“thought training” program for a week at the Korea Military Graduate School and take a written test upon completion of the program. The performance was assessed by Chông’s military aides. A marine colonel in full gear, wearing a pistol, watched over the MCI bureaucrats’ day-to-day conduct, including after working hours, with the power to dismiss anyone found to be unworthy of revolutionary tasks. Even going to a bar could risk one’s job. Chông also appointed many young military officers to lead or staff state-owned and MCI-controlled industry organizations. In his memoirs, Chông recalls that he appointed “capable officers” from the army, navy, air force, and marine corps as heads of all MCI-controlled industry organizations. He believed that military officers assigned to these new positions were more capable than civilians in carrying out his agenda, such as the maintenance of probity and the reformulation of industry goals in accordance with the “soldier’s spirit.”61
Although Chông Nae-hyôk was not a member of the original core group of the coup, he was hand-picked by Park as the MCI minister for his reputation in the armed forces as being incorruptible and extremely capable.
Park entrusted Chông with the crucial task of comprehensively reforming South Korea’s electric power industry, which the U.S. Task Force on Korea had listed in its report of June 5, 1961, as one of the major economic problems that had faced the Chang Myôn government. The task force recommended that the U.S. government urge South Korean authorities to take “essential steps to correct the present financial insolvency of Korean power companies . . . including a further rate increase, merger of the power companies to effect savings, and establishment of an independent rate commission.”62 Thus the United States advised the military junta
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that U.S. aid, especially for fiscal year 1962—which the task force estimated as reaching $282.5 million for economic assistance, $120 million for supporting assistance, and $86 million for a Food for Peace Program—
would be provided on the condition that the South Korean power companies were overhauled.63 The urgency of reform made Chông restructure the power industry in the fashion of a military combat operation. The MCI minister replaced the heads of the three electric companies and their eight affiliated companies with military officers on active duty.64 By June 8, 1961, the electric companies had cut a total of 1,654 personnel after dismantling labor unions in each of the companies. Against this inefficient over-crowded industry, Chông acted as a surgeon, operating with the belief that “everything was possible under the revolutionary military junta.”65 On June 23, 1961, the SCNR legislated the establishment of the Korea Electric Company, which merged two distributors—Kyôngsông and Namsôn Electric companies—with Chosôn Electric Company. Major General Pak Yong-jun, commander of the army’s Ninth Division, was appointed the chairman of the new company. It had taken just one month for Minister Chông to complete the restructuring, a task that civilian governments since 1951 had not been able to accomplish.66
Park’s Leap toward the Presidency
The KCIA’s withdrawal from economic policymaking after mid-1962 did not mean that Kim Chong-p’il’s radius of activities dramatically shrank.
Although Kim became a political burden for Park after the failed currency conversion reform,67 Park needed Kim’s talents more than ever to pursue his own political ambitions, because the date for the transfer of power to civilians was rapidly approaching. No one in the mainstream faction could match Kim Chong-p’il in strategic thinking, vision, and organizational skill. The Park–Kim Chong-p’il axis was becoming a politically risky alliance, but it still remained a highly effective mechanism for consolidating Park’s leadership position. Consequently, from the summer of 1962 onward Kim Chong-p’il was given the task of clandestinely (and illegally) organizing a new ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP), under the pretext of establishing an Association of Comrades for National Reconstruction. In the context of the junta’s outlawing of all political activities, the organization of the DRP meant that Park got a head start on preparations for the upcoming electoral contest.
Once the financial crisis triggered by the currency conversion reform was under control, Park shifted his attention to the transfer of power to an
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elected civilian government, which he officially announced on December 27, 1962, the day after the announcement of a newly revised national constitution. By then, the military junta thought that it had achieved its initial objective of rebuilding the state bureaucracy into a military-style organization, as well as laying the organizational basis of the DRP. Park believed he was ready to pursue his ultimate goal of becoming the president through competitive elections with the help of both state and party apparatus. Just as Park declared his intention to join the election, other coup leaders, especially the young colonels, made public their ambition to become the pillars of any future “civilian” government.
The announcement of Park’s candidacy and the revelation of the organization of the DRP provoked an intense power struggle within the SCNR
between the young “radical” colonels of the Kim Chong-p’il–led and KCIA-backed mainstream faction, on the one hand, and the “moderate”
senior generals of the nonmainstream faction, on the other. Ironically, the final stage of power consolidation begun with the launching of the DRP
was imploding the military junta from within by causing the nonmainstream faction to fear its exclusion from what they thought was destined to become the center of power in the soon-to-be-launched Third Republic.
