by Anil Jaggia
Chapter One of the Plan is under the sub-head, ‘Introduction’ and details the necessity for the contingency plan: “Unlawful interference with Civil Aviation continues to be a worldwide phenomenon. India is no exception. With a view to ensuring safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel and the general public, it is essential to have a Contingency Plan so that there is no confusion as to the resppnsibility of different agencies should a situation arise.” Hijacking reigns supreme in the Contingency Plan, and the plan is to be activated if an Indian aircraft is hijacked in India or abroad, if a foreign registered aircraft is hijacked either within India or abroad and may land in one of the airports in India, or a foreign aircraft hijacked in some other country is expected to land in India.
The second chapter, dealing with the management of occurrences, details the three-tier structure that will be established in case of a hijacking. Right on top is the Crisis Management Group headed by the Cabinet Secretary, and is tasked to be the “apex body comprising senior officials of the government to deliberate on the problems arising out of the contingency such as involvement of another country, negotiations involving other countries, deployment of commandos and terms and strategy of negotiations. The group lays down broad guidelines of policy matters for the Central Committee and if need be, may obtain directions from the Cabinet,” according to 2.21 of the contingency manual. Under 2.24, “the CMG may keep the Army Chief, Air Force Chief, and Naval Chief (in case a naval base is affected) informed of the developments of the contingency,” it states.
What was done: The apex body met only at 6.00 p.m. in the evening, more than an hour after the crisis. The decision to deploy the commandos was given at 6.10 p.m. However, the NSG aircraft left IGI airport only at 8.04 p.m. when the hijacked aircraft had already taken off from Amritsar and landed at Lahore. The CMG is supposed to set broad guidelines for the Central Committee that coordinates the Aerodrome Committee. In the case of IC 814, the Central Committee was given no clear guidelines on how to stop the aircraft at Amritsar. The plan says, if need be, directions can be taken from the Cabinet. But the PM was informed of the crisis only when he arrived in Delhi, close to an hour after the hijacking, and a meeting of the Cabinet was called forty-eight hours into the crisis.
The three Service Chiefs felt completely left out and finally met the Prime Minister and lodged their protest at their non-inclusion and non-consultation by the CMG.
The plan states that the Central Committee that functioned from the Air Traffic Services Building in New Delhi is the executive authority responsible for dealing with the contingency of hijacking . . . “the CC is empowered to deal with the situation in all respects and take appropriate decisions on its own initiative. The CC is headed by the Director General of Civil Aviation. It shall be in constant contact with the CMG on the one hand and the concerned aerodrome committee on the other. It shall guide the Aerodrome Committee in conducting negotiations with the hijackers/terrorists in the light of the policy guidelines made by the CMG.” It also specifies that once the CC gets activated, it will be the official channel of communication between the CMG on one hand and the affected AC on the other
What was done: On the day IC-814 was hijacked, although the CC was in place by 6.00 p.m. no clear instructions were given by the Director General of Civil Aviation, H.S. Khola, Chairman of the CC, to the Aerodrome Committee at Amritsar. There was ambiguity as the AC was being given confusing messages and it was the CMG that was in touch with the AC. This resulted in the confusion of the aircraft almost being refuelled after a mysterious caller posing as a home ministry joint secretary asked for it to be urgently done.
Under the Contingency Plan, the Aerodrome Committee at Raja Sansi airport headed by Director V.S. Mulekar was to position crash fire tenders and ambulances at strategic points when the aircraft landed. The crash landing drill includes sending of fire tenders and ambulances to the aircraft by the officials of the airport. Besides, the Contingency Plan says that the Central Committee shall consider the situation and give such guidelines as may be necessary to the AC for strict compliance. However, it has some amount of ambiguity as it suggests when a situation is of extremely urgent nature which does not permit adequate time to consult the Central Committee, the AC shall handle the situation in the best possible manner.
What was done: When IC 814 landed in Amritsar, the crash landing drill was not observed by the District Commissioner, Amritsar, who is the Chairman of the AC, and Airport Director who is the Convenor, despite it being clearly stated on a board that hangs in the Amritsar control tower. The Airport Director V.S. Mulekar did not order the fire tenders and ambulances to follow the aircraft which could have been positioned near the aircraft when the aircraft landed, as they are part of the normal procedure and the hijackers could not have objected to their presence. These could have helped in blocking the way of the aircraft. Incidentally, Lahore airport used this drill when IC 814 landed at the airport. Investigations have revealed that a confidential report to the government has pointed out this lapse and that, had the crash drill been followed, the aircraft could have been stopped at Amritsar.
Another major bloomer was the fake caller J. Lai pretending to be a joint secretary from the Ministry of Home Affairs, ordering the Airport Director to have the aircraft refuelled. Even without the authorisation of the Central Committee, a bowser moved towards the aircraft after the Airport Director authorised refuelling. However, even before it could reach the aircraft, the CMG told the AC to stop it, and the bowser was stopped. This caused a panic reaction and led to the stabbing of Rupin Katyal who died later. It also points out that there was absolutely no coordination between the AC at the ground and the CMG and CC in New Delhi.
