The first major step was a change in the army’s lines of communications. Hitherto these had run up the exposed Cadibona Pass from Savona; from April 19 a new system was opened up the Tanaro valley to Ormea. This change made it possible to weaken the forces holding the right flank—Dego was now strategically unimportant—and La Harpe was ordered to leave only one brigade at Cairo and march the remainder of his division to relieve Massena at San Benedetto; Massena, in his turn, was moved up to take a central position between the divisions of Sérurier and Augereau in preparation for the renewal of the attack on the village of St. Michele, the key to Colli’s position. The grand assault was ordered for the morning of the 21st.
Once again, however, General Colli decamped during the night and fell back on Mondovi. Stengel immediately launched a vigorous cavalry pursuit but was mortally wounded during one skirmish, thus depriving the Army of Italy of its most experienced cavalry officer. Nevertheless, Colli was afforded no time to organize the town’s defense. Old Sérurier confounded all the experts by leading a frontal attack against the Piedmontese. In later years, Marmont described the incident as follows: “To form his men in three columns, put himself at the head of the central one, throw out a cloud of skirmishers, and march at the double, sword in hand, ten paces in front of his column; that is what he did. A fine spectacle, that of an old general, resolute and decided, whose vigor was revived by the presence of the enemy. I accompanied him in the attack, the success of which was complete.”5
By a mixture of force and guile the French bundled the enemy out of the town and took possession of the well-stocked arsenal. It was a turning point of the campaign; with the capture of Mondovi, Bonaparte had reached the fertile plains of Piedmont, and his pressing administrative anxieties were considerably lessened. Imminent starvation no longer threatened the army and, although the men at once proceeded to get out of hand and indulged in an orgy of pillage and destruction that lasted a complete day, Bonaparte had good reason for relief and self-congratulation.
Bonaparte did not linger at Mondovi a moment longer than was necessary to reorganize his army. Colli’s force was still technically undefeated, and Piedmont had yet to be forced to sue for peace. Therefore the advance on Turin was commenced on April 23. Massena and Augereau moved forward astride the River Tanaro, their flanks protected by Sérurier and La Harpe, each part of the army being within a day’s march of the rest and so in a position to concentrate against any threatened point. In fact, however, the Piedmontese will to resist was broken after the loss of Mondovi, and on the evening of the 23rd Colli asked for an armistice. Bonaparte’s reaction to this was to push forward even faster. Two days later, Massena was in occupation of Cherasco and Augereau was in Alba. These moves completed the separation of the Piedmontese forces from any communication with Beaulieu. Following up this success, Bonaparte once more shifted his lines of communication—this time from the Tanaro valley to the sheltered Col di Tende—and ordered La Harpe to advance on Acqui to engage Beaulieu’s full attention.
By this time the Court of Turin was in a fever of apprehension, and the young French prodigy was in a position to dictate terms. He made it clear that he was not empowered by the Directory to conduct formal negotiations, but declared himself willing to enter into a temporary arrangement until Paris was consulted. The River Stura was to form the line of demarcation between the two armies; in addition to Ceva, the fortresses of Cuneo and Tortona were to receive French garrisons, but if the latter was still in Austrian hands, Alessandria would be handed over in its place. A further clause gave the French the right of free passage through Piedmontese territory and permission to cross the River Po at Valenza should the general so desire. Such were the provisional terms embodied in the Armistice of Cherasco, which the King of Savoy—deserted by his Austrian ally, now in full retreat for the River Agogno—formally approved on 28th April. The question of a full treaty was referred at once to Paris, Colonel Murat being sent to the Directory with the details of the armistice terms.
