[Kim Hak-ryôl’s Leadership Style: The Groundbreaker of Economic Planning], in Chônhwan sidae-¤i haengjôngga: Han’gukhyông chidojaron [Public Entrepreneur in a Time of Turbulence: A Leadership Model in Korea], ed. Yi Chong-pôm (Seoul: Nanam, 1994), 43, 53.
54. Cho Kap-che, Nae mudôm-e ch’im-¤l paet’ôra 3: hyôngmyông chônya [Spit on My Grave ), 3:136, and Nae mudôm-e ch’im-¤l paet’ôra 6: maengho-n¤n kanda [Spit on My Grave, vol. 6: The Tiger Corps Is Going to Vietnam]
(Seoul: Chosun Ilbosa, 2001), 46.
55. Yôm Chae-ho, “Kwahak kisul-¤i chôndosa: Ch’oe Hyông-sôpron” [A Preacher of Science and Technology: Ch’oi Hyông-sôp’s Leadership Style], in Chônhwan sidae-¤i haengjôngga [Public Entrepreneur in a Time of Turbulence], ed.
Yi Chong-pôm, 104–132.
56. Ch’oe Sông-mo, “Seoul-¤i s¤k’ai rain-¤l pakkun chôngnyôl-¤i haengjôngga: Kim Hyôn-okron” [The Passionate Administrator Who Changed the Skyline of Seoul: Kim Hyôn-ok’s Leadership Style], in Chônhwan sidae-¤i haengjôngga
[Public Entrepreneur in a Time of Turbulence], ed. Yi Chong-pôm, 60–101.
57. Cho Kap-che, Nae mudôm-e ch’im-¤l paet’ôra 4: Kukka kaejo [Spit on My Grave, vol. 4: National Reconstruction] (Seoul: Chosun Ilbosa, 1999), 47, 107; and Nae mudôm-e ch’im-¤l paet’, 7:20–27.
58. Kim Chông-ryôm, Han’guk kyôngje chôngch’aek 30nyônsa: Kim Chông-
Notes to Pages 161–171
675
ryôm hoegorok [A Thirty-year History of Korea’s Economic Policy: The Recollections of Kim Chông-ryôm], 238, 252.
59. Ibid., 239–243.
60. Ibid., 256–257, 263–268, 273.
61. See O Wôn-ch’ôl, Han’gukhyông kyôngje kônsôl: enjiniôring ôp’¤roch’i 3
[Korean-style Economic Development: An Engineering Approach], 3:259–
279, and Kim Chông-ryôm, Han’guk kyôngje chôngch’aek 30nyônsa: Kim Chông-nyôm hoegorok [A Thirty-year History of Korea’s Economic Policy: The Recollections of Kim Chông-nyôm], 322–323.
62. Interview with Kim Chông-ryôm.
63. Kim Young-sam, Kim Young-sam hoegorok 2: minjuju¤i-r¤l wihan na-¤i t’ujaeng [The Recollections of Kim Young-sam, vol. 2: My Struggle for Democracy], 82–88.
64. Korea National Statistical Office.
65. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: Free Press of Glen Co., 1961).
66. See Chapter 12 below.
67. Kim Young-sam, Kim Young-sam hoegorok [The Recollections of Kim Young-sam], 2:135–161.
68. Ibid., 159.
69. Yi Sang-u, Kwollyôk-¤i mollak: yushingwôllyôk-e chôhanghan panch’eje min gwôn undongsa [The Demise of the Powerful: The History of the Antisystem Human Rights Movements against the Yushin] (Seoul: Dong-A Ilbosa, 1987).
6. The Armed Forces
1. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 203–210, 225–233. Also see Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 13.
2. Concerning the relationship between professionalism and political intervention by the military, see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960).
3. For detailed description of factions and power struggles in the South Korean military, see Han Yong-wôn, Han’guk-¤i kunbujôngch’i [Military Rule of Korea] (Seoul: Taewangsa, 1993), 222–255; Kang Ch’ang-sông, Ilbon/Hanguk kunbôl jôngch’i [Japan/Korea Politics of Military Factions] (Seoul: Haedong munhwasa, 1991), 331–356.
