However, in October 1808 Moore was still an unknown quantity as an independent army commander and it was to be some little time before he found his feet amid the unfamiliar and baffling surroundings of Portugal and Spain. His orders from the British Government were to join up with General Baird’s division of 12,000 reinforcements (presently on their way by sea from England to Corunna) in the general vicinity of Valladolid before undertaking operations in support of the Spanish armies in the Castillian plain as occasion offered. Difficulties of supply, inadequate transport, poor roads and chronic Spanish liaison were, however, destined to delay Moore’s effectual entry into the Spanish campaign until the first week of December. At the very outset, a glaring miscalculation on the part of his staff and their local advisors resulted in Moore’s guns, trains and scanty cavalry being sent off under General Hope from Lisbon toward Salamanca along a circuitous 380-mile route through Elvas, Badajoz, Talavera and Escurial, in the mistaken belief that the more direct road through Coimbra (followed by the rest of the army) was wholly unsuitable for heavy equipment. As a result the guns had to travel a full 130 miles further than the infantry columns. It was not to be until December 3 that the last components of Moore’s own army succeeded in reaching the rendezvous near Salamanca, although the commander in chief and his infantry had reached the city as early as November 13. Even as late as the first week in December there was still no sign of General Baird’s column. That unfortunate officer had arrived in transports off Corunna on October 13, but owing to the intransigence of the local Spanish authorities he was permitted to land only on the 26th. Once Baird was ashore his troubles really began. Despite grandiloquent promises, no transport had been provided for his stores, nor were adequate food supplies made available for his men. As a result the secondary British force only managed to make its way as far as Astorga by November 22, and was still a full 100 miles away from Moore at Salamanca three weeks later. To all intents and purposes, therefore, the French had little cause to concern themselves about the British until mid-December. Even then, as we shall see, they had only the very vaguest idea of Moore’s whereabouts or intentions. Nevertheless, despite the chronic inadequacies of the commissariat service and of its allies, the British army was destined to play an important part in determining the final outcome of Napoleon’s campaign of 1808, and the Emperor himself would in due course be moved to pay tribute to Moore’s abilities. Long before Sir John could intervene in the struggle, however, the ludicrous incapacities of the Spanish strategists had resulted in the successive defeat and scattering of all their forces in the field.
The plan of campaign evolved by the Spanish generals was, from the very start, riddled with inconsistencies and dangerous strategical errors. The scheme that emerged from lengthy consultations envisaged a double envelopment of the French forces from east and west, designed to cut the French off from their Pyrenean lifelines. Blake was to press eastward from Reynosa toward Bilbao along the Biscay coast while Castaños and Palafox swept forward in the general direction of Caparrosa and Pamplona to turn Moncey’s flank, leaving a slim force to contain Ney and Bessières in the center near Burgos. At the same time, the siege of Barcelona was to be pressed forward and brought to a satisfactory conclusion.
In making these decisions, three basic mistakes were committed. In the first place, no provision was made for a centralized command capable of coordinating the various thrusts. Castaños had some makings of a good soldier, but he held no authority over his fellow captain-generals. Secondly, a large gap was deliberately allowed to develop between Blake’s western army and the forces of Castaños and Palafox away to the east, the only troops available for the protection of this intervening area being the weak Army of Estremadura at Burgos (at least, until Sir John Moore could make his presence felt). Thirdly, an altogether disproportionate number of first and second line troops were under orders to head for distant Barcelona when their presence was urgently needed to strengthen the center. Sir John Moore described the Spanish plan for encircling the French as “a sort of gibberish”; 80,000 Spaniards, divided into two wings separated by 200 miles, with no strong covering force to hold their center, could hardly hope to surround even 65,000 French troops led by veteran commanders (who were, in any case, on the point of receiving massive reinforcements over the Pyrenees). Indeed, the overall weakness of the Spanish position was graphically demonstrated as early as October 25, when Ney, Moncey and Bessières launched a small-scale attack against Castaños’s center and right, and successfully reoccupied Logroño to the south of the Ebro. In great alarm, Castaños and Palafox immediately halted the preparations for their own offensive and ordered their men to concentrate around Tudela and Saragossa. Thus the initiative had already passed out of Spanish hands even before the arrival of Napoleon and the greater part of the reinforcements from Germany. However, on November 5, a deputation from the Supreme Junta at Madrid arrived at the front to order Castaños to resume his offensive preparations willy-nilly, and consequently the Spanish armies remained at their dangerously exposed positions at Saragossa and Calahorra although it was prudently agreed to delay the forward move against Moncey until tidings arrived from the Biscay flank concerning the fortunes of General Blake’s advance, which, by this date, should have been well under way.
