17
THE EMBRYONIC SYSTEM: CASTIGLIONE
To conclude this study it is proposed to examine one battle which illustrates the Emperor’s favorite battle system. The battle of Castiglione (August 5, 1796) shows the system in action at an early stage in Napoleon’s career and proves that the method was clear in his mind as early as his twenty-sixth year.
Writing to the Directory describing the battle of Castiglione, the relevant section of General Bonaparte’s dispatch opened with the following words: “At daybreak on 5th August we found ourselves in contact with the enemy; until 6
A.M., however, nothing took place. I then ordered a retrograde movement by the whole army in order to draw the enemy after us—and thus occupy the time it would take Sérurier’s division (which I was expecting every second) to come up from Marcaria, and thereafter turn Würmser’s left, This move had at least part of its intended effect.”58 In these three sentences Napoleon Bonaparte gave a succinct summary of the battle of Castiglione, and at one and the same time revealed the secret of his embryonic system of “strategical battle.”
The Battle of Castiglione, August 5, 1796: strategical situation early August
In late July 1796, the Army of Italy was striving to prevent a junction between the two parts of the Austrian army and at the same time prevent a relief of the Austrian garrison besieged in the great fortress of Mantua. One wing, led by Quasdanovitch, had been advancing down the western side of Lake Garda; the second, commanded by General Würmser, the commander in chief, had approached Mantua from Trent down the Adige as far as Verona. The initial strengths of these armies were 18,000 and 24,000 respectively, exclusive of the garrison of Mantua (12,700). Additionally, a smaller formation, 5,000 men under Meszaros, advanced down the Brenta Valley. At this time Bonaparte disposed of approximately 46,000 men—but with these troops he had to hold down the whole of the Lombard Plain and prosecute the siege of Mantua as well as take measures to meet and thwart any Austrian attempts to relieve the great city and fortress, which might come from several directions at once. At the outset, events went very seriously for the French. Würmser drove Massena out of Verona and set off across country for Mantua, while Quasdanovitch repulsed the weak forces of Generals Sauret and Guieu near Salo. It appeared that the Austrians would succeed both in joining up south of Lake Garda and in relieving Mantua. For some time General Bonaparte was uncertain which adversary to tackle first, but in the end he took the hard decision of ordering Sérurier to abandon the siege of Mantua and move westward to Marcaria on the River Chiese, where he would be in a position to protect the army’s communications, running back through Milan to Nice, and at the same time be within marching distance of the Lake Garda battle area. Simultaneously, Massena and Augereau were recalled west of the Mincio to form the bulk of the field force. These moves became operational on July 31 and the general French concentration began.
As Würmser insisted on marching straight on Mantua to make contact with Count d’Irles, it was Quasdanovitch who received the greater part of Bonaparte’s initial attention, and during the 2nd and 3rd of August there were fought a series of actions around Lonato and Castiglione. The former, against Quasdanovitch, was largely Massena’s responsibility; the latter, against Würmser’s advance guard, was fought by Augereau’s division, aided by Kilmaine. By nightfall on the 3rd Quasdanovitch had been severely repulsed, and Würmser, for the present, brought to a standstill. In firm control of the central position between the two Austrian forces (although at the height of the double battle only five miles had separated them) lay the tiring Army of Italy. The jaws of the Austrian nutcrackers remained open, but the interposed nut was not a little battered.
Early on August 4, General Bonaparte began to mass his troops for an attack on Würmser’s 25,000 Austrians, who were now occupying a strong position based on the Castiglione-Solferino heights. Leaving General Guieu to pursue the retreating Quasdanovitch, Bonaparte summoned every remaining available soldier for this operation, recalling Despinois from Brescia to join Massena and Augereau, Marmont the gunner and Beaumont the cavalry commander onto the plain below Castiglione. Simultaneous orders were sent to Sérurier (currently at Marcaria), summoning him to march on the village of Guidizzolo in Würmser’s rear. By this concentration, Bonaparte produced almost 31,000 men (including Sérurier and Despinois). He had thus achieved superiority of force at the decisive point—but only, be it noted, at the price of abandoning the siege of Mantua.
