mugabe tells Carrington to go to Hell. The Mob in Lusaka ransacked the British Embassy and destroyed the Union Jack while shouting swine, white pigs and other insulting remarks. The black man in Africa can do whatever he likes, and get away with it, even murder, knowing full well that the British politicians will continue to grovel before them in an attempt to win their support.
Last evening saw Muzorewa’s press interview on TV — regrettably inept. My secretary informs me that the media representatives were loud in their criticism. One said: ‘He sounded as if he had over-indulged,’ but I know he doesn’t touch the stuff! It is sad, because we’re landed with him, for better for worse, and must make the most of it.
I had a good meeting that morning, 23 November, with the Rhodesian Front’s two Salisbury divisions and Mashonaland rural. Although the story which I gave them of the Lancaster House agreement was tough and unpalatable, these wonderful Rhodesian people had a facility to absorb whatever punishment you threw at them without deviating from their course. The next day, 24 November, I went down to Bulawayo for a meeting with the Matabeleland division, and as usual there were no problems — they were strong, resolute and unswerving. On my way to Salisbury Airport I called in at Government House to see President Gumede. He was disillusioned. None of the black politicians seemed to know what was happening as a result of Lancaster House. They had clearly given in to the British and the terrorists, and were now confused and uncertain. We were in the desperate position of having no leadership. Was there nothing I could do? he asked. Apart from agreeing with his sentiments and assuring him of my continuing efforts to guide affairs along the correct channels, it was a fact of life that I was no longer in control. He shook his head and quietly said: ‘That, of course, was the mistake we made.’
At cabinet on the morning of 27 November, I expressed strong concern over the restrictive exchange dealing with the remittability of pensions in the draft constitution from London, and it was agreed that we would send our protest to the British government. But I was not hopeful, as it was clear to me that the British were obsessed with placating the Patriotic Front. Moreover, they would make the assessment that this kind of appeal, while having strong support from our white people, would attract lukewarm support from our blacks, as their main attention was directed at gaining concessions in those areas which would win them voter support at the impending election.
Two days later, on 29 November, I had separate meetings with the two Chiefs —Chirau and Ndweni — who wished to brief me on their election tactics. I also bumped into Dumbutshena and congratulated him on his contrbution in the House on the previous day when he was strongly critical of Muzorewa’s unbelievable statement which made reference to the side-stepping of Parliament. Dumbutshena said this was ‘the kind of incomprehensible behaviour that one has grown to expect from him’. There is no doubt that the idea was placed in his mind by Hector MacDonald’s irresponsible outburst at Lancaster House. My comment was that it would have been bad enough if he had spoken like that in some back room, but to use the hallowed ground of the despatch box in Parliament was nothing short of sacrilege — akin to the Archbishop of Canterbury using Canterbury Cathedral to preach a sermon against God! — especially when one realised that Muzorewa was one of the chief architects of the constitution passed through Parliament a year ago. In other words, he was contemplating unconstitutional action against himself. Was that not heresy on the part of both a prime min
ister and a bishop?!
On 30 November, I was taken aback by the news that UANC (Muzorewa) had attacked me publicly, saying that I had made a secret pact with ZAPU (Nkomo). The record is clear: I warned Muzorewa at Lancaster House that the agreement favoured the Patriotic Front (Nkomo and Mugabe), but he knew better. I had not seen or spoken to any PF member since departing from London. Ever since, all of my efforts had been directed at trying to ensure that we, the parties forming the current government (including the UANC), win the election. When I subsequently questioned him, he claimed that the statement was made without his knowledge! He undertook to make a retraction, but it never came.
Within the Rhodesian Front there was also dissension. On 3 December a small delegation came to say that there was a strong feeling in our caucus that David Smith should not be offered a constituency in the election, as he was suspect. In addition, they said, Paddy Millar had indicated that he was opting out. He was tired of the intrigue of politics. (In fact he had already informed me of his decision personally.) They brought a message from Hilary Squires expressing his concern over the intrigue which had come to his notice and saying, if his services were required, that he would step down from the bench (he had become a High Court judge) and stand for Parliament. Not only had he been one of my most able ministers, but loyalty and courage were obvious qualities in his generally quiet demeanour. I came to the conclusion that he could best serve his country by continuing in his current capacity. Strong and independent judges who have the courage of their convictions are an essential ingredient of our civilisation.
The Lancaster House agreement was becoming a reality. The British Governor, Lord Soames, arrived on 12 December to the strains of ‘God Save the Queen’. When he drove into Government House there was a handful of people with a Union Jack to welcome him — the same old bunch of starry-eyed liberals who had always been petrified at the thought of standing alone in this world. They now heaved a sigh of relief at once more being able to cling on to the mother country’s apron strings. At the same time, they were busy fawning over those whom they believed would be their future masters. It is pertinent to note that over the next few years many of them packed their bags and departed, complaining that they could no longer live in the country — conditions had deteriorated at such an alarming rate!
Muzorewa and his UANC produced a mock coffin as part of their ceremony of burying UDI. The comment came from a number of our black people: ‘Did they not use Smith and his UDI to bring themselves into power?’
They reached an agreement with the architects of UDI, and then used the UDI constitution and Parliament to implement the 1979 constitution which brought them into power, and then went on to use the same UDI base to usher in this latest constitution, which they helped to fabricate at Lancaster House. So this was a belated, and somewhat pathetic effort, to remedy the situation. But they only succeeded in drawing attention to their self-made predicament. In the eyes of the hard-core nationalists, they stood condemned for building their edifice on a UDI foundation. It would have been an intelligent tactic if they had claimed success in turning UDI to their advantage, using it to bring in the majority rule for Zimbabwe that had always been their cherished objective. But this past year had been a sad story of one blunder after another.