4. Kim Chae-hong, Kun: chôngch’ijanggyo-wa p’okt’anju [Military 1: Politicized Military Officers and Boiler-makers] (Seoul: Dong-A Ilbosa, 1994), 226–
227.
5. Even chiefs of staff did not attend the meeting where President Park deliber-ated on the promotion of generals. See Kim Sôk-ya and Kodani Hidesiro, (Sillok) Park Chung Hee-wa Kim Chong-p’il: : han’guk hyôndaejôngchi’isa
Notes to Pages 171–176
676
(True Record) [Park Chung Hee and Kim Chong-p’il] (Seoul: P’¤rojekt’¤ 409, 1997), 70.
6. Chông Ch’ang-yông, Pukhan kyôngje ch’eje-¤i kaebanghwa yoin: punsôkkwa chônmang [Factors Inducing Open Economy for North Korea: Analysis and Prospects] (Seoul: ROK Unification Board, 1985).
7. Ch’oe Ch’ang-gyu, Haebang 30nyônsa 4: Chesam gonghwaguk [History of Thirty Years since Emancipation, vol. 4: The Third Republic] (Seoul: Sôngmun’gak, 1976), 248–249.
8. These soldiers were eventually court-martialed and found guilty. Yi Sang-u, Park chônggwôn 18nyôn: k¤ kwôllyôk-¤i naemak [Eighteen Years of Park’s Regime: Secrets of its Power] (Seoul: Dong-A Ilbosa, 1986), 270–273.
9. Kim Ch’ung-sik, Namsan-¤i pujangd¤l [The KCIA Directors], 3rd ed., vol. 1
(Seoul: Dong-A Ilbosa, 1992), 103–106.
10. Kôn’gun 50nyônsa [Fifty Years of Armed Forces Building] (Seoul: Kukbang kunsa yôn’guso, 1998), 204–205. Also see Han Yong-wôn, Han’guk-¤i kunbujôngch’i [Military Rule of Korea], 294.
11. Kim Hyông-uk and Pak Sa-wôl, Kim Hyông-uk hoegorok 2: han’guk chungang chôngbobu [The Recollections of Kim Hyông-uk, vol. 2: The Korea Central Intelligence Agency] (Seoul: Ach’im, 1985), 153–154.
12. For the details of the Brown Memorandum, refer to U.S. Congress, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Organization, Investigation on Korean-American Relations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1978).
13. Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: Norton & Company, 1997), 321.
14. Ch’oe Ch’ang-gyu, Haebang 30nyônsa [History of Thirty Years since Emancipation], 4:423. At their summit in Honolulu on April 17, 1968, Park and Johnson agreed to regular bilateral meetings between their defense ministers, the first of which was held on May 27–28, 1968. The meeting was enlarged to become the Security Consultative Council in 1971. See ROK Ministry of National Defense, Kukbang paeksô [Defense White Paper], 1991–1992 (Ministry of National Defense, 1992), 188–193.
15. See Public Relations Association of Korea, A Quarter Century of North Korean Provocations (Seoul: Public Relations Association of Korea, 1974), 64–
70; ROK Ministry of National Defense, Kukbang paeksô [Defense White Paper], 429–436.
16. Ch’oe Ch’ang-gyu, Haebang 30nyônsa [History of Thirty Years since Emancipation], 4:419–420.
17. Third Military Academy of the ROK Army, Yukkun chesamsagwanhakkyo samsimnyônsa [Thirty-Year History of the Third Military Academy]
(Yôngch’ôn: Third Military Academy, 1998), 24–27.
18. Kôn’gun 50nyônsa [Fifty Years of Armed Forces Building], 241–243.
19. North Korea’s “Four Military Principles” called for the arming of all North Koreans, the development of all soldiers into military leaders, the fortification of all the land of North Korea, and the modernization of weapons. See Yu Wan-sik, Kim Il Sung chuch’e sasang-¤i hyôngsông kwajông yôn’gu [A Study
Notes to Pages 176–180
677
of the Formation Process of Kim Il Sung’s Chuch’e Ideology] (Seoul: Unification Board, 1977).