In a ten-day campaign, General Bonaparte had brought the state of Piedmont to its knees and thus secured, for the time being at least, the flank and rear of the Army of Italy which could now turn to smite its principal opponent—the Austrian army in the Po valley. Much of the future still hung in doubt; Bonaparte was aware that the Directory might renounce his terms and refuse to conclude a satisfactory peace with Piedmont, especially as he had deliberately flouted their original instructions in respect of Piedmontese territory and interests. In this eventuality the Army of Italy’s communications might again be dangerously exposed, but Bonaparte’s shrewd appraisal of his masters’ foibles and weaknesses convinced him that they would accept the situation with a good grace. He had brought victory to French arms, and no politician would dare to throw away his achievement; besides, the general had been prudent enough to send the Directors material proof in the form of booty, and his fellow Corsican, Saliceti, the senior representative of the French Government accompanying the army in the field, had long ago thrown in his lot with his young general and could be relied upon to report back favorably.
By sheer determination and offensive action, by repeated concentrations of force at critical places and times, by cunning economy, tight security and brilliant control of every move made by each component of his army, Napoleon Bonaparte had accomplished his preliminary task. At a cost of 6,000 casualties he had burst into the Po valley, taking the protecting Alps by the flank. “Annibal a forcé les Alpes” he exclaimed, “nous, nous les avons tournés!” In the process he had run enormous risks, and minor setbacks such as those at Cosseria and Dego might well have presaged disaster had his opponent been a soldier of greater determination and audacity. General Schérer’s earlier unwillingness to launch an offensive can more easily be understood in the light of the perils his more brilliant successor was called upon to meet, but an inflexible will and complete understanding of the problems of time and space had overcome every obstacle. A flamboyant manifesto summarized the achievement: “Soldiers! In fifteen days you have gained six victories, taken 21 colors and 55 pieces of artillery, seized several fortresses and conquered the richest parts of Piedmont. You have captured 15,000 prisoners and killed and wounded more than 10,000….”6 The promises of March 27 had been fulfilled indeed; this, however, was only the beginning.
See Part Six, p. 346, for a description of this formation.
Therefore only 60 guns and a few mountain pieces could accompany Bonaparte’s advance. The lack of heavy pieces was to be particularly keenly felt before Mantua.
7
THE BRIDGE OF LODI
The French army now paused for a brief spell to reorganize in preparation for the offensive against Beaulieu. During this lull, Bonaparte summoned the troops of Generals Macquart and Gamier from the Col di Tende and sent an eloquent plea to the Directory for further reinforcements, indicating that 10,000 men from Kellermann’s Army of the Alps would serve very well in this capacity. There was need, however, to act swiftly, for although the French lines of communication could in no way be considered secure until a formal peace was ratified with Piedmont, the Austrians might still be able to recover from their initial setbacks and launch a counteroffensive if they were afforded sufficient time. In fact, this was not very likely; Beaulieu had already pessimistically reported to Vienna that “the army is in a very bad situation,” and his half-hearted attempts to succour Colli illustrated his caution and indecision. The loss to date of between five and six thousand Austrian troops out of his army of 30,000 in no way encouraged the old man to run any further risks, and his one thought was to withdraw his men to the comparative safety of the Po’s north bank with its series of good defensive positions offered by the tributaries and fortresses.
This withdrawal Bonaparte was determined to forestall if it lay in his power. Writing to Carnot, he declared: “My intention is to catch up with the Austrians and beat them before you have time to reply to this letter.” To achieve this, as we have already seen, h
e had ordered La Harpe on April 28 to advance on Acqui, but that officer was forced to postpone his march by a mutiny among his starving men who had not shared in the looting of Mondovi, having been on the extreme flank of the French army. In consequence of this delay, La Harpe reached his destination only on the 30th, and by that date Beaulieu’s evacuation was well under way; Alessandria had been abandoned on the 28th, and two days later most of his men were safely over the Po, crossing at Valenza in spite of Piedmontese protests. Thwarted of his prey, Bonaparte next ordered the army to concentrate in the area bounded by the towns of Tortona, Alessandria and Valenza. By this time the army’s strength had risen to 39,600 men, and the new lines of communication with the Col di Tende were in full operation.
