43. The initial PRM-13 included removal of most of the nuclear weapons of the Second Division of the USFK. See Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg, 132. Kim Chông-ryôm, Han’guk kyôngje chôngch’aek 30nyônsa: Kim Chông-ryôm hoegorok
[A 30-Year History of Korea’s Economic Policy: The Recollections of Kim Chông-ryôm] (Seoul: JoongAng Ilbosa, 1995), 353–354; Lee and Sato, U.S.
Policy toward Japan and Korea, 111–112.
44. War History Compilation Committee, Kukpang choyakchip [The Treaties of National Defense], 769.
45. Lee and Sato, U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea, 114.
46. See Harold Brown, Thinking about National Security (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 125.
47. “Human Rights and Foreign Policy,” address by Secretary Vance, Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1977.
48. A. Glenn Mower, Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: The Carter and Reagan Experience (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 71.
49. Ibid., 73.
50. For Carter’s attempt at linking the issues of troop withdrawals and human rights, see KÃji Murata, DaitÃryÃno zasetsu [Frustration of a President] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1998), 127, and Victor Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 145.
51. Humphrey and Glenn, U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the ROK, 21.
52. See Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, 144 and n15, and Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 85.
53. William Gleysteen, former ambassador to South Korea, recalls the situation:
“Anti-Korean fireworks in Congress, magnified by Korea bashing in the media, must have encouraged Carter to think he would have support for or at least acquiescence to his position on the troop issue. In any event, he failed to consult Congress before making up his mind.” Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence, 22.
54. Mower, Human Rights and American Foreign Policy, 28.
55. Kim Chông-ryôm, A! Park Chung Hee [Ah! Park Chung Hee], 207.
56. Korea Herald, September 2, 1977.
57. Humphrey and Glenn, U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the ROK, 59–60; Department of State Bulletin, January 1978.
58. Brzezinski , Power and Principle, 126.
Notes to Pages 473–480
712
59. Mower, Human Rights and American Foreign Policy , 30.
60. Vance, Hard Choices, 32.
61. See Boettcher , Gifts of Deceit, 241–266.
62. See Investigations of Korean-American Relations, 124 n40; Kim Chông-ryôm, Han’guk kyôngje chôngch’aek 30nyônsa, 440.
63. See editorials of Korea Herald and Seoul Sinmun on April 5, 1978.
64. U.S. Congress Committee on Ethics, “Korean Lobby Probe Ended Lamely,”
Congressional Quarterly, 1980, 44.
65. Kim Hyông-uk and Pak Sa-wôl, Kim Hyông-uk Hoegorok 3: Park Chung Hee wangjo-¤i pihwa [The Recollections of Kim Hyông-uk, vol. 3: The Secrets of Park Chung Hee’s Dynasty, vol. 3 ] (Seoul: Munhwa Kwangjang, 1987), 253–
254.
66. Boettcher, Gifts of Deceit, 258–259.
67. Investigations of Korean-American Relations, part 7, Hearing, House of Representatives, 95th Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1978), 8.
68. See Hak-Kyu Sohn, Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea (London: Routledge, 1989), 116–117, and the Korea Herald, June 2, 1978.
69. Boettcher, Gifts of Deceit, 280–281.
70. “Korean Lobby Probe Ended Lamely,” Congressional Quarterly, 37.
71. In Fraser’s early human rights hearings in 1974, Yi Chae-hyôn testified that Ambassador Kim Tong-jo distributed money to U.S. congressmen.
72. Lee and Sato, U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea, 116.
73. Humphrey and Glenn, U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the ROK, 1–5, 40.
74. Lee and Sato, U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea, 118–119, and “Pullout Review in Order,” an editorial of the Korea Herald, April 11, 1978.
75. Vance, Hard Choices, 129.
76. See Lee and Sato, U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea, 119–120, and Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, 153.
77. See abstract of Statement by President Carter, Department of State Bulletin, April 1978.
78. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 101–102.
