Napoleon finally made up his mind on August 24, and the following day the Grande Armée resumed its eastward march, although conditions in its rear remained extremely confused and there was an even greater shortage of supplies. The corps moved in three parallel columns within easy marching distance of each other, for Napoleon anticipated that the Russians would stand and fight in the near future now that Kutusov was reported to be on his way to assume control of the Russian forces. The central column followed the main post road from Smolensk toward Moscow, led by Murat’s over-employed and rapidly tiring cavalry, with the Guard, the Ist and IIIrd Corps in support. On the left marched Viceroy Eugène on the right, Prince Poniatowski. All in all, some 124,000 infantry, 32,000 horsemen and 587 guns were on the move.
There was little overt opposition; several cavalry skirmishes and other alarms took place, and Murat and Davout chose this inopportune time to fall out seriously with one another over the former’s misuse of the mounted arm, but otherwise it was generally a repetition of the old story of blazing towns and villages, spoiled crops and hovering Cossacks. Severe rainstorms proved more troublesome than Russian bullets, and on August 30 Napoleon announced that unless the weather improved within the next twenty-four hours he was going to order a withdrawal to Smolensk. However, the 31st dawned clear and sunny, and so the advance went on. On September 1, headquarters were at Gzhatsk; three days later Gridnevo was reached; and in the afternoon of the 5th, the French army halted within striking distance of the village of Borodino. Across the plain could be seen, at long last, the dark masses of the armies of Muscovy, halted and evidently preparing for battle, digging like moles to throw up field fortifications, as was their wont before action.
The general nature of the terrain in the vicinity of Borodino is rolling countryside, intersected by numerous streams and ravines and interspersed with woodland, open fields and hamlets. Approximately parallel to the main post road lies the course of the Kalatsha River. This obstacle was fordable at most parts, but in the interests of speed needed bridging. As far as the village of Borodino the high road lay along the north bank, but it then crossed over to the south side, and followed the general direction of a deeply ravined tributary brook. Some two miles to the south lay the old post road, running through considerable areas of woodland to the village of Utitsa, beyond which lay several notable knolls and ridges. A number of small streams ran southward from the Kalatsha toward the Utitsa area, with a succession of hamlets on their banks, Fomkina, Schivardino and Semionovskaya being the most important. The largest of the tributaries ran from close to Borodino toward Utitsa, but after about a mile it divided into two divergent forks.
The Russian soldiers had been hard at work adding to the natural defensive advantages of this area. As an outlying position, they had constructed an earthen redoubt on a mound beyond the hamlet of Schivardino. Their main positions, however, were prepared a mile further east. Beyond the forked stream the ground steadily rose to form a plateau, and between Borodino and Semionovskaya (where the houses had been razed) a large entrenchment, known variously as the Great or Raevski Redoubt, was in the process of completion. A mile further south, between the forked rivulets, three small hills had similarly been crowned with flèches, arrow-shaped redans open on the eastern side. Additionally, an earthwork had been constructed to block the main post road near the village of Gorki, and several more overlooked the meandering course of the Kalatsha above Borodino as it wound its way northeastward to flow into the River Moskva. From the Russian point of view, the main advantage offered by this area was the broken and intersected nature of its terrain; any force attacking from the westward would find it virtually impossible to maneuver without breaking formation, and ragged masses of struggling troops would provide a perfect target for artillery firing from within the prepared overlooking positions. There was also one major disadvantage to the site; to the south of the old post road the ground was somewhat less obstructed and would offer an enemy the chance of an outflanking maneuver. Moreover, the broken ground to the front of the position would obviously prove as difficult an obstacle for a Russian counterattack as for a French assault.
