P.M. on the 20th. Stretching from Bissamberg to the vicinity of Mühleuten beyond Gross-Enzersdorf was a long cordon of cavalry patrols commanded by General Klenau; stronger infantry outposts were maintained in some of the towns and villages bordering the Danube. Behind this security force, the main Austrian corps (six in number in addition to the cavalry reserve) were drawn up along the northern edge of the Marchfeld between the Danube and Wagram, headquarters being temporarily sited in the hamlet of Seiring. This was a well-conceived and commanding position, permitting the employment of a mobile defense, but the Archduke Charles had clearly not recovered from the drubbings of April. His address to his men on the 19th spoke more of containing Napoleon’s army than of destroying the enemy, and it was clear that defensive considerations filled his mind. He made no attempt to call in large outlying detachments to strengthen his position still further, but left Kollowrath’s IIIrd Corps far away to the west and even sent further units to the rear.
Meanwhile, Berthier was drawing up a detailed timetable for the crossing. According to this, the division of General Molitor was to lead the way, crossing over to Lobau island in boats on the night of the 18th-19th to serve as a covering force for the sappers building the bridge span. The pontoons were to be in place by daybreak on the 20th, when the three remaining divisions of the IVth Corps and the two divisions of the cavalry reserve were to cross over onto the island and thence by a second bridge onto the north bank. These forces would be followed by the IInd Corps the next morning, the rear being brought up by elements of Davout’s IIIrd Corps (if required), presently under orders to remain in a state of readiness between St. Polten and Vienna. To distract the enemy’s attention from the first moves, a diversionary, attack—or at least the threat of one—was to be launched from the vicinity of Nussdorf on the further side of Vienna. Such was the outline of the operational plan, hastily made and poorly prepared, being based on false assumptions and gross miscalculations concerning both the characteristics of the Danube and the dispositions and capabilities of the enemy army.
The French sappers settled down to work with a will. To span the 825 yards between the right bank and Lobau island, 68 pontoons and 9 rafts were required. The work was still in an early stage when, on the evening of the 18th, Molitor crossed over into Lobgrund (an outlying island adjoining Lobau) and drove out the sparse Austrian garrison. Then, under cover of darkness, the real bridging work began and continued throughout the next day and night. During the 19th, General Molitor took possession of the whole of Lobau island and sited six guns to cover the approaches to Mühlau, where the salient had been provisionally selected for the final crossing point. At midday on the 20th, rather behind schedule, the two parts of the main bridge were joined, and the IVth Corps and cavalry began to cross onto Lobau. Napoleon in person visited the forward positions and confirmed the siting of the final span opposite Mühlau. By six in the evening this 125-yard section made up of 15 pontoons and three trestles was complete, and all appeared ready for the passage of the army. First across were the men of Massena’s corps, who lost no time in pushing forward to occupy the virtually undefended towns of Aspern and Essling. All was not going quite so well to the rear, however, for the first of a sequence of breaches had been smashed in the main pontoon bridge by a large Austrian hulk, floated down on the fast current. This setback prevented the crossing of any more troops onto Lobau that night.
Napoleon still had no reason to expect a large battle on the northern bank. The large number of light cavalry included at the head of the crossing schedule indicates that he still expected to have to search for Charles’ army. At 4:00
A.M. on the 21st, the Emperor held a consultation with his marshals to discuss the situation. Bessières’ advanced cavalry patrols, who might be expected to have discovered the presence of the main Austrian army so close to the bridgehead, sent back no such tidings; clearly the French reconnoitering cavalry proved a broken reed on this occasion. As there were no reports of the enemy, Lannes gave it as his opinion that the army would encounter no more than 8,000 Austrians on the 21st at the very outside. Only the wary Duc de Rivoli hazarded a guess that the enemy might already be nearby in force, but the consensus was against him.
Archduke Charles, of course, was already within easy striking distance of the French bridgehead, as Napoleon should have known had his intelligence and scouting services been equal to their work. Signals from the Bissamberg observatory informed Charles that the French had repaired their bridge and were again crossing in a continuous stream; clearly, then, this was no bluff. Accordingly, at ten o’clock on the 21st Charles ordered his infantry to prepare for an attack in five columns along a six-mile front. Three corps (VIth, 1st and IInd) were to attack Aspern; the IVth, divided into two columns, was to attack Essling; the Austrian cavalry would form the link between the two wings. All movements were to commence at noon, the aim being to drive the French back into the island of Lobau rather than to effect their complete destruction.
