P.M. he had forced the Austrian general Nordmann to evacuate Essling, and slightly more than two hours later the IVth Corps was also in possession of Aspern—General Klenau and his VIth Austrian Corps beating a hasty retreat toward the Bissam heights. This considerable success temporarily created a gap between Massena’s men and those of Oudinot, but Napoleon remedied this by moving both Bernadotte and Eugène’s troops from the second line into the empty space.
By five in the evening, the situation was therefore as follows. The French army was drawn up in the shape of an irregular arrowhead. On the right, Davout, Oudinot, Eugène and (eventually) Bernadotte—or some 110,000 men—were facing the middle reaches of the Russbach, behind which were deployed three Austrian Corps (1st, IInd and IVth) who, together with the cavalry reserve, amounted to a total of perhaps 90,000 troops. On the far left, Massena’s 27,000 men were drawn up opposite the Bissamberg wing of the Austrian army which consisted of the reserve grenadiers near Gerasdorf, the VIth and IIIrd Corps in the vicinity of Stammersdorf and Strebersdorf, and Reuss’s Vth Corps around Lang-Enzersdorf in the rear—or some 65,000 Austrians. In reserve, Napoleon had the Guard (11,000) and 8,000 troopers of Bessières’ cavalry, while Marmont’s XIth Corps (10,000) and General Wrede’s command (7,000) were on the point of crossing into Lobau island from the right bank. There was still no sign of the Archduke John’s array, but as a precautionary measure Napoleon had pushed out 8,000 light cavalry toward Leopoldsdorf and Glinzendorf together with d’Hilliers’ division of infantry to keep a close watch on the open flank.
A glance at these dispositions on the map will reveal that Napoleon had secured the advantage of a central position interposing his army between the two Austrian wings. The Austrian formations were necessarily more extended than his own, and he was in a position to transfer troops from one flank to the other with greater rapidity than his opponents, who would have to cover more ground. On the other hand, the Grande Armée was faced with the necessity of fighting with the Danube at its back, and although the bridging arrangements were immeasurably superior to those used on the former occasion in May, the rear areas were still potentially vulnerable to any determined Austrian attack along the left bank of the river. On the Austrian side the Archduke Charles was becoming only too aware that his position was overextended. His left was in a good position along a four-mile front between Wagram and Markgrafneusiedl with the steep-banked Russbach to the fore, but between this wing of his army and the right (drawn up between the Bissam and Gerasdorf) there existed a dangerous three-mile gap covered only by the Austrian reserve cavalry. Thus the apex of the Austrian position was missing, and their two wings virtually separated.
Both commanders in chief were busily engaged in drawing up plans to exploit or improve the general situation. The Archduke now desired to close up his right wing around Wagram and employ all his troops in a massive frontal battle, with John’s force playing an important role on the extreme left. This meant the abandonment of the plan put forward by General Wimpfen, his chief of staff, which envisaged a double envelopment of the French flanks after the fashion of Hannibal’s great maneuver at Cannae, but the new scheme did promise the advantages of concentration. However, before these orders could be issued, Napoleon launched his evening attack, and in the light of the situation that then developed Charles had no recourse but to readopt part of Wimpfen’s concept for his counterattack on July 6.
Three considerations, meantime, were dominating Napoleon’s mind. In the first place he was determined to exploit the weakness of the Austrian center before it could be reinforced; secondly, he was anxious to force a decisive battle on the Austrians on the present ground, and prevent Charles from beating a retreat overnight; thirdly, he wished to complete the separation of the two wings of the enemy army before Archduke John could come up to add a new factor to the battle. All these considerations suggested an immediate attempt at a penetration attack, despite the late hour and the fact that not all the French corps were in position. Accordingly the following orders were issued between six and seven o’clock. The right wing of the army was to lose no time in attacking the Austrian positions behind the Russbach. Davout and Oudinot were to tie down the Austrian IInd and IVth Corps, and at the same time threaten the Austrian eastern flank, while Bernadotte and Eugène marched against the 22,000 men of the Austrian 1st Corps at Wagram itself and breached their line. Once this had been achieved, a general advance by the right wing toward the Helma-Hof should suffice to drive a deep wedge between the two wings of the Austrian army. On the left, meantime, Massena would fight a containing action against Charles’ Bissamberg wing.
