Wôn-ch’ôl.24 Most critically, Park directed O to develop an independent missile development system, with the goal of producing surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with a range of 200 kilometers (roughly 125 miles) at the first stage, and then progressively expanding the range in later stages.
Park also identified the ADD as the coordinator for research and development.25 By September 1972, a group of scientists and engineers from the ADD, the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), and the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was able to assemble a missile development plan, with the title “The Promotional Plan for the Aerospace Industry.” The actual plan, however, focused on developing ballistic missiles, calling for the successful testing of mid-range surface-to-surface missiles by the end of 1976 and long-range missiles by the end of 1979.
In February 1973, Park approved the “Basic Plan for Developing Ballistic Missiles” and ordered its implementation as part of the Yulgok project to modernize the South Korean armed forces. Its inclusion in the Yulgok project virtually guaranteed state financial support. The actual implementation began in 1975, with an infusion of 6.2 billion won from the state. In 1976, the bill stood at 5.7 billion won.26 By December 1976, the construc-
The Search for Deterrence 495
tion of the Taejôn Machine Tool Center was completed to serve as a technical base for the development of ballistic missiles. The ADD actively sought to purchase the necessary propellant and guiding technologies, parts, and components on the international market, as well as to recruit several South Korean scientists and engineers from the United States.
To develop a missile design, the ADD chose McDonnell Douglas (MD) as its preferred licensor, because MD manufactured the Nike-Hercules (NH) missiles used by U.S. ground troops in South Korea. Moreover, MD was suffering financial difficulties in the mid-1970s, which the ADD
thought would make it eager to sell missile design technologies. To the disappointment of MD, however, the ADD was asked to get permission from the State Department. When the State Department would not approve the sale of missile design technologies, the ADD proposed a joint research project to increase the range of NH missiles from 180 kilometers (112
miles) to 240 kilometers (150 miles). MD concurred, but at a price of $30
million, which forced the ADD to divide the research project into three stages and to conclude a contract for the first stage of joint research in the amount of $1.8 million. As part of this first stage, which was essentially a feasibility study, ten ADD researchers were sent to MD for six months.
Upon the completion of the six-month-long feasibility study, the ADD acquired basic design technologies for ballistic missiles and canceled the remaining two stages of joint research.27
Acquiring the propellant technology was also a difficult process. Because U.S. companies were legally required to secure the State Department’s prior approval in the sale of propellant technologies, the ADD initially chose to contact a French company, SNPE, for the purchase of technology, equipment, and parts and components. Then, in the middle of negotiations with SNPE, the ADD, hearing of Lockheed’s plan to close down its propellant plant in California due to financial distress, swiftly contacted Lockheed for the purchase of some of the equipment at the plant. Lockheed counterproposed that the ADD buy all of the equipment in the California plant, with the pledge that it would get the necessary permission from the State Department. In the end, the ADD invited both Lockheed and SNPE to bid for the project, and eventually chose the option of buying Lockheed’s California factory at the price of $2.6 million—
but without the manufacturing technology. The manufacturing technology was excluded from the deal because of strong opposition from the State Department. Consequently, the ADD had to conclude a separate deal with SNPE to acquire the manufacturing technology at a cost of $3 million.28
The deal with Lockheed came through only because the United States was internally divided, with the U.S. embassy in Seoul joining the Defense De-
International Relations 496
partment in supporting the Lockheed plan and the State Department remaining strongly opposed on the following grounds:
[Deputy Secretary of Defense] William P. Clements’ memorandum of January 23 contends that the Lockheed plant would enable [South Korea] to achieve substantial savings in reloading motors for the US-made rockets it now possesses. The memorandum further states that it is desirable for the ADD to undertake research and test programs for anti-tank and other rocket ordnance
. . . The Department of State believes that [remained classified] President Park, through the ADD, is embarked upon an ambitious program to develop advanced weapons systems which will be “strategic” in the context of the Korean Peninsula. In addition to advanced missiles the ADD has been directed to supervise production of a prototype nuclear weapon . . . Linkage of nuclear weapons development to an advanced missile capability would have the most serious strategic implications given [South Korea’s] geographic location.29
After the construction of the Taejôn Machine Tool Center and the relocation of the Lockheed propellant factory to South Korea, the missile development program quickly gained momentum. At the same time, with the heightened activities of the ADD and KAERI in overseas nuclear and missile markets, U.S. surveillance of South Korea was also increasing. The chief of staff at the Blue House, Kim Chông-ryôm, once recalled that the greatest obstacle in the missile development program was the United States’ objection. Ambassador Richard L. Sneider repeatedly expressed strong objections to the South Korean missile program in a monthly luncheon meeting he held with Kim Chông-ryôm.30 To secure U.S. guiding technology and equipment, which were required to complete the development of ballistic missiles, the ADD had to agree with the United States to limit the range of the South Korean missiles to 180 kilometers (112 miles) and the warhead weight to 1,000 pounds.
