The Battle of Arcola: the third day, November 17, 1796
The Battle of Arcol a, November 17, 1796 (third day). In the foreground is the pontoon bridge built by Andréossy’s sappers; in the middle distance, beyond Arcola (left), Augereau’s troops are in the process of forcing back Alvintzi’s line.
The 17th dawned with no alarming news from Vaubois, so the French prepared a third attack against d’Alvintzi. By this time the general situation was turning decidedly to Bonaparte’s advantage. D’Alvintzi’s army was now split into two unconnected parts, no less than a third of his effective strength fighting in the marshes under Provera and Hohenzollern. That meant Bonaparte enjoyed a numerical superiority over each enemy wing and had maneuvered the foe into a false position. Bonaparte decided to attack d’Alvintzi’s main force to complete his demoralization. Massena’s division was therefore given the task of engaging the enemy’s attention among the marshes while Augereau made for the Albaredo crossing, took Arcola in the rear, and swept on to capture San Bonifacio.
In the event, however, most of the honors of the day were won by Massena. His recrossing of the Adige at Ronco was bitterly contested by a force of Austrians, and at one point halfway through the operation disaster threatened the French when the bridge collapsed, but in due course the enemy was beaten off after the damage had been repaired. Continuing to carry out his orders, Massena stationed a single brigade on the Arcola and Porcile roads and concealed the rest of his division amongst the willows and dykes. The Austrian garrison of Arcola fell for the bait and launched an attack on the exposed brigade, which fell back under heavy pressure, leading their pursuers straight into the ambush. The Austrians lost heavy casualties and were thrown into confusion by this surprise, and Massena seized the opportunity to recapture part of Arcola at bayonet point.
Massena’s success offset Augereau’s difficulties. Part of his column was diverted to Legnano where there was a good bridge, but the remainder of his division safely reached Albaredo, only to find the crossing strongly defended, and several efforts failed to dislodge the Austrians from the area between the crossing place and Arcola. Bonaparte devised a stratagem to overcome the difficulty. Aware of the low state of Austrian morale, he dispatched a small force of the Guides with four trumpeters to create a diversion in the enemy’s rear. These men forded the river unseen by the Austrians and proceeded to make so much noise that the local commander feared he was under heavy attack and ordered a rapid retreat to rejoin the main body. As their opposition wavered, Augereau’s men poured up the river bank to join part of Massena’s division at Arcola, and from there onto the plain. This move coincided with the arrival of the column from Legnano. Faced by what appeared to be a major attack against his rear areas, d’Alvintzi ordered his whole army to retire overnight toward Vicenza. The next morning the French patrols found the enemy gone.
So ended the battle of Arcola. A three-day struggle had resulted in a definite victory for Bonaparte. The French inflicted at least 7,000 casualties for the loss of 4,500 besides thwarting d’Alvintzi’s main intention of linking his forces with those of Davidovitch. It had been a notable achievement of endurance, and the army returned to Verona on the 18th.
Profiting from his central position, Bonaparte at once switched all his power against Davidovitch. His intervention came in the nick of time for during the day of the 17th, Davidovitch had at last launched the long-anticipated attack against Vaubois and beaten the French back to Castelnuovo. Leaving the cavalry to pursue the retreating d’Alvintzi, Bonaparte rushed his infantry to his subordinate’s assistance. Augereau conducted a forced march up the left bank of the Adige in an attempt to envelop Davidovitch in the vicinity of Dolce on November 21, but the Austrian commander realized his peril at the very last moment, managed to slip out of the trap and beat a hasty retreat towards Trent. This maneuver cost him 1,500 prisoners besides the loss of two bridging trains, nine cannon and most of his baggage. The news of his withdrawal finally persuaded d’Alvintzi to abandon the present attempt to reach Mantua and withdraw up the Brenta to regroup his shaken forces.
