The rangers stormed on in anger, and no doubt in fear as men fell wounded. ‘It was sickening, it was brutal … but that was our job’, Altieri wrote later. They cleared the hill and took several prisoners. These, along with the 18 wounded rangers on improvised stretchers slung between rifles, were taken with the force as they moved out two and a half hours before dawn. What little water they had was passed to the wounded.
Bill Darby led them, his long steps hurrying them back across ridges and ravines, then stretching their stride to cover the last six of 20 desert miles. Ignoring their thirst and the ache of hunger after two nights and a day in the enemy’s hills, they pushed on fearing his tanks might encircle them. The wounded suffered the pain of this rough journey without complaint, and as the sun rose the Rangers carried them clear of the mountains. Bill Darby stood at the foot of the path, his blackened face glistening with sweat, his uniform torn and tattered. ‘Keep pushing’, he urged the stragglers as they covered that last six miles to the comparative safety of the French outpost which was now guarded by some British armoured cars that moved out to cover the last stages of the rangers’ withdrawal.
The direct military gains from the raid were some 100 Italians killed, six quick-firing cannon and 12 machine-guns destroyed, and useful intelligence gained from the prisoners on German and Italian dispositions in Tunisia. A further and far-reaching outcome was the proof of the 1st Rangers’ ability to hit hard in a complex operation, in which their skill and daring had kept their own casualties to one killed and 18 wounded. Germans radio paid its own peculiar respects to their prowess, referring to them as ‘the Black Death’.
Two days after the raid in the foothills of the Sened Pass, on 14 February 1943, German tanks broke through the American lines and Rangers covered the withdrawl of II Corps, marching out under the fortunate cover of a heavy mist. For several weeks the Rangers—as did I Commando and 6 Commando—fought as infantry, taking more than 30 prisoners in active patrolling.
On 21 March, the Colonel led the battalion 12 miles (19km) along a mountainside track—it almost goes perhaps without saying: through the night—along a route reconnoitred the previous two nights by ranger scouts. The path crossed low cliffs, along fissures, and wound through high valleys to a plateau overlooking Italian positions blasted out of the Djebel El Ank gorge in the mountains east of El Guettar. This gorge was on Patton’s line of advance and the nests of strongpoints would be difficult to take in frontal assault. High on the plateau behind them, however, the rangers formed a skirmish line and in the half-light before dawn rose on a bugle call, they were leaping down the slope with shrill Red Indian warcries, jumping from rock to rock. They were on the Italians before this enemy could redirect his machine-guns to defend the rear of these positions, and in 20 minutes the Italians were overrun. The battalion then worked their way across the gorge, reaching the foot of the opposite slope by midday. Here their Italian-speaking padre, Father Basil of the Commandos was able to persuade the enemy officer to surrender his unit, saving many lives which would have been lost had both sides of the gorge had to have been fought for.
Although this pass was cleared, there would be many battles fought before Patton’s army joined Montgomery’s Eighth Army coming from the east. The Rangers themselves fought in a dozen soldier’s battles in the fluid situation around their army’s main thrust. D company once being cut off, some time was needed for other rangers to relieve them. Although this war in Tunis would not be over until early May the Rangers were pulled out of the fighting on 27 March 1943. Their history is followed in later chapters and summarised in Appendix 7, but the 1st Rangers’ companies were the nuclei of other battalions.
THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, 1940 TO 1943
In the last months of 1940, the British desert army took only 10 weeks to advance 700 miles (1,100 + km) into the Italian colony of Libya, crossing its province of Cryrenaica and penetrating the province of Tripolitania. In mid-February 1941, General Rommel and his Afrika Korps landed at Tripoli, driving the British back into Egypt during April, although their garrison at Tobruk held out.
The British and Commonwealth army in Africa had been depleted when an expeditionary force was sent to Greece. The Germans entered Greece and the Greeks capitulated on 6 April 1941. The British extracted most of their forces from the mainland, but lost 29,000 men fighting the German airborne invasion of Crete late in May.
Against this background of changing fortunes in the desert, and the Axis occupation of many Mediterranean islands—although not Malta and Cyprus—the commandos mounted a couple of major raids and several small ones.
The consequences of the victory at El Alamein and the November 1942 landings in North Africa have been described earlier. But the Americans continued to consider the Mediterranean a less important theatre than north-west Europe, where a ‘second front’ would require almost all the available shipping. Nevertheless, an invasion of Sicily was agreed at the ‘Trident’ conference in Washington (May 1943). This operation ‘Husky’ was carried out in July 1943: three American divisions landed, spearheaded by Rangers, on the south coast, to drive north across the western part of the island to Palermo; and, for British divisions with Commandos landed on the south-east tip of the island to advance north along the east coast to Messina.
