There were several reasons why the comparatively undistinguished Lefebvre and his hybrid formation were selected for this task. In the first place, the collection of odd units which made up the new Xth Corps was better suited for such a task than for normal frontline duties. Secondly, there may have been a political motive in the Emperor’s all-embracing mind. He was considering a further step in the creation of the new French peerage, and it was important for the favorable reception of these measures in France that the gallant Lefebvre—after the disgraced Moreau the most respected republican soldier of the later Revolution—should be included in the list of new Dukes. To justify such an elevation, however, Lefebvre had to be given the chance of gaining some form of military distinction, and the command of operations against Danzig seemed to be the perfect appointment for this purpose.
As the historian Macdonnell describes it, however, “Lefebvre was no hustler.”2 Although his men were driving back the Prussian outposts by March 11, it was not until April 24 that the heavy batteries were in position to fire on the main defenses. This is not to belittle Lefebvre as a soldier, for the defending commander, General Kalkreuth, had at his disposal 14,400 infantry and 1,600 cavalry besides 303 guns, 20 howitzers, 26 mortars and full storehouses. Moreover, the defenses of the city were in good trim and the approaches to the main positions were complicated by numerous marshes and waterways. Nor was Lefebvre a “political” soldier, full of republican ideals that might have clashed with his military responsibilities. On an earlier occasion he had addressed himself to the townsfolk of a small town in Franconia, newly “liberated” by the French, in the following terms: “We have come to bring you Liberty and Equality, but don’t lose your heads about it; for the first one of you that moves without my leave will be shot.”3 This was not the language of a ninny.
Nevertheless, the preliminary moves against Danzig consumed a great deal of time. The full investment dates from March 18, but the first parallel was only completed by April 2. A bastion named the Hagelsberg, which commanded the outer line of fortifications, was selected as the target, but the frozen earth proved awkwardly resistant to the onslaught of pick, shovel and entrenching tool. With the development of a thaw, however, progress began to improve, and between April 11 and 14 the second parallel was dug. The garrison attempted a sortie on the 13th and another on the 26th, but both were driven back after heavy fighting amid the trenches. By the 29th, the third and last parallel was prepared within musket shot of the main fortifications, and more raids instigated by Kalkreuth were beaten back. The moment of assault or surrender appeared close at hand, as the forward trenches were extended to cover the last approaches. But eleven days later a fleet of Russian vessels, bearing 8,000 Russian reinforcements under the command of General Kamenskoi, accompanied by a Royal Navy squadron, appeared off the port, and proceeded to disembark the troops at the Prussianheld outpost of Neufahrwasser to the west of the mouth of the Vistula.
The siege of Dancing and the Russion attempt at relief
Fortunately for Lefebvre, the Russian newcomer was disconcerted when he found the island of Holm (intervening between Neufahrwasser and Danzig) already in French hands. For four days Kamenskoi hesitated to launch his attack, staying in the vicinity of his landing place, and this delay enabled Lannes to reach the besiegers’ positions on the 12th with his leading division, followed over the next two days by the remainder of his corps. At last, on May 15, the Russians advanced in four columns to make their attempt at breaking through the besiegers’ ring into Danzig. The effort was directed against the troops of Generals Schramm and Gardanne, holding the low-lying Frische-Nehrung which in turn guarded the approaches to the key island of Holm. Schramm manfully held his ground until Lannes and Oudinot reached the scene with the first reinforcements. After a bitter struggle, the Russian columns reeled back, leaving 1,500 casualties behind them. The attempt to relieve Danzig had failed, and within a few days Kamenskoi re-embarked his men. Had Kalkreuth made a determined sortie at the same instant as the Russian relief force advanced to the attack from the north, the outcome might well have been different, but on this single occasion the garrison, which at all other times maintained the staunchest defense, failed to rise to the occasion and the moment passed forever.
