18. Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, June 13, 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:487.
19. Ibid., 488.
20. Macdonald, U.S. -Korean Relations, 216.
21. FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:482–486.
22. Telegram from the U.S. embassy in Korea to the Department of State, October 28, 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:522 and passim.
23. Letter from the Ambassador to Korea (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:543.
24. During his farewell visit to SCNR chairman Park in Washington in November 1961, Secretary Rusk joked that Park “was very strongly represented in Washington, not only by [Korean] Ambassador Chông but by Ambassador Berger as well.” FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:541.
25. Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, July 27, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:590–591.
26. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, August 5, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:591–592.
27. He mobilized various sources, including not only Ambassador Chông but General Van Fleet, who wrote a personal letter to the president. FRUS, 1961–
1963, 22:608, 615.
28. Cited in Macdonald, U.S. -Korean Relations, 219.
29. Cho Kap-che, Nae mudôm-e ch’im-¤l paet’ôra [Spit on My Grave], 5:144–
147.
30. Ibid., 217. Cho writes that it was on February 13, not 17, and cites an interview with Pak Pyông-gwôn, where he denied that anything similar to an ultimatum had been made on that day.
31. FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:622, 626–627.
32. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, March 16, 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:630–631.
33. Ibid., 639–641, but FRUS does not mention the content of the letter. Nor does FRUS list the letter.
34. FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:642–644.
35. Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, July 15, 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:652–656.
Notes to Pages 72–76
657
36. Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, September 2, 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:660.
37. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, October 22, 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:667.
38. The Sixth National Assembly had a total of 175 seats, comprising 131 district and 44 party-list seats. Of the 110 seats won by the DRP, 22 of those seats were allocated from the party-list seats. The Democratic Justice Party, which had won the next largest number of seats, had a total of 41 seats, of which 14
were from the party-list seats.
39. In 1964, negotiations between South Korea and Japan for diplomatic normalization caused a severe political crisis and forced Kim Chong-p’il to go on his second exile. Berger’s term was terminated in July 1964 and Kim returned to South Korea in January 1965. Kim remained behind the scenes until the normalization treaty was ratified. When he sought center stage again, however, his utility to Park was not the same as before. By that time, Park commanded greater public support and control of the state apparatus and political power.
40. FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:474–475.
41. Ibid., 475. Komer’s memo reflected both his enthusiasm for applying the Rostovian model of economic development to the South Korean case and his frustration with bureaucratic intransigence to policy change. See the next section.
42. Comment by Bundy to Kennedy, cited in Woo, Race to the Swift, 76.
43. Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, October 28, 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:522.
44. Memorandum by Robert H. Johnson, June 6, 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:470.
45. Tadashi Kimiya, Han’guk-¤i naep’ojôk kongôphwa chôllyak-¤i chwajôl: 5.16
kunsa chôngbu-¤i kukkajayulsông-¤i kujojok han’gye [“The Failure of the Inward-looking Deepening Strategy in South Korea: The Limits of the State’s Structural Autonomy in the 5.16 Military Government”] (Ph.D. diss., Korea University, 1991), 33–57.
46. Chaejông k¤myung 30nyônsa [Thirty Years of Fiscal and Financial Policy]
(Seoul: Committee to Publish “Thirty Years of Fiscal and Financial Policy,”
1978), 99–103.
47. Macdonald, U.S. -Korean Relations, 218. The quotation within the quote is from the source.
48. Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, July 23, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:581–585.
49. Macdonald, U.S. -Korean Relations, 293. It is a matter of contention whether it was the lack of consultation or the seemingly socialist nature of the plan that made Washington particularly unhappy. While U.S. diplomatic documents generally refer to the former, there is evidence that the latter was no less important. Kim Chin-hyôn, then an economic reporter for the Dong-A Ilbo, said that he personally heard from Berger that the United States took the issue—
the “socialist” nature of the plan—so seriously that it was even contemplating the termination of diplomatic relations with South Korea. Stunned, Kim asked
Notes to Pages 77–84
658
Berger if he could write about it. Berger answered in the affirmative, but Kim did not write the story.
50. Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State, July 15, 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:655. Yet it seemed that withholding the aid was largely motivated by political concern. In the same telegram, Berger reports that “timing of latest developments (appointing Kim Hyông-uk to KCIA director) worth mentioning. That they came after additional US food commitment and additional $15 million support assistance announced . . . is probably not just coincidence. [Park] knows US reaction to these moves will be adverse but, encouraged by Kim Chong-p’il, he believes that US is so committed in Korea that we will have to accept his actions.” Ibid., 653.
51. Cited in Macdonald, U.S. -Korean Relations, 295–296.
52. Memorandum from Robert W. Komer to Rostow, March 15, 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:426.
53. Notes of the 485th Meeting of the National Security Council, June 13, 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:479–480.
54. Memorandum from Komer to Bundy, December 20, 1961, FRUS, 1961–
1963, 22:548–549.
55. Memorandum from the JCS to Secretary of Defense, April 10, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:554.
56. “The Outlook for South Korea,” SNIE 42–62, April 4, 1962, FRUS, 1961–
1963, 22:553.
57. “Korea: A Political-Military Study of South Korean Forces,” as an attachment to letter from McNamara to Hamilton, April 27, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:562.
58. Robert Komer’s memo to Forrestal, July 31, 1962, JFKL.
59. Robert Komer, Memorandum for the Record, May 4, 1962, FRUS, 1961–
1963, 22:562–564.
60. Yi Tong-wôn’s memoir, reported in the JoongAng Ilbo, August 7, 1999. Although the circumstances were more complicated, Yi was generally right.
61. Cho Kap-che, Nae mudôm-e ch’im-¤l paet’ôra [Spit on My Grave], 5:190–
191.
62. Telegram from Embassy in Seoul to Department of State, March 11, 1961.
63. Cho Kap-che, Nae mudôm-e ch’im-¤l paet’ôra [Spit on My Grave], 5:57. The point was shared by Americans. Memorandum of Discussion, June 15, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:575–576.
64. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, August 5, 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 22:592.
65. The Korean Task Force Report of June 5, 1961, gave wide discretion to the newly appointed ambassador to meet the needs of the highly fluid situation in post-coup South Korea.
66. See note 27 above.
67. See above notes 23 and 33.
68. In this regard, the ending paragraph of the book by Donald Macdonald, then the Korean desk officer in the State Department, is apt. “While [Park Chung Hee and the military leadership] do deserve much of the credit [for sustained
Notes to Pages 86–91
659
rapid e
conomic growth], it must be recognized . . . that it was the American effort of the previous fifteen or more years . . . that prepared the material and social ground for Korea’s economic take-off. . . . Moreover, if it had not been for the guidance and restraining hand of the United States, its ambassadors [including Berger] and its aid chiefs [including Killen], and their staffs, the economic excesses of the military might well have jeopardized [South] Korea’s economic future.” Macdonald, U.S. -Korean Relations, 301.
3. State Building: The Military Junta’s Path to Modernity through Administrative Reforms
1. See “Choguga! Tangsin¤n yôngyông?” [Fatherland! Will you wilt forever?, in Wôlgan Chosun Palgul: Han’guk hyôndaesa, pijaryo 125 kôn [The Monthly Wôlgan Chosun’s Discoveries: Korea’s Modern History, 125 Secret Materials] (Seoul: Chosun Ilbosa, January 1996), 199–200. See also Yi Sôk-jeche, Kak’ha, Uri hyôngmyông hapsida [General, Let’s Have a Revolution] (Seoul: Sôjôkp’o, 1995), 75–76.
2. Berger to the Secretary of State, October 28, 1961, National Security Files, Box 128, Country File: Korea, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston [hereafter NSF: Korea, JFKL], cited by Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 79.
3. The name of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was changed in the 1980s to the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI). This chapter, however, uses the earlier name, to reflect the period covered.
4. The other two leading groups consisted largely of: (1) a mixed group of generals from Park’s Manchurian days; and (2) a colonels’ group of the fifth class of the Korea Military Academy. See Chapter 1 above.
5. Military Revolution in Korea (Seoul: Secretariat of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, 1961), 25–26.
