Within a fortnight, however, events had proved these calculations over-optimistic. The trusted cordon offered hardly any resistance to the enemy advance; there were barely 70,000 French troops between Paris and the converging Allied armies, and many of these were in a state of low morale; to cap it all enemy strength was still near 200,000 men.
This was hardly a cheering overall prospect, but Napoleon was adamant that whatever else was sacrificed Paris would have to be defended to the last. In the section of conclusions to the Note of January 12, the Emperor significantly placed at the head of the list “make no preparations for the abandonment of Paris, and if necessary bury ourselves under its ruins.” This fixation with the need to defend Paris at all costs was to underlie every one of the French maneuvers until late March. To a large extent this was a justifiable attitude; as the historian Petre describes it: “Paris was the heart and center of his power, the storehouse of his military supplies and the headquarters of his army organizations. It represented France in a way that Moscow did not represent Russia in 1812, or Berlin Prussia in 1813.”7 Yet the fortifications of the city were in a very incomplete state, for Napoleon hesitated to alarm the volatile and panic-prone citizenry by revealing the danger in which it lay, and his brother Joseph later proved incapable of improving them. Paris also contained many a scheming civil servant and unscrupulous politician whose loyalties were becoming increasingly uncertain. Finally, Napoleon’s decision to appoint his elder brother as lieutenant-general of the realm and chief adviser to the Empress during his forthcoming absence at the front was to prove disastrous, for Joseph had many foes and was not completely reliable as regards either his judgment or loyalty. As will be seen, almost all Napoleon’s schemes depended in the final analysis on the continuing loyalty of his capital. In the end Paris was to prove his Achilles’ heel when the “trimming” politicians turned openly against him at a critical time, effectively cutting the ground from under his feet and leaving him with no alternative but abdication.
If the security of Paris was one cardinal point of Napoleon’s strategy, it was equally clear that he was committed to a defensive based on “the central position” where the operations of his field forces were concerned. “Come,” he said to Berthier, “we must repeat the campaign of Italy.”8 Yet in 1814 the stakes were immeasurably higher than in 1796—nothing less than the survival of France was involved. If the two main Allied armies were allowed to unite their forces effectively and launch a carefully coordinated drive upon the capital, it was extremely unlikely that Napoleon’s meager forces would be able to withstand such superiority of strength. It was accordingly vital that the Armies of Bohemia and Silesia should be kept apart and defeated in detail. This Napoleon set out to attempt. As early as the 14th he had instructed Bertrand, Grand Marshal of the Palace, to “send my horses toward Châlons,” but it was only on the 25th that the Emperor proved able to leave Paris. Twenty-four hours later he reached Châlons-sur-Marne, and immediately assumed direct control of the dispirited French forces.
83
A PARLOUS OPENING
The situation of the combatants on January 26 was approximately as follows. Marshal Ney’s Young Guard corps (incomplete) and part of the Guard cavalry (comprising the Emperor’s escort) were the only French troops at Châlons itself. Far away to the north, Macdonald was falling back from the vicinity of Liege towards Mezières on the Meuse. On the Emperor’s order, Marmont was retiring from Metz toward Bar-le-Duc. Marshal Victor was striving to maintain an extensive cordon line along both banks of the Marne between Vitry and St. Dizier. General Gérard (Morand’s replacement) was holding Arcis-sur-Aube with a detachment pushed forward to Lesmont. Marshal Mortier, with the Old Guard and one division of Gérard’s corps, was retiring on Troyes following his narrow defeat at Bar-sur-Aube on the 24th. Finally, Général de Division Allix was holding crucial crossing points over the Yonne River at Sens and Auxerre. Perhaps 85,000 French troops were operating on the eastern front; of these some 41,000 were at Napoleon’s immediate disposal.