Under the Contingency Plan, the security guidelines for the AC state that it shall make arrangements for a cordon around the aircraft at a reasonable distance that does not provoke the hijackers. More importandy, it states that the police cordon would not close without the specific authority from the CC. It adds that under section 5.42 of the plan that, “Under no circumstances the AC/ police officers shall take any action to terminate the unlawful seizure of the aircraft without the clearance of the Central Committee.”
What was done: Investigations have revealed that the cordon was placed when the aircraft landed at the Raja Sansi airport. Punjab Police commandos had hidden themselves in the long grass around the runway. However, there were no instructions from the CC or the CMG as required by the contingency plan to take any action to stop the aircraft from taking off. It was at this point that CC did not follow the contingency plan and the AC did not act as it is not supposed to act on its own. There was a clear lack of coordination between the officials belonging to various agencies—while the airport officials including the Airport Director come under the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the police and the District Commissioner are under the state government. Besides, there were no regular meetings held in Amritsar of the AC prior to the hijacking, nor a contingency drill held that could have made coordination between these officials better. Investigations have revealed that in the report submitted to the government, it is pointed out that the control tower at that time was choking with officials from various agencies and nothing was done to regulate their entry, which created problems and was a clear security lapse.
The Contingency Plan states that there should be coordination between the CMG and CC at all times. However, even when the aircraft had taken off from Amritsar and landed at Lahore, the NSG aircraft took off from Delhi and landed at Amritsar. Besides, the plan states under section 4.10 that the ATC should direct the aircraft to an isolated parking bay away from the main runway and the main terminal building, and mentions that, “the main runway should not be blocked so that the runway can be used by other aircraft and, in particular, the rescue aircraft.”
What was done: This is yet another telltale instance that proves there was something seriously wrong with the coordination between the various committees. What was the use in sending the NSG
aircraft at a time when the aircraft had already left Amritsar and landed at Lahore? Despite being a part of the Contingency Plan the aircraft could not be taken on to an isolated bay on the specific demand of the hijackers who were aware of this. In spite of this knowledge, the NSG plane took off for Amritsar: had the hijacked aircraft still been on the runway, there is no way that NSG aircraft could have landed there. The Crisis Management Group should have thought of an alternative.
Under the Contingency Plan, it is imperative for the air traffic services or the ATCs to maintain close cooperation with the security agencies to provide the known or anticipated route of the flight, besides the known or suspected destination and the estimated time of arrival. They are also supposed to provide supplementary flight details such as fuel endurance.
What was done: The CMG and CC were not briefed on the fuel endurance part by the air traffic services and they worked on the assumption that the aircraft had more or less run out of fuel, and since Lahore had refused permission; the aircraft would not take off from Amritsar, clearly pointing to the lack of reasoning in the CC and CMG who could not interpret that the pilot was speaking under the fear of a gun.
Under the Contingency Plan, chapter eight, devoted to media management, says that the control of the media is necessary in such a situation and for effective implementation of contingency plans . . . “in particular the movement and activities of the commandos it should be ensured that the press must be kept out of the forward operational area and this can be effectively achieved only if they are given regular official progress reports prepared and cleared for publication through the Central Government Agencies.”
What was done: With little information forthcoming from the government, the media laid seige to the third floor of Rajiv Gandhi Bhavan right outside the Crisis Management Group room where the officials were deliberating. There was no attempt by the government to actually hold regular briefings and clear the area. Ironically, even the NSG wireless link was set up right outside the CMG room under the glare of a dozen-odd TV cameras and hordes of nosey scribes—so much for secrecy and the government’s adherence to the Contingency Plan.
The IC 814 hijack clearly points out the inadequacies in the government’s Contingency Plan that was selectively implemented by the officials during the crisis, compounding the problem. It only points to the need of re-examining the entire Contingency Plan to avoid a bungle as costly as Amritsar that proved to be the turning point in the hijacking of the aircraft.
* * *
ANNEXURES
Annexure -1
Crisis Management Group [CMG]
(i)
Cabinet Secretary
:
Chairman
(ii)
Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister
:
Member
(iii)
Foreign Secretary
:
Member
(iv)
Defence Secretary
:
Member
(v)
Home Secretary
:
Member
(vi)
Secretary, Civil Aviation
:
Member
(vii)
Secretary (RAW) Cabinet Secretariat
:
Member
(viii)
Director, Intelligence Bureau
:
Member
(ix)
Director General, National Security Guard
:
Member
(x)
Addl. Secretary Cabinet Secretariat
:
Convenor
Annexure - II
Central Committee [CC]
(i)
Director General of Civil Aviation
:
Chairman
(ii)
Joint Secretary, Min. of Civil Aviation
:
Member
(iii)
Jt. Secretary (Security), Min. of Home Affairs
:
Member
(iv)
Jt. Secretary (Pers.) Min. of External Affairs
:
Member
(v)
Joint Director, Intelligence Bureau (MHA)
:
Member
(vi)
Inspector General of Police (Operations) National Security Guard
:
Member
(vii)
Addl. Commissioner of Police Delhi
:
Member
(viii)
Member (Oper.) National Airports Authority
:
Member
(ix)
Director of Aerodromes, AAI Delhi
:
Member
(x)
Director (Operations) Indian Airlines
:
Member
(xi)
A Senior Executive of the concerned airline
:
Member
(xii)
Commissioner of Security (CA), Bureau of Civil Aviation Security
:
Member
(xiii)
Such other representatives as may be considered necessary by the Convenor
:
Member
N.B.
