In his typically thorough fashion, Bonaparte had ordered comprehensive reconnaissances of the major Alpine Passes as early as December 1799. Three routes were his to choose between. The first, by way of Geneva and the Great St. Bernard, was the shortest from Dijon, but it was narrow and part of the distance appeared impracticable for guns. The second lay over the Simplon Pass, leading almost directly to Milan, and outflanking the western river lines defending the left bank of the Po. The third route was possibly the best of all, for the St. Gotthard, the farthest east of three possible passes, was large enough to accommodate a whole army and its lines of communication. In early April the First Consul envisaged using a combination of the Simplon and the St. Gotthard for the crossing of the Alpine ranges. On arrival in the valley of the Po, Bonaparte intended to move the Army of the Reserve by rapid marches to occupy Stradella, a position on the main road from Piacenza to Alessandria. The advantages of Stradella were obvious; at this point the gap between the Po and the Appenines shrinks to a mere twelve miles and the village, dominating the only practicable road, consisted of stone cottages. Stradella therefore seemed an ideal position, placed as it was athwart the Austrian lines of communication, for the smaller French army, with its noted deficiencies in cavalry and guns, to offer battle. “If the enemy wanted to reopen his communications it had to be by way of Stradella … this position seemed expressly made for the French army; the enemy cavalry could achieve nothing against it, and their great superiority in artillery would be less effective there than almost anywhere else.”18 Bonaparte calculated that Melas would have 120,000 men in the field but expected Massena to tie down at least a third of them, leaving Berthier’s 50,000 and Lecourbe’s 25,000 to face the remainder on practically equal terms. He anticipated that Austrian morale would be gravely shaken by the sudden and unexpected appearance of an enemy in the rear, and that in the ensuing chaotic retreat, the Army of Reserve would be able to engage and obliterate each enemy corps in turn. The French might very well advance beyond Stradella to fight the foe; indeed, Bourienne records the famous incident when his general, stretched full length across his maps on the floor, drove a pin into the village of San Giuliano, three miles to the east of Marengo, exclaiming, “I will fight him here, on the plain of the Scrivia.” Such perspicacity and accuracy, which would do credit to a modern computer, went unnoticed at the time, but the secretary remembered it three months later.
If everything was crystal clear in the consular mind, it was not in any other quarter. Moreau found one excuse after another for continuing his inaction for several days beyond the stipulated deadline of April 20. Added to his growing concern over this continued delay, which could compromise the opening of the St. Gotthard Pass and the transfer of Lecourbe, Bonaparte found Berthier full of doubts and anxieties; the perfect chief of staff was already revealing distinct shortcomings as a commander in chief, if in fact only a nominal one. On April 16, the First Consul felt obliged to add a cheering footnote to his routine despatch: “Soyez gai” (“Cheer up”). The inevitable “fog of war” still further increased Berthier’s despondency, and also his confusion as one incident will show. In the light of the depressing news from Italy, on April 24 Bonaparte required the Minister of War, Carnot, to transmit three instructions to Berthier: he was to move his army to Geneva; he was to transport his military stores over the lake to Villeneuve by boat; and lastly he was to hold himself in readiness for a move on Piedmont and Lombardy by a route to be announced later. In the form in which this message reached Berthier, there was no mention of the first two instructions, nor was there a specific reference to the actual objective, but a new clause had been added mentioning the need to support Moreau. Not unnaturally, Bonaparte was furious with the minister when Berthier replied that he was moving the bulk of the army into central Switzerland ready to cover the Army of the Rhine’s advance. Thenceforward all important communications were sent direct and not through “proper channels.”
Realizing with his habitual foresight that Moreau was capable of disappointing him over the matter of Lecourbe’s corps, and fully aware that the deteriorating Italian situation would brook no further delay, Bonaparte formally raised the strength of Berthier’s army to a nominal 60,000 men on April 26. The same day he wrote to his subordinate, “It is by the Great St. Bernard that I wish you to pass:” To ease the congestion of the crossing and increase its security, the First Consul organized three subsidiary columns which were to cross at different points. General Thurreau, with 2,500 men, was to move past Mount Cenis toward Modane; Chabran, with his division of 6,500, was to use the Little St. Bernard and join the main column at Aosta; and Béthencourt was to demonstrate noisily in the Simplon with a token force of a single demi-brigade. In due course, it was hoped, the assistance from the Rhine Army would pour over the St. Gotthard, thus making use of a fifth pass. Berthier was enjoined to hasten his preparations, for it appeared that the garrison of Genoa was already down to 30 days’ rations.