No inkling of the gathering storm reached the French outposts. Even Massena allowed himself to be lulled by the comparative calm and failed to order the construction of fortifications at either Aspern or Essling. By midday there were three French infantry and two cavalry divisions in the bridgehead area, two of the former (Molitor and Legrand) being responsible for Aspern and its environs, the third (Boudet) being put under the command of Marshal Lannes for the day and charged with the defense of Essling. The central linking sector—marked by a slightly banked road—was in due course occupied by Bessières’ cavalry. However, Napoleon was becoming increasingly anxious about the vital bridge linking Lobau with the south bank. Not only had the Danube risen three feet overnight, but a continuous series of water-borne missiles—fireships, logs and floating mills—continued to batter the leaking pontoons. Shortly after midday a second breach was made, and the flow of troops again interrupted. The Emperor even toyed with the idea of calling off the whole operation, but the impending Austrian attack was soon to make this virtually impossible.
Shortly after one o’clock, the leading units of the Austrian 1st Corps drove Molitor’s outposts back into Aspern. The French were taken unmistakably by surprise; the combination of a low ridge and a convenient dust storm served to disguise the impending attack until almost the last moment. Fortunately, Molitor was equal to the occasion; by superhuman efforts he drove back the first, rather ineffective Austrian attack, and gained enough time to summon all his four regiments into the town. All afternoon repeated Austrian attacks were met and repulsed, but by 5:00
P.M. all three Austrian Corps were in a half-circle around Aspern, and Archduke Charles ordered a general assault. General Molitor was now hard pressed to hold his ground, attacked as he was from three directions at once by overwhelming numbers of the enemy, and in the hours that followed Aspern changed hands no less than six times. However, the stalwart Molitor refused to accept defeat and hung on grimly until he could be reinforced by first General Legrand and then Carra St. Cyr, the vital bridge being at last open to traffic once more.
The Battle of Aspern-Essling, May 21-22, 1809: the first day, May 21
In the center, meanwhile, Bessières’ 7,000 sabers fought a long series of engagements against the Austrian cavalry and parts of the neighboring corps. One notable casualty was the brave cuirassier commander, General d’Espagne, killed by an Austrian saber stroke, a grievous loss to the French cavalry. On the extreme right the garrison of Essling was faring very well. Here the French were only effectively attacked by Rosenburg’s IVth Corps from 6:00
P.M. onwards, and thanks to Lannes’ cunning disposition of Boudet’s troops within the town they were able to repulse three successive Austrian onslaughts, not a house or a yard of ground was lost. Shortly before seven the last newcomers of the day entered the fray; St. Germain’s brigade of Nansouty’s division and St. Sulpice’s cuirassiers arrived in time to take part in Bessières’ last attack against the enemy center, but nothing notable was achieved.
/> Little by little, a situation of stalemate settled over the length and breadth of the smoke-filled plain. Darkness brought major operations to a halt, and except in Aspern, where only a few yards divided French from Austrians, the two armies settled down for the night. In his new headquarters at Breitenlee, the Archduke Charles busied himself planning the next day’s fighting. A few miles away, on the island of Lobau, Napoleon was sending off urgent messages summoning Davout from Vienna and drawing every available soldier into the bridgehead.
Nothing could conceal the fact that Napoleon had suffered a grave tactical check, more damaging to his reputation than the near-disaster at Eylau, according to Petre.24 There was no question of Charles evading action the next day, and there was little prospect of a better outcome for the French unless large reinforcements could be transferred over the river during the night and throughout the 22nd. The first four hours of fighting on the 21st had been undertaken by only 23,000 French troops, and even at dusk this number had only risen to 31,400. Facing the bridgehead were at least 100,000 Austrians, vastly superior in guns, and with the prospect of more reinforcements to come. For the French, then, everything depended on maintaining a steady flow of men and materiel over the single fragile bridge, already seriously battered by Austrian missiles and increasingly threatened by the continuing rise of the swollen river. The omens for the 22nd were certainly not propitious; the day might well see the annihilation of the IVth Corps and the French cavalry.