Bonaparte’s aim was to destroy Würmser lock, stock and barrel, and his one great fear was that the Austrian commander might reconsider his position and retire into Mantua. If Würmser pursued such a course, the reimposition of an effective siege would be practically impossible; for with 37,000 well-provisioned Austrians within the fortress, the Army of Italy would be hopelessly overstrained trying to maintain the siege, hold down North Italy, and provide a covering army all at one and the same time. To avoid this possibility, there had to be a battle at Castiglione at all costs.
Spying out the lie of the Austrian positions, Bonaparte noticed that Würmser’s right was anchored on the Solferino heights and a neighboring tower, while his left extended along the ridge with a detachment thrown forward to occupy the hillock of Medolano, protected by a heavy battery. Instantly, a scheme presented itself to the 26-year-old general, a plan destined to serve in the future as the prototype for a dozen major battles. First of all, he would engage Würmser frontally by means of a pinning attack carried out by Massena against the Austrian right and Augereau against the Austrian left; this action would in due course be supported by the 4th and 5th demi-brigades of General Despinois (still hastening up from Brescia) and the cavalry of General Beaumont (holding the extreme right). Then, at the correct moment, Sérurier’s division (actually commanded by General Fiorella on the day, for the divisional commander had fallen seriously sick at Marcaria) would materialize through Guidizzolo covered by the 5th Dragoons and fall upon Würmser’s left rear, effectively cutting him off from all retreat toward Mantua and at the same time spreading alarm and despondency among his ranks—the classical interpretation of the Grand Tactical “envelopment.” Then the main attack would be launched. A special force of three battalions of grenadiers, supported by eighteen guns commanded by Colonel Marmont and Beaumont’s cavalry—all carefully massed en potence behind the French right wing in echelon formation—would fall like a thunderbolt against Würmser’s left center (presumably weakened by the need to find troops to meet Sérurier) and pierce his line. This coup de foudre would be supported by a simultaneously renewed attack against all frontal sectors of the Austrian line. A ruthless pursuit would then follow to ensure Würmser’s destruction. Every ingredient of a great Napoleonic battle was thus included in the plan for Castiglione in August 1796.
The Battle of Castiglione, August 5, 1796: early morning phase
As so often in war, actual events did not go wholly according to plan, although the opening was brilliant enough. To ensure the success of his initial attack and to draw the Austrians down from their strong positions on the heights, Bonaparte resorted to one of the most ancient and at the same time most dangerous stratagems of war—a feigned withdrawal in the face of the enemy. Hardly had the firing opened than he ordered Massena and Augereau to give ground. This movement might have proved fatal had not the troops been well trained and fully confident in their leader, but as it happened it produced exactly the desired effect. Amazed at his good fortune and believing he had the French on the run already, Würmser swung his right flank forward (pivoting on his left) in an attempt to crush Massena’s left and thus open up a road toward Lonato and the presumed position of his subordinate colleague, Quasdanovitch, for the Austrian commander in chief had received no certain news of his subordinate’s defeat at Lonato on the 3rd. This unwise move was greatly to Bonaparte’s liking, for it made the probable effect of Sérurier’s intervention even more decisive. The foe was fairly in the trap.
Meanwhile, General Fiorella
had arrived with Sérurier’s division at Guidizzolo at about six in the morning; Würmser still had no clue about his presence, thanks to the effective screening operations performed by the 5th Regiment of Dragoons. “His fire would be the signal for battle,” wrote Napoleon on St. Helena. “We expected a great moral effect from this unexpected onslaught.”59
Unfortunately for the complete success of Bonaparte’s plan, three things now went slightly wrong. Firstly, Fiorella launched his attack a trifle prematurely, and this gave a surprised Würmser just enough time to recover from his surprise, halt his advance against Massena, and turn part of his men to face the new threat. Secondly, not all the Austrian reserves had, in fact, been committed to the frontal battle, and the French troops proved unable to pin those that were. Therefore Würmser was able to fall back toward his old position along the heights, which he held with his first line of battalions and squadrons while the remainder of his army (the second line) filed away to the left to form a new line against Fiorella, leaving part of their number to form a reserve en potence behind their right. Thirdly, some of Bonaparte’s frontal troops, not understanding their full role which now necessitated an immediate attack all along the line, hung back until a shouting General Bonaparte galloped up to stir them from their lethargy. Storming up to Colonel Joubert, commander of one recalcitrant unit, Bonaparte cried out: “Don’t you see Sérurier attacking directly he has arrived? You ought to be engaged already; go with your chasseurs and force the enemy center!”60 A combination of these three errors robbed the battle of any chance of complete success; basically, it was the French timing that had gone astray in each instance. But then General Bonaparte was learning his profession.