By these measures Bonaparte hoped he was gaining invaluable time and simultaneously throwing dust in the eyes of Austrian intelligence, but inevitably he was taking considerable risks. By using so many crossing points he doubtless hoped that he would find at least one route practically undefended and at the same time conceal the main axis of his advance for as long as possible. Nevertheless, the fact that he counted on concentrating the various columns of his army on the farther side of the Alps in enemy territory was decidedly dangerous. If Melas reacted quickly and wisely the Austrians might well be able to block the difficult exits from the passes with small holding forces and then maneuver their main force to destroy each isolated French column in turn as they separately debouched from the Alps. Furthermore, the season of the year was still early for crossing the major passes; snow and ice were present in large amounts further to complicate the steep paths, narrow gorges and threatening glaciers. Although the projected crossing was by no means a unique conception—many different armies had crossed the mountains since the days of Hannibal—no modern force had attempted to cross the loftier passes with a full complement of artillery, caissons and forges so early in the year. The army’s chief engineer, General Marescot, described the worst perils to be expected in a report dated May 8: “It is vital to take precautions against avalanches which can bury several battalions in a flash,” he wrote. After advocating the use of marches “when the moon is shining, or during the morning before the sun has melted the surface of the snow,” he recommended the firing of guns to bring down threatening avalanches, and the provision of vinegar to counteract the havoc that the drinking of snow water would wreak on the troops’ digestive systems.19 There is little wonder that pessimists were not lacking in the Army of the Reserve, faced by such an apparently perilous ordeal.
Certain conditions were, however, already operating in favor of the Army of the Reserve. Genoa continued to hold out, albeit on half rations, and the siege distracted most of Melas’ attention from the Alps, as did his conviction that the French would move to defend Provence against the threat of invasion. What is more, after much prodding by Bonaparte and Carnot, General Moreau at last undertook active operations on April 25, and met with considerable success. Lecourbe safely accomplished the Schaffhausen crossing on May 1, and two days later the Army of the Rhine routed the Austrians at Stockach, taking 3,000 prisoners and 9 guns. Engen, Moesskirch and Biberach were the scenes of further successes, and within two weeks General Kray was in full retreat to Ulm, away from the critical regions of Switzerland. After achieving all his initial objectives in this way, Moreau slackened the pressure and became ever more reluctant to release Lecourbe for his special role.
In the meantime, Bonaparte continued to reassure the doubting Berthier: “Thirty thousand men and 30 cannon will make you the temporary master of Italy,” he wrote soothingly on the 2nd. Three days later the pace of events noticeably quickened with the arrival of two variegated pieces of news in Paris. The good tidings told of Moreau’s success at Stockach, but the bad intell
igence was even more significant: Massena had smuggled out a further bulletin putting the possibility of continued resistance at a maximum of 15 days. There was no time to waste. “I leave at midnight,” Bonaparte wrote to Berthier; the same day Carnot was instructed to convey an order to Moreau personally demanding the immediate detachment of Lecourbe. Two messages were dispatched to Genoa. “The Reserve Army is on the march,” ran the first; “I depend on you to hold out until the 20th May.” The second was secretly relayed through Suchet; Massena was to be told—by word of mouth—that it was imperative for his resistance to continue until June 4. Bonaparte calculated he would need a full month to encompass Melas’ destruction.