Shortly after seven the French batteries opened fire and the initial attacks went in. Oudinot was the first into action, but in spite of the desperate valor of his men the Austrians held their positions around Baumersdorf and eventually forced the French to withdraw after suffering heavy losses. Meanwhile, Eugène was advancing on the IInd Corps’ left with the Army of Italy and part of Bernadotte’s corps. At first all went well, and General Macdonald appeared to be on the point of breaking through the Austrian line when the Archduke Charles appeared on the scene in the nick of time to rally the wavering elements of his 1st Corps. He also brought up several battalions of the Austrian IInd Corps, newly victorious against Oudinot. These reinforcements checked Macdonald’s advance, but worse was to follow; a sudden panic spread through the ranks and the Italians broke and ran, a phenomenon that had never been experienced on such a scale at either Austerlitz or Jena, as Petre points out.35 The fugitives only rallied when they ran onto the bayonets of the Imperial Guard, drawn up in reserve.
Although the Austrians failed to exploit their advantage owing to the fading light, this setback broke the impetus of the French offensive. On Eugène’s left, Bernadotte proved unable to storm Wagram and was pushed back into Aderklaa, while on the extreme right, Davout, who was very late receiving his orders, failed in his turn to make any progress and eventually fell back to Glinzendorf for the night. Bernadotte tried to disguise his own failure with ill-judged Gascon bravado. According to Marbot he publicly stated that Napoleon had directed affairs badly throughout the day and that “had he been in command, he would have forced Charles—by means of a ‘telling maneuver’—to lay down his arms, almost without combat.”36 This remark was reported to the Emperor who not unnaturally resented it. Bernadotte was becoming insufferable.
Thus Napoleon’s hopes of clinching a quick victory by breaching the line of the Russbach on the 5th proved illusory. Hardly any ground had been gained during the evening attack, and under cover of the succeeding hours of darkness the Emperor took the precautionary move of reconcentrating the main elements of his army, ready for anything the dawn might bring. This involved the relinquishment of a little ground by Davout on the right, and the drawing of Massena’s corps closer to Aderklaa on the left. Only Boudet’s division was left in the vicinity of Aspern to guard the approaches to Lobau island and its precious bridges. Behind the front line formations, Napoleon massed Wrede’s division, Marmont’s corps, the Guard and the reserve cavalry in a central supporting position around Raasdorf. In this way the bataillon carré was re-formed, capable of undertaking operations in any direction. Reynier’s troops were left to garrison Lobau island for the time being. All in all, the day had not gone too badly; the army was massed in strength on the left bank, the Austrians had received at least a severe shaking, and the morrow appeared to hold the promise of a decisive victory. The Emperor spent the night in a roadside bivouac surrounded by his troops, snatching a little sleep sheltered by a pyramid of piled drums. Nevertheless, there was little rest to be had; practically all night Napoleon was interviewing senior officers as they rode up for orders. It was his third night without proper sleep.
The Battle of Wagram, July 5-6, 1809: the second day
A few miles away over the plain, Charles was also issuing instructions for the renewal of the battle on the 6th. He had no thought now of calling off the battle. The way
in which his Russbach position had defied the Grande Armée served to increase his confidence; furthermore, he felt certain that his brother John could not now be far distant from the field. Accordingly, Charles decided to implement the scheme he had so nearly abandoned the previous afternoon, namely a double envelopment. The main target was to be Massena and the French left, patently the weaker wing of Napoleon’s army. This sector was to be attacked by the 36,000 men of the IIIrd and VIth Corps, while the central formations of the Austrian army launched a secondary attack on the French positions at Aderklaa, and Rosenburg assaulted Grosshofen-Glinzendorf to threaten Napoleon’s right. According to the plan, all these attacks were to commence at as near the same time as possible, that is to say about 4:00
A.M. Aware of the importance of Aderklaa—the key to his weak center and the hinge of the French position—Charles determined to accompany his 1st Corps in person during its attack there. Then, while Klenau and Kollowrath swept through Massena’s positions by way of Aspern and Breitenlee toward the vulnerable French bridges, Archduke John would appear on the further French flank to turn victory into complete triumph.