The afternoon and evening of the 5th saw a fierce struggle for possession of the outlying Schivardino Redoubt and various neighboring hamlets. Prince Gorchakov defended the position with 12 guns and the 27th Russian Division against General Compans’ troops, and for several hours the issue lay in doubt until the arrival of Poniatowski’s Vth Corps up the old post road persuaded Kutusov to abandon the post and order a limited withdrawal to the main positions. That night Napoleon camped near the main road surrounded by his Guard. Unfortunately, he was far from enjoying the best of health; he was suffering from a heavy cold and an old bladder complaint had recurred. These facts were to have an important bearing on his conduct of affairs over the following days.
The greater part of the 6th passed in a state of unreal calm, both sides being fully occupied making plans and calling up outlying formations. The French patrols were soon reporting the approximate dispositions and strengths of Kutusov’s forces. The Russians had at their disposal some 17,000 regular cavalry, all superbly mounted, 7,000 Cossacks, 72,000 infantry, possibly 10,000 militia and 640 pieces of artillery (14,500 gunners), a total of not less than 120,800 combatants. However, the Russian command was clearly still anxious about the probable line of Napoleon’s attack, and consequently had extended their forces over a five-mile front (initially), stretching from the confluence of the Kalatsha and Moskva Rivers in the north to the approaches to Utitsa in the south. This, they doubtless hoped, would cover all eventualities. By the late evening of the 6th, Barclay’s First Army (holding the northern half of the line) was drawn up as follows: a screen of Cossacks formed the extreme right, with Baggavout’s IInd, Tolstoi’s IVth and Doctorov’s VIth Corps forming his main line from near Masslova on the Moskva, through Gorki to the approaches to Borodino. Behind these forces were deployed Uvarov’s, Korf’s and Pahlen’s cavalry corps. Borodino itself, placed somewhat in front of the main positions, formed the hinge of the Russian line, and the junction point of the two armies. It was held by the chasseurs of the Russian Imperial Guard. The right of Bagration’s Second Army was anchored to the Great Redoubt, which now mounted 20 heavy guns and was garrisoned by four battalions of Raevski’s VIIth Corps, which was also responsible for the area of ground leading to the razed village of Semionovska. Occupying the three flèches was Borozdin’s VIIIth Corps, while Tutchkov’s IIIrd Corps (after moving from its original location on the far right) formed the left of the whole Russian line, occupying the woods above Utitsa and the neighboring hillocks, with a screen of Cossacks thrown out to his front and left. The only force drawn up behind this line on the southern sector was Sivers’ cavalry, placed in support of Raevski. Finally, about a mile to the rear of the center was stationed the Russian reserve, found by the Grand Duke Constantine’s Vth Corps.
Several criticisms can be leveled against these dispositions and preparations. In the first place, a disproportionate number of troops were allocated to the northern, Kalatsha sector. Kutusov had no means of knowing exactly where the French attack would fall, of course, but the fact that the river to the front of his right wing was very steeply banked, that much of the area on his right flank consisted of marshes, and that Napoleon was reported to be advancing up the two post roads (that is to say, toward the Russian left) should have indicated the most probable axis and caused him to place rather less troops on his right from the outset. The second criticism is linked with the first. The open nature of the ground to the south of the Russian position was palpably inviting an enveloping attack, and might well have been dominated by the Russians in more decisive fashion. Kutusov would have been better advised to mount a powerful reserve of all arms behind his exposed left wing. Thirdly, the Russian cavalry and the reserve Vth Corps were placed too close to the front and were to suffer unnecessary casualties in consequence. Fourthly, the Russian chain of command was unnecessarily complicated;
in addition to Kutusov’s supreme headquarters at Gorki and the two army staffs, the Russians had subdivided each army area into subordinate command sectors. Thus Miloradovitch held local control over IInd and IVth Corps, together with Uvarov’s and Korf’s cavalry, Doctorov controlled Pahlen’s horsemen as well as his own corps, while in the Second Army area Gortchakov held sway over the VIIth, VIIIth and Siver’s Corps, with Tutchkov in general charge over the Moscow militia. This multiplication of headquarters had little to recommend it and hampered the passing of orders and the efficacy of their execution. A final point was that the Russian redoubts and flèches, though outwardly imposing, were, in fact, hastily built and afforded little cover for their respective garrisons. These disadvantages notwithstanding, the morale of the Russian army was exceptionally high, and the fervor of the rank and file was brought to a new pitch when the Black Virgin of Smolensk was solemnly paraded past the kneeling ranks of the entire army during the afternoon of September 6.
