If French provocations are largely to blame for the distinctly unfavorable situation facing her in late 1805, one diplomatic achievement must be credited to Talleyrand. By clever wiles, the ex-Bishop of Autun persuaded Prussia to abstain from immediate participation in the impending European struggle. In spite of his friendly relationship with the Tsar and the strong pro-Russian proclivities of his dynamic and beautiful Queen, Frederick William III could not bring himself to ignore the bribe of the free gift of Hanover dangled before him by Talleyrand, while the proximity of Bernadotte’s corps to Prussian territory further reinforced his determination to “sit on the fence” and withstand all the blandishments of William Pitt and the Tsar, at least for the time being.
Nevertheless, the situation facing France appeared threatening enough. In the near future 200,000 Russian troops under Buxhowden, Kutusov and Bennigsen would be on their way westward to link up with the 250,000 Austrian soldiers led by the three Archdukes, Charles, John and Ferdinand; a further 50,000 English, Swedes and Neapolitans would soon be performing an irritant role on peripheral fronts. Thus William Pitt’s diplomacy had at last succeeded in mobilizing close to half a million men against Napoleon, and if Prussia could be persuaded to change her dilatory policy a further 200,000 would be added to this impressive total. Behind the armies, 66 million Europeans stood ready to defy the “Corsican tyrant” and his 25 million Frenchmen. It was a threatening prospect which was to test severely the military system of the new French Empire; in the following months, however, Napoleon was to prove more than equal to the challenge.
32
LA GRANDE ARMÉE
Before turning to the dramatic events of September to December 1805, we must pause to consider the organization, weapons and tactics of Napoleon’s Grande Armée, so soon to attain its prime. Since the establishment of the Consulate in 1799, Napoleon had devoted no little time to devising a sophisticated weapon of war, ready for any challenges that might materialize. The basis of the new army was, of course, the old revolutionary forces that he received ready-fashioned from Carnot, but between 1800 and 1804 a great many improvements and adaptations were incorporated to make the most of France’s military potential.
At its inception, La Grande Armée was intended to reach a frontline strength of 200,000 men; there were seven corps d’armée, each of which originally contained between two and four infantry divisions, a brigade or division of light cavalry, between 36 and 40 cannon, and additional detachments of engineers and train troops. The composition of these major formations was deliberately kept fluid in order to confuse enemy intelligence and to allow for the varying capabilities of the corps commanders. In addition to the main corps d’armée, Napoleon devised a cavalry reserve, consisting of two divisions of cuirassiers, four of mounted dragoons, one each of dismounted dragoons and light cavalry, supported by 24 guns—a total of 22,000 horsemen. Also in process of formation was an artillery reserve, comprising almost a quarter of the army’s cannon, with a high proportion of 12-pounders; finally there was the new Grand Reserve, basically consisting of the Imperial Guard and various other detachments of élite grenadiers drawn from the line regiments.
These were not essentially new concepts of organization. As we have seen, as early as 1796 General Bonaparte was extemporizing cavalry and artillery reserves, and in 1800 the Army of the Reserve was already organized along rudimentary corps d’armée lines; but during the period of relative quiesence that lasted from 1802 to 1805 these ideas received considerable development and more permanent shape. However, one basic principle of the greatest significance emerged during this period, that of centralization of command and organization. The old “front” armies (Carnot, it will be remembered, had created no less than thirteen) were abolished; henceforward there would be only a single French army, with its main strength concentrated against the most important target and detachments detailed to contain the enemy on other sectors as necessary. As Napoleon wrote, “In systems of war, as in sieges, it is necessary to concentrate all fire on the same point.”18 Including garrisons and second-line troops, La Grande Armée probably comprised some 350,000 men by 1805; in later years it was to grow to more than double that size following the incorporation (from 1806) of ever-increasing numbers of Allied troops. For example, by 1808 there were a total of 520,000 soldiers in the field besides a further 180,000 in the depots and on garrison duties. In 1812, no less than 630,000 men were mobilized against Russia alone, and a further 250,000 were serving in Spain.