79. Brown stated that from 1970 to 1977, the number of North Korean ground troops increased by about 30 percent, and tank and artillery inventory almost doubled. See Brown, Thinking about National Security, 123.
80. See Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg, 140–141, and also refer to James V. Young,
“70nyôndae 3 dae sagôn makhu pisa” [Hidden History of Three Key Incidents of the 1970s], Wôlgan Chosun [Monthly Chosun], 1995.
81. Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg, 144.
82. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence, 29.
83. Lee and Sato, U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea, 121.
84. “East Asia: FY 1980 Assistance Proposals,” Department of State Bulletin, April 1979.
85. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence, 44; and Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas.
86. See Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence, 48, and Vance, Hard Choices, 130.
Notes to Pages 480–488
713
87. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence, 47–48, and Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 106–107.
88. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence, 48–49; War History Compilation Committee, Kukpang choyakchip, 779.
89. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 127–128.
90. For Carter doctrine, see Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 426–469, and Robert Schulzinger, U.S. Diplomacy since 1900, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 332.
17. The Search for Deterrence: Park’s Nuclear Option 1. JoongAng Ilbo, November 3, 1997.
2. See the “Agreement for Cooperation between Governments of the Republic of Korea and the United States Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy,” Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST), Wônjaryôk kwan’gye pômnyôngjip [A Collection of Laws and Regulations of Atomic Energy]
(Seoul: MoST, 1977), 809–860. Quoted in Young-Sun Ha, Nuclear Proliferation: World Order and Korea (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1983), 82.
3. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1997), 13.
4. See also Park’s speech celebrating National Military Day on October 1, 1970, available online at http://www.516.co.kr/library/sp/f-speech.htm.
5. Taik-young Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power (London: Routledge, 1999), 80.
6. See Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 82.
7. Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, various issues.
8. JoongAng Ilbo, November 3, 1997.
9. See Kang Yong-wôn, “Pak K¤n-hye Ch¤ngôn: Abôji¤i Chuk¤mgwa Haekkabal” [Pak K¤n-hye’s Testimony: Father’s Death and Nuclear Development”], Monthly Chosun, April 1994, 228–229.
10. Ch’oe Hyông-sôp had served as the director of KAERI twice, in 1962–1963
and 1964–1966. When he was appointed the minister of science and technology in June 1971, Ch’oe initiated a fifteen-year Nuclear Power Development Plan. He was to serve in that position for seven and half years. Yun Yong-gu was appointed as the director of KAERI in August 1971, and served until March 1978.
11. Even to the ADD researchers, Park tried not to issue an explicit order for the development of nuclear weapons, lest the United States trace the program to the Blue House and accuse it of undermining the NPT regime. A former ADD
researcher, in charge of nuclear weapons design between April 1971 and early 1975, reportedly said that when he met Park on the occasion of his appointment, Park emphasized, “we need to develop superweapons, and this has to be done secretly” (italics added). Although the ADD researcher recollected that the term “superweapons” generally referred t
o chemical weapons among
Notes to Pages 488–493
714
South Korean scientists, he thought Park meant to say the development of nuclear weapons. See JoongAng Ilbo, November 10, 1997.
12. There exist different accounts on Park’s pursuit of nuclear development. On the basis of interview with a high-ranking South Korean official, a U.S. congressional report argues that it was the Weapons Exploitation Committee (WEC), established within the Blue House, that voted unanimously to proceed with the project. By contrast, Seung-young Kim relies on his interview with former South Korean army generals to argue that it was the South Korean armed forces that raised the possibility of nuclear armament as an option to counter North Korea’s superior conventional military capabilities. See U.S.
House of Representatives , Investigations of Korean-American Relations, Report of the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1978), 80, and Jacques E. C. Hymans, Seung-Young Kim, and Henning Riecke, “To Go or Not to Go: South and North Korea’s Nuclear Decisions in Comparative Context,” Journal of East Asian Studies 1, no. 1 (February 2001), note 15.