After leaving Paris at midnight on May 5-6, the First Consul’s cortege reached Geneva very late on the 8th. There, a three-day wait ensued while the artillery completed its preliminary marches and the last formations came into their camps along the north bank of Lake Geneva. The time was spent in inspecting the troops and in making speeches designed to delude Austrian agents concerning the destination of the Reserve. At the same time, a mass of valid orders poured out of headquarters. A secret instruction of the 10th detailed the order of march for the crossing; Lannes was put in command of the advance guard, comprising Watrin’s and Mainoni’s divisions, and Rivaud’s cavalry brigade. This force, perhaps 8,000 strong, was to reach the foot of the Great St. Bernard by the 14th, and was to occupy Aosta on the farther side by the 16th at all costs. The main body was organized into two temporary corps d’armée General Duhesme was to command the troops of Loison and Boudet, and Victor took over Chabran’s and Chambarlhac’s divisions. Monnier’s division, Lecchi’s brigade, the Consular Guard and the army’s trains would bring up the rear of the column. Murat was appointed to lead all the cavalry, and Marmont put in charge of the 48 guns which were to accompany the expedition. Bonaparte’s overall object was to reach Ivrea with the bulk of the army by the 18th—“If the fort of Bard does not delay us,”20 as General Dupont, chief of staff to Berthier, prophetically confided to the acting minister of war in a letter dated the 10th.
Four days later, on the very eve of operations, Carnot reached headquarters to report on the success, or otherwise, of his mission to Moreau. The news he revealed the next morning was not a surprise to Bonaparte, although its impact could have been crushing. “I am going to gather in Switzerland,” wrote Moreau airily, “twenty battalions and as many squadrons as quickly as may be, together with the guns the Minister has asked for. These forces will be under the command of General Moncey.”21 A detailed statement accompanied the letter, revealing that Moreau was ridding himself of the scrapings of his army to the number (on paper) of 18,714 infantry and 2,803 horse, in the place of the skilled Lecourbe’s veteran corps; and in the event, only 11,000 of these troops were to materialize. Bonaparte’s wisdom in raising Berthier’s strength was now fully vindicated; Moreau was being revealed in his true colors, but at least some support was on its way.
However, the 13th had brought one cheering piece of news to the First Consul in the form of a letter from his old comrade Desaix, newly arrived from Egypt after running the British blockade. Bonaparte found time to scribble him a note of welcome: “Come, as quickly as you can, to join me wherever I am. By the time you read this letter I shall be, I hope, at Ivrea.”22 A further message of cheer was sent off to reassure Massena: “The army is all on the march. The aide-de-camp whom you have sent will tell you verbally the state of affairs here. You are in a difficult position, but I am reassured by the fact that you are in Genoa; this is one of those instances when a single man is worth 20,00.”23
The massive operation of transferring the 50,000 men of the Army of the Reserve over the Alps began in the early hours of May 15. The distance from Martigny to Aosta is twenty-five miles. In preparation for this journey each soldier had been issued nine days’ rations and forty cartridges. Behind Lannes, the remainder of the army was echeloned back toward Lake Geneva in five columns which were to march at daily intervals. The most difficult section was expected to be encountered beyond the village of St. Pierre, where the track was reported impassable to heavy wheeled vehicles. “The greatest difficulty was to get the guns over. The Great St. Bernard was deep in snow, and the gradients were steep. General Marmont, commanding the artillery, employed two expedients; the first was to hollow out tree trunks in the form of troughs, into which were laid the eight pounders and the mortars. One hundred men were harnessed to each gun, and took two days to drag them over the St. Bernard. The second method was to use sledges on rollers manufactured by Brigadier Gassendi at Auxonne. The carriages were taken to pieces and carried in sections, except for the mountings of the eight pounders which were carried by ten men apiece on stretchers. The wagons were emptied and sent ahead light, their contents being carried in boxes on the men’s and mules’ backs….”24
Assisted by imaginative measures of this kind, the army made good progress. After clambering up the narrow, precipitous road to the Col, which stood at a height of 8,120 feet above sea level, the weary troops paused at the famous Hospice of St. Bernard, where the monks provided wine, bread and cheese for every man as the columns passed by. Then the even more treacherous descent alongside the rushing waters of the Dora Baltea began. First reports reaching Bonaparte at Lausanne indicated that Lannes was making good progress. The advance guard reached Aosta as ordered on the 16th and captured the place after a sharp but brief skirmish. After awaiting the arrival of Chabran’s division over the Little St. Bernard the following day Lannes routed 1,500 more Austrians at Chatillon. On the 17th, the First Consul moved to Martigny, where he waited three more days before moving up the pass. By that time Lannes had run into real trouble for the first time after reaching the Fort of Bard on the 19th. This constituted a formidable obstacle. The village stood athwart the single road, but the real strength of the position was “a small fortress perched on top of a precipitous rock at the point where the valley is narrowest.” By the 21st the Austrians had been driven out of most of the village, but the commander of the fort, one Bernkopf, with his garrison of 400 grenadiers of the Kinsky regiment and his assorted 26 cannon, had little difficulty in beating off Lannes’ desperate assaults. Berthier set up his headquarters six miles short of Bard, and for a time it seemed that hopeless delay might ruin the timing and impact of the offensive. If Melas was to act quickly enough on the information that must now have reached the Austrian headquarters, he would still be able to block the French incursion. Fortunately for Bonaparte, the enemy failed to evaluate the information until it was too late.