In the face of opposition on multiple political fronts, Kim Chong-p’il was a sitting duck. The exposure of his political sins provided his opponents with many opportunities to strike back. First, there was the issue of illegally organizing the DRP through the KCIA-initiated “Operation Victory.” At stake was the control of power after the transition to electoral politics, prompting the diverse factions of Kim Tong-ha, Kim Chae-ch’un, and others of the nonmainstream to fight back vigorously to snatch away the DRP from young colonels of Kim Chong-p’il’s group. Second, Kim Chong-p’il was also condemned for his controversial negotiations with Japanese foreign minister Ohira Masayoshi on the issue of normalization of relations,68 which generals of the nonmainstream used to criticize Kim Chong-p’il as a corrupt, power-hungry politician, ready to pursue a “humiliating diplomacy” and even sell out his country to realize his ambitions for power. Third, the KCIA-initiated a political fund-raising campaign for the DRP that snowballed into the “Four Scandals,” damaging the credibility of Kim Chong-p’il even more. He was accused of rigging the Seoul stock exchange; of permitting duty-free imports of Japanese Datsun automobiles for resale in the South Korean market at double the import price under the name “Saenara” (New Country); of authorizing the duty-free importation of 880 pinball machines from Japan; and of illicitly authorizing the construction of a Walker Hill holiday resort aimed at attracting
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U.S. GIs stationed in South Korea—all with the goal of acquiring operational funds for the DRP.69
Tensions exploded in January 1963, when Major General Kim Tong-ha of the marine corps reserves—also the chairman of the SCNR’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Subcommittee—joined several other moderate SCNR members in openly refusing to become members of the newly proposed DRP.70 Kim Tong-ha was supported by military officers of the marine corps and the natives of Hamkyông provinces. As part of the nonmainstream faction, they looked at the DRP as nothing but “Kim Chong-p’il’s private party.”
Former prime minister Song Yo-ch’an also publicly demanded Park’s resignation on January 7, 1963, declaring that “the core members of the military revolution should not participate in the future civilian-led government. If they do, there will be permanent [military] rule.”71 On January 16, even Yu Wôn-sik, now dissatisfied with his marginalization from the center of power after the failed currency
conversion reform, publicly declared that the DRP was “a political party that belonged to the Kim Chong-p’il faction and thus does not hold majority support.”72 The opposition within the SCNR reached a critical point when Commander Kim Chae-ch’un of the army’s powerful Counter Intelligence Corps, Yu Yang-su, chairman of the SCNR’s Finance and Economy Subcommittee, and defense minister Pak Pyông-gwôn joined the chiefs of staff of the four military services in demanding Park’s withdrawal of his candidacy in the forthcoming presidential election. They also demanded the removal of Kim Chong-p’il from the DRP. To paralyze the mainstream faction, they also urged Park to send Kim abroad at once and keep him in “exile” until the elections were held.
Although Park denied any knowledge of Kim Chong-p’il’s clandestine preparations to establish the DRP, everyone thought that Park knew of Kim’s activities from the very beginning and was wholly supportive of the DRP project.73 In the face of mounting opposition, Park pursued a two-track response. First, he skillfully distanced himself from taking any blame for the currency conversion reform, the Four Scandals, and the Kim-Ohira memorandum on South Korean–Japanese normalization of relations by making Kim Chong-p’il take responsibility for the fiascos, as well as moving to cut Kim loose, albeit in a highly measured manner.74 On February 25, 1963, Kim was forced to take his first exile abroad after initially refusing Park’s advice. In less than a month, Kim had slid from his position as second-in-charge of the military junta to a man in exile and from Park’s most trusted and astute lieutenant to scapegoat for all the illicit activities
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of the junta. Moreover, Kim’s exile did not hurt Park’s power position, because by then Park had laid the groundwork for his presidential candidacy.
On the contrary, Kim’s disgrace helped Park’s consolidation of power, because Kim had by then grown into a politician of national stature.
Second, just as Park had chosen the strategy of purge to deal with the obstacle of Chang To-yông and his supporters from the P’yôngan region in July 1961, Park again opted for a crackdown. From January to March 1963, the Park–Kim Chong-p’il axis carried out a total of eleven purges.
The climax came in March, when Kim Tong-ha, Colonel Pak Im-hang, a moderate member of the SCNR, and Provost Officer Yi Kyu-gwang were arrested on the charge of plotting a counterrevolution. This incident, known as the “Alaska Operation” because of the geographical remoteness of Kim Tong-ha’s native Hamgyông region, came to be the final blow for what remained of the Northern faction that had dominated the leadership of the South Korean armed forces since its establishment in the 1945–1948
period. The northwestern part of the faction had been purged with the arrest of Chang To-yông in July 1961. The remaining northeastern part was dismantled with the purge of Kim Tong-ha in March 1963.75 A well-seasoned survivor with an exceptional ability to think strategically and move swiftly, Park had transformed the crisis into an opportunity for power consolidation.
Personal ambitions matter. The military coup of May 16, 1961, was Park’s third or fourth attempt to seize power by force.76 Park himself said that he wanted revolution or death, nothing in between.77 He was driven by his desire for power, but he also sought power not only for its own sake but also for his vision of national reconstruction.