The problem was now to devise a means of crossing the Po in the face of Beaulieu’s army and thereafter force him to fight a battle. The difficulties of a river crossing were increased by the absence of a proper bridging train in the French army, but the Austrian commander in chief’s decision to station his army around the town of Valeggio on Piedmontese soil instead of retiring to the far stronger position offered by the River Ticino farther to the east was a considerable if short-lived advantage. Bonaparte could select one of three possible crossing places over the fast-flowing Po. Of these, Valenza was the closest, and the right to a free passage had been guaranteed by the Piedmontese at Cherasco. But the disadvantage was the proximity of the main Austrian forces, and not even the Army of Italy could contemplate the possibility of being caught halfway over the river with equanimity. The second possibility was to pass the river south of Pavia; such a crossing would place the French in rear of Beaulieu athwart his communications, but again the area was just within Austrian striking distance, and this could well prove disastrous. The third conceivable crossing was no less than fifty miles from Valenza at Piacenza. Despite the distance and the great width and depth of the River Po at that point Bonaparte selected it, for it offered several distinct advantages, and the French general was confident that his men would be able to march fast enough to outwit their foes. Writing to the Directory on May 6 after beginning the complex operation, he indicated his reasons. “Yesterday morning we cannonaded the foe posted on the farther bank of the Po. This river is very large and difficult to pass over. My intention is to cross it as close as possible to Milan, so as to be faced by no further obstacles before I reach that capital. By so doing, I shall turn the three lines of defense that Beaulieu has prepared along the Agogno, the Terdoppio and the Ticino. So today I march toward Piacenza; Pavia will find itself turned, and if the enemy determines to defend that town, I will find myself between him and his depots.”7 Success would depend on the old formula of speed and surprise, but the risks were worthwhile. At the least his move would compel Beaulieu to retreat precipitately; at the best, he might even destroy the enemy entirely.
The essence of Bonaparte’s plan was to distract Beaulieu’s attention for the vital period it would take a select force to make the march to Piacenza and establish a bridgehead on the north bank of the Po. The first duty was entrusted to Massena and Sérurier, who were to mount diversionary operations appearing to presage a major crossing at Valenza; the second task was given to a special corps d’ élite drawn from the grenadier units of the whole army and led by General Dallemagne. Four battalions of this force were entrusted to the dashing Colonel Lannes, and in all, Dallemagne’s command totaled 3,600 grenadiers and 2,500 cavalry. He was to be supported in the first instance by the divisions of La Harpe and Augereau, who were to follow hard on his heels, and in due course the remainder of the army would similarly march eastwards.
The Maneuver of Lodi, May 1796, the prototype of la manoeuvre sur les derrières (or strategical envelopment)
The preliminary moves were completed on May 5 and 6. At four in the morning on the following day Dallemagne left Stradella, and by dint of magnificent marching reached Piacenza by nine o’clock. The troops seized a large ferry and at once began to cross, the first man to set foot on the north bank being Colonel Lannes. By the middle of the afternoon the advance guard had been reinforced by La Harpe’s division, which was perhaps just as well, for Dallemagne suddenly found he was faced by the Austrian General Liptay with a division of infantry and several squadrons of cavalry. The enemy reaction had come earlier than had been anticipated. As early as May 4, Beaulieu had sent Liptay to occupy the bridges near Pavia and to keep an eye on the crossings further to the east. During the succeeding forty-eight hours, the Austrian commander in chief’s attention had been held by Sérurier’s diversion near Valenza, but as no serious attempt at a crossing was made Beaulieu took the wise decision to retire the bulk of his forces behind the River Ticino. In the midst of this maneuver Beaulieu received definite news of the French crossing in force near Piacenza, and at once changed his plans and marched with all speed to support Liptay, calling up General Wukassovitch’s 4,500 men from Valeggio. Thus by dark on the 7th, a long column of Austrian troops, spread over a distance of some fifty miles, was converging on the French bridgehead.