Thus the third Austrian attempt at a counteroffensive had fared no better than its predecessors; both parts of d’Alvintzi’s army had suffered a sharp reverse and been driven back respectively to Bassano and the Tyrol without obtaining even a glimpse of Mantua where the garrison was now down to twenty-eight days’ rations. Yet it had once again been a close shave for the French, and only Bonaparte’s genius had averted catastrophe in the face of superior enemy forces. Arcola had been the climax of the campaign, and was probably General Bonaparte’s greatest achievement to date. The German historian and commentator von Clausewitz summed up the success as follows: “What is it, then, that turned this hotly contested battle into a victory for Napoleon? It was a better use of the elements of tactics, a greater bravery in the field, a superior mind, and boldness without any limits.”30 Bonaparte had revealed himself as a true master of the strategic defensive. He did not allow the reverse at Caldiero to blunt his determination, but at once embarked upon a second, bolder scheme of operations. The great American historian Dodge wrote an appropriate summary of the campaign: “There are few short struggles which better illustrate the strength of interior lines coupled to vigorous offense, as well as exhibit the weakness of operations conducted by divided or concentrically operating forces.”31
However, Bonaparte’s work was not yet completed; the Austrian will to resist was still far from broken, and before many weeks had passed the Army of Italy was to face one last desperate Imperial effort to avert the fall of the great fortress of Mantua.
10
RIVOLI
By the end of November the French Government was eager to see the war ended, even at the cost of a compromise peace. Negotiations were duly opened with the Emperor, General Clarke representing the Directory, but they at once broke down over the issue of Mantua. The Austrians demanded the right to reprovision the fortress while the talks were in progress, but this was out of the question from the French point of view.
The Army of Italy in the meantime was putting itself into the best possible positions to meet d’Alvintzi’s next advance. The Austrian general hovered threateningly in the neighborhood of Bassano, receiving reinforcements which eventually brought his army up to a total of 45,000 men.
As we have already remarked, there were three main routes which the Austrians might use to approach Mantua: down the Adige, through the Brenta valley to Vicenza, or along the River Chiese in the French rear. As on each previous occasion, Bonaparte had to dispose his troops so as to cover each possible approach until the enemy revealed his main line of operations. This necessity placed a heavy and continuous strain on French resources. The army had received several new brigades of reinforcements to bring its fighting strength up to 34,500 men in addition to the 10,000 outside Mantua and perhaps as many more stationed along the lines of communication, but the extent of its responsibilities, and in particular the need to isolate the garrison of Mantua, made it impossible for Bonaparte to take the offensive. Every nerve, therefore, was strained to devise the best possible defensive arrangements. Field fortifications were dug at La Corona, Rivoli and along the Lower Adige. Only too aware that misinformation and delayed transmission of news had aggravated several of the crises in previous months, the French commander refashioned the communications system. A series of courier posts were set up to link the various detachments with Headquarters, and a system for passing news by cannon shot was devised. The artillery was re-equipped and brought to a strength of seventy-eight field pieces, and many old and inefficient officers purged. On the eve of d’Alvintzi’s last attack, the French troops were placed as follows: Joubert’s division was holding the area between La Corona and Rivoli on the east side of Lake Garda, supported by Massena at Verona. Augereau was stationed on the lower reaches of the Adige south of Ronco, while General Rey occupied the western shores of Garda. Vaubois was relegated to the minor command of Leghorn, relieving the convalescent
Sérurier who, to his delight, was reinstated in command of the siege of Mantua before the end of December, Kilmaine having been taken ill in his turn.