In the absence of the Director General of Civil Aviation for any reason, the Central Committee will be presided over by the Joint Secretary, MCA & T.
Annexure - III
Passenger Manifest
Aggarwal / A Mr
Aggarwal / Anita Mrs
Aggarwal / Gopal Mr
Aggarwal / Sandeep Mr
Ahuja / Rajiv Mr
Arora / A Mrs
Arora / H Mr
Baisla / Aakansha Ms (ch)
Baisla / G Ms
Baisla / Kriti Ms (ch)
Baisla / Prashant Mast (ch)
Bansal / Poonam Mrs
Bansal / Sushil Kumar Mr
Barara / S Mr
Bhat / U B Mr
Bhatt / J Mr
Bhattacharya / AK Mr
Bhattacharya / Suchitra Mrs
Bhojwani / B Mr
Bhuyan / KC Dr
Calabrasi / Cristina Mrs
Chapagain / N P Mr
Chhabara/Chander Prakash Mr
Chunmun / INF
Dahal / R B Mr
Dawar / M Mrs
Dhanasekhar / S Mr
Dhital / S Mr
Dogra / R Mr
Dubey / B Mrs
Dubey / K Mast (ch)
Dubey / S Mr
Falcione / Rodriguez C Mr
Gangahar / A Ms (ch)
Gangahar / N Mrs
Garg / Pawan Mr
Garg / Ritu Ms
Garg / Shalu Mrs
Ghosh / R K Mr
Giori / Robert Mr
Goel / D Mr
Goel / S Mr
Goepfert / D Mrs
Goepfert / G Mr
Grover / Arvind Mr
Grover / Romesh Mr
Grover / Vaishali Mrs
Gupta / A Mrs
Gupta / Anupama Mrs
Gupta / Atul Mr
Gupta / D Mrs
Gupta / Laxmi Narayan Mr
Gupta / M Mrs
Gupta / Sangeeta Mrs
Gupta / Sanjay Mr
Gupta / V Mr
Guru / Krishnamd Mr
Hisada / Chiaki Ms
Jain / A P Mr
Jain / Aakansha Ms (ch)
Jain / Aarushi Ms (ch)
Jain / Amit Mr
Jain / Anahd Mr
Jain / Seema Mrs
James / F Mr
Johnson / D Mr
Joshi / Anita Dr
Jougla / F Mrs
Kachroo / R Mr
Kalra / Puran Lal Mr
Kalra / S Mrs
Kalra / Satish Mr
Kannan / K Mr
Kannan / R P Mr
Kapoor / Satish Mr
/>
Kar / S Mr
Kataria / Poonam Mrs
Kataria / Rakesh Mr
Kathuria / A A Mr
Katyal / R Mr
Katyal / R Mrs
Kaur / Rajinder Mrs
Kaur / Yamini Ms
Khandelwal / A Mr
Kharwadkar / Prashant Mr
Khurana / Anil Mr
Koul / Karan Mast (ch)
Koul / Usha Mrs
Kulasekhar / R Mr
Kumar / Anita Mrs
Kumar / Ashok Mr
Kumar / D Mr
Kumar / Ramesh Mr
Kumar / Satish Mr
Kumar / Subhash Mr
Lloret / Ana Mrs
Macherel / Ginette Mrs
Macklian / S Ms
Mahesh / N Mrs
Mahesh / N Mr
Maheshwari / H Ms (ch)
Maheshwari / M Mast (ch)
Maheshwari / S Mr
Maheshwari / U Mrs
Masoch / Marcel Mr
Mayoral / Josem Mr
Meena / Kasturi Devi Mrs
Menon / Bipin Mr
Menon / Ipseeta Mrs
Mistri / Z I Mr
Moore / JR Ms
Moreno Varela / V Ms
Mustaq Ahmed / M Mr
Naithani / Alka Mrs
Naithani / Arun Mr
Naithani / B Mr
Naithani / K Ms
Naithani / R Mr
Naithani / S Mrs
Neena / Mrs
Parthasarthy / R Mr
Pathak / R Ms
Perumal / B Mr
Prasad Babu / CG Mr
Qazi / S A Mr
Raghav / Rajiv Capt
Raghav / Shikha Ms
Ravi Kumar / Mr
Sahni / Satish Mr
Sayyed / S A Mr
Sethi / Ajay Mr
Sethi / S Mr
Shaikh / A A Mr
Sharma / A Mr
Sharma / K K Mrs
Sharma / Kavita Ms (SOL)
Sharma / M Mr
Sharma / R K Mr
Sharma / S Mast (ch)
Sharma / H Mast (ch)
Sharma / S Mrs
Sharma / Sanjeev Mr
Sharma / SK Mr
Sharma / Vishal Mr (SOL)
Shrestha / J L Mr
Shrestha / M Mrs