There was still considerable fight left in the garrison, however, as they demonstrated on May 20 by launching yet another sortie, which succeeded in destroying the latest day’s work in the trenches, before being driven back into Danzig. The next day, however, Marshal Mortier’s VIIIth Corps appeared from Colburg to reinforce Lefebvre and Lannes still further. The writing was now on the wall for Kalkreuth. The bastion of the Hagelsberg would be assaulted any day, and its fall was practically assured. Shortly thereafter, the French batteries would be in a position to reduce the city of Danzig to a burning shambles if the garrison continued to resist. Kalkreuth was a realist; he was aware that he would secure better terms by opening negotiations before the preliminary assault took place. Accordingly, when Lefebvre sent forward a final parlementaire under flag of truce on the 22nd, Kalkreuth agreed to bargain. The French terms were generous, for Napoleon required possession of the city without further delay as the spring campaign was opening, and he could ill afford to leave a defiant Danzig in his rear, nor could he spare the three corps now engaged in investing it. The garrison was accordingly granted the full honors of war, and on the 27th Kalkreuth led out his men, drums beating, bayonets fixed, colors flying, to be escorted to the Prussian outposts near Pillau. The garrison formally agreed not to fight against the French or their allies for a twelve-month period. Within the next few days, the remaining outposts also capitulated. A memorable siege was over, and old Lefebvre duly became “le Maréchal due de Danzig” the following year. The Emperor visited the city on the 30th and appointed General Rapp as governor.
52
THE BATTLE OF HEILSBERG
On the main front the last two months had not passed entirely without incident. During March, large Russian forces were reported moving up to the vicinity of Elbing, and the Emperor thought it advisable to take certain precautionary measures. On April 12, Imperial Headquarters were moved back to Finkenstein, and as the month progressed, the likelihood of a sudden Russian offensive intended to relieve pressure on the garrison of Danzig steadily increased. Consequently, in early May, Napoleon ordered the army out of its bivouacs and moved the corps behind the rivers Passarge and Alle to avoid a repetition of January’s surprise attack. All that actually transpired, however, was a series of small and ill-coordinated Russian attacks along the lines of the Passarge and the Narew, designed to divert attention from the impending landing of Kamenskoi’s force near Danzig. But these proved singularly ineffective, and on May 14, all activity once more ceased along the main front. By this time, the French in Poland numbered 220,000, while Bennigsen controlled only some 115,000 men, mainly made up of 87,000 regular infantry, 11,000 cavalry and 8,000 Cossacks.
Nevertheless, it was the Russians who once again made the first definite move on June 5, when columns moved through Heilsberg to attack the bridgeheads of the 1st Corps and the IVth Corps at Spanden and Lomitten respectively. The French successfully beat off these local onslaughts, but it soon became evident that these operations were merely bluffs to confuse the French command. A few days later, after marching rapidly southward, the Russians reappeared in strength opposite Deppen and fell upon Ney’s forward positions. To counter this new threat, Napoleon moved Davout’s corps up to Osteröde, and gave orders for all available reserves to gather at Möhrungen. Eventually, four French Corps (the 1st, IIIrd, IVth and VIth) were involved in the fighting before the Russians suddenly fell back. One casualty of note during the 5th was the Prince of Ponte Corvo, wounded in the head by a musketball. The 1st Corps was accordingly temporarily assigned to General Victor.
The Emperor was still by no means sure what Bennigsen was about. The only fact of which he was certain was that Königsberg constituted the Russian center of operations. He determine
d, therefore, to try to cut off Bennigsen from his base, but the enemy’s general intentions and possible reactions remained a mystery. The Emperor asked Davout:
What will the enemy do? Will he continue to march toward Allenstein while we still retain possession of Deppen and Liebstadt? If so, very singular events may well take place.
All my cavalry and infantry reserves are concentrating between Saalfeld and Möhrungen; I will myself be at Saalfeld in an hour’s time, and I hope to hear from you two or three times during the night if this is at all possible.
It is necessary to leave nothing at Allenstein—everybody must be evacuated to Marienwerder, for my line of operations is to run from that town to Marien-burg and thence to Danzig. The enemy is moving as though my line was still based on Thorn.