For the past two decades the communists had been trying, in vain, to destroy Rhodesia. They had now succeeded. The black political parties who had joined together in forming our current anti-communist government had tragically allowed themselves to be hoodwinked into supporting this devious plan. The name ‘Rhodesia’ would be removed from the statute books, but we would preserve the wonderfully proud Rhodesian spirit. There are many tribes in our country — the Matabele in the west, the Karanga in the midlands, the Zezuru and Manyika in the east, the Venda and Shangaan in the south, and the MakoreKore and Tonga in the north — all composed of black people. There is only one white tribe, the Rhodesians, who are indigenous to this country. Our blacks admire those who are strong and have pride in themselves, their traditions and their history. They would welcome the white tribe as part of our new nation, making their unique contributions towards building a great, free, democratic, viable and happy country which would continue to be the envy of the rest of Africa.
That week I received a lovely book, Sigh for a Merlin, by the great Spitfire test pilot, Alex Henshaw, and he wrote inside: ‘There is no dishonour in a lost cause — the shame is with those who betrayed you.’
The Lancaster House agreement was in being but there were still difficulties with the ceasefire arrangements. On 16 December I received a visit from one of my friends in telecommunications; he had a tape of a conversation between Christopher Soames and Carrington. The British were trying to obtain another assembly point for the Patriotic Front (PF) near Que Que, and Antony Duff — as a member of the British team — had persuaded Walls to agree. On the tape there was much back-slapping and smug satisfaction: ‘Absolutely fantastic, congratulations Christopher, old boy.’ Then the reply: ‘Don’t mention it Peter, after all it’s part of the job and the main credit is due to Duff. He knows these chaps so well and they trust him completely.’ Carrington was absolutely thrilled that they had ‘done the trick’, and the whole Lancaster deal could now be clinched. Soames said he had been on the phone to Cyrus Vance and he was completely satisfied. Carrington assured Soames that he would phone him as soon as he and his Prime Minister got over to Washington. It looked to me as if once again the British Foreign Office had taken our security chaps for a ride. Our intelligence department was still suspicious of these Britishers — rightly so — and were watching every step.
On 17 December I had a happy day, with constructive meetings at Karoi and Sinoia. I was impressed with their strong dedication to the principle of unity among our white people — it was our only hope. Wherever I had been since returning from London, to the four corners of the country, there was that tremendous Rhodesian character, reconciling itself to the inevitable treachery inflicted upon us, but betraying no sign of retreat from those decent standards and beliefs that had always motivated our way of life. Before taking off from New Sarum, Chris Dixon, one of our air force pilots, brought along the British General, John Acland, and introduced him. Acland said it was a pleasure to be able to tell me of the high regard in which our security forces were held by their British counterparts. He also wished to mention the respect which I personally enjoyed throughout Britain, and his satisfaction that he would be able to inform his own family that he had met me personally.
I visited Soames on the morning of 18 December and we talked for over an hour. He met me with great courtesy and was most reasonable in our discussion. I was impressed by his acceptance of the fact that a daunting task confronted him, and the humility with which he hoped he would be able to cope. He questioned me on a number of points, such as getting the white election out of the way first, and I concurred that this would be a simple, straightforward operation. His main concern was the behaviour of the Patriotic Front and whether they would comply with the terms of the agreement. I told him the problem was that if you give them an inch they will take a yard, but that they understand and respect a firm hand in the administration of justice. When I departed he walked out with me on to the veranda and thanked me for giving him the benefit of my advice, and hoped that we would continue to communicate: ‘You have forgotten more about Africa than I will ever know.’
The next day, 19 December, I received a message inviting me to travel to London the following day for the signing ceremony of the agreement — I would be an observer, not a signatory. I could not believe it. I certainly would not have attended as a signatory — to sign my own death warrant — and I was even less keen to go as an observer, watching others doing the job for me would have been a nauseating experience. My rejection of the invitation was therefore firm and unambiguous.
As a matter of interest, attending the conference were four parties and their leaders representing our government, and two parties and their
leaders representing the PF. At the signing ceremony both PF leaders were signatories, while only one of the four government leaders was invited to sign: another classic example of how the British government pandered to the terrorists.
By 22 December, we were going through one of those periods when the media were having an absolute ball building up magnificent pictures and creating heroes out of a situation which occupies a black page in Britain’s history. It was orchestrated by political opportunists seeking short-term glory at the expense of sacrificing their own loyal kith and kin. During the Lancaster House talks, whenever the British gave way to the demands of the PF, we would subsequently read reports of how they had resisted these unreasonable requests and won the day. Whenever Muzorewa and his associates collapsed and gave ground, they were commended for having the courage to stand firm on their principles. In our local Herald Jimmy Carter hailed the magnificent Rhodesian agreement. In truth he should have lamented the fact that it played into the hands of communist transgression in Africa. Even Margaret Thatcher, obviously prompted by Carrington, thought that the Rhodesian agreement would make an enormous difference to the whole of southern Africa. Then the editorial: ‘Carrington deserves the greatest credit for having masterminded the ceasefire agreement.’ In fact the plan was worked out by the Rhodesian and British security representatives, not by Carrington.
In order to obtain a true picture of how the original planning commenced, it is necessary to go back to the Commonwealth prime ministers’ conference held in Lusaka in August 1979. Carrington, together with Malcolm Fraser, the Australian Prime Minister, ganged up with the leaders of the front-line states, and together they pressurised Margaret Thatcher to abandon her plan to give recognition to the Zimbabwe Rhodesian government even though it had fulfilled all the conditions laid down by successive British governments. This would have complied with undertakings given by Margaret Thatcher, and indeed the Conservative Party, in their election campaign, followed up by statements made after their election victory.