6. Yi Sôk-chje, Kak’ha [General], 136.
7. Interview with Yi Sôk-che. Details of Yi’s account on this topic are also available; see ibid., 132–137.
8. Yi Kyông-nam, “Tak’ument’ari: Panhyôngmyông” [A Documentary: Counterrevolution], Sindonga, November 1982, 183–201.
9. Hahn-Been Lee, Korea: Time, Change, and Administration (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968), 167.
10. McConaughy to Task Force on Korea, “Revised Progress Report on Follow up Actions,” 6–7.
11. Born in Puyô in South Ch’ungch’ông Province on January 7, 1926, Kim Chong-p’il was a junior at the Teachers College, Seoul National University, when the Republic was inaugurated in 1948. He immediately joined the army that year and was selected to enter the KMA a year later, graduating as a member of its eighth class. Kim began his military career as an intelligence officer and rose to head the North Korean Section of the army’s Intelligence Bureau by 1952. In that capacity, he had access to the personnel files of many in the
Notes to Pages 91–93
660
South Korean officer corps, which he was to use later for the identification and recruitment of the members of both the coup coalition and the post-coup military junta. Park and Kim first met in 1949, after Park was dismissed from the army in 1948 (see Chapter 1) and was then allowed to work as a civilian at the Intelligence Bureau. Despite many differences in character, upbringing, and style of leadership, Park and Kim instantly became close. When Kim married Park’s niece, Yông-ok, in late 1951 in Taegu, where both Park and Kim were stationed as intelligence officers, their loyalty to each other became even stronger. The relationship turned into a revolutionary partnership when, as we saw in Chapter 1, Park initiated a military reform campaign with Kim and his group of young colonels after President Rhee’s resignation on April 26, 1960. See Han’guk kunsa hyôngmyôngsa, I [A History of the Korean Military Revolution], vol. 1 (Seoul: Kukka chaegôn ch’oegohoe¤i Han’guk kunsa hyôngmyôngsa p’yônch’n wiwônhoe,1962), 915; and Kim Hyung A, Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961–1979
(London: Routledge Curzon, 2004), 22–27.
12. Berger to Secretary of State, October 16, 1962, Box 127, NSF: Korea, JFKL.
13. Ibid.
14. The KCIA was founded on June 10, in accordance with the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction Law promulgated the same day.
15. Han’guk kunsa hyôngmyongsa, II [A History of the Korean Military Revolution], vol. 2 (Seoul: Kukka chaegôn ch’oegohoeui han’guk kunsa hyông-myôngsa p’yônch’anwiwônhoe, 1962), 610.
16. Marshall Green [the U.S. deputy chief of mission in Seoul] to Secretary of State, June 3, 1961, Box 128, NSC: Korea, JFKL.
17. Ibid.
18. Kim Ch’ung-sik, Namsan ¤i pujang-d¤l, 1 [The KCIA Directors, vol. 1]
(Seoul: Dong-A Ilbosa, 1992), 50.
19. Cho Yong-jung, “Tak’yument’ari: kukka chaegôn ch’oego hoe¤i” [A Documentary: The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction], Sindonga, May 1983.
20. Cho Kap-che, Naemudôm-e ch’im¤l paet’ôra: Kukka kaejo [Spit on My Grave], vol. 4:150.
21. The SCNR later announced that the Military Administration dismissed 35,684 persons out of a total bureaucracy of 241,877 during the period from June 20 to July 20. See Military Revolution in Korea, Secretariat of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, 1961, 31.
22. For details of the guidelines, see Cho Kap-che, Nae mudôm-e ch’im-¤l paet’ôra, 4:. 138.
23. Hankook Ilbo, May 22, 1961.
24. Embtel 1667 (section one of two), May 25, 1961, Box 128A, NSF: Korea, JFKL.
25. As the youngest ever director-general of the MoF’s elite Financial Management Bureau (1959–1960), Kim Chông-ryôm was hand-picked as the MoF
vice minister soon after the disastrous currency conversion reform of 1962.
Notes to Pages 93–95
661
He was to become vice minister of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) in 1964, the MoF minister in 1966, the MCI minister in 1967, and the chief of staff to the president in 1968.
26. O Wôn-ch’ôl eventually moved to the MCI as bureau director and then assistant vice minister (1961–1971). He was to become one of the architects of heavy and chemical industrialization as second senior economic secretary to the president during the yushin regime (1972–1979).