As for the Allies, their two armies were still operating in isolation although the distance separating them was rapidly narrowing. Schwarzenberg was advancing in three main columns; Generals Wittgenstein and Wrede were marching on Neuchâtel from the direction of Epinal; the Army of Bohemia’s main body was moving from Langres through Bar-sur-Aube; to the south General Colloredo was heading for Châtillon-sur-Seine. In all, this armament probably numbered about 150,000 men in terms of effective strength. Blücher’s Army of Silesia was similarly moving in a number of widely separated components. The Prussian commander in chief was drawing close to St. Dizier with two corps after moving north from Joinville; General Yorck’s corps was advancing from the direction of Metz in slow pursuit of Marmont; two more corps were still in Germany; and further detachments were besieging French garrisons in Verdun, Metz and Luxemburg. As for the Army of the North, General Winzingerode was operating amidst the Flanders fortresses in support of Bülow and Graham. The rest were still east of the Rhine. Discounting the forces operating in the Low Countries and North Germany, probably 200,000 Allies were massing along the Marne, Aube and Upper Seine.
A brief geographical description of the war theater can usefully be included at this point. To all intents and purposes the western boundary is formed by the central reaches of the Seine, continued from Montereau by its southward-flowing tributary, the Yonne. The eastern limit may be said to be the Meuse. Three more rivers, flowing in a great arc from the southeast to join the Seine, divide the intervening plain. The northernmost is the River Aisne, joining the Oise twenty miles west of Soissons which in turn reaches the Seine to the northwest of Paris. Down the center runs the great curving valley of the Marne, meeting the Seine immediately south of the capital. To the south flow the waters of the River Aube, which join the Upper Seine ten miles east of Nogent. In winter and spring all these rivers presented considerable natural obstacles, increasing the importance of the available bridges and their neighboring towns. Eleven of these key military posts lay along the banks of the Marne and seven along the Aube, but their military value to the French was generally decreased by the inadequate state of their defenses. The whole campaign was to center around control of important bridges and the speed with which demolished ones could be brought back into service.
The general configuration of the ground separating the rivers may be described as reasonably flat. North of the Aisne and south of the Upper Seine the land rises into considerable chains of hills, but the intervening area is largely level, although west of a line drawn between Etoges and Nogent-sur-Seine the countryside becomes considerably more undulating and the valleys deeper.
In 1814 the area was well provided with roads, but three highways proved of transcendent importance. The southernmost of these ran from Auxerre to Sens up the right bank of the Yonne, crossed that river and headed for Montereau and thence Paris. The second ran from Chaumont up the Aube as far as Bar-sur-Aube, where it crossed over the river before running westward toward Troyes; thereafter its line ran northwestward to Nogent-sur-Seine where it recrossed the river, heading for the Marne and Paris. The third followed the valley of the Marne from Châlons to Château-Thierry, La Ferté and the capital, crossing the river at several places.
So skilled a soldier as the Emperor knew how much advantage could be derived from this river- and road-dominated terrain in mounting a defensive campaign. Using Paris as his base, shifting his center of operations from town to town as the situation required (Châlons, Arcis, Sézanne, Nogent and Provins would all serve in this capacity in turn) and employing the smaller petites places as intermediate food and ammunition depots, Napoleon considered that he could dispense with long, slow-moving convoys and thus be able to prosecute operations of lightning speed against heavily encumbered opponents. Every effort must be made to keep the foe from fully uniting his forces but a full-scale battle must be avoided. The emaciated French army could not even afford the heavy casualties that would be incurred
in a victory let alone a defeat. A war of subtlety and fast maneuver, of engagements with isolated enemy detachments on advantageous French terms, of slim forces manning the river lines to hold off the hostile masses, this was now the requirement. “It is necessary to fall well concentrated on some corps of the enemy and destroy it,”9 wrote Napoleon to an officer on his staff (January 23). The rapier of 1796 was to replace the bludgeon of 1812.
After a slow start, and despite its disastrous outcome, this was to be one of Napoleon’s finest campaigns. His powers of generalship took on a new lease of life and inspiration; unfortunately few of the generals and none of the politicians rose to the occasion—although the “Marie-Louise” conscripts were to perform wonders under Napoleon’s leadership.