Under these general circumstances of Spanish fumbling and incompetence, there is small wonder that Napoleon made short work of the Bourbon armies once he arrived at the front. After returning to Paris from Erfurt, the Emperor lost no time in hurrying southward to Bayonne; he arrived in the city at two in the morning of November 3. By that time, his military preparations for the new Spanish campaign were practically complete. On his order, the minister of war had commenced the mobilization of 140,000 new conscripts (Classes of 1806-10) on September 10; three days earlier, an Imperial decree had outlined the reorganization of the French Army of Spain, bringing into existence a reorganized and strengthened force of six corps d’armée, three of which (the Ist, IVth and VIth) were being transferred from the German front.* Two more corps, Mortier’s Vth and Junot’s repatriated VIIIth, were to follow their predecessors over the Pyrenees in due course to form a reserve. Throughout September and October, a living tide of seasoned troops flowed southward. To improve the quality of the formations already in Spain the pernicious system of provisional regiments and bataillons de marche was discontinued, the former being assimilated into the army’s regular establishment, the men of the latter being drafted back into their parent units.
As we have seen, part of Ney’s command was on the scene of action in time to take part in the limited attacks of October 25. After leaving Glogau and Liegnitz on August 22, the remaining formations of his command were hurrying to the Rhine using all available means of transport. “We journeyed by brigades,” noted sous-lieutenant Alphonse d’Hautpol. “Columns of four or five hundred four-horse wagons traveled at the trot, each carrying two regiments. Twice a day we ate meals which we found prepared for us in the fields bordering the road. By this means we covered thirty leagues a day, spending each night in villages or bivouacs.” After the Rhine had been crossed at Worms, the troops were required to continue their march on foot, but the pace hardly slackened. “We were expected to make a double-march each day,” continued our informant, “… Three hundred leagues lie between Worms and Bayonne, but we had only four rest days.”33 At many towns in France triumphant arches spanned the roads, and the footsore troops were liberally feted by the local townsfolk on the Emperor’s express orders. These measures proved successful in keeping the men’s morale at a high level, and the numbers that deserted or fell by the wayside remained remarkably small. The same was equally true of the other forces converging on Bayonne and Irun. Indeed, the transfer operation was a masterpiece of planning and administration. Thanks to its effectiveness, Napoleon was eventually able to mass close on 200,000 men between the Ebro and Bayonne.
By the time he reached the front, the Emperor had formulated his plan of campaign. The Spaniards appeared to be playing str
aight into his hands by continuing to pursue their rash strategy of encirclement. From the reports of his subordinates, Napoleon was soon aware of the gap dividing Blake and his fellow generals. From this he deduced that the further the two disconnected Spanish wings could be persuaded to advance, the greater would be the likelihood of their total destruction. A swift French thrust over the Ebro at the right moment to capture Burgos would place both Spanish wings in the direst peril. A well-timed double outward wheel through Logroño and Burgos, east and west, would, all being well, lead to the complete encirclement of both Spanish wings within a very few days, and leave the road to Madrid open in the center.
The Emperor apportioned responsibilities for the various phases of this master plan as follows. Ney and Moncey were between them to hold, outflank and ultimately destroy Castaños and Palafox, while Lefebvre and Victor meted out similar punishment to General Blake; once these operations were well in hand, Napoleon would lead the remainder of his army (followed in due course by a further 43,000 men of Mortier’s and Junot’s reserve corps) in a dash for the Spanish capital, storming the defiles of the Somosierra and Guadarrama en route. It appears that at this juncture Napoleon had no knowledge of the existence of either the Army of Estremadura at Burgos or Sir John Moore’s force moving up from Portugal, but these omissions were to have few adverse effects on his master plan. The former was too weak to prevent the initial breakthrough at Burgos, while the latter was still too far distant to intervene effectively, at least during the initial stages of the French offensive.