The Trial of Park’s Nuclear Ambitions
Park’s nuclear weapons program proceeded uninterrupted until mid-1974.
The United States paid relatively little attention to the issue of nuclear proliferation in developing countries until then, giving Park a window of opportunity to construct an institutional basis for research and development and contract with foreign companies for the sale of technology and/or facilities for the development of nuclear and missile capabilities. With India’s successful nuclear test in May 1974, the U.S. attitude changed dramatically, leading the State Department to investigate other potential challengers of the NPT regime. It was against this background that the United
The Search for Deterrence 497
States became aware of South Korea’s negotiations to purchase reprocessing technologies and facilities from France and Canada in late 1974
and ordered the U.S. embassy in Seoul to appraise South Korean intentions in acquiring nuclear reprocessing facilities. A telegram from the embassy to the State Department on October 28, 1974, demonstrates U.S. concern:
“Embassy is currently preparing analysis of [the] potential in [South] Korea for developing nuclear weapons and we plan to address related questions of surface-to-surface missile development . . . in the context of our nuclear weapons analysis.”31
A few months later, the State Department informed a branch of U.S. intelligence—most likely the Central Intelligence Agency—of the need to investigate South Korea’s nuclear development program.32 In early 1975, the United States conducted a survey of potential nuclear proliferation in the third world and put South Korea in the group of developing countries with the capability to develop nuclear weapons within a decade. The State Department was then of the opinion that the South Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons would break down regional stability by compelling China and the Soviet Union to provide the North with strategic nuclear weapons in the event of military belligerency on the Korean Peninsula.33
Anxious about the dangers of nuclear proliferation, the United States pro
posed that the member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union) convene a meeting to develop common guidelines on export policy, including the export of nuclear technology, parts and components, and facilities, with the goal of restraining sales of sensitive nuclear materials. To the U.S. query on the French sale of a reprocessing plant to South Korea, the French answered that it would seek to have IAEA safeguards on the completion of the deal. In addition to such efforts to mobilize multilateral support for restricting the South Korean nuclear program to peaceful uses, the State Department also resorted to bilateral pressure to stop the program from developing into a military one by pushing for South Korea’s ratification of the NPT. At the same time, the United States tightened its surveillance over South Korean nuclear facilities and strengthened intelligence on research activities.
The U.S. embassy in Seoul took the most alarmist view. In its eyes, given the South Korean people’s “diligent nature” and Park’s commitment, South Korea could develop its own nuclear weapon by the early 1980s. The embassy also argued that the United States should not underestimate South Korea’s ability to obtain nuclear technology and equipment from a third country through commercial deals. The embassy believed that South Korea would push ahead with its nuclear weapon development program de-
International Relations 498
spite the high political and economic costs involved and that its successful acquisition of nuclear weapons would mean a precipitous decline in U.S.