Napoleon’s initial plan, for which no documentation has survived (probably all his orders were given verbally), appears to have been as follows: on the secondary battlefield Massena was to hold off any Austrian onslaught, while Bernadotte and Oudinot made a frontal attack against the Russbach. These operations should serve to cover a determined effort by the IIIrd Corps to penetrate beyond the stream and roll up the Austrian left flank through Markgrafneusiedl. At the critical moment, the masse de décision—Eugène’s Army of Italy—would advance and smash through the Austrian center at Wagram. The Guard and Marmont’s corps were to be held in central reserve near Raasdorf, ready to deal with any intervention by the Archduke John from the direction of Leopoldsdorf In the event, this plan was never put into operation in its initial form; Archduke Charles managed to get his blow in first.
The French troops were roused from their slumbers and sent to their forming-up stations about four in the morning, and hardly were they in position when heavy firing broke out on Davout’s extreme right. This was caused by the unanticipated attack of Prince Rosenburg at the head of the Austrian left. Napoleon was undoubtedly taken by surprise by this development, and immediately ordered all his subordinates to hold their proposed attacks in abeyance until the situation was clarified. Fearing that an attack from such a quarter might presage the arrival of Archduke John on the field, the Emperor hurried off to visit Davout, sending the heavy cavalry and Nansouty’s horse artillery to the extreme right. At the same time the Guard moved a slight way east, proof of Napoleon’s perturbation. For a time Davout was forced to give ground, but the arrival of reinforcements enabled him to station twelve guns on the flank of the Austrian IVth Corps, and these fired to such good effect that Rosenburg’s advance was halted, and by 6:00 o’clock the IIIrd Corps was triumphantly recrossing the Russbach on the heels of the discomfited Austrians. Napoleon, well-satisfied with the turn of events on Davout’s sector, ordered the attack on Markgrafneusiedl to proceed, noting, however, that it would be two hours before the preparations for it could be completed. Most of the reserves, meanwhile, returned to the center.
The crises of the day were only beginning. No sooner was Napoleon satisfied about his right flank than news reached him that Bernadotte’s sector was about to disintegrate. The Prince of Ponte Corvo had abandoned the village of Aderklaa without reference to Imperial Headquarters between three and four o’clock in the morning, eager, it appears, to close up with Eugène on his right and Massena on his left and thus shorten his line. Napoleon was furious when he realized that this crucial point had been given over to Bellegarde’s Austrians without so much as a shot being fired, and forthwith ordered Bernadotte and Massena to retake the place heedless of casualties. The fact that Napoleon included Massena in this instruction proves that he still had no idea of the impending Austrian main attack against his left. In fact, Napoleon was watching the right, waiting for the moment when Davout should succeed in taking Markgrafneusiedl and thus compromise the safety of the enemy’s entire Russbach position.
Massena accordingly sent forward Carra St. Cyr’s division, supported by Bernadotte’s Saxons on his right, to retake Aderklaa. The village was regained with élan, but then up came Archduke Charles to influence the fortunes of the combat yet again. The Austrian grenadiers and reserve cavalry were flung into the battle, and in no time the Saxons were in full flight for the rear taking part of Massena’s corps with them. It was unfortunate that Bernadotte, trying to get ahead of his men to rally them, galloped in front, and the performance of this unconventional maneuver led him straight into Napoleon’s path. Mindful of Bernadotte’s reported remarks of the previous evening, the Emperor could not resist the temptation to take his revenge: “Is this the type of ‘telling maneuver’ with which you will force Archduke Charles to lay down his arms?” he enquired cuttingly. An astounded Bernadotte could only gobble in reply. “I herewith remove you from command of the corps which you have handled so consistently badly,” continued the Emperor. “Leave my presence immediately and quit the Grande Armée within twenty-four hours….”37 It was a cruel punishment, but Bernadotte, although never a coward as was now circumstantially implied, had long been an unreliable and even treasonable subordinate.