From the strategical point of view, the Emperor’s plan of operations is very impressive in its underlying simplicity and apparent infallibility. An initial powerful thrust over the Ebro, followed by two simultaneous “manoeuvres sur les derrières” against the isolated Spanish wings while the remaining third of the French army pushed ahead for Madrid in exploitation of the initial breakthrough—this was indeed the concept of a military mastermind. The presence of two further corps moving over the Pyrenees in the second wave would similarly provide a powerful reserve which could readily be employed on any sector of the front as need arose. The whole scheme is an impressive example of the way in which Napoleon was able to grasp the weakness in his enemy’s dispositions and make the most of superior numbers and a perfectly devised central position to encompass their downfall.
However, as on many preceding and later occasions, the execution of the successive stages of Napoleon’s plan was partially marred by mistakes on the part of his subordinates. In the first place, it was clearly important that the French attack should be timed for exactly the right moment if it was to achieve maximum effect. In other words, it was vital that the Spanish armies should be lured as far as possible from their bases before the trap was sprung; any premature French attack might make the foe aware of his danger and give him time to retire out of immediate peril. Accordingly, the Emperor ordained that no part of the offensive was to open until he gave the express order.
One hound, however, managed to slip the leash. It is easy to imagine the Imperial wrath, when, as he prepared to leave Bayonne for Vittoria on November 4, Napoleon learnt that Marshal Lefebvre had launched a premature attack against General Blake on October 31 in direct contravention of his orders. As part of Blake’s hybrid army straggled hesitantly eastward from Reynosa through Bilbao, the temptation to attack its 19,000 men with the 21,000 troops of the IVth Corps proved too great for the aged Duke of Danzig, who had always longed for the chance of fighting an important battle on his own. As a result, he ordered his men to attack forthwith. At the combat of Pancorbo, Blake sustained a sharp rebuff, losing some 600 men killed, wounded or captured while the French lost fewer than 200 casualties. However, the outcome was in no way decisive, save that it induced Blake to order a precipitate retreat westward, the one eventuality the Emperor had been so anxious to avert. Thus, by the time Napoleon learned of the engagement, the first of his intended victims had succeeded in placing 40 miles between himself and the nearest French formations, thanks to Marshal Lefebvre’s refusal to obey instructions.
In spite of this annoying contretemps, it was still possible that Marshal Victor would be in time to cut off Blake’s retreat, providing he received adequate support from the rest of the army. It was clearly time for Napoleon to move forward over the Ebro, for the moment was also opportune on the eastern flank, where Ney and Moncey had carefully moved their troops into close proximity with those of Castaños and Palafox unnoticed by the enemy. Accordingly, as soon as he reached army headquarters at Vitoria on November 6, the Emperor ordered the offensive to begin without further delay, although he made several important alterations to the timings of the various thrusts in order to compensate for Lefebvre’s premature intervention. For the time being, the easterly attack against Castaños and Palafox was to stay in abeyance, while every effort was concentrated on seizing Burgos in the center and trapping Blake on the right before he could make good his escape. To achieve the latter object, Lefebvre and Victor were ordered to continue their pursuit with all speed, and the IInd Corps was to lose no time in swinging northwards from Burgos once the city was in French hands so as to sweep deeply into Blake’s rear and thus ensure that the French trap should close about him.
On the morning of November 7, the second Spanish Campaign duly opened, and the French eagles were once again in full flight, seeking out their prey. However, if Lefebvre’s premature attack had almost compromised Napoleon’s offensive before it could even begin, a series of new errors by certain French commanders and an inexplicable lethargy on the part of others soon provided fresh grounds for the expression of Imperial displeasure.