20. K¤ktong munje yôn’guso, ed., Pukkoe kunsa chôllyak charyojip [The Puppet North Korea’s Military Strategy: Documents] (Seoul: K¤ktongmunje yôn’guso, 1974), 327–329; Pukhanch’ongram [Encyclopedia on North Korea] (Seoul: Pukhan yôn’guso, 1983), 1468–1470.
21. In the joint communiqué on February 6, they agreed to U.S. military assistance to South Korea, South Korea’s exclusive responsibility for defending the DMZ, allied defense of South Korea in case of unprovoked war, and the establishment of an annual security consultative meeting. See Kôn’gun 50nyônsa
[Fifty Years of Armed Forces Building], 248.
22. Originally launched as the Research Agency for Defense Science, the agency was officially changed to ADD in 1971. Ibid., 292.
23. Han Yong-wôn, Han’guk-�
�i kunbujôngch’i [Military Rule of Korea], 298.
24. P’alsibnyôndae pangwi sanub-¤i kibon chôngch’aek [A Basic Policy for the Defense Industry in the 1980s] (Seoul: Kukbang kwanri yôn’guso, 1981), 17.
25. Kôn’gun 50nyônsa [Fifty Years of Armed Forces Building], 296.
26. According to former U.S. ambassador William Gleysteen, Park recognized that ROK-U.S. relations were endangered by his nuclear development program and tacitly agreed to renounce it. See William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Massive Entanglement and Marginal Influence (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999). Korean translation: Allyôjiji an-¤n yôksa, trans. Hwang Chông-il (Seoul: JoongAng M&B, 1999), 41.
27. Kôn’gun 50nyônsa [Fifty Years of Armed Forces Building], 293–296, 303–
305.
28. The Nike-Hercules was originally a surface-to-air missile, but the Agency for Defense Development converted it into a surface-to-surface missile. The South Korean government had tried to improve its range and guidance system, but had been constrained by technological dependence on the United States.
See Yi Sông-su, “Mugi ijôn-¤i kukchejôngch’ihak: han’guk-¤i kyông’u-r¤l chungsim-¤ro” [The International Politics of Arms Transfers: A Case of Korea] (MA dissertation, Seoul National University, 1986), 136.
29. Kim Chông-ryôm, A! Park Chung Hee: Kim Chông-ryôm chôngch’i hoegorok
[Ah! Park Chung Hee: Kim Chông-nyôm’s reflections on politics] (Seoul: JoongAng M&B, 1997), 305.
30. Kim Chae-hong, Kun1: chôngch’ijanggyo-wa p’okt’anju [Military 1: Politicized Military Officers and Boiler-makers], 364.
31. Kôn’gun 50nyônsa [Fifty Years of Armed Forces Building], 275–280.
32. See ROK Ministry of National Defense, Kukbang paeksô [Defense White Paper], 1991–1992, 191–192.
33. Yu In-t’aek, Hanbando kunsamunje-¤i ihae [Understanding Military Affairs on the Korean Peninsula] (Seoul: Pômmunsa, 1996), 40–45.
34. Peacetime operational control was returned to the ROK armed forces on December 1, 1994. Ministry of National Defense, ROK-US Alliance and USFK
(Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2003), 53.
Notes to Pages 182–188
678
35. Kim Hyông-uk and Pak Sa-wôl, Kim Hyông-uk hoegorok 2 [The Recollections of Kim Hyông-uk], 2: 116–123, and 123–128.
36. Kim Sôk-ya and Kodani Hidesiro, (Sillok) Park Chung Hee-wa Kim Chong-p’il: han’guk hyôndaejôngchi’isa [(True Record) Park Chung Hee and Kim Chong-p’il] (Seoul: P’¤rojekt’¤ 409, 1997).
37. Kim Hyông-uk and Pak Sa-wôl, Kim Hyông-uk hoegorok [The Recollections of Kim Hyông-uk], 2:157–158.
38. Kang Ch’ang-sông, Ilbon/Han’guk kunbôl’jôngch’i [Japan/Korea Politics of Military Factions], 360; Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968). Korean translation: Soyongdoli-¤i Han’guk chôngch’i, translated by Pak Haeng-ung and Yi Chong-sam (Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2000), 502–503.
