Taehyun Kim and Chang Jae Baik
The united states hadanoverwhelmingpresenceinSouthKoreain the years leading up to 1961. It was the United States that liberated the Korean Peninsula from Japanese colonialism in 1945, ruled its southern half directly for three years as a military government, and helped to create a strong anticommunist regime. The United States defended South Korea from military takeover by the communist North during the Korean War (1950–1953). As a legacy of the armed conflict, a large U.S. military presence near the demilitarized zone was maintained by the Americans, who also exercised operational control over the South Korean armed forces. Even in 1960, after major parts of U.S. military forces were withdrawn from South Korea, the power and presence of the United States remained predominant. Most of the South Korean budget was made up of the counterpart fund1 originating from U.S. aid, in addition to the large sum spent directly on the South Korean military through the Military Assistance Program. American advisors were present throughout the South Korean military, and over five hundred officials at the United States Operations Mission (USOM) managed aid money and hence the budgetary allocation of counterpart funds, thus overseeing and shaping South Korea’s major social and economic policies for all practical purposes. On many occasions, moreover, South Korea lacked the expertise necessary for modern government and frequently relied on American advisors to strengthen state capabilities.
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Yet the United States could not prevent Park Chung Hee from launching a military coup that toppled democratically elected Chang Myôn on May 16, 1961. Once the United States accepted the coup as a fait accompli, it succeeded in persuading Park to accept the principle of an eventual transfer of power to the civilians, but failed to set the timing and conditions of the power transfer. On the contrary, it was Park who had the upper hand, delaying the elections to sometime in 1963 to buy time and lay down the institutional infrastructure of selective political coercion and mobilization to back his presidential candidacy as a military-turned-civilian leader.
Even in the economic realm, where the United States appeared to have the resources to make or break Park, the client more often outmaneuvered the patron than was checked and balanced by it. The two agreed on the primacy of economic development in fighting the communist threat, but disagreed profoundly on how to bring about economic growth. Under political pressure to demonstrate to the public that the military junta had the capacity to deliver the growth it had promised, but also with an eye to strengthen the financial base of his faction within the junta at the cost of his rivals, Park entrusted economic policy to the hands of the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), with close associate Kim Chong-p’il in charge, and tried to jump-start the economy through a series of shock therapies. Meanwhile, the USOM was calling for opposite policies for financial stabilization. Park also effectively resisted U.S. pressure to reduce the size of the South Korean armed forces through the end of the junta years.
Chapter 2 argues that the failure of the United States in transforming its political, military, and economic resources into power is owed mainly to three factors. First, the primacy of U.S. military interests in South Korea and the security dilemmas of defending the southern half of the Korean Peninsula in the communist-dominated Asian continent prevented the United States from flexing its muscle to the point of undermining Park’s ability to govern what was already a volatile and uncertain political situation. When Park’s political survival was at stake, the United States believed it necessary to tone down its political pressure and, if possible, compromise with the military junta. Second, given the complexity of U.S. interests in South Korea, ranging from military deterrence to democratization to economic development, there were always multiple agencies of the U.S.
government competing against each other to shape U.S. policy there. The United States was not a unitary actor. On the contrary, interagency rivalry was the norm, preventing Park’s bigger ally from confronting him with a unified policy. Third, in order to achieve the goals of military deterrence, democratization, and economic development, the United States needed Park’s cooperation, the result of which was to temper U.S. pressure.
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U.S. Preferences and Interests
In the late1950s, U.S. policy toward South Korea began shifting from an exclusively military focus2 to a more political and economic one. Military containment remained at the center of U.S. policy, justifying the stationing of large numbers of U.S. troops in South Korea, the ratification of a Mutual Defense Treaty with the South, and assistance to modernize its armed forces, but views on how to ensure military containment became more complex as U.S. policymakers increasingly realized that the task was as much political and economic as it was military. This evaluation was based on the Soviet Union’s impressive economic growth throughout the 1950s, the quick postwar reconstruction of North Korea, and the continued economic stagnation and political turmoil in the South. The Soviet model of development looked more attractive to less-developed states than the Western one, prompting the United States to redefine the Soviet danger to be more political. The combined strength of the United States Forces in Korea (USFK) and the South Korean armed forces, together with a firm U.S. commitment to the defense of the South, was deemed sufficient to deter any North Korean resumption of hostilities with or without Chinese military support.
The North Korean threat, instead, was psychological and political, making the South look like a hopeless case of poverty, social anomie, and political instability that was destined to lose in the inter-Korea competition to become the sole legitimate government of the entire Korean peoples. In 1961, North Korea’s per capita GNP stood at $160, twice that of the South, and the gap in economic performance was rising. To undercut the South’s confidence further, its political stability proved to be fragile. In 1956, the popularity of Syngman Rhee did not translate into the election of his designated successor, Yi Ki-bung, to the office of vice president, causing the Liberal Party to panic over its ability to survive the transition to a post-Rhee era. Moreover, Cho Pong-am of the leftist Progressive Party won over 2 million votes (24 percent of the valid votes), making the entire conservative camp worry about the revival of leftist forces.