Bonaparte made use of the quiet period in December to conclude a convention with the Grand Duke of Tuscany and to prepare an expedition against the Pope, the inveterate enemy of France. But the operation was never put into effect, for on January 8, 1797, Augereau reported that his outposts had been driven back on Legnano by an Austrian attack. The French commander in chief received these tidings on the 11th, and at once returned to his centrally located headquarters at Roverbella to study the development of events. Moving on to Verona, he reached the city to find Massena under attack, but Bonaparte still did not consider that d’Alvintzi had revealed his full hand. Augereau, on the contrary, was convinced he was under serious attack and appealed for assistance. Bonaparte gave this active consideration but lingered for definite information from the Garda sectors, where conditions remained suspiciously quiet. Writing to Joubert on the morning of the 13th, Bonaparte revealed his lingering uncertainties: “Let me know as soon as possible whether you consider the enemy on your front to number more than 9,000. It is vitally important that I should know whether the attack being made upon you is serious … or merely a secondary affair designed to put us off. Here at Verona the enemy numbers about 6,000 men and I am at this moment ordering an attack. If there are nine or ten thousand facing you—as there must be if the enemy intends a real attack—it follows that there can be no more than a similar number at Legnano, and if that is so, and if your attack and mine here succeed, as they must, by this evening, then I have no need to fear that they will get over the Adige.”32
The reply to this dispatch arrived at 3:00
P.M. and left no further trace of doubt. Joubert reported that he had been attacked by large forces and pushed out of La Corona. D’Alvintzi had revealed his hand at last. The Austrian general was launching a multiple attack, but his major effort was from the north. One column, 6,200 strong, under Bayalitsch had struck at Verona, while Provera, with 9,000 men, attacked Legnano, hoping to break through over the Adige to Mantua, link up with Würmser and then attack the French in the rear. Meanwhile, d’Alvintzi was moving with the mass of the army, 28,000 strong, to crush Joubert in the Adige valley.
Bonaparte’s reaction was immediate. Ordering Joubert to hold firm at all costs, he set out at once for Rivoli to join him, summoning Massena and Rey to do the same. “The enemy’s plan is at last unmasked,” he wrote to Sérurier, “he is marching with considerable forces on Rivoli.”33 Three thousand men were left to garrison Verona, the rest hurried north.
The terrain over which the battle of Rivoli was fought undoubtedly favored the defense. Several good roads lead north from Verona to the horseshoe formation of the Trombalore Heights, interposed between the rivers Adige and Tasso, greatly facilitating the concentration of troops. The northern approaches to the plateau of Rivoli offered the Austrians fewer facilities. Between Lake Garda and the Tasso towered the difficult obstacle of Mount Baldo, crossed only by tracks; separating the Tasso and the Adige valleys stretched the high spur known as Mount Magnone, and to the east lay further mountains. The only good roads available to the Austrians were two in number, one running down each side of the Adige, but only the western highway offered a direct approach to Rivoli by way of the gorge and village of Osteria. D’Alvintzi had no choice, therefore, but to bring all his artillery and trains down these roads in two columns. His other forces were compelled to move across country with only a few mountain guns.
The Austrian general made several errors that reduced his chance of victory. He failed to follow up his initial success against Joubert on the 12th, and this afforded Bonaparte just enough time to reinforce his forward division. The slowness of the Austrian advance was partly due to the nature of the ground and partly to the increasing shortage of rations caused by a miscalculation on the part of d’Alvintzi’s quartermasters. But the greatest drawback was the complexity of the battle plan, which envisaged an attack by no less than six columns advancing over a vast area of ground. Three columns under generals Liptay, Koblos and Ocksay were ordered to assault the northern side of the plateau, but the absence of roads in the sector meant that they had to do this unsupported by cannon. Two more columns, those of Lusignan and Wukassovitch, were to outflank the Rivoli position from the west and east respectively and fall on the French rear, while Quasdanovitch’s 7,000 men, supported by the Austrian cannon, stormed up the Osteria gorge after driving back the French outposts from the ridge of Mount Magnone. The problem of coordinating these diverse efforts was to prove too much for General d’Alvintzi.
Bonaparte rode ahead of his troops to join Joubert at Rivoli at 2:00
A.M. on the 14th, just in time to prevent the withdrawal of the outnumbered French division. The two commanders then rode forward to inspect the position. “The scene was lit by superb moonlight,” wrote Bonaparte. “We scaled the different heights and observed the lines of enemy camp fires; they filled the space between the Adige and Lake Garda … we could easily distinguish five camps, each belonging to a column.”34 It was clear that the village of San Marco was one key to the position; its possession by the French would divide the Austrian assault in two, and Bonaparte at once ordered its reoccupation. The battle was obviously going to be a race against time; everything depended on the speed of the reinforcements’ arrival to counteract the progressive commitment of the scattered Austrian detachments. By 6:00
A.M. the leading echelons of Massena’s division were visible from the field headed by a battery of horse artillery. Bonaparte ordered Joubert to occupy the eastern side of the plateau with one brigade to hold the key positions of San Marco and the Osteria gorge, and to send his remaining two brigades to occupy the northern sector and hold off Koblos and Liptay, whose attack could be expected first. Massena, who had arrived ahead of his men, was instructed to hold the Tasso valley on the left flank with a brigade and mass the remainder of his division, as it arrived, in reserve around Rivoli.