No doubt you will select advantageous positions at Osteröde from which you will be able to hold up the enemy should he advance thither. You are my extreme right wing. Until the enemy attacks you there my intention is to pivot on you. I am relying on the courage of your corps and your staunchness—and even more on your guns and strong positions—to win us as much time as possible.4
The next day (June 6), Imperial Headquarters decided to employ a stratagem to delude Bennigsen. Mindful of the havoc wrought on Napoleon’s plans in late January when a message inadvertently fell into enemy hands, a bogus dispatch was now fabricated with the intention that it, too, should be captured by Cossacks. This document, addressed to Ney, revealed that Davout was on the point of attacking the Russian rear areas with a force of 40,000 men. In fact, Napoleon’s target was the entrenched Russian camp at Heilsberg on the Alle. Two officers were sent off with copies of this message after being very comprehensively briefed about the routes they were to take. Of course, it could not be revealed to them that they were expected to be captured for the Russians might have grown suspicious, but the fact that their journeys were directed so close to places known to be occupied by the enemy might have provided them with a clue. One officer performed prodigies of valor and succeeded in making his way to Ney’s headquarters with his message, to the Emperor’s considerable chagrin when the man reported back on the successful completion of his mission. The second messenger, however, performed his intended function to perfection.
When the 7th dawned, Napoleon was still little the wiser about Bennigsen’s intentions. “I am still guessing what the enemy intends to do,” he wrote to Bernadotte. “Everything has the air of an impending massive blow…. I am going to try to find the foe and force a major battle to finish him off.”5 On the 8th, he calculated that the impetus of the Russian offensive must have expended itself in the actions three days earlier, and he ordered his forces to assume the counteroffensive. There was no longer any doubt that the Russians were falling back, and it was necessary to smite them without delay before they could retire to the sanctuary of Königsberg. Some Russian prisoners taken during the day confirmed his impression that Bennigsen was falling back on Güttstadt to concentrate. “It is probable that I shall move on Güttstadt tomorrow,”6 the Emperor confided to Soult. The 9th indeed found him on the road thither accompanied by Ney, Davout, Lannes, the Imperial Guard and the reserve cavalry, but when he reached the environs of the town there were few signs of the enemy apart from a rear guard. Bennigsen had indeed originally determined to offer battle at Güttstadt that day and had summoned the greater part of his divisions to join him there, but in the late morning he had changed his mind, being dissatisfied with the position, and consequently ordered the withdrawal to continue to Heilsberg. Meanwhile, Napoleon’s formations moved inexorably toward Güttstadt through the heat of the early East Prussian summer. Soult’s corps, moving up from Möhrungen, soon found itself embroiled with Kamenskoi’s retiring command, but this affair caused only a brief delay. Similarly Murat’s cavalry found themselves faced by Bagration at Glottau as the Russian turned at bay to cover the retreat of his confederates from Güttstadt. A brief fight ended in the precipitate retreat of Bagration once more, but Platov’s Cossacks gallantly covered his withdrawal over the Alle and successfully burned the bridges behind him. By nightfall, Ney, Murat and the Guard were masters of Güttstadt, Davout was in possession of the Alle’s left bank above the town, Mortier was fast approaching, Soult’s corps was camping around Altkirch, but the Russians were gone.
Napoleon was now more than ever determined to cut Bennigsen off from Königsberg and drive him away from his few remaining Prussian allies. During the night orders were issued instructing Murat, Soult, Lannes and Ney, together with Savary’s grenadiers, to march directly on Heilsberg with their joint 50,000 men, while the corps of Davout and Mortier prepared an outflanking movement against the Russian right flank. The Guard was, as usual, to be kept in reserve. Further to the north, General Victor, now in command of the 1st Corps, was to retain the Prussians on the Lower Passarge and in due course drive them back into Königsberg.