Some days before he quitted Paris, Napoleon had decided to try conclusions with the Army of Silesia. It was closest to hand; it was also apparently considerably scattered. Schwarzenberg was still far away near Bar-sur-Aube, while Blücher was last reported approaching St. Dizier; Yorck’s command was still a considerable distance away, and the Emperor knew that Marmont’s forces were already interposed between the two parts of the Army of Silesia.
The Campaign of the Defense of France, 1814
Instructing that his arrival at the front was to be kept a close secret and ordering the issue of four days’ rations to the troops, Napoleon prepared his first plan. Believing Blücher to be still in the vicinity of St. Dizier, Napoleon determined to march against him there at the head of some 34,000 soldiers while Marmont moved on Bar-le-Duc to sever the Army of Silesia’s communications. Mortier and Gérard would meantime hold up Schwarzenberg. An imperial aide—Colonel Bernard—reported Blücher’s present strength at between 20-25,000 men supported by between 36 and 40 cannon.
News also arrived, however, that Marshal Victor was making little headway in his attempt to hold Blücher at St. Dizier, but was steadily falling back toward Vitry, leaving the Prussians to take possession of the town. This was annoying, but Napoleon decided to continue with his plan notwithstanding; there might still be a chance of catching Blücher only half deployed over the Marne.
The French arrived too late. Blücher had already moved through the town toward Brienne, leaving only a small rear guard behind him. Nevertheless there was a stiff engagement before the French retook St. Dizier. “The town was literally riddled by the artillery and musketry fire,” recalled Captain Coignet. “You could easily count thousands of holes in the wooden doors and shutters which balls had pierced…. All the houses had been subjected to pillage, and not a single inhabitant was able to remain in this unhappy town.”10 Writing to the minister of war later the same day, Napoleon revealed the disappointing scope of the operation: “We have taken several guns, killed a few men and captured a handful of prisoners. But I have learnt here that Blücher is already on his way to Brienne with 25,000 men—he will arrive there today. I have severed his line of operations, Bar has been occupied, and I am leaving today to get on Blücher’s tail. If he holds his ground, it is quite possible that there will be a battle tomorrow at Brienne.”11
His first pounce on his adversary having failed, Napoleon now tried to make up for lost time. His main forces advanced rapidly in three columns toward Brienne—the scene of their Emperor’s schooldays—while Marmont moved on Vassy to prevent Yorck’s intervention. The Emperor was aware that once Blücher reached Brienne he would be in close touch with at least part of Schwarzenberg’s army, but he hoped the French might still be in time to drive the patently overconfident Prussians into the Aube before they could be heavily reinforced. Mortier was ordered to move on Arcis-sur-Aube, providing this did not compromise the safety of Troyes.
Once again, however, the Emperor was destined to face disappointment. One copy of his orders to Marshal Mortier fell into the hands of roving Cossacks, and by early on the 29th Blücher was fully aware of the fate bearing down on his rear. At that moment he had only the Russian corps of Olssufiev at Brienne, but he just had time to recall Sacken from Lesmont and to receive the advance guard of Wittgenstein’s corps of the Army of Bohemia (3,000 cavalry under General Pahlen) before the French blow fell. Prior to this timely intelligence, Blücher had been unconcernedly advancing on Arcis-sur-Aube with the intention of taking Mortier in flank, considering the events at St. Dizier of little significance. But now he reversed his line of march in the very nick of time.
Napoleon was not prepared to waste a single hour before attacking. He engaged Blücher with Grouchy’s cavalry and horse artillery during the late morning of the 29th, without waiting for the conscripts of Ney and Victor to come up. It was almost three o’clock before the French were able to attack in any force; then Ney advanced with two divisions on Brienne village while one of Victor’s brigades headed for the Château; the remainder of IInd Corps meantime worked its way around the enemy right to cut off his line of retreat towards Bar-sur-Aube.