The Battle of Castiglione, August 5, 1796: late morning phase
This was nevertheless the moment for the launching of Verdier’s grenadiers of the carefully husbanded masse de rupture. First, covered by Beaumont’s cavalry, Colonel Marmont galloped up his eighteen guns to open a pointblank cannonade against the fortified battery position on the Medolano knoll now forming the “hinge” linking the two fronts of Würmser’s army. As Marmont later recalled the incident in his memoirs: “Under these circumstances I received strong proof of General Bonaparte’s confidence in me; I was still only a chef de bataillon but he placed all the horse artillery under my orders. This consisted of five companies totalling eighteen guns—and they were destined to play an important role. The center and left of the enemy army stretched down obliquely into the plain; the two parts of his line were held together by an isolated redoubt—a short distance from the village of Medolano, covered by heavy guns. The enemy’s caliber was superior to mine; I could only engage him by advancing a great way forward, and although the countryside was open, there was one defile to cross before I could deploy at a convenient range. Enemy shot was raking this defile, which was narrow enough. So I crossed it in sections of two guns at a time; after placing at its head the company in which I had the least confidence, I rushed my column forward at a full gallop; the leading unit was duly wiped out, but the rest of my artillery rapidly deployed and unlimbered at short cannon range.”61
Then the infantry went in with the bayonet, and soon the whole of the Austrian left wing was reeling back in confusion, leaving Monte Medolano in French hands. However, the breakthrough was only limited. Bonaparte at once signaled for renewed efforts by Massena and Augereau. Responding to his appeal, the newly arrived 4th and 5th demi-brigades under Adjutant General Leclerc formed up on Massena’s left and then proceeded to storm the castle of Solferino and the neighboring heights with the greatest élan. At one moment the French light cavalry managed to surprise Austrian headquarters, and General Würmser only avoided capture by a hair’s breadth. It was a shaken Austrian general who thereupon ordered a general retreat. But in fairness it must be stated he had fought a gallant battle, leading many charges in person heedless of risk.
The battle was won—but not so decisively as General Bonaparte could have wished. Würmser, acknowledging defeat, sent his men back toward Peschiera, abandoning 20 cannon, 120 caissons and 1,000 prisoners en route to add to the 2,000 killed and wounded left on the field. However, the French pursuers were so weary after the marches and countermarches of the preceding days—indeed, it had been a notable risk to push them into battle on the 6th at all—that they proved incapable of heading Würmser off from the River Mincio. “It was a complete rout,” reported Bonaparte, “but our troops, worn out by fatigue, could only keep up the pursuit for three hours.”62 And so Würmser and the greater part of his discomfited army lived to fight another day.
Why had Bonaparte failed to bring off his “total” victory? There were perhaps four good reasons. The first was the fact that he had been unable to turn the Austrians strategically before giving battle. Although Sérurier’s division was well positioned to block the road to Mantua, there were insufficient forces available to dominate the roads leading eastward toward Brescia, the Adige and Trent—Würmser’s natural line of retreat—or to prevent the intervention of some 5,000 fresh troops from Peschiera who did much to cover his withdrawal. Secondly, the exhaustion of Massena’s and Augereau’s troops had meant that the “pinning” attack was not executed with the fullest vigor; as a result, only the first Austrian line was fully engaged in battle when Fiorella arrived, and Würmser had at his disposal most of his unused second line. Thirdly, the masse de rupture was hardly large enough to effect a real penetration of the Austrian line; the capture of the Medolano feature exhausted its impetus, and this fact afforded Würmser with the chance of beating a comparatively uncomplicated retreat. Lastly, the strategic pursuit was poor, largely because of the small size and indifferent quality of the French cavalry and the complete exhaustion of the troops.