How were such huge numbers of troops found? In 1805 about a quarter of the military manpower consisted of seasoned veterans who had seen service in the early days of the Republic; as many more first donned uniform at the time of the Consulate; the remaining 50 per cent consisted of conscripts (with a leavening of genuine volunteers) called up since 1801. To make good the wastage occasioned by sickness, casualties in action and desertion, increasing recourse had to be made to conscription. Based upon Jourdan’s Conscription Laws of 1798,* the Imperial legislation of later years followed a repetitive pattern: all men between the ages of 18 and 40 were expected to register; those between 18 and 25 (subsequently 30) were liable for call-up in annual classes. After 1805, when the Emperor secured the right to fix the proportion of each class called to the colors annually,† the practice of anticipating the annual output of potential recruits became increasingly employed; thus in 1809, faced with a war in Germany as well as one in Spain, the Emperor ordered the mobilization of 100,000 of that year’s class, 20,000 and 30,000 respectively of the classes of 1806 and 1807 (from the balance of men liable for service but not actually called forward in their proper years or who had, by one means or another, succeeded in evading their responsibilities) and a proportion of the class of 1810. By 1813, this practice of mortgaging the future to fill the ranks of the present had reached ludicrous proportions, and mere boys of 15 or 16 (les Marie-Louise) found themselves carrying muskets in the line regiments. Rarely were the annual quotas met, however, for after 1806 military service became increasingly unpopular; the numbers of réfractaires deliberately avoiding call-up and of deserters from the ranks rose steeply, and the hunting down and rounding up of these dissatisfied and often desperate elements of society posed no small problem for the police and National Guard. Until late 1813, however, the practice of purchasing a substitute was permitted, although the cost of legally evading military service in this way soared immensely as casualty lists grew. Many family men were also exempted.
Another important source of soldiers came from abroad. The foreign contingents serving in Napoleon’s army steadily grew over the years. By 1807, approximately a third of his forces were of foreign origin; by 1812 the proportion was fully a half. These troops came into the French service in one of three ways. The earliest were those belonging to areas adjacent to the French territorial frontiers, which were duly incorporated within metropolitan France as a result of conquest and negotiation; secondly, there were the entirely foreign units of what might be termed “mercenaries” included in the French service—the Swiss, the Irish and the Hanoverian “Legions,” etc.; thirdly, there were the national contingents provided by Allied or satellite states—Bavaria, Saxony, Italy, Naples and the rest. The quality of these foreign troops varied considerably—Italians, Swiss and Poles were good, Neapolitans and Dutch generally bad; Germans proved variable.
If it proved troublesome to find sufficient “cannon fodder” to fill the ranks., it was not at first so hard to find good leaders. The real strength of the Grande Armée lay in its superb officer cadres, and until 1812 no serious shortage of suitable material was experienced. The most striking aspect of the leadership was its comparative youthfulness. The Marshalate—re-created in May 1804—set the pattern. The average age of its original 18 members was a little over 44 on appointment; Davout was the baby at 34, Serurier the veteran at 62. Similarly, the general officers fitted into an age group of between 29 and 58 years, while the average age of colonels of regiments was about 39. Of course,
the casualty rate among officers was always high. It was bound to be in a service where the greatest emphasis was placed on the need to demonstrate personal courage and leadership, and after 1808 the rate of officer-casualties rose steeply as the quality of the rank and file deteriorated, necessitating even more self-sacrifice from the chosen leaders. However, there were sources of replacement. Many subaltern officers first attained commissioned rank after long and meritorious service in the ranks of the old army, and it is estimated that fully half the officer corps in 1805 had carried a musket at one time or another. Many new cadres were produced by two particular institutions. The école Spéciale Militaire, founded in 1802 at Fontainbleau (but moved six years later to St. Cyr), was initially capable of producing 100 newly-trained officers a year, and by 1815 no less than 4,000 cadets had passed through its gates to take up commissions in the infantry and cavalry. L’École Polytechnique produced numerous gunners and engineer officers during the same period, perhaps its most celebrated product being General Drouot.