The battle of Rivoli began at daylight when Joubert advanced his 10,000 men with their 12 cannon, and a further 6 provided by Massena, to drive back the first three Austrian columns totaling some 12,000 in all. At first the French attack went well, capturing the hamlet of San Giovanni from the enemy, but Koblos succeeded in checking Joubert’s advance, and Liptay began to work round the flank of the westernmost French brigade. This threat became critical when the 85th demi-brigade, which it will be remembered had already misbehaved under Vaubois in November, broke and fled. Bonaparte at once ordered up part of Massena’s reserve from Rivoli. The general rode off ahead of his men and was almost taken captive by the advancing Austrian troops. “Prisoner! Prisoner!” they cried, but with superb unconcern the gallant André turned his back on his foes and rode off whistling to rejoin his advancing troops, who soon stabilized the position. By eight o’clock the French had 17,000 men on the field, and this figure would rise to 23,000 by midday if Rey arrived in time from the west bank of Lake Garda and was able to join his comrades.
The Battle of Rivoli, January 14-15, 1797
As the morning progressed, the battle became increasingly serious for the French. The Austrians in the Adige valley had seized the opportunity offered by the distractions on the northern sector to mount several batteries on the further side of the river and to seize the approaches to the crucial Osteria gorge, including the overlooking crest of Monte Magnone. The main Austrian attack was clearly imminent, but at this very moment a new threat developed to worry the French. Lusignan’s column, after making a long detour which had taken up most of the morning, suddenly appeared along the ridge to the south of Rivoli, cutting Bonaparte off from further reinforcement. The task of reopening the line of retreat was entrusted to the 18th demi-brigade newly arrived from Lake Garda. Bonaparte addressed the men: “Brave Eighteenth,” he cried, “I know you; the enemy will not stand before you.” He was followed by Massena: “Comrades,” shouted the latter,
“in front of you are 4,000 young men belonging to the richest families in Vienna; they have come with post-horses as far as Bassano; I recommend them to you.”35 With a roar of laughter the troops advanced, crying, “En avant !”
Meanwhile the crucial battle was developing in the Osteria gorge. The Austrian grenadiers seized the village at eleven o’clock and appeared to be on the point of breaking through Joubert’s tired men. Bonaparte’s tactical insight told him that Koblos and Liptay were, for the time being, spent forces, and he at once realigned Joubert’s brigades to meet the eastern threat. A battery of light artillery poured case shot into the dense Austrian column at point-blank range. A lucky shot exploded two Austrian ammunition wagons, causing fearful carnage, and into the confusion the French launched a charge of 500 infantry and horsemen led by Leclerc and Lasalle. The Austrians reeled back before these repeated blows, and soon the gorge was clear. Bonaparte had successfully surmounted the main crisis of the battle, but every man had to be immediately rushed back to the northern edge of the plateau to repulse the regrouped forces of Koblos and Liptay. This was done with great élan, the French splitting the Austrian army into two parts. They were then free to turn their attentions against the Austrian flanking columns. Lusignan’s division lost 3,000 prisoners, caught between Rey’s arriving troops and Massena’s reserve brigade from Rivoli.
The Battle of Rivoli, January 14, 1797—a romanticized reconstruction; in the background is the Osteria Gorge
By five in the evening the victory was practically complete, but Bonaparte had no time to linger. During the afternoon news had arrived that Provera was attempting to bridge the Adige at Anghiari, and as soon as the major issue of the day at Rivoli was beyond doubt, Bonaparte handed over the battle to Joubert and Rey, and hurried south with Massena’s hard-fighting brigades to prevent Provera from penetrating to Mantua.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 18