39. Kang Ch’ang-sông, Ilbon/Hanguk kunbôljôngch’i [Japan/Korea Politics of Military Factions], 358.
40. Kim Chae-hong, Kun: chôngch’ijanggyo-wa p’okt’anju [Military 1: Politicized Military Officers and Boiler-makers], 281–285.
41. Kim Chin, Ch’ôngwadae pisôsil [Presidential Secretariat of the Blue House]
(Seoul: JoongAng M&B, 1993), 417.
42. Kang Ch’ang-sông, Ilbon/Hanguk kunbôljôngch’i [Japan/Korea Politics of Military Factions], 364–365.
43. Ch’oe Ch’ang-gyu, Haebang 30nyônsa [History of Thirty Years since Emancipation], 4:500–502.
44. Kim Ch’ung-sik, Namsan-¤i pujangd¤l [The KCIA Directors], 1:329.
45. See Korea Military Academy, Armed Forces and National Development (Seoul: KMA, 1981), 158, table 5–3. For a time-series comparison, see C. I.
Eugene Kim, “The Value Congruity between ROK Civilian and Former Military Party Elites,” Asian Survey 18 (1978): 840.
46. The Gang of Four included Kim Sông-gon (chairman, Central Committee of the DRP), Kil Chae-ho (DRP secretary-general), Paek Nam-ôk (DRP chairman), and Kim Chin-man (chairman, Financial Committee of DRP).
47. For the full text of the Proclamation of the State of National Emergency, see Chosun Ilbo (December 7, 1971). Kim Sông-jin, presidential press assistant, said, “The emergency shall continue until the threat from North Korea disappears.”
48. See Park Chung Hee’s Kukka Pisang Satae Sônôn [Special Statement on the Proclamation of the State of National Emergency], as reported in Chosun Ilbo, December 7, 1971.
49. For the full text of Park’s official letter to the chairman of the National Assembly to urge for the passage of the Special Law for Defending the State, see Chosun Ilbo, December 24, 1971.
50. Kim Chae-hong, Kunbu-wa kwôllyôk: 6 kong kunbu-¤i inmaek [The Military and Political Power] (Seoul: Nanam, 1992), 257–258.
51. No Ka-wôn, Ch’ôngwadae kyônghosil 2 [Presidential Security Service of the Blue House, vol. 2] (Seoul: Wôlgan mal, 1994), 140–156.
52. Kim Hyông-uk and Pak Sa-wôl, Kim Hyông-uk hoegorok 3: Park Chung Hee
Notes to Pages 189–195
679
wangjo-¤i pihwa [The Recollections of Kim Hyông-uk, vol. 3: The Secrets of Park Chung Hee’s Dynasty] (Seoul: Ach’im, 1985), 134–137.
53. See ibid., 3:165–167.
54. See No Ka-wôn, Ch’ôngwadae kyônghosil 2 [Presidential Security Service of the Blue House], 2:207.
55. Kim Chin, Ch’ôngwadae pisôsil [Presidential Secretariat of the Blue House], 38–39.
56. Kang Ch’ang-sông, Ilbon/Hanguk kunbôljôngch’i [Japan/Korea Politics of Military Factions], 372–378.
57. Kim Chin, Ch’ôngwadae pisôsil [Presidential Secretariat of the Blue House], 12–13.
58. See KMA, Armed Forces and National Development, 154–161.
59. The Yushin Junior Officials numbered a total of 784 over eleven years. Among these officers, 85 were from the navy and the air force; 89.2 percent were from the Korea Military Academy (KMA). See KMA, Yukkun sagwan hakkyo 50nyônsa [Fifty Years of the KMA] (Seoul: KMA, 2000), 872–890.
60. While in the army as a student soldier during the Korean War, Ch’a applied to enter the eleventh class of the KMA but failed. He subsequently enlisted in the Officer Candidate School (OCS). See Kim Chin, Ch’ôngwadae pisôsil [Presidential Secretariat of the Blue House], 105.
61. Ch’a Chi-ch’ôl’s base of power was the Committee for Presidential Security, which he organized with the Capital Garrison commander, the commissioner general of the national police headquarters, the mayor of Seoul, and some cabinet ministers as members. See Kim Chae-hong, Kun 2: haekkaebal k¤kpijakchôn [The Military, vol. 2: Secret Development of Nuclear Program]
(Seoul: Dong-A Ilbosa, 1994), 45–46.