Napoleon could never have enough officers; in later years when regular sources of supply failed to meet the increasing demand, recourse was made to mass-commissioning of sergeants and newly-entered cadets, with adverse effects on standards of ability and overall quality. Nevertheless, promotion remained slow for the average officer, although the prospect of rapid advancement to field and ultimately general rank was always present as an incentive for deeds of outstanding courage and devotion. It is notable that there was a marked fall in the numbers of generals appointed each year under the Empire. In the days of the Republic, a maximum of 170 was once attained in one twelve-month period; under Napoleon, the highest number was only 37. Moreover, of the general officers, a full quarter had seen commissioned service in the old Royal Army; another quarter had enlisted before 1794. There was, therefore, no dearth of experienced officer material in La Grande Armée of 1805; Napoleon found himself served by good executives—men of intelligence who would nevertheless obey his orders blindly without question and execute their duty in the bravest and most determined manner imaginable.
Soldier’s Release Certificate, 1809. Veteran Sravalo is granted an honorable discharge owing to “weakness of chest” and “coughing blood.” After entering the army in January 1790 (the old Royalist Regiment of Flanders), he later served with them artillery and as a Mounted Gendarme. Re participated in no less than thirteen campaigns, and this, together with his “20 years, 1 month and 12 days” of full-time service, entitled him to claim over thirty-three years’ service for purposes of gratuity, and the dignity of “veteran” Among the signatures is that of Count Walther, General of Division, commanding the Imperial Guard. The French Army took better care of its old soldiers than most contemporary forces.
The corps d’élite of the new Imperial Army was, without the shadow of a doubt, the Imperial Guard. This celebrated formation evolved in a most haphazard and complicated fashion over the years, and here it will only be possible to mention the most important developments. Originally, it sprang from three sources—the personal escort (known as the Guides) of General Bonaparte commanded by Captain, later Marshal, Bessières, to which were added selected members of the Guards of the Directory and the Legislative Assembly. These three cadres were combined in late 1799 into the Consular Guard, and five years later underwent a final change of title in the year of the Emperor’s coronation. The Imperial Guard’s size grew enormously. At Marengo, the Consular Guard numbered only 2,089; by 1804 it had developed to comprise 5,000 grenadiers, 2,000 éite cavalry and 24 guns—or a total of some 8,000 soldiers in all; by mid-1805, this number had risen to over 12,000 men; no less than 56,169 Imperial Guardsmen were in service at the time of the Moscow campaign, but the all-time record was reached in 1814 when 112,482 soldiers could claim some type of membership of the Imperial Guard. Thus the corps d’élite developed from the size of a strong regiment to that of an army, but at the very end (“The Hundred Days”) it was down again to 25,870 soldiers.
The Imperial Guard eventually comprised three distinct sections. The original nucleus was the “Old Guard,” a force that eventually comprised foot grenadiers (the archtypical grognards) chasseurs, mounted grenadiers à cheval (known as grosse-bottes), the chasseurs à cheval (the “favored children”), dragoons, lancers, Mamelukes, gendarmes d’élite, besides Marines of the Guard and detachments of gunners and sappers. Then in 1806 was formed the embryo of what became known as the Middle Guard, made up initially of two fusilier regiments to which were eventually added (1812-13) two regiments of flankers, raised from gamekeepers and woodsmen, one and all noted as crack shots. Lastly, in 1809 there was founded the Young Guard, which mainly comprised regiments of light infantry, voltigeurs and tirailleurs. This last-mentioned formation consisted of the pick of each annual conscript class, and was a deliberate attempt to throw a more glamorous light onto the hated duties of compulsory military service; it was noted, however, that the Young Guard never fully attained the standard of the senior Guard formations.