Fortunately, the bridge remained open for the greater part of the night, and by 4:00
A.M. Lannes’ own command, formed by St. Hilaire’s division and Oudinot’s corps of grenadiers (Tharreau and Claparède’s divisions) were safely into the bridgehead together with some more cavalry and guns. The new troops were at once posted to hold the central sector of the position, Bessières’ cavalry being drawn back into local reserve. Boudet’s troops were still holding Essling, with a force on their right occupying the open ground. Over on the left, Aspern and its environs were partly in the hands of Legrand and Carra St. Cyr, but Molitor’s battered regiments, which had borne the brunt of the previous day’s fighting, were pulled back into reserve to the south. Finally, two divisions of the Guard were in position guarding the bridge salient, and General Demont’s division was on the point of crossing over from Lobau island. In round figures this meant that the French now disposed of some 50,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry and about 144 guns (to include the batteries on Lobau island). Facing them were well over 100,000 Austrians supported by at least 260 artillery pieces. The odds had thus improved for the French overnight, but were still long.
Sporadic streetflghting continued in Aspern throughout the earlier part of the night, but shortly after 5:00
A.M. the Austrian 1st and VIth Corps mounted a new full-scale assault on the town and the nearby closely wooded area called the Gemeinde-Au, moving up under cover of darkness and a thick mist. The fortunes of the struggle swung this way and that, but a particularly successful counterattack by Massena about 7:00 o’clock resulted in the French recapturing the whole of Aspern. Essling’s garrison also beat off a new attack. As the impetus of the Austrian offensive died away, Napoleon decided the time had come to take the initiative. Charles was clearly bent on repeating his methodical plan of the previous day—a series of heavy attacks against the wings of the French bridgehead, ignoring the center. The chances were, therefore, that the Austrian center would be invitingly weaker than their flank forces. The Emperor had long ago decided to strike there, intending that Davout’s corps should pass through Lannes’ positions to make the attack. Faced with the present opportunity he decided to use Lannes’ IInd Corps instead of Davout, as the latter was still approaching the bridges and would not be in position for several precious hours.
Shortly after seven, the drums beat the pas de charge, and Lannes led forward St. Hilaire’s division with Oudinot’s grenadier divisions in echelon, left flank refused, on his left. They marched into a maelstrom of Austrian shot and shell, which virtually wiped out the batteries of corps artillery sent forward with the infantry. The troops suffered enormous losses, for their commanders were forced to adopt dense square and column formations on account of the large numbers of inexperienced soldiers included in the ranks, but the advance went on with the aid of some charges by the cavalry reserves. The Austrian soldiers of the IInd Corps and the cavalry troopers began to waver under the pressure. “Marshal Lannes advanced bravely over the plain,” recalled Marbot; “nothing could stand in his way…. in one instant he captured a complete battalion, a standard and five guns. The Austrians fell back with regularity, but their center, being compelled to extend as we advanced further, finished by breaking! Disorder set in among the enemy troops to such a degree that we could see the officers and sergeants beating their men with sticks without being able to keep them in their ranks.”25
According to Marbot and other French accounts, complete victory was in sight when Napoleon suddenly ordered Lannes to halt his attack. In fact the initial check to the French advance was caused by the personal bravery and example of the Archduke Charles, who rushed up his reserve of grenadiers and plunged headlong into the fighting, bearing the colors of the Zach grenadier regiment in his hands. It was this counterattack, together with a growing shortage of ammunition, that first halted the French. Napoleon then tried to retrieve the situation by sending through Bessières’ cavalry in a series of charges, but they too were driven back. By this time Napoleon was in any case gravely worried by news from another quarter. Shortly after eight o’clock he learned that the bridge had parted again, which meant that Davout’s corps—so vitally needed for the coup de grâce—could not cross. This, together with the fact that Lannes’ impetus had run out, left Napoleon with no alternative but to order a phased withdrawal to Aspern and Essling. Archduke Charles received early news of the new breakdown of the bridge from his invaluable Bissamberg observation post, and by 10:00 o’clock all the Austrian corps were back in the attack. The struggle raged on around the villages as before, and during this period the gallant St. Hilaire was mortally wounded, to the grief of his superiors and inferiors alike. All morning the sappers toiled like madmen to repair the bridge, and shortly after midday it reopened again to traffic. Only for a short while, however, for a blazing floating mill soon smashed a new gap, and Napoleon was compelled to realize that he faced no alternative but to call off the battle if it lay in his power.
