by Anil Jaggia
* * *
On board IC 814
By the evening it was horrible. There was no water in the plane. The children who were on board cried continuously, asking for water, but had to be given beer instead. Even beer was a luxury though. If one of the terrorists had destroyed the alcoholic beverage in his zeal, God knows what would have happened.
I had heard that the hijackers had made known their demands. They wanted Kashmir to be made part of Pakistan, $200 million in cash, and the release of 35 Mujahideen jailed in India. The negotiator asked: “Why, Kashmir? Why not the whole of India? Then you will not have any more trouble; you can rule over the whole country then.”
I overheard the hijackers saying the Indian government had been informed that the hijackers would set free 19 hostages for every jailed terrorist. They then intended to fly to some other destination from where they would let India know what their next demand was.
All the passengers were advised to remain seated as a delegation comprising Indian and foreign diplomats would be coming to inspect the aircraft. The hostages were instructed not to speak in their presence. A sinking feeling settled over me.
Later, the stillness of the night was pierced by a scream that jerked awake the dozing passengers. The hijackers remained on full alert as the screaming continued. Bhola ran up and down the aisle looking for Burger who had accidentally locked himself in the toilet. After ascertaining that it did not involve any mischief on behalf of the passengers, the toilet lock was released and Burger brought out.
At some point still later that night, I stepped out with Burger to supervise the toilet servicing of the aircraft. Near the tail of the Airbus was a jeep with a security officer. While Burger’s attention was elsewhere, the security officer signalled to me to come to the jeep. I could have easily slipped into the jeep and made a quick getaway. But that would have meant abandoning my colleagues and the passengers. I knew I could never do that. Besides, the hijackers could have got me back and killed me. Of course, there was also the slight chance that they were testing me, and this was part of their plan.
I just smiled at the officer and walked away.
* * *
New Delhi
The fax from Kandahar listing the demands, stepped up the pace of activities in Delhi. The CMG instructed the intelligence agencies to prepare a dossier of the names and their groups at the earliest. (See Annexure—Release of Following Terrorists Demanded by Hijackers.)
In New Delhi, Intelligence agencies took some time to search out the dossiers of the demanded militants, as well as identify the locations where they were being held. Teams of intelligence sleuths and security officials were dispatched for a fresh round of questioning with some of the militants who were lodged in various parts of the country—some at Kot Bhalwal jail in Jammu, others at Jodhpur, and yet others in Delhi’s Tihar. Special Secretary in the Home Ministry, M.B. Kaushal was asked to make available a brief on the affiliations of the militants demanded by the hijackers. Kaushal shuttled between Rajiv Gandhi Bhavan and North Block and prepared a dossier that gave credence to what many in the government hadn’t thought even twice about: a possible Pakistani hand.
Prabhat Kumar, with the Home, Foreign, Defence and Civil Aviation secretaries, and the chiefs of RAW, IB and NSG, sat down over the wish list. An overwhelming majority of these militants, 33 in fact, belonged to Pakistan. Some of them belonged to Harkat-ul-Ansar. “It looks like an ISI operation,” hazarded the Intelligence sleuth presenting the dossier. Most of those present nodded. CMG officials had little reason to be happy after the discovery that they knew who the hijackers might be.
The CMG listened with rapt attention as the dossiers on the others were read out. Among them was Mushtaq Zargar, a dreaded militant close to Azhar who, when confined in Delhi’s Tihar Jail, had been known by the nickname of Latram. The founder of Al-Umar, Zargar had ordered a ban on Maruti vehicles in Srinagar.
Home Minister Advani and External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh were briefed that evening on the findings. One look at the dossiers and they knew it would be a long and difficult night.
At a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security, the overwhelming view was to damn Pakistan and expose its role in the hijacking. The proposal received more backing after the Intelligence operatives in Kathmandu sent a report that reconstructed the events at Kathmandu and pointed that the hijackers had boarded the flight straight from a PIA flight. The following day, Jaswant Singh announced at a press conference that the militants whose release was demanded were Pakistani nationals, and had boarded the Indian Airlines flight from a PIA flight.
New Delhi’s strategy fumbled, and a war of words started between the two countries, with Pakistan accusing New Delhi of maligning Pakistan by stage-managing the hijacking. Even the contention that the hijackers boarded the IA flight straight off a PIA flight was denied by Nepal. There was a tactical error in the report—the PIA flight had arrived in the morning while the IA flight had left late in the evening, and the hijackers couldn’t have remained in the apron for so long. New Delhi had blundered. Obviously, someone at Kathmandu had not done his homework well. New Delhi’s effort to nail Pakistan was brushed aside by the US and other Western countries as a predictable South Block statement.
* * *
On board IC 814
At 10.30 at night, Red Cap came out of the cockpit. He looked at Sharan, Rajinder and me and said: “We may have to fly out tomorrow.”
“Why, what happened?” asked Captain Sharan.
“Nothing in particular. We want to go away from here.”
I interjected, “But negotiations are going on. Why do you want to go?”