62. Kim Chin, Ch’ôngwadae pisôsil [Presidential Secretariat of the Blue House], 112–113.
63. Chông S¤ng-hwa, 1212 sakkôn: Chông S¤ng-hwa-n¤n malhanda [The December 12 Incident: Chông S¤ng-hwa Says] (Seoul: Kkach’i, 1987), 144.
64. According to General Chông S¤ng-hwa, he became aware of the presidential decree that allowed the security chief to command the Capital Garrison force just after he got into office as the army chief of staff on February 1, 1979. General Chông and Ch’a Chi-ch’ôl were thenceforth in opposition. In March 1979, General Chông recommended to Park Chung Hee that he appoint General Chun Doo-hwan as the security commander. As his reason for the recommendation, he wrote: “To check Ch’a Chi-ch’ôl’s rampant abuse of power and to speak for the military’s interests.” See Chông S¤ng-hwa, 1212 sakkôn: Chông S¤ng-hwa-n¤n malhanda [The December 12 Incident: Chông S¤nghwa Says], 21–23.
65. Defense Security Command, Taegong 30nyônsa [Thirty Years of Counter-Communist Activities] (Seoul, 1978), 559.
66. Chosun Ilbo Wôlgan chosunbu, Pirok: han’guk-¤i taet’ongnyông [Con-fidential Records: Presidents of Korea] (Seoul: Chosun Ilbosa, 1993), 242–
/>
243.
Notes to Pages 196–210
680
67. Kim Chin, Ch’ôngwadae pisôsil [Presidential Secretariat of the Blue House], 105.
68. Kim Chae-hong, Park Chung Hee-¤i yusan [The Legacy of Park Chung Hee]
(Seoul: P’ur¤nsup, 1998), 47.
69. Kang Ch’ang-sông, Ilbon/Hanguk kunbôljôngch’i [Japan/Korea Politics of Military Factions], 370–381.
7. The Leviathan: Economic Bureaucracy under Park The research for this chapter has been supported by a Korea University Grant.
1. Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: State and Industrial Transformation (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1995), 12–14.
2. On neutral competence, see Hugh Heclo, “OMB and the Presidency: The Problem of ‘Neutral Competence,’” Public Interest 38 (Winter 1975): 82.
3. On patrimonialism, consult Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 344–347.
4. Yi Yông-sôk, JP wa HR: Kim Chong-p’il-gwa Yi Hu-rak-¤i chôngch’i pihwa
[JP and HR: The Untold Political Story of Kim Chong-p’il and Yi Hu-rak]
(Seoul: Wôn¤m ch’ulp’ansa, 1983).
5. Consult Park Chung Hee, Uri minjok-¤i nagal-gil [Our Nation’s Path] (Seoul: Dong-A ch’ulp’ansa, 1962), 39–40, 198–205.
6. For a general review of Rhee’s personnel administration, see Pak Tong-sô, Han’guk kwallyo chedo-¤i yôksajôk chôn’gae [The Historical Development of the Korean Bureaucratic System] (Seoul: Han’guk yôn’gu tosôgwan, 1961).
7. O Wôn-ch’ôl, Han’gukhyông kyôngje kônsôl: enjiniôring ôp’¤roch’i [Korean-style Economic Development: An Engineering Approach] (Seoul: Kia kyôngje yôn’guso, 1996), 3:209–257.
8. Russell Mardon, “The State and the Effective Control of Foreign Capital: The Case of South Korea,” World Politics 43, no.1 (October 1990): 115–122, 126–137.
9. See Hahn Been Lee, Korea: Time, Change and Administration (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968), and Pak Hok, “R¤ppo k¤myunggye-r¤l umjigin inmaek, han¤n inmaek-¤l chungsim-¤ro” [Report, The Driving Force behind the Financial Community: A Focus on Former Bank of Korea Human Networks], Dong-A Ilbosa, November 1980, 188–196. Also the interview with EPB vice minister Ch’a Kyun-h¤i (1962–1963).
Park Chung Hee Era Page 97