influence on South Korea. The embassy recommended that the United States take explicit action to prevent South Korea from continuing with its nuclear weapons program.34 Groping for ways to stop South Korean efforts, Ambassador Sneider met with Park on May 1, 1975, to discuss South Korea’s missile development program. Predictably, Park reiterated his firm commitment to building his country’s defense capabilities, including its missile stock, as a preparatory measure for the planned U.S. military reduction of forces, if not withdrawal. By contrast, Sneider pointed out that the missile development program entailed too great a financial cost for the objective of self-reliance and that South Korea needed to take into account U.S. concerns before proceeding further. Incidentally, Park emphasized that he had no plans to develop nuclear weapons.35
On July 2, Robert S. Ingersoll, then deputy secretary of state, drew up a memorandum for the White House to lay out the options for defeating South Korean efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.36 Recollecting how he secured cooperation from France and Canada in preventing the earlier deals that might have evolved into a nuclear weapons program,37 Ingersoll stressed that South Korea’s nuclear weapons program directly threatened U.S. security interests in the East Asian region. On the other hand, in Ingersoll’s view, there was a significant role to be played by the United States as a licensor and donor if South Korea’s attempt to acquire the reprocessing technology was strictly motivated by the economic need to secure an alternative form of energy in the era of high oil prices and South Korea’s fragile access to Middle Eastern sources of oil and gas. Considering the stakes at hand, Ingersoll urged the United States to act right away. To dissuade Park from toying with the risky nuclear weapons strategy, Ingersoll recommended that the United States clearly state its deep concern over South Korea’s nuclear reprocessing program and warn that future U.S. nuclear assistance, including the pending U.S. Export-Import (EX-IM) Bank loan for Kori 2, would be terminated in the event of Park’s use of the technology for military purposes.38 Moreover, Ingersoll urged the United States to pressure South Korea not to proceed with its planned construction of a pilot reprocessing plant. In return for South Korea’s acquiescence, he thought the United States could invite South Korea to participate in a regional reprocessing plant.39
By October, the U.S. embassy had asked at least twice that Park stop his nuclear reprocessing program, only to see him reject the demand. Instead, Park offered the “concession” of allowing U.S. inspection of the planned reprocessing facilities as a gesture of his goodwill toward the United
The Search for Deterrence 499
States. In the same vein, South Korea had ratified the NPT in April 1975, after seven years of postponement, when the United States succeeded in persuading France and Canada to join it in pressing for South Korea’s ratification of the NPT as a precondition for the French and Canadian sale of nuclear technology. Faced with the united front of its suppliers, South Korea quickly agreed, and the ratification took less than two minutes in the National Assembly. However, given the long record of South Korea’s attempts at going around the United States to develop nuclear capabilities, the damage to the two countries’ relationship could not be healed by the ratification of the NPT alone. On the contrary, the skeptics within the U.S.
government argued that the ratification was only an opportunistic move aimed at silencing U.S. objections to the French sale. Moreover, the South Korean ratification came only after a U.S. congressional resolution calling for the U.S. EX-IM Bank to defer its approval of loans for the construction of the Kori-2 reactor.40 In view of the situation, Sneider thought the United States had four options:
(1) We can now let [the] question lie fallow without further reply, letting ROKG [the Republic of Korea Government] discover for themselves [the] difficulty of proceeding without our support in [the] nuclear field; (2) We can acquiesce in [the] reprocessing sale, accepting ROK offers of bilateral U.S. as well as international inspection; (3) We can raise this issue once again directly with President Park [to seek] compromise of a moratorium on reprocessing contract, which we have heard may be feasible; or (4) we can confront Park personally with uncompromising line.41
The first two options prevented an escalation of nuclear conflict that was certain to damage the already fragile alliance, weakened by human rights disputes, the Koreagate scandal, and the U.S. military withdrawal (see Chapter 16). However, either option would come with the cost of letting South Korea take the initiative in defining the security situation on the Korean Peninsula as well as in the East Asian region. Depending on South Korea’s understanding or misunderstanding of U.S. security interests, an arms race in Northeast Asia could break out. The first two options, in other words, counted on South Korea’s ability to realize, without hostile U.S. pressure, that its decision to push ahead with the nuclear weapons program would hurt its own interests by prompting the United States not only to refuse the pending Kori-2 loan but also to cut U.S. military assistance. In light of the risks and limitations of the first two options, the third option urged the United States to confront Park directly and seek a compromise. In this scenario, the United States would look for a two- to three-year moratorium on the South Korean purchase of a reprocessing plant.