“Aap ki sarkar hee aisi hai. (Your government is crazy). They think that they are the hijackers and we are the hostages. They believe just the opposite of what’s happening on the ground. How can this dialogue go on? How can these talks progress? You tell me? Take rest while you still can. Tomorrow morning you’ll have to fly out from Kandahar.”
I was extremely worried. I looked at the passengers who looked like they had all turned to stone. Sharan’s brow was dark with worry. What could we do?
The more important question was where the hijackers would make us fly. They had spoken about atrocities in Chechnya and Bosnia. Would we be asked to land there? My heart missed a few beats at the thought of being in the midst of fundamentalists there. During the war in Chechnya the previous year, the Chechens had surrounded some young Russian soldiers and flushed them out of their trenches. Those Russian boys were between 18 and 21 years old. The Chechen guerillas had then done something that could only be described as barbaric and medieval—they had crucified them. That the Russians extracted a heavy penalty and made the area Chechen-free was altogether a different story. The fact is, these fundamentalists were made of some devilish stuff. I didn’t want to land in that country.
I struggled to sleep, hoping that something—anything— would happen that night to prevent the flight taking off the next morning. Maybe Indian commandos would storm the aircraft... It was a desperate hope and the possibility seemed unlikely, given the active help the Afghans on the ground seemed to be providing the hijackers. But couldn’t the Indians in a huge parachute brigade take over the airport and its surroundings, and then storm the aircraft? Too risky and, judging the effect it would have on Indo-Afghan relations, extremely unlikely . . .
It was a long, sleepless night.
* * *
7
December 29, 1999
BLIND BATE
Among the passengers to be released was Dr Anita Joshi. I took the opportunity to speak to her. I gave her a message for my wife that everything was all right. But more important, she must inform the Indian negotiators or other officials that the hijackers most likely had a time bomb in a bag in the hold and could easily blow up the aircraft if they so chose. I hadn’t told her this earlier to prevent panic in the cabin.
Kandahar
The demand for the coffin of Sajjad Afghan
i brought the hardliners in the Taliban into prominence and they began to build pressure that the hijackers withdraw it. A meeting of Shura, the Taliban supreme council, was convened: it decided that the demand for the coffin and the payment of $200 million was un-Islamic and must be dropped. If they failed to do so, the hijackers would be forced to fly out of Kandahar. Mullah Omar instructed his Foreign Minister Muttawakil to step into the negotiations at this stage and he spoke to the chief hijacker from a separate room for about 30 minutes.
During the conversation, he reassured the hijackers and told them that they would put pressure on the Indian government to release the militants and ensure a safe passage for them. The hijacker remonstrated that he had information that the Indians were planning a storming operation with the help of the US, and that it would lead to bloodshed. Muttawakil assured him the Taliban would not allow any such operation: they would surround the aircraft with anti-aircraft guns and armoured vehicles to act as a deterrent, and their anti-aircraft guns around Kandahar had already been positioned to counter any attack. After an initial reluctance, the hijacker agreed. Muttawakil came out and told the Indians that he had persuaded them to scale down their demands. This was also conveyed to the press corps hungry for any information. The Taliban was playing its cards well and had ensured that they were able to play their double game without anyone raising a finger.
Katju now informed New Delhi of the latest position. He also told New Delhi the Taliban was taking an active part in the negotiations and had persuaded the hijackers to scale down their demands. This was exactly what Muttawakil wanted, and in New Delhi, Jaswant Singh again declared that the Taliban was cooperating with India in the negotiations.
* * *
On board IC 814
Time was without meaning. We had become so disoriented we didn’t know whether it was day or night. Meals had been infrequently supplied, and the window shutters were kept lowered inside the aircraft. The stench was horrible.
I had woken up with a hollow feeling in my stomach. I wished the night had never ended. The light of the morning made me realise how vulnerable we were to the threats of the hijackers. We were mere toys in their hands. I dreaded the thought of one of the hijackers summoning me to the cabin and ordering me to prepare the flight for take-off.
At 10.00 a.m. breakfast was served. We had bread and omelette and I managed to somehow gulp it down.
Some 15 minutes later, Red Cap came into the cabin and told us that the talks had resumed and the prospects of a deal looked good.
This was good news. Perhaps we were not to be blown up after all, our bodies scattered over some barren mountains.
Red Cap went back into the cockpit.
* * *
Kandahar
The Indian negotiators continued doggedly, once again asking for the release of women and children. “We have dropped two of our demands and now it is for your government to release all our brethren if they want these hostages back,” the chief hijacker reported. Doval dodged, “The government is working at it . . . there is some confusion about the release of the persons you have asked for and we are trying to locate them . . . We don’t even know what jails they are in. In India, not everything is under the jurisdiction of the central government, so it may take time.”
“We want your government to take a decision fast . . . or we will blow up the plane,” the hijacker riposted. Muttawakil who was in the room at the time told Doval, “We will provide you all help but you can’t force them and have bloodshed . . .This can’t go on forever. You have to take a decision fast.”