During the day, Dallemagne had clashed inconclusively with the advanced elements of Liptay’s troops and the Austrian patrols fell back to the village of Fombio. Next morning La Harpe and Dallemagne stormed the position and scattered Liptay’s force. The French pursued the fugitives with great élan. Saliceti recorded: “for two hours Lannes and his grenadiers pursued the Austrians, marching alongside our Hussars who went on at a full trot.”8 In the meantime Augereau’s division was crossing the Po at Varetto, some way to the west of Piacenza, and Sérurier and Massena were drawing steadily closer. During the night, however, the head of Beaulieu’s converging columns came into violent conflict with the French troops at Codogno, and in the general confusion of a night action La Harpe was tragically shot by his own men. Deprived of firm leadership, the French troops began to waver, but the situation was saved by the chief of staff, Berthier, who rode forward with other senior officers to take personal control of the battle. In due course the Austrians pulled back, leaving one cannon and sixty prisoners in French hands. This brush proved too much for Beaulieu’s determination, and, despite his current superiority of numbers, he ordered a full retreat toward Lodi on the River Adda, anxious to place a river obstacle between himself and the French. This allowed Bonaparte to complete the concentration of the Army of Italy unhindered, and during the 9th the last units of Massena’s and Sérurier’s divisions passed over the Po after a sixty-mile march to join their comrades-in-arms. This river crossing in the proximity of a large enemy army has deservedly become regarded as a classic operation of war, its success being based on precise planning, careful deception and, above all, speed of marching. Bonaparte was not, however, completely satisfied with his achievement. Beaulieu had managed to escape the net before his lines of communication had been severed, and although the fall of Milan was now a certainty, the enemy army had still to be defeated before he could be reinforced if the remainder of the Po valley, and above all the city and fortress of Mantua, were to pass into French hands.
The Battle of the Bridge of Lodi, May 10, 1796
Hounded on by their near-distraught commander, the leading French troops were within sight of Lodi by the early morning of May 10, but practically the whole Austrian army had meanwhile safely crossed the Adda, leaving 10,000 men under General Sebottendorf as a covering force. Three battalions of these troops, supported by a dozen cannon, were drawn up in positions dominating the bridge of Lodi and the causeway leading up to it. Six of these guns were placed upon the eastern end of the bridge itself, and two further artillery detachments of three cannon apiece were situated on each side of the roadway in a position to sweep it with enfilade fire. The capture of the bridge was clearly going to present a considerable problem to the pursuing French.
The Battle of the Bridge of Lodi, May 10, 1796
The advance guard of the Army of Italy soon cleared the town of Lodi of the last detachments of Austrian troops, and Bonaparte rode right forward wit
h his staff to supervise personally the capture of the bridge beyond. While he waited for Massena’s dust-stained column to reach the town, the general busied himself siting twenty-four guns along the west bank and sent cavalry detachments up and down the river to search for a ford which might enable the French to outflank the enemy position. He formed the grenadiers into column within the shelter of the walls of Lodi, and after addressing them with a stirring speech, launched them through the gates onto the causeway. The first charge, facing a storm of Austrian shot, reached the center of the bridge before losing its impetus and falling back. The effort was immediately renewed, many senior officers, including Massena, Dallemagne, Cervoni and Berthier placing themselves at the head of the column, and with a cry of Vive la République! the men swarmed forward again into the maelstrom.
This time the outcome was successful. Numbers of troops jumped from the causeway into the shallows near the farther bank and opened an enfilading fire on the Austrian gunners, and under this cover, the head of the column stormed the bridge and drove off the Austrian defenders. A counterattack almost regained the bridge for Sebottendorf, but the arrival of Massena’s men, followed by Augereau, soon clinched the issue, breaking through the center of the extended Austrian line, while a body of cavalry under Ordener at last appeared on the enemy’s flank, having found a ford. Sebottendorf hastened to extricate his men and retreated toward Beaulieu’s main body, leaving behind him 153 killed, 1,700 prisoners and sixteen guns. The French lost at least 350 casualties in the affair.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 14