Meanwhile, a desperate struggle had developed in Essling, where the Austrian IVth Corps succeeded in driving Boudet’s troops out of all their positions except the central granary. Pressure against the French center was also mounting. In some desperation Napoleon sent forward a large part of the Young Guard under General Mouton—the hero of the Landshut bridge—with orders to retake the lost parts of Essling and stabilize the position on the right. They proved insufficient for the task, and so General Rapp was sent after him with more troops drawn from Napoleon’s ultimate reserve: “I was directed to take two battalions of the Young Guard and to hasten to the assistance of our troops; I was to disengage them, to effect a retreat with them, and to take up a position between the village and the rest of the Guard, on the banks of the Danube near the broken bridge…. our position became most hazardous.” Ignoring the letter of Napoleon’s orders, Rapp persuaded Mouton to join in a desperate counterattack against the triumphant Austrian troops in Essling. “Our five battalions moved forward, charged, repulsed and dispersed the enemy at the point of the bayonet. We were masters of the village.”26 Napoleon commended this disobedience: “If ever you did well in not executing my orders, you have done so today; for the safety of the army depended on the retaking of Essling.”
The Battle of Aspern-Essling, May 21-22, 1809: the second day, May 22
The Guard insisted that the Emperor should retire out of range of the enemy shells: “Bas les armes si I’Empereur ne se retire pas.”27 Napoleon accordingly handed over control to Lannes shortly after three and returned to Lobau
, whence the army was beginning to withdraw. Step by step the retreat continued. The Emperor was directing the siting of some guns when news was brought to him, shortly after four, that Marshal Lannes had just had his leg smashed by a cannonball. Napoleon was extremely grieved by the news. Marbot was the first to raise the stricken marshal, and he was borne rapidly to the rear. Surgeon General Larrey had no choice but to amputate his right leg. For a few days he seemed to be recovering, but then gangrene carried him off on the 31st. “In Marshal Lannes we lost one of the most gallant men our armies could at any time boast of. His life was too short for his friends, but his career of honor and glory was without a parallel.”28 So died the fine soldier we first met in 1796; the Marshalate had suffered its first fatality in action and Napoleon had lost one of his few true friends. The whole army mourned the loss; the Emperor wept openly.
To return to the last events of the 22nd, the French rear guard fell back over the bridge into Lobau island after dark. Massena was almost the last man over. At 3:30
A.M. the moorings of the forward bridge were cast off and its various sections drawn back into the island. Finally, half an hour later, two boats brought off the last handful of light infantry screening the dismantlement. The two-day battle of Aspern-Essling had been brought to a close.
During the course of the battle, the Austrians lost a total of 23,340 killed and wounded, and surrendered one standard and six guns. The French losses were probably in the region of 20-22,000; Napoleon, true to form, put them at only 4,100, but this figure was flagrant propaganda. However, the Austrians only captured three guns, one pair of colors and seven ammunition wagons, and could therefore hardly claim a decisive victory. The Archduke Charles was not sufficiently capable to exploit his success in the way Napoleon would have certainly done in his place. In the words of Kircheisen, “Although Napoleon’s conduct must be said to have bordered’on madness, in challenging fate, as he did, by venturing on a battle without knowledge of the Austrian positions, without securing his passage of the river, and without assembling his whole strength on the island of Lobau, yet the Archduke’s failure to make any further use of his victory is almost equally incredible … he might perfectly well have made an attempt to capture the island … [or] have obstructed their operations by bombarding the island with his artillery. But nothing of the sort was done.”29 Nevertheless, there was no disguising the fact that Napoleon had definitely been worsted over each of the two days’ fighting. His apologists may enthuse over the fine fighting qualities displayed by the outnumbered French on the 21st, of the near-success of Lannes’ assault and the skill of the evacuation on the following day, but in the final analysis Napoleon had been thwarted and repulsed. The news caused a thrill of gloating excitement to run throughout hostile Europe. The defeat of Dupont at Bailen or Junot at Vimeiro was one thing; but the bearding of the “Corsican Ogre” in person was quite another matter. Napoleon’s reputation for invincibility in the field had received a severe shaking, but at least he had learned the consequences of military overconfidence and overhasty preparation. His next attempt to retrieve his position was to be well-planned and exhaustively prepared; in 1809 he could still learn from his mistakes.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 87