From disturbing dispatches which reached headquarters on November 6, it appeared that Lefebvre and Victor had fallen into the basic error of underestimating the caliber of General Blake after his easy repulse at Pancorbo. They were consequently conducting the pursuit in a fortuitous fashion, allowing their divisions to become dangerously strung out and separated. Their unpreparedness was demonstrated on the night of November 4 when General Blake suddenly reversed his march and returned eastward to rescue a subordinate trapped in a defile by the French vanguard. By this time Blake’s strength had been raised to 24,000 men by the arrival of La Romana’s division, and this sizeable force suddenly fell “out of the blue” to attack the leading French division of General Vilatte early on November 5. In a short time, this isolated force had been driven out of the village of Valmaçeda, and the trapped Spaniards immediately rejoined their victorious comrades. For a time it seemed that Vilatte would be engulfed—few supporting French units were close by and no reinforcements came to his aid—but the French managed to fight their way out, formed in square, for a loss of 300 prisoners and one gun. Within two days the situation was redressed when the Duke of Danzig’s corps moved up to intercept Blake’s forces and the Spanish commander was soon heading westward once more to evade the trap. But Napoleon was furious that even a slight check should have been inflicted on his men by “the worst army in Europe.” Berthier was instructed to issue a stiff reprimand to the Duke of Belluno: “His Majesty is severely displeased,” began this missive, “that you left General Vilatte at grips with the enemy without moving to his aid; your fault is aggravated by the fact that you knew Marshal Lefebvre had already made the mistake of leaving your single division exposed by moving his two divisions toward Bilbao.”34 The pursuit, however, was still left in Victor’s hands.
Nevertheless, only five days after the affair of Valmaçeda, a chance occurred for Victor to make amends for his former misconduct. After retreating toward Reynosa throughout the 8th and 9th, General Blake suddenly decided to turn again and face his pursuers, choosing for his stand a sound defensive position hard by the township of Espinosa. Throughout the 10th, the three divisions of Victor’s corps successively dashed themselves against Blake’s 23,000 men and six guns, but their attacks were piecemeal and poorly coordinated by the Duke of Belluno, who wanted a quick, easy victory to redeem his sull
ied reputation, and as a result at nightfall’ the Spaniards were still holding their ground—no mean achievement against 21,000 French troops. However, the following morning Victor mounted a more scientific attack, broke Blake’s center, and sent the army of Galicia scattering for the hills with an initial loss of some 3,000 casualties. It was not in itself a decisive action, but fully half of Blake’s men never rejoined their colors.
Another senior officer to earn Napoleon’s displeasure was the victor of Medina Seco the previous July, Marshal Bessières, commander of the IInd Corps. Bessières was ordered to advance with all speed from Pancorbo and seize Burgos on the 6th, but three days later he had still not moved into sight of his objective. The Emperor had no time for sluggards, however fine their previous record, and the Duke of Istria was immediately replaced in command of the IInd Corps by Marshal Soult, newly arrived from France.* Bessières was relegated to command the cavalry reserve, a post of inferior responsibility but close under the Emperor’s eye, which pleased his vanity.
Once the urge to reorganize affairs had Napoleon in its grip, he rarely did things by halves. This same period saw several corps turned inside out; perhaps Ney suffered most—by the time the reshuffle was over his command had been reduced to a mere two divisions, both newly arrived from Germany—but hardly a major formation remained unaltered as the Emperor transferred and interchanged brigades and divisions wholesale.
Nevertheless, a new sense of urgency galvanized the French army following these changes in administration and command. Very soon, 67,000 men were pounding down the road to Burgos (November 9), led by Soult’s IInd Corps and two divisions of cavalry. With such a mighty armament bearing remorselessly down on the city, the 10,000 available men of the Army of Estremadura had little chance of offering effective resistance. The army had been recently placed under the command of the youthful and rash Count Belvedere, following General Galuzzo’s abrupt recall to Aranjuez to answer a set of treason charges before the Supreme Junta. The new commander did nothing to improve his chances by insisting on marching out of the city to take up a hopeless position near the village of Gamonal, and there he was duly fought and scattered on November 10 by one cavalry and one infantry division under the personal direction of Marshal Soult. Five Spanish battalions were cut to pieces by the 5,000-strong French cavalry in the twinkling of an eye, and the remainder turned and fled, abandoning 16 guns and losing 12 colors besides between three and four thousand men. The panic-stricken soldiery turned deaf ears to the appeals of their general, who repeatedly tried to rally the flood of fugitives, and the human tide fled onward toward the distant town of Lerma, sweeping away with them the unblooded 3rd Division as it moved up in support. By the evening of the 10th the Emperor’s headquarters was established in Burgos, and the French celebrated their success by sacking the town with their usual thoroughness and indiscipline.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 78