International Relations 500
Like the first two options, however, the third option did not foreclose Park’s development of nuclear weapons in the future. Sneider explained: We should stress that this [third] approach [of agreeing on a moratorium]
would permit an expanding flow of technological and economic benefits from
[the United States], including offer of some training of ROK technicians in
[the] reprocessing field. We should deal directly with Park’s longer-term concerns, stating that in our view ROKG is in [a] strong security position and we see no need for concern; but if they are indeed worried about [the] withdrawal [of the U.S.] nuclear [umbrella], which we do not anticipate, we would be glad to discuss this contingency. We must, at [the] same time, make clear that [the] spectrum of our relations and our ability to support ROK not only in nuclear power development but across the board will be impaired without Park’s cooperation.42
The fourth option was much more confrontational, asking Park to back down without any corresponding concessions from the United States.
What exactly the United States decided to do to force Park’s surrender of his nuclear ambitions remains classified, but the actions must have had potentially
serious political fallout. Of the four options, Sneider recommended the third but with a cautionary note that the United States should engage in a “truly serious and strict application of our multilateral approach to nuclear reprocessing. To be tough with [the South] Koreans while giving the appearance of lenience toward other countries . . . in [the]
same [situation] would cause [the South] Koreans to conclude that [the United States] has serious doubts about relationship of trust, which underpins the alliance, and will probably cause permanent damage to [the] spirit of cooperation needed for assuring [South] Korean security.”43
Thereafter, the United States began pressing Park to give up the nuclear reprocessing deal with France. In addition to Sneider, Philip Habib, a former U.S. ambassador to Seoul and then the assistant secretary of state, played a central role. On December 10, 1975, Sneider asked the State Department to communicate with the South Korean ambassador to the United States, Ham Pyông-ch’un, regarding the profoundly negative consequences South Korea would encounter if it continued the nuclear reprocessing effort.44 Ham Pyông-ch’un was scheduled to meet with Park in a week to convey the message to Park and his staff at the Blue House. In a telegram to the secretary of the state, Sneider reported: Conversation with Prime Minister [Kim Chong-p’il] indicates that to be effective, our approach must emphasize adverse impact on our broader relationship with ROKG . . . if it persists in completing [the] French reprocessing deal.
This point is reinforced by [the] initial negative reaction to [the] approach to
[Prime Minister Kim Chong-p’il] which I received from Deputy [Prime Minis-
The Search for Deterrence 501
ter] Nam [Tôk-u] this morning. Thus, in [our] approach to [Ham Pyông-ch’un], I believe we must make it indelibly clear that far more than our nuclear support is at stake here, that if ROKG proceeds as it has indicated to date, [ the] whole range of security and political relationships between [ the United States] and ROK will be affected, including potential for adverse congressional action on security assistance for [South] Korea. (Emphasis added) When Sneider realized that his effort to persuade Park during the months of October and December 1975 had failed, he recommended that the State Department issue an ultimatum that included the possible reconsideration of South Korea’s overall bilateral security and political relations. What Sneider meant to say when he warned that the “whole range of security and political relationships between the United States and South Korea will be affected” is unclear, but it is safe to infer that he thought the very alliance itself could be irreparably damaged in the event of Park’s continuing pursuit of nuclear weapons development. The United States was in possession of a vast arsenal to directly reshape Park’s preferences.
Park Chung Hee Era Page 71