The U.S. decision to give its policy of military deterrence a more political and economic character was also triggered by tight resource constraints. When Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered a review of U.S. policy toward South Korea in 1957, the country was then its largest aid beneficiary in the third world. The United States hoped to reduce aid to the South as its trade surplus declined and then turned into deficit, but the reduction of aid seemed possible only if the South could begin to generate economic growth. It was in this context that the United States came to review the co-
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lossal size of the South Korean armed forces, whose needs posed an unbearable burden on the war-devastated economy. In January 1957, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) prepared four alternative programs, with the goal of reducing the size of the South’s military without undermining its deterrence capabilities, through weaponry-upgrade programs for both the South Koreans and the USFK.3 After six months of deliberation, program NSC 5702/2 was adopted. It called for the conversion of four of the twenty South Korean army divisions into reserves and the provision of dual conventional-nuclear weapons to the USFK. Reflecting the newly recognized importance of political stability and economic development, NSC 5702/2 added two points to the list of U.S. objectives: (a) “Encouraging [South Korea] in the further development of stable democratic institutions and of cooperative relations with the other free nations in Asia” and (b) “Enabling [the South] to achieve a maximum rate of economic development compatible with a reasonable degree of stability and present levels of essential consumption.”4 The U.S. shift of focus became more evident in NSC 6018, adopted after the election of John F. Kennedy.
The document embraced the
takeoff theory of economic development, based on Keynesian economics, of the economist and deputy special assistant to the president for national security affairs, Walt W. Rostow.5 NSC
6018 also reflected the dramatic overthrow of Syngman Rhee by a student-led revolution in April 1960. The growing apprehension that poverty, authoritarian rule, and corruption could lead to chronic political instability gave greater legitimacy to those in U.S. policy circles who advocated a shift from a military to a political and economic emphasis. NSC 6018 redefined the long-range objective of America’s South Korea policy as seeking to build “a unified Korea with a self-supporting, growing economy, possessing a free, independent and representative government responding effectively to popular aspirations and dealing effectively with social problems, oriented toward the United States and other countries of the Free World, and capable of maintaining internal security and offering strong resistance in the event of external attack” (emphasis added).6
By February 1961, the continuing political instability in post-Rhee South Korea came to command the attention of top officials in Washington, including NSC staff members led by Walt Rostow. Hugh D. Farley, the assistant director of the USOM in South Korea until February 1961, initiated an interagency review of U.S. policy with the submission of a report to the White House in early March. Farley argued that the conjunction of three circumstances made “it imperative that the U.S. Government recognize the gravity of the situation and act promptly to remedy it.” He cited: (a) deep-rooted corruption in South Korean society and the resulting lack of public confidence in the government and political leaders; (b) rap-
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idly deteriorating political dynamics in South Korea that undermined the governing capabilities of the post-Rhee Democratic Party leadership; and (c) the indecisive and inadequate leadership of the USOM.7 USOM, a powerful organization manned by as many as five hundred staff members to operate U.S. aid programs, was deemed inept and perhaps as corrupt as the South Korean government in performing its mission of overseeing the economic reconstruction of South Korea. U.S. aid financed over 90 percent of the South Korean government budget as late as 1961, and the ineffectiveness of USOM meant that the South Koreans were losing an opportunity to catch up economically with the North and to benefit from a government with greater political legitimacy. Farley predicted that a major political crisis could break out in the coming months, particularly around the first anniversary of the April 19 Student Revolution that had overthrown Syngman Rhee. Farley did not rule out the possibility of a military takeover. On the contrary, he thought a coup likely, unless the United States acted promptly and decisively.
The U.S. embassy in South Korea and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency disregarded Farley’s warnings. The two thought the possibility of a coup was remote, because any such thoughts would be “deterred by the knowledge that the United States would oppose such a project.”8 However, they shared the view that the situation was gloomy, predicting that
“South Korea [was] basically so weak economically and unsteady politically that internal crisis or threat of crisis [would] be the norm, not the exception, over the years ahead.”9 In a memo to Rostow in March 1961, Robert W. Komer of the NSC staff argued:
Look at the basic problems of the ROK: (a) a poor country with few resources and skills; (b) saddled with staggering task of supporting a far larger military establishment than it really [is] able to (or than is needed); (c) corruption feeding on inexperience in democratic government; and (d) a rising nationalism and expectancy frustrated by what the ROK increasingly believe is U.S. disinclination to accord them full equality, push for unification, or change overwhelming military emphasis in ROK. Underlying ills and needs are economic.