The negotiations, however, continued till late into the night. The hijackers were getting restless, and often threatened to blow the plane up. The negotiators even tried to weave an emotional bond with them: “Why are you doing this? There are other ways to fight for your cause . . . Doval said, “Your religion does not teach you this ... It is against the tenets of Islam to hijack innocent passengers.” “Just keep your mouth shut . . . You don’t teach us Islam, we know what we are doing,” the hijacker replied angrily. The negotiators immediately mellowed their stance. “We are simply stating that many of those on board are not well, and may even die. Do you want to take the blame if something happens to them? Why don’t you release them?” persuaded Doval.
“The blame will be on your government,” the hijacker responded. “We want to know fast what you have decided. It is a long time since we gave you the demands.”
It was becoming obvious that the hijackers were trained even in the field of warding off negotiators.
One of the negotiators later confessed that the hijackers snapped back whenever they realised that the negotiating team was beating around the bush. “Just give us the answers to what we are asking, don’t try and act smart with us . . . Keep your answers short and tell us if you have something new to say.”
However, the Indian negotiators managed to convince the hijackers that the Taliban cleaning staff should be brought in again to clean the toilets. After some initial reluctance, the hijackers agreed. “Okay, we will allow them but wait for our instructions.” A little later they asked the cleaners to be sent, and told the Taliban to send an ambulance to fetch a sick man. Simon Brara, who was suffering from cancer and not feeling well, was released for medical aid but later taken back to the aircraft.
During the course of the parleys, the negotiating team was feeling the pressure to secure the release of the militants demanded by the hijackers. Taliban Foreign Minister Muttawakil told the negotiators that they had to advise their government to act fast and take an early decision to release the militants. “Even the hostages are upset with your government,” he said. “Anil Khurana broke down and told me that the Indian government is not doing anything as no one is a minister’s son on board, otherwise half the Cabinet would have landed here,” he added. The negotiators were also worried that the hijackers may go on a suicidal mission, given their hardline stance, as the Intelligence agencies had also indicated. They were worried that if the hijackers’ demands were not met by the 31st, the aircraft would be blown up. The Taliban too was slowly hardening its stance and had refused New Delhi’s request for despatching a second relief aircraft to Kandahar with a fresh crew.
In New Delhi, the CMG informed the Prime Minister that the Intelligence agencies had reported that the hijackers were prepared to take off to another destination if their demands were not met—it could even be Tripoli or Khartoum. The PM’s crisis managers suggested that he should speak to some prominent Muslim leaders with links in these countries. This would also help in putting pressure on the Taliban through their sources in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Iran, as the head of the Organisation of Islamic Unity, wielded some influence over Islamic countries like Pakistan.
In Kandahar, the negotiators had been fighting a battle that seemed hard to win. They were working under severe constraints and pressure, had little to offer the hijackers, and were trying hard to buy time and restrain them hijackers from doing what they had been threatening: to blow up the plane. “Are you releasing them or not, tell us clearly,” the hijackers asked Doval. “We want to end the crisis soon, and our government is working 24 hours to try and find out how they can be released,” he replied. “In India, we have a system where the state in which the prisoner is lodged has to be taken into consultation before anyone can be released, and then there are a lot of difficulties that we face, as often the Chief Minister of the state will not agree.”
“That is your problem. We want our men released—all of them—tell your government to do whatever it has to if it wants to save these lives.”
The negotiators then came to specifics and said that there was some problem as many of those whose release had been sought were in jails in Kashmir, “You know the Chief Minister, Farooq Abdullah may not agree. He has been opposed to the idea of releasing any militant, but we are still trying . . . but there may be some delay.”
“Don’t tell us that. What happened when your government released milita
nts when Rubaiyya was kidnapped . . . Farooq Abdullah was the Chief Minister even then, but he had to obey the orders of the central government. He will do it now if the pressure is put,” the hijacker said. For the Indian negotiators, the precedent of Rubaiyya’s release seemed to haunt them. “Are you seriously worried about the lives of these people or not?” the chief asked them.
Well into the evening, the negotiators kept trying to make the hijackers see reason for a climbdown, but they seemed determined even at the end of the sixth day and showed no signs of fatigue.
Late that night, the negotiators told them that they were looking at legal formalities and releasing all of the militants would mean a long delay. “Can you wait for that long?” they asked. “We have told you that we don’t want to listen to all that . . . We don’t want to talk to you . . . We’ll blow up the plane, everyone will die and you will be responsible for all that,” the hijacker said, and the negotiations broke off.
Faced with a deadlock, the negotiators approached the Taliban who had been flexing their muscles. Muttawakil had declared earlier that if the Indians and the hijackers didn’t resolve the crisis, they would force the aircraft to leave. It was only after the US officials spoke to Maulvi Hakim Mujahid and told him to be patient that Muttawakil told the negotiators that he would ask the hijackers to be more reasonable, but that even the Indian government had to climb down from its rigid posture. The negotiators said they would get back to him, and Katju spoke to Jaswant Singh who explained that they were examining all the options before them.
* * *
On board IC 814
At 4.30 in the afternoon, Red Cap had announced over the public address system of the aircraft that as a gesture of goodwill, they had decided to release 15 passengers. The airport bus would be coming for them. He said that talks that morning had been successful and the Indian government was looking into the demands of the hijackers.