As Napoleon and his suite galloped north to join his perspiring columns, he suddenly swung off the road to the left and rode up to the summit of a commanding height to view the countryside. We are indebted to the historian de Norvins for the following brief glimpse of Napoleon at work in full campaign:
After arriving on the large flat plateau which crowned the height, the Emperor reined in his horse and leaped to the ground, calling out, “Berthier—my maps.” Immediately, the Grand Equerry made a sign to the staff orderly bearing the portfolio of maps, opened the case and handed it to the Chief of Staff, who, hatless, spread an immense map on the turf; onto this the Emperor advanced on his knees, then on all fours, and lastly at full length, using a small pencil to mark it up. In this position he remained for a full half hour, in deep silence. In front of him, awaiting a sign or an order, stood the motionless grand dignitaries, their heads uncovered despite the blazing sun of the northern summer.7
Despite this commendable application to cartographical study, the battle of Heilsberg on June 10 proved a failure for the French and a tactical success for the Russians. The heights on each side of the Alle were strongly fortified with entrenched redoubts, and among these Bennigsen had drawn up his nine divisions to the best advantage. Murat was the first on the field. Initially his efforts were crowned with success as he drove the Russian advance posts from the outlying village of Launau, and his men rode forward towards Bevernick. But once there, he was pinned down by a well-sited Russian battery, and was forced to await the arrival of Soult’s infantry and guns before the capture of the hamlet could be attempted. Hardly had this been achieved at about 3:30
P.M. than Murat was violently attacked, after making an unwise move, by Bagration’s and Uvarov’s massed squadrons. Murat was, by this time, in a foul temper with all and sundry. The troopers of the vaunted cavalry reserve were soon in full flight, and only the timely arrival of General Savary’s two fusilier regiments and twelve guns saved the situation.
There was little gratitude in the Prince of Berg, however, and he roundly reviled his deliverer, accusing him of cowardice.
As the Russian horsemen fell back in their turn, Bagration’s right flank was exposed, but the Grand Duke Constantine saw the danger and by skilfully deploying his guns on the right bank of the Alle to enfilade Soult’s advancing divisions as they crossed the Spuibach brook, he succeeded in averting the danger. Throughout the late afternoon and evening the fighting raged on as Soult urged his men forward time after time against the Russian redoubts on the left bank of the Alle. The struggle became one of sheer attrition, but the numerical advantage and the terrain were decidedly on the side of the Russians. Napoleon hounded on his subordinates, but by late afternoon the entire French line was in the act of reeling back over the Spuibach under heavy pressure from the Russians, when Lannes’ leading division made its appearance on the left. Although the French would have been well advised to call off the action at this point and accept the fact of a repulse, the dashing newcomer thought differently. Eager to snatch a victory from near defeat under the eyes of his Emperor, Lannes drove
his men forward in a terrible night attack at 10:00
P.M. and received the severe drubbing such an ill-considered action deserved, losing 2,284 casualties in the process. Only at 11:00
P.M. did the firing die down for the night.
The French calculated their losses as they waited for the dawn. In addition to Lannes’ casualties, Soult had suffered 8,286 killed and wounded, and thus the French had lost well over 10,000 men without gaining any advantage. The Russians had successfully held their main positions for the loss of perhaps 8,000 men. Covered by night, the camp followers and local peasantry swarmed onto the stricken field to strip the dead and wounded in their search for loot. When the sun’s rays revealed the pitiful debris these human scavengers left behind them, “by mutual, though unspoken consent, French and Russian met peacefully on the ghastly plain to bury the dead and remove the wounded.”8
Both sides then prepared to renew the struggle, but although the Russian batteries laid down a heavy bombardment, no further action developed. Napoleon had decided—as well he might the previous day—that he could force Bennigsen to relinquish his strong position by maneuver rather than direct assault. Pressed by Mortier and Davout through the day, Bennigsen accordingly began to retire toward Bartenstein during the night of June 11 to protect his threatened communications, abandoning his stores and wounded in the redoubts on the hillsides.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 70