Eventually the Aderklaa sector was more or less stabilized, but at about 9:00 o’clock even worse tidings arrived, this time from the extreme left. It transpired that an hour earlier the attack by Charles’ IIIrd and VIth Corps had at last materialized, four hours late it is true, but for all that well timed as it coincided with Massena’s preoccupation with the Aderklaa situation. Boudet’s isolated division had been bundled back by overwhelming numbers into the Mühlau salient, Klenau’s advance guard was already as far east as Essling, and it appeared that nothing could prevent the successful Austrian envelopment of Napoleon’s left. The Emperor at once headed for the new area of crisis. Fortunately for the French, the Austrians, with their customary dilatoriness, failed to press their advantage to the full, and this gave Napoleon a small margin of time in which to devise countermeasures and avert disaster. Fortunately, too, Eugène had already used his initiative and decided to turn both Macdonald’s command and his corps artillery to the westwards so as to form the nucleus of a new line. This tricky maneuver was successfully accomplished—and temporarily succeeded in checking the Austrian advance.
Napoleon was always at his best in a crisis. As Marmont recorded, “The Emperor remained perfectly calm although he read in the faces of his staff the anxiety caused by the victorious march of the enemy’s right wing.”38 He was faced with two alternatives. He might allow Klenau to move on unchecked, in the same way that at Austerlitz the Austro-Russian left was permitted to cross the Goldbach, and in the meantime await Davout’s victory on the right; but he knew that his men on this field of battle were not of the same quality as those of 1805, and that consequently a panic might develop—there had already been two instances in the past twenty-four hours. Therefore he decided on the second course, which involved the difficult evolution of re-forming a continuous line running to the banks of the Danube by turning the remaining three divisions of Massena’s corps to their left and marching them southward across the very front of the enemy army, supported by Lasalle’s cavalry. This was a daring expedient, but the crisis called for desperate measures, and Napoleon had every confidence in the skill of perhaps his ablest subordinate. This move would take up invaluable time, and there was little enough to be spared before the Austrians could penetrate and inevitably open up a gap in the French center which would have to be filled. To gain a breathing space, Napoleon called upon Bessières’ and the reserve cavalry. With the greatest gallantry and self-sacrifice, the French horsemen launched repeated charges against the Austrians massing between Aderklaa and Süssenbrünn, thereby enabling Massena to disengage his embattled divisions from the attentions of the Austrian grenadiers and
1st Corps and set off on his march.
The Emperor was also equal to the task of filling the gap this evolution had created in his line. The Saxons and the Army of Italy filled half the interval, but there were no regular formations to spare for the Neu-Wirthaus sector, so he rapidly formed a battery of 112 guns under the command of General Lauriston by calling up all the 72 pieces of the Guard artillery and adding them to the 40 cannon attached to the Army of Italy. In the meantime, Davout was ordered to press on with his attack on the opposite flank without delay. These measures, conceived on the spur of the moment, proved sufficient to save the day. The French cavalry won invaluable time, as they had done at Eylau two years before, and Macdonald’s infantry and Lauriston’s batteries successfully brought the Austrian IIIrd Corps to a standstill. This was only achieved at terrible cost in life, however; dozens of gunners were mown down by the Austrian fire, and their places could only be filled by drawing men from the ranks of the Guard. “The detachment of chasseurs and grenadiers sent to the foot batteries of the Guard artillery behaved with the greatest gallantry,” recorded General Drouot in his report.39 Thanks to their unstinted heroism, Kollowrath was held at bay by a continuous hail of roundshot and case. Guns were also playing a decisive role on another sector; the massed batteries on Lobau island found a perfect target in the flank of Klenau’s packed columns moving lethargically towards Essling, and were soon wreaking terrible havoc. Aided by these diversions Massena was able to reach his appointed position by midday ready to counterattack, and the worst crisis of the battle had passed.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 89