13. KAERI, Han’guk wônjaryôk yôn’guso 40 nyônsa [Forty-year History of KAERI] (Seoul: KAERI, 1990), 55.
14. Interview with a key nuclear engineer in the special project team, November 2000.
15. JoongAng Ilbo, November 13, 1997. Ku Sang-hoe, who was in charge of missile development, recounted the complete story of South Korean missile development in Sindonga, from February to April 1999.
16. Saint-Gobain Technique Nouvelle and CERCA agreed to provide KAERI with $46 million and $2.6 million in commercial loans, respectively. See JoongAng Ilbo, November 6, 1997.
17. The bilateral Agreement for Cooperation with the United States for the peaceful use of atomic energy explicitly prohibited any use of American-supplied material for military purposes. See Article X(2), Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. Signed November 24, 1972; entered into force March 19, 1973. 24 UST 775; TIAS.
7583. Quoted in Reiss, Without the Bomb, 85, 293.
18. Cable from U.S. Ambassador Richard L. Sneider to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, “Non-proliferation Treaty,” February 26, 1975.
19. Telegram from the State Secretary to Embassy Seoul, “ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” March 4, 1975, MLF MR Case no. 94–146, Document no. 49.
20. See the U.S. Energy Research and Development Agency’s report of April 1977
as cited in U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Nuclear Proliferation Factbook, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1980), 325.
21. JoongAng Ilbo, November 3, 1997.
22. See Ku Sang-hoe, “A Retrospective of Dr. Ku Sang-hoe, a Living Witness of Korean Missile Development,” Sindonga, February, March, and April, 1999.
23. Reiss, Without the Bomb, 91.
Notes to Pages 494–500
715
24. Ku Sang-hoe, “A Retrospective.”
25. O Wôn-ch’ôl, “Chun Doo-hwan and the U.S. Intervention in the Development of Ballistic Missiles,” Sindonga, January 1996, 395–396.
26. Ibid., 397.
27. Ibid., 399–400.
28. Ibid., 401. Also see telegram from Embassy Seoul to the State Secretary,
“Lockheed Proposals for ROK,” October 28, 1974.
29. George S. Springteen, “Sale of Rocket Propulsion Technology to South Korea,” a Memorandum for Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, the White House, February 4, 1975, 3.
30. JoongAng Ilbo, May 3, 1997.
31. Telegram from Embassy Seoul to the State Secretary, “Lockeed Proposals for ROK,” October 28, 1974, MLF MR Case No. 94–146, Document no. 52.
32. Telegram from the State Secretary to Embassy Seoul, “ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” December 11, 1974, MLF MR Case no. 94–
146, Document no. 47.
33. Telegram from the State Secretary to Embassy Seoul, “ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” March 4, 1975, MLF MR Case no. 94–146, Document no. 49.
34. Telegram from Embassy Seoul to the State Secretary, “ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” March 12, 1975, MLF MR Case no. 94–
146, Document No. 28.
35. Telegram from Embassy Seoul to the State Secretary, “Meeting with President Park: Missile Strategy,” May 1, 1975, MLF MR Case no. 94–146, Document no. 54.
36. Robert S. Ingersoll, Acting Secretary, “Approach to South Korea on Reprocessing,” A Memorandum to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, July 2, 1975, MLF MR Case no. 94–146, Document no. 14.
37. At first, France was reluctant to cooperate with the United States due to its economic interests in the nuclear deal with South Korea. However, France eventually renegotiated with South Korea to include a clause on the non-replication of equipment for a period of twenty years. South Korea accepted this condition and on September 22, 1975, the safeguards agreement among the IAEA, France, and South Korea entered into force. See Reiss, Without the Bomb, 92.
38. At that time, South Korea was seeking a U.S. Export-Import Bank loan of $132 million and an additional commercial loan of $117 million guaranteed by the U.S. government for the construction of the Kori-2 reactor.
39. The idea of building an East Asian regional reprocessing plant was first mentioned in this document without much detail. However, this idea never materialized.