27. Kim Hak-ryôl was the holder of the highest scores in the civil service examination of 1950. He transferred from the MoF’s Taxation Bureau to the newly established Economic Planning Board to head its Budget Bureau in July 1961.
Reportedly a “tutor” to Park on economic issues, Kim Hak-ryôl was promoted to EPB vice minister (1962–1966) to play a key role in revising the first FYEDP and preparing the second (1967–1971). In 1966 Park promoted Kim Hak-ryôl to the post of finance minister before he was appointed senior economic secretary to the president, serving from 1966 to 1969. He rose to deputy prime minister and EPB minister (1969–1972).
28. This new mode of merit-based recruitment and promotion was later given further impetus by the introduction of the National Civil Service Law in 1963.
Kim Kyông-nak, “Kunsa chôngbu insa haengjông kaehyok p’yông’ga” [Assessment of the Personnel Administration Reform under the Military Government] (MA thesis, Seoul National University, 1968), 59–62.
29. During this period, Kim worked outside both the MoF and the MCI twice. In June 1963, he served for about nine months as a member of the South Korean delegation appointed to negotiate with the Japanese government on normalization. Kim was out of work for about eleven months, however, from September 1966 when he resigned from the MoF as its minister until October 1967 when he was appointed minister of commerce and industry.
30. Park Chung Hee, Our Nation’s Path (Seoul: Hollym Corporation, 1970), 201.
First published as Uri minjok uinagial-gil [Our Nation’s Path] (Seoul: Dong A ch’ulp’absa, 1962).
31. The illicit profiteering by the chaebol was one of the major issues in the masses’ call for an anticorruption campaign immediately after the April Student Revolution in 1960, and thus the interim government under Hô Chông
passed a law in the National Assembly in May of the same year to punish those “illicit profiteers.” See “Pujông ch’ukjaeja ch’ôri chônmalsô” [The Final Report on the Prosecution of Illicit Profiteers], Sindonga, December 1964, 158–177.
32. Embtel 530, September 29, 1961, Box 128, NSF: Federation of Korean Industries Korea, JFKL; Chônkyôngryôn 40-nyônsa, sanggwon [A Forty-Year History of the Federation of Korean Industries], vol. 1 (Seoul: Chônkyôngryôn 40-nyônsa p’yônch’an wiwônhoe, 2001), 207.
33. Yi, in fact, was picked up by a KCIA agent from the airport. Yi Pyông-ch’ôl, Hoamjajôn [Yi Pyông-ch’ôl’s Autobiography] (Seoul: JoongAng Ilbosa, 1986), 110–112. “Hoam” is Yi’s penname.
34. Chônkyôngryôn 40-nyônsa [A 40-Year History of the Federation of Korean
Notes to Pages 95–101
662
Industries], 1:207; O Wôn-ch’ôl, Han’gukhyông kyôngje kônsôl: enjiniôring ôp’¤roch’i [Korean-Style Economic Development: An Engineering Approach], vol. 1 (Seoul: Kia kyôngje yôn’guso, 1996), 19.
35. Cited in Ambassador Berger’s report to Secretary of State, September 29, 1961, Box 128, NSF: Korea, JFKL.
36. Chônkyôngryôn 40-nyônsa [A 40-Year History of the Federation of Korean Industries], 1:207; Cho Kap-che, Nae mudôm-e ch’im-¤l paet’ôra [Spit on My Grave], vol. 4:192–193.
37. Embtel 530, September 29, 1961, Box 128, NSF: Korea, JFKL.
38. Ibid.
39. The immediate predecessor to the FKI was originally established under the Chang Myôn administration on December 13, 1960.
40. For this new arrangement, the Special Measure for the Control of Illicit Profiteering was revised twice, on October 26 and November 20, 1961.
41. Kim Chin-hyôn, “Pujông ch’ukjaeja ch’ôri chônmalsô” [The Final Report on the Prosecution of Illicit Profiteers], 172–173.
42. In his determination to protect Yi Chu-il, Park had Yi accompany him on his official visit to Washington in November of that year.
43. Cho Kap-je, Nae mudôm-e ch’im-¤l paet’ôra: Kukka kaej [Spit on My Grave], vol. 4:257.
Park Chung Hee Era Page 94