Ironically, however, for such a visionary man, Park lacked a concrete plan of action on the issue of national reconstruction when he launched the military coup. The junta’s multiple reforms for state building, as a step toward national revolution, were without clear objectives, strategies, or defined plans. Lacking any grand strategies, the junta necessarily zigzagged from the day of the military coup, imprisoning the chaebol owners, only to release them to seek their cooperation in the first Five-Year Economic Development Plan; frequently replacing economic ministers and then making a U-turn to favor the rise of civilian technocrats; and imposing the currency conversion reform, only to rescind it within a few weeks.
The revisions of the first FYEDP’s gross domestic product target goals after a year and a half also illustrate the absence of any master plan. Many of the reform programs were drawn up by Kim Chong-p’il and his KCIA without internal consistency. They even undermined the reform programs
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initiated by the SCNR. As a whole, the junta’s reform programs had no central coordination, not only because there were multiple centers of power competing for political hegemony, but also because the junta seized power without an agreed-upon programmatic plan.
Nevertheless, what is important is that Park zigzagged in strategy, but not in overall policy priorities. And it is in this sense that the personal ambitions of Park mattered for the fate of Park, the junta, and the country.
The central issue for Park was economic development, and he linked this issue with the issue of state building through administrative reform. This was itself a great leap forward for the country. First, because the goal was economic development, Park zigzagged but also moved forward incrementally, learning through the policy failures of the 1961–1963 period what the goal of economic modernization entailed and how that goal could be achieved. Through a process of trial and error, he learned what not to do. Second, through the zigzags of economic policy, there emerged a set of institutions that were to make positive contributions to national reconstruction and economic modernization, once Park consolidated power and readjusted his goals and strategies from a position of political strength after 1963.
The swift changes in policy that lay ahead in 1964 were to show that Park was a quick learner regarding the management of both political power and economic issues. The junta years were a bridge to Park’s new leadership style. During the military junta, Park was prepared to do whatever was necessary, including the purge of his own co-revolutionaries and risking economic destabilization, if his power was on the line. Sheer ruthlessness was enough for Park to “remake” himself to maintain his control over politics, and he demanded the same degree of commitment from his subordinates and his countrymen. A sea change had begun in South Korean society, with the people barely realizing that the road to a genuine revolution had commenced, with Park at the forefront.
p a r t
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POLITICS
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Modernization Strategy:
Ideas and Influences
Chung-in Moon and Byung-joon Jun
Certainly, Park Chung Hee was a man of action. However, unlike the image portrayed by many historians, he was also a man of ideas and what he believed mattered greatly for South Korea. He mixed the Japanese ethos of top-down mobilization and the U.S. ideas of technocracy with Korean nationalism in most un-Japanese and un-American ways to clear the way for economic growth. As a leader, Park shared the spirit of the Japanese Meiji revolutionaries, Young Turks, and Bismarckian Germans, in which the state commanded the market to expedite the process of development,1 as opposed to the Anglo-American version of modernization framed around market forces and evolutionary processes, but the way Park combined the ideas of statism, mercantilism, corporatism, and U.S. liberalism were distinctly his own. The new strategies and policies were not imposed from the outside; they were the product of ideologies, images, and information embedded in the inner world of Park Chung Hee.
It is through these ideational dimensions that Park conceived, guided, and drove all of South Korea’s modernization in the 1960s and 1970s.
On the economic front, Park adopted a strategy of economic nationalism that combined import protection, industrial policy, and export promotion to transform infant industries into internationally competitive engines of growth. To clear away societal obstacles and mobilize scarce resources for this dirigiste path to economic development, his political strategy centered on a guided democracy and state corporatism in which both civil so-
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ciety and political society were reorgani
zed, controlled, and orchestrated by the state for the sake of efficiency, stability, and regime security. His social modernization strategy supplemented his economic and political strategies by making the South Korean people the targets of spiritual reform and resource mobilization by the state. Civil society was reorganized and mobilized for national harmony and economic prosperity along the military ideals of order, discipline, and collectivism. These three strategies of economic nationalism, guided democracy, and corporatist social mobilization made Park’s modernization a classic and yet distinctive example of
“revolution from above,” tapping what Alexander Gerschenkron once termed the “advantages of historical backwardness” to beat the developed countries in the international marketplace and catch up on modernization.
To be sure, Park’s threefold modernization strategies were reactive actions to cope with South Korea’s state of underdevelopment. His choice of goals and strategies was also constrained by dominant societal interests, underlying coalitional dynamics and state-society power structures. On the one hand, Park, like Syngman Rhee and Chang Myôn before him, faced a situation in which his country desperately needed a leader to preserve national security in the face of North Korean threats, ensure economic prosperity and welfare, and create a viable political system.2 But such mandates did not in themselves decide the content of Park’s approach to modernization. Nor were societal groups and their coalitional dynamics accountable for his choice of strategy. They shaped the range of strategic options, but not his choices within that range of options. Through his extreme concentration of power in the South Korean imperial presidency, Park was the one who defined policy agendas, shaped the social and political terrain, and altered South Korea’s mode of interaction with global markets though the formation of a new coalition that consisted of the state, big business, academic technocrats, and small farmers at the expense of labor.
Park Chung Hee Era Page 16