40. Reiss, Without the Bomb, 92.
41. Telegram from Embassy Seoul to the State Secretary, “ROKG Nuclear Reprocessing,” October 31, 1975, MLF MR Case no. 94–146, Document No. 31.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
Notes to Pages 500–507
716
44. Telegram from Embassy Seoul to the State Secretary (immediate), “ROK Nuclear Reprocessing,” December 10, 1975, MLF MR Case no. 94–146, Document no. 36.
45. Telegram from Embassy Seoul to the State Secretary (immediate), “ROK Nuclear Reprocessing,” December 16, 1975, MLF MR Case no. 94–146, Document no. 40.
46. Ibid.
47. Telegram from Embassy Seoul to the State Secretary (immediate), “ROK Nuclear Reprocessing,” January 5, 1976, MLF MR Case no. 94–146, Document no. 42.
48. Telegram from Embassy Seoul to the State Secretary (immediate), “ROK Nuclear Reprocessing,” January 14, 1976, MLF MR Case no. 94–146, Document no. 43.
49. Telegram from State Department to Embassy Seoul, “ROK Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plans,” June 30, 1975, MLF MR Case no. 94–146, Document no.
13.
50. Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea (Lexington: Macmillan, 1991), 35.
51. Victor Cha at Georgetown University provided me with this excellent comment.
52. According to O, Park never intended to use the would-be nuclear weapons against North Korea. Private conversation with O, November 18, 2009.
53. Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg, xxxix.
54. Such an argument of nuclear optimism is set forth by Kenneth N. Waltz in
“Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 731–745. This line of nuclear optimism is contrasted to the nuclear pessimism addressed mainly by Scott C. Sagan and Peter D. Feaver. For the details of the debate, see David J. Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97): 87–119; and Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N.
Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995).
55. Consult Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter, 1996/
97): 54–86, for such a view.
56. See Telegram from Embassy Seoul to the State Secretary
, “ROKG Nuclear Reprocessing,” October 31, 1975, NLF MR Case no. 94–146, Document no. 31.
57. Reiss, Without the Bomb, 91.
58. For this argument, the author owes special thanks to Victor Cha of Georgetown University.
59. Telegram from State Department to Embassy Seoul, “Non-proliferation Treaty,” February 26, 1975, MLF MR Case no. 96–146, Document no. 53.
60. Telegram from the State Secretary to Embassy Seoul, “ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” March 4, 1975, MLF MR Case no. 94–146, Document no. 49.
Notes to Pages 507–513
717
61. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 71.
62. Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: President Park Chung Hee, Senior Protocol Secretary Ch’oe Kwan-su, Secretary of Defense James R.
Schlesinger, and Ambassador Richard L. Sneider, MR 94–143, no. 19.
63. Reiss, Without the Bomb, 104–105.
64. Kang Yong-wôn, “Pak K¤n-hye Ch¤ngôn” [Pak K¤n-hye’s Testimony], 228–
229.
65. Cho Ch’ol-ho, “Park Chung Hee Haekchongch’aek-kwa 1970nyôndae huban hanmigwangye” [Park’s Nuclear Policy and the U.S.-Korea Relations in the late 1970s], paper presented at the Winter Conference of the Korean Association of International Studies, 2002.
66. O Wôn-ch’ôl, “A Brutal Fight between Park and Carter,” Sindonga, November 1974, 426.
67. Ibid., 430.
68. JoongAng Ilbo, November 10, 1997.
69. Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Secure telephone conversation with Secretary Harold Brown on Wednesday, January 26, 1977.
70. O Wôn-ch’ôl, “Chun Doo-hwan and the U.S. Intervention in the Development of Ballistic Missiles.”
71. Etel Solingen has a similar view. Too much was at stake for Park to continue his nuclear program after all. See Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 82–99.
18. Nation Rebuilders: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Lee Kuan Yew, Deng Xiaoping, and Park Chung Hee 1. For Atatürk and Turkey, see Andrew Mango, Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey (Overlook Press, 1999); Lord Kinross, Atatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey (Quill, 1964); Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire (Quill, 1979); Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbuden, eds., Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State (C. Hurst and Co., 1981).
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