Napoleon carried out two close reconnaissances of the Russian positions during that day and gradually evolved his plan of attack. First, he ruled out the possibility of making a major onslaught to the north of Borodino; the terrain was too unfavorable, particularly the Kalatsha’s cliffs. However, it would clearly have been useful to mount a demonstration in the area in the hope of tying down the strong forces of the Russian right, although this was not in fact done. Passing on to the center, he appreciated the apparent strength of the Great Redoubt, but nevertheless accorded it priority for capture heedless of the probable losses this would entail. Lastly, an inspection of the Russian left revealed its comparative weakness, and that the way was open to an outflanking attack plain for all to see. Marshal Davout was particularly insistent that this was the movement to undertake. He repeatedly begged Napoleon to send 40,000 men forward overnight so that they could move round the open Russian flank and place themselves in Kutusov’s rear by 8:00
A.M. the next morning. Such a move, he assured the Emperor, would leave the Russians with no recourse but a precipitate withdrawal into the angle formed by the Moskva and Kalatsha rivers, where they would be completely at their opponents’ mercy. From the first, however, Napoleon set his face against any such strategical movement. “Ah, you are always for turning the enemy,” he remarked to the Prince of Auerstadt. “It is too dangerous a maneuver!”40
A number of apparently irrefutable reasons led him to this decision. In the first place, the numerical strength of the Grande Armée was too small to permit the mounting of a full-scale manoeuvre sur les derrières; the approximate parity of the contesting forces would make the detachment of a large force, even if for only a temporary period, extremely foolhardy. Then again, the condition of both the artillery and the cavalry arms was giving cause for anxiety; the horses, in particular, were in very poor fettle. Napoleon also knew that his troops were hungry and homesick for France, and that most of them had long ago given up any genuine interest in the campaign, other than simple survival. Above all, he feared that the Russians would withdraw from their position overnight if the least indication of a strategic envelopment reached them; they had successfully avoided battle several times already since June 22, and Napoleon had no desire to see a repetition of these Fabian tactics. Lastly, he had reason to doubt that the Russians would be unduly worried if a French force suddenly appeared in their rear. His studies of the campaigns of Frederick the Great had convinced him that Russian armies were not particularly sensitive about their communications when it came to the actual fighting of a full-scale battle; Frederick’s experiences at both Zorndorf and Kunersdorf were particularly relevant in this context.
Napoleon’s battle plan, therefore, was based on the idea of a straightforward frontal attack with diversionary operations against the enemy’s wings. On the left, Eugène’s corps and Grouchy’s cavalry were to capture the village of Borodino and thereafter cross over the Kalatsha to attack Doctorov and Raevski’s Great Redoubt, leaving only a covering force to hold the north bank of the river. At the same time the divisions of Compans and Dessaix from the 1st Corps would assault the Russian fortifications known as the flèches. Once this attack had become established, Ney was to advance on Davout’s left with the IIIrd Corps drawn up in echelon to capture Semionov-skaya and drive a wedge through the Russian left center. On the right, Poniatowski was to march for Utitsa with the Vth Corps and attempt to create a tactical outflanking threat to the rear of the Russian line. At the outset, Junot’s VIIIth Corps, the Guard, Friant’s division of Ist Corps and the bulk of the cavalry formations would be held in central reserve.