The fighting was very uneven for much of the afternoon. The untried French conscripts beat off Pahlen’s cavalry successfully, but on the left Victor’s main force was compelled to give ground. According to Coignet and other authorities, Napoleon had a narrow escape from a party of Cossacks at one critical moment, but immediately thereafter placed himself at the head of his staff and coolly led the tiring and battle-shocked conscripts back into the fray. The struggle continued until long after nightfall, and it was by the light of burning houses that men of Victor’s detached brigade at last succeeded in fighting their way into the Château. Blücher and Gneisenau in their turn now narrowly avoided capture, leaving the castle courtyard by one gate as the French troops broke in at the other. Thereafter the battle gradually tailed off, but there was one last flare of action about 10:00
P.M. when the Allies attempted a vain counterattack against the Château. An hour or so later Blücher extricated his troops with skill and secrecy, retiring southward. The Allies left 4,000 casualties behind them. The French probably lost 3,000 men killed and wounded.
Although the French conscripts were jubilant at this success, the Battle of Brienne had not come up to Napoleon’s expectations. Though repulsed, Blücher was far from destroyed, and the only significant outcome of the action had been to drive the leading components of the Army of Silesia into closer contact with Schwarzenberg’s forces. Of course the Emperor had sustained two strokes of ill fortune: the capture of the revealing dispatch had warned Blücher of his danger, while the personal escape of the Prussian commander from the Château of Brienne had been a very near thing. At best, however, the Battle of Brienne must be regarded as inconclusive; the new conscripts had been “blooded” and the overconfident Allies given something to think about, but the military situation had hardly been changed.
The overall picture was still far from clear. The exact location and strengths of the Allied formations could only be hazarded, but the Emperor decided to make the most of his limited success and attempt an immediate blow against part of the Army of Bohemia. Accordingly the French troops followed Blücher through La Rothière on the 30th, but for the next two days Napoleon somewhat uncharacteristically bided his time, waiting upon events. During this period of relative inaction, however, good contact was made with Mortier through Lesmont. The marshal was thereupon ordered to retrace his steps to Troyes. The center of operations was moved from Châlons to Arcis, and the greater part of Macdonald’s corps was summoned from St. Menehould to Châlons with instructions to reinforce the garrison of Vitry with a strong detachment. Unfortunately, heavy snowfalls hampered French reconnaissances during this relatively quiescent period.
The Allies, meantime, were busily concerting their plans. After a very confused and haphazard junction between their two armies near Trannes, Blücher and Schwarzenberg determined to launch a heavy attack against Napoleon on February 1. Blücher was given direct command of 53,000 troops—two corps of his own strengthened by two from Schwarzenberg’s army. Wrede’s Bavarians (25,000 strong) further undertook to operate against the French left, and Blücher wa
s told that he would be supported by Barclay de Tolly and the Russian reserve (perhaps 33,000 more men) in any emergency. In round numbers, therefore, some 110,000 Allied troops set themselves in motion on the morning of February 1 and marched north from Trannes, concealed by convenient blizzards.
Napoleon, starved of reliable information, gradually convinced himself that the Allies were plotting to keep him pinned near La Rothière while they launched their main blow elsewhere. Mortier had reported signs of enemy movement south of Troyes—this seemed to suggest that Schwarzenberg might be intending to make his real attack in that direction while Blücher demonstrated noisily in the Trannes area to distract Napoleon’s attention. At 10:00
A.M. on the 1st, the Emperor accordingly issued orders for a general movement on Troyes, Marmont being instructed to occupy Lesmont. Ney’s divisions immediately set out along the road through Brienne.
The Battle of La Rothière, February 1, 1814: the general situation, 2 p.m.
Unexpectedly at midday, Marshal Victor reported large-scale enemy movement near Trannes and Éclance, seemingly presaging an attack. Was this Blücher’s supposed bluff, or should it be taken seriously? Although he was still inclined to believe that the former was the case, Napoleon decided that he had better stand his ground until the situation was finally clarified. This decision to wait for Blücher was to place the French army, barely 40,000 strong, in dire peril before many more hours had passed.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 117