Major thrust of U.S. effort over next decade must be: (a) substantial cutback in ROK military establishment, with diversion of U.S. funds thus released to crash economic development. Defense of ROK could be met by ROK plus U.S. forces in Korea and reminders to [the Soviet] Bloc of U.S. intent instantly to protect from outside Korea; (b) buildup of ROK economy, stressing public sector, creation of light labor-intensive industry, and full utilization of main ROK resources—people.10 (original emphasis) Rostow informed Kennedy of the controversy surrounding the Farley report, and pointed out that the fundamental problem was “to get our
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massive aid to [South] Korea shifted around in a way which would not merely keep [it] from going down . . . but would begin to get [South] Korea moving forward.”11 At the NSC meeting of May 5, Kennedy approved the establishment of a Task Force on Korea, headed by assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs Walter P. McConaughy (ambassador to Korea until that April), to prepare a new policy toward South Korea. While the report was under preparation, a military coup led by Major General Park Chung Hee with some 3,600 troops took place at dawn on May 16.
The Coup
The United States was aware of the existence of potential coup groups as early as April 1961.12 No evidence, however, supports the suspicion that the United States was so disappointed with the Chang Myôn government that it worked on a covert operation to overthrow it.13 Yet it is also true that with the exception of the confusing days of May 16 and 17, when General Carter B. Magruder, chief of both UN and U.S. forces in South Korea, tried to persuade President Yun Po-sôn to resist the coup by mobilizing troops, Washington hesitated to put down the military junta that had overthrown a democratically elected government or to restore the Chang Myôn regime. In the first official document issued by the State Department on the day of the coup, a telegram to the U.S. embassy in South Korea, undersecretary of state Chester B. Bowles, acting for secretary of state Dean Rusk, ordered the embassy to take a “wait and see” attitude instead of identifying the United States “with the fate of what may be a lost cabinet.”14
When Prime Minister Chang Myôn announced his resignation together with that of his cabinet members on May 18, the State Department welcomed Chang’s action in a press release, anticipating that the move would end the political turmoil.15 The New York Times ran an editorial urging the acceptance of the coup as a fait accompli.16 U.S. officials were aware of Park’s communist activities during the chaotic days after Korea’s liberation in 1945, but believed he had fully converted to South Korean conservatism. The USFK thought that the people were indifferent, if not sympa-thetic, to the junta’s takeover. Indeed, it seems that within a few days of the coup, the U.S. government was willing to accept what had occurred and to work with coup leaders. As early as May 25, the State Department drafted a telegram acknowledging the receipt of the “official” message from Lieutenant General Chang To-yông, chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee and the army chief of staff, that explained the objectives of
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the coup.17 Yet in subsequent days Washington deliberately delayed any public announcement recognizing the military junta as the new government of South Korea, so that the United States could increase its leverage in the coming negotiations with the coup leaders on the issue of restoration of civilian rule. Chang To-yông, soon to become chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction and prime minister, sought to visit Washington to see Kennedy in an attempt to solidify U.S. acceptance of the coup and, through it, his position within the junta. The meeting would have conferred legitimacy on Chang To-yông, but he received cold responses from the U.S. embassy in Seoul as well as from its superiors in Washington. Park Chung Hee got even worse treatment in the early days of the coup. At the embassy in Seoul, U.S. deputy chief of missions Marshall Green consulted mainly with Chang To-yông and Lieutenant General-in-reserve Kim Hong-il, the minister of foreign affairs, on the issues of day-to-day government, although it was soon revealed that Park held the real power in spite of his formally supplementary role as the vice chairman of the SCNR.
There were other reasons for the delay in establishing working relations with
the junta. In addition to the goal of strengthening U.S. leverage over the military, the United States had to deal with the problematic situation of the transition, during which Yun Po-sôn remained president. Although the office of the president was mostly a symbolic one, with Yun serving as the formal head of state, his presence gave a semblance of legal continuity and meant that there was no urgency for the United States to recognize the junta as the “new” government of South Korea. The United States had time to accept the coup leaders on U.S. terms. Moreover, it was not certain who would emerge as the winner in the fierce power struggles within the junta. Not only was there no need to risk U.S. influence by betting on a particular faction, but by withholding U.S. support, the superpower patron could “tame” the emerging leadership, whether it turned out to be Park, Chang To-yông, or some unknown third force. Delay was the best tactic for the strong when the future was uncertain.
In addition, the coup leaders irritated U.S. officials in Seoul and Washington in several instances. After the junta’s arrest of Lieutenant General Yi Han-lim, the commander of the First Army, on May 18, for countercoup activities, it moved two divisions under the First Army from the front lines to the capital without the prior approval of General Magruder, in violation of the Taejôn Agreement of July 12, 1950, which gave operational control of the South Korean military to the chief of the UN Command, or UNC (he was, in addition, the commander of the USFK). Chang To-yông also abruptly announced his plan to visit Washington for a meeting with
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Kennedy without consulting the U.S. embassy. Apparently the coup leaders were convinced that the United States had no choice but to accept their actions, and even tried to intimidate U.S. officials with the argument that the “only alternative to the continuation of [the] junta [is] a Communist takeover.”18 Therefore, in order to put the junta on the defensive and set the conditions of its military rule, the United States believed that taking “a position of friendly reserve [was] infinitely preferable to expressions of complete confidence and support,” especially during the early uncertain days of the military coup.19
Park Chung Hee Era Page 9