On the 20th, the First Consul set off up the pass riding a mule, paid a short visit to the Hospice, and then continued on his way to Berthier’s headquarters, which he reached the same evening. Part of the downward journey was accomplished in an unconventional fashion. According to the official bulletin: “The First Consul came down from the top of the St. Bernard Pass, sliding and rolling in the snow over steep places and mountain torrents.”
Viewing the situation as a whole, he was not unduly worried by the continued resistance of Fort Bard. Lannes had been enterprising enough to bypass the position with part of his force and push on for Ivrea. In the days that followed, more divisions followed his route over the mule tracks clinging to the side of Monte Albaredo, but such a journey was out of the question for the guns or the cavalry despite the efforts of Marescot’s engineers to improve the way. Without any guns the infantry concentrating around Ivrea were in an unenviable position, but the only way to pass the cannon through to them was by using the road through Bard at dead of night under the very noses of the Austrians. The first two attempts were detected and ended in failure, but on the night of the 24th two four-pounders and one caisson successfully made the perilous journey. “The artillerymen succeeded in drawing their cannon in the dark through the town, close under the guns of the fort, by spreading straw and dung on the streets, and wrapping the wheels up so as to prevent the slightest sound….”25 The next night two eight-pounders
and a couple of howitzers similarly made their way through, and the immediate crisis was over. These six pieces represented the difference between success and failure; leaving Chabran’s division of conscripts with the remainder of the guns to reduce the fort, the bulk of the army hurried on for Ivrea, which Lannes had occupied on the 22nd after driving out 3,000 Austrians. The gallant garrison of Fort Bard held out into early June, and “we have the authority of Napoleon for the assertion that if the passage of the artillery had been delayed till its fall, all hope of success in the campaign was at an end.”26 Bonaparte had met a similar situation the previous year at El Arish on the frontiers of Syria, but Fort Bard did not delay him so long, nor so vitally, for its resistance had been anticipated. By May 24, the greater part of 40,000 men were in the valley of the Po; other detachments were close at hand, and Moncey was reported approaching the St. Gotthard Pass. The gamble had worked; the reserve was’over the Alps and reasonably concentrated on the further side without meeting major interference by the enemy. The prologue was over; Massena in Genoa had fulfilled at least part of his intended role, Melas had made his greatest mistake, and the First Consul was free to consider his next move.
“We have fallen like a thunderbolt,” wrote Bonaparte to his brother Joseph on May 24; “The enemy did not expect us and still seem scarcely able to believe it.”27 His confident tone was largely justified; a total of 66,000 troops were rapidly converging on North Italy, more than two thirds of them already assembled, and the addition of Massena’s 18,000 in Genoa gave the French at least nominal parity with the Austrians, whose original 100,000 first line troops had been pared down to a little over 86,000 by their hard-fought contests with Massena and Suchet. Although the Austrians enjoyed the advantage of interior lines, the greater part of Melas’ force was still distributed in a wide arc around Turin, whereas the French would soon be reasonably concentrated.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 37