The Battle of Castiglione, August 5, 1796. Note the preponderance of companies in linear formation as the French advance. In the background is Solferino; Monte Medolano is shown in the right foreground, beyond the Austrian captives.
Nevertheless, these criticisms notwithstanding, it should be recognized that the battle of Castiglione defeated the first Austrian attempt to relieve Mantua preserved General Bonaparte’s hold on the whole of North Italy led to the reimposition of the crucial siege and headed Würmser’s survivors away in a safe direction. Thus Bonaparte achieved most of his strategically defensive aims. Most significantly of all, the form of the battle proves beyond any doubt that Napoleon’s master battle plan was already clear in his mind as early as 1796. In subsequent years he might polish and improve its technique—especially the crucial matter of timing the successive stages—but all the elements of the successful attacks carried out at Austerlitz, Friedland or Bautzen were already in existence and in operation at the battle of Castiglione.
PART FOUR
Oriental Interlude: The Six Acres of Land
THE CAMPAIGN IN EGYPT AND SYRIA, MAY 19, 1798 TO OCTOBER 9, 1799
INTRODUCTION THE SANDS OF MARABOUT
T
HE LANDING OPERATION had been by no means easy and was still incomplete. General Bonaparte stood amid the sand dunes near the insignificant Egyptian village of Marabout, impatiently awaiting the reports of his divisional commanders. He had ordered the landing to commence the previous afternoon (July 1), quitting his quarters in the towering Orient for the pitching deck of a small Maltese galley to lead the first boatloads of troops toward the shore. Although the disembarkation met no opposition it was beset with difficulties from the start. A combination of rough seas, universal seasickness and considerable incompetence had cost the lives of at least twenty men, and even by two o’clock the next morning only an eighth of the 32,000 men of the Army of Egypt had found their way ashore. Menou, Kléber and Bon were rallying their bedraggled commands on the beaches, but General Reynier could find a mere 300 of his division, and there was no trace at all of Desaix’s troops, the horses or the guns. The men were soon complaining of dry throats, but there was no fresh water to be found.
No matter—immediate action was
the cure for their misery; thirst would sharpen the men’s fighting mettle. At three o’clock Bonaparte ordered an advance against the western fortifications of Alexandria, about eight miles away, and at once set off at the head of his men. Around the young fire-eater tramped his somewhat disconsolate staff officers: Berthier, chief of staff, already pining for the charms of his beautiful mistress, left far away in Italy; Cafferelli, the army’s brilliant engineer, stumping through the dunes, his wooden leg often buried to the knee; the huge General Dumas, commander of the cavalry—at this moment a somewhat incongruous appointment as not a single trooper could be found; and lastly, Dommartin, the artillery general, at present without a gun. Behind them the men grumbled, the officers swore in the darkness, but the march went on, and by eight in the morning the leading column was within sight of the walls of Alexandria. For all the present inconvenience, General Bonaparte could at least console himself with the knowledge that he had evaded the fleet of Admiral Nelson, albeit by better luck than by judgment, and brought his army safely to its destination.
18
ORIENTAL OPPORTUNITIES
To understand the origins of this extraordinary campaign it is helpful to glance briefly at the events following the Armistice of Leoben, signed the previous spring. Throughout the greater part of the summer of 1797, the victorious young general ruled his Italian conquests with an almost regal authority from the castle of Mombello, close by Milan, aided by the presence of the artful Josephine, his adored if frivolous wife, and a brilliant coterie of soldiers and scholars. This period was not, however, without its anxieties and problems. Several local risings had to be suppressed and expeditions mounted against Rome and Venice. Much of Bonaparte’s time was further taken up reorganizing the greater part of North Italy into the new Cisalpine Republic, but he took great care to keep in close touch with political developments in Paris.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 28