Of course, to serve in the Guard was an immense privilege and honor. The minimum qualification for entry into the Old Guard was five years’ service and two campaigns, and the selection and transfer of suitable recruits was a continuous process. Membership of the Guard carried with it considerable material advantages; the ordinary grenadiers and chasseurs drew the pay of sergeants; Guard corporals were paid on the same scales as line sergeant majors, and so on right to the summit of the hierarchy. Moreover, the Guard always received special rations and equipment allowances, and if there was any food to be had on campaign the rest of the army balefully noted that the Guard got the first share. There was no doubt that the Guardsmen were Napoleon’s “favorite children”; they provided him with a strong reserve of élite troops always at his immediate disposal, ready to be sent into action at the decisive point and place. Until 1813, however, he proved extremely chary of committing them at all, being extremely unwilling to see his cherished protégés—most especially the Old Guard—exposed to cannon shot and musket balls. This hesitation to make full use of the Guard earned Napoleon considerable criticism from both contemporary and subsequent commentators, but he was probably justified in keeping something “up his sleeve” on at least the majority of occasions. The Guard also provided the Emperor with a standard for the rest of the army to emulate; as entry to its sacred ranks was open to any deserving soldier, it served as an incentive for loyal and valorous service. However, the creation of a corps d’élite had at least one bad effect on the army: the ceaseless draining-off of the best soldiers from the line regiments and squadrons to fill the ranks of the Guard undoubtedly weakened the value and fighting capabilities of the original parent units, and it can be argued that the expansion of the Imperial Guard was both unnecessary and wasteful—unnecessary in that the Guard rarely swung the fortunes of battle decisively by direct action (although none contend the moral value of its presence in reserve); wasteful in the way it absorbed the talent of the entire army and removed the most outstanding troops from the ordinary units where their good example might have led to greater emulation on the part of their comrades.
The line infantryman or fantassin;* continued to form the backbone of the Imperial Army, as he had previously served its revolutionary predecessors. The infantry continued to be organized in battalions (the basic tactical unit), but in 1803 Napoleon ordered a return to the old title of “regiment” for all groupings of three battalions (in lieu of the demi-brigades in vogue since 1792). Two or more regiments formed a brigade, and two or more brigades went to make up an infantry division, which frequently had a battery of artillery attached to it, but never any cavalry (the corps d’armée being the smallest force of all arms). The main distinction within the infantry arm remained between line and light. In 1803 there were 90 line and 26 light regiments, but by 1813 no less than 127 new regiments had been brought into being, by which time the proportion of light units had shrunk to approximately one sixth of the total infantry strength. Th
e actual organization of the battalions varied enormously at different periods. Until 1805, the three-battalion regiment contained a total of 27 companies, each battalion comprising one grenadier and eight fusilier companies. Over the next three years, however, a condensed and simplified organization was adopted. The line regiments were reorganized into four combat battalions of six companies each—one grenadier, one voltigeur (light infantry) and four fusilier units making up a battalion’s strength—with an additional depot battalion of four fusilier companies charged with the duties of providing drafts and training conscripts. In its heyday, the line regiment had a strength of 3,400 fantassim, each company containing 140 officers and men. There was also a small regimental headquarters, regimental aid post and a band on the establishment. These full figures were rarely attained in practice, however, despite Napoleon’s urgent endeavors, for the drain on manpower proved too drastic and continuous.
Regimental artillery had been provisionally discontinued by Napoleon after the Peace of Amiens on the grounds that the standard six-pounders were too heavy to accompany infantry in the field without imposing a curb on their mobility. As General Lespinasse wrote in 1800: “If you want to prevent your troops maneuvering, embarrass them with guns…. A line of infantry supported by good, properly established batteries, retains its order of battle better.”19 However, the gradual deterioration in the quality of his infantry as more and more veterans dropped out, to be replaced by increasing numbers of raw conscripts or foreign troops, induced Napoleon to revert to the old system. Thus in 1809-10, a company of artillery (four four-pounders) was provisionally attached to each infantry regiment, and the following year the practice was confirmed. “The more inferior the quality of a body of troops,” the Emperor wrote in 1809, “the more artillery it requires.”20 In 1813 the practice was again abolished, this time on account of the losses of horses and metal incurred during the Russian Campaign.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 44