There was little subtlety in this plan; it consisted of a series of sledgehammer blows against the Russian line which, all being well, would be pierced at one or more points. Had more priority been accorded to the tactical outflanking of the Russian left, the final outcome might have been far more satisfactory for Napoleon. However, he felt so pressed for time that he discarded all elaborate ideas. Borodino was to be a battle of attrition and brute force. The arrival of disturbing news from Spain coincided with these deliberations. Six weeks earlier Wellington had defeated Marmont at Salamanca. These tidings reinforced Napoleon’s desire for a quick victory in far-away Muscovy.
The preliminary orders were issued late on the 6th. Five bridges were to be built over the Kalatsha, west of Borodino, in addition to three large artillery redoubts holding 120 guns for the massive bombardment of the Russian positions which would open the morrow’s battle. There is evidence of poor staff work concerning the siting of these batteries; the guns were placed out of range of their targets, and consequently had to be moved forward from their prepared positions before they could open fire on the 7th—such an error would not have slipped past Napoleon’s eagle eye in the days of his prime.* Indeed, his ill-health seems to have taken heavy toll of his efficiency on this occasion. However, a newly delivered portrait of the infant King of Rome helped to rally the Emperor’s spirits, and Napoleon spent much of the evening showing it off to his officers and Guard.
Finally, at 2:00
A.M. the next morning, a proclamation was issued to the troops. “Soldiers!” it ran. “Here is the battle you have so long desired! Henceforward, victory depends on you; we have need of it. We will win ourselves abundance of supplies, good winter quarters, and a prompt return to our Motherland. Conduct yourselves as you did at Austerlitz, Friedland, Vitebsk and Smolensk, so that posterity will for ever acclaim with pride your conduct on this day; let them say of each one of you: ‘He took part in the great battle beneath the walls of Moscow!’”41
An hour before dawn on September 7, the five infantry corps, the Guard and the four formations of the reserve cavalry, a total of 103,000 infantry and gunners, 28,000 cavalry and 587 guns, moved off to take up their assigned positions. Shortly after 6:00
A.M. the artillery of the Guard, together with the guns of the Ist and IIIrd Corps thundered into action, and poured a hail of shot at the Russian positions. Then the leading divisions moved forward to the attack, drums beating the pas-de-charge. Initially, everything appeared to be going in the French favor. On the left, the IVth Corps stormed into the outskirts of Borodino under cover of the thick morning mist and shortly afterwards took possession of the village, sending the Russian chasseurs reeling back in confusion. Meanwhile, on the central sector, Davout’s troops were attacking the positions held by Borozdin with considerable though hard-won success, while on the extreme right, Poniatowski flung the Russians out of Utitsa.
However, the Russian counterattack was not long delayed. Kutusov authorized part of his reserve to strengthen the threatened sectors of his line, and shortly after 7:00
A.M. Eugène’s leading division, after unwisely pushing on toward the Gorki heights without due preparation, found itself forced back into a defensive position around Borodino with severe losses. Soon afterwards, Davout was compelled to relinquish his hold on the flèches, and Poniatowski found his advance eastward from Utitsa completely checked by the hail of fir
e brought down by Tutchkov’s batteries and the musketry of Russian light infantry holding the woods to the north of the village. For the next two hours the battle on the French right devolved into a long drawn out and indecisive skirmishing action, and the development of the Vth Corps’ turning action was consequently postponed.
About 7:30
A.M. Eugène pulled his troops back from their forward positions beyond Borodino and carried out the proposed transfer of two divisions to the right bank of the river, using the bridges built the previous evening, leaving only a single division and some cavalry to hold the village and north bank. This movement did not go unobserved by the Russians. Realizing that the corps lining the lower course of the Kalatsha were in fact performing no useful function and were certainly not faced with any immediate threat, Kutusov began to transfer Baggavout’s corps southward to reinforce Borozdin and Tutchokov on the further wing. While this move was in progress, the struggle for the flèches rose to a new climax as Davout, supported by Ney and General Friant, sought time and again to regain control of the area. During this struggle several generals were killed, Davout himself was wounded, and Rapp received his twenty-second battle injury.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 98