General Alexander held the US Seventh Army in the west of the island, protecting General Montgomery’s flank, but once these Americans turned east along the north coast road, there was a race to Messina as the British made their way around the slopes of Mount Etna. Despite attempts to cut their escape route, the Germans skilfully evacuated 60,000 of their men and 75,000 Italians during the five days to 17 August, when Sicily was finally secured by the Allies.
CHAPTER 8
Mediterranean Shock
Troops
By 1943 the roles of the Commandos had multiplied since the winter of 1940-41 when Roger Courtney took his SBS canoeists from Arran to the Med, and raiding from the United Kingdom was made by small units with the only raid by a full Commando—Lofoten in March 1941—attacking a soft or undefended target. Nigel Clogstoun—Willmott had pioneered a specialist role in beach reconnaissance, the United States Marine Corps were landing Raider companies, and the US Rangers were expanding with five battalions and eventually six. Other commando and raider units, large and small, were in various stages of development, as will be seen in later chapters dealing with theatres outside the Mediterranean. But in the Mediterranean and Middle East, there were, in the changes that took place in commando roles between 1941 and 1943, many parallels to other theatres. Similarly there were parallels to the changes in personal relationships between individual services and between Allies in the developments of amphibious raiding.
In March 1941 a force of 7, 8, and 11 Commandos arrived in Egypt at a time when General Rommel’s Afrika Korps were gaining the initiative in the desert and German troops were moving through Yugoslavia to support the Italians in Greece. Known as Layforce, after their commander, the resolute and professional Lieutenant-Colonel R. (Bob) E Laycock, these commandos were joined by 50 and 52 (Middle East) Commandos raised in Egypt. Although the force was initially used as a reserve brigade of the British Eighth Army, Bob Laycock was asked to mount a raid on Bardia. This port lay on a forbidding coast some 250 miles (400km) west of Alexandria and, because the Germans were within 50 miles (80km) of the British Imperial Headquarters in Cairo, was beyond British fighter aircraft cover. The Colonel was keen his men should do well in this first major raid likely to meet opposition—Vaagsö was nine months away—but things went wrong from the start.
HMS Glengyle (see Appendix 4), carrying 7 Commando designated A battalion in a brigade of 6 Division, arrived with her escorting anti-aircraft cruiser and three Australian destroyers off Bardia on the night of 19-20 April 1941. Roger Courtney, his submarine already late after being attacked by British (!) planes, damaged his canoe on launching and was unable to fix the intended navigation marker light on an islet. The LCAs were not launched un
til 2235, some two hours after Glengyle reached the dropping zone. One craft stuck in the davits and others were late beaching after the 40-minute run to the shore, but there were no enemy troops on the beach as the men—in ‘ankle putties, oldest battledress and gym shoes’—came ashore, wading chest-deep through a nasty swell. One party crossed a wadi, the dry bed of a desert’s flash-flood river, crossed over a flooded tank trap, and then ‘at a beast of a clip’ marched on a compass course of 101 degrees to the Italian barracks, taking these in a rush after pausing to assemble the Sections before the attack went in at 0030 to a timed plan, apparently. The attackers killed or wounded some 45 Italians according to an eye-witness and fired 25 vehicles, but the stone barracks could not be burnt down. They came back on a reciprocal compass course to the boats guarded by several Sections. Other parties failed to find the local pumping-station or were too late to set charges on installations before having to withdraw—again apparently to a timetable—because the boats had to leave the beach in time to allow the carrier to clear the coast before daylight. However, some Italian naval guns’ breaches were blown before the commandos left the beach. The LCAs returned to their carrier although many had trouble with their compasses, not an uncommon event before crews realised how easily a tin hat or box of ammunition placed too near the binnacle might upset the magnetic needle.
Location of Special Forces’ Mediterranean, Italian and related operations showing large forces’ actions in capitals (date and code name) in alphabetical order by year. Numbered locations broadly follow coast lines: 1-10 in French North Africa; 11-18 in Sicily; 19-32 western Italy and southern France; 33-38 in eastern Italy; 39-48 in Adriatic; and 49-62 in eastern Mediterranean.
1941
Appollonia (18 Nov, Cooper-Flipper)
51
Apulian aqueduct (by paras, 10 Feb, Colossus)
36
BARDIA (19/20 Apr)
54
Beda Littoria (18 Nov, Cooper-Flipper)
52
Benghazi (May)
49
Berbera* (16 Mar, 1/2 & 3/5 Punjabis, Appearance)
Cap d’Ali (28/30 July, SBS)
16
Cirene (18 Nov, Cooper-Flipper)
50
CRETE (May)—not numbered
Gulf of S. Euphemia (27 July, SBS)
20
LITANI RIVER (9 June, Export)
55
Rhodes (Mar, beach recces)
61
Senigallia (27 Oct, SBS)
29
Seracino River (27/8 Aug, SBS)
27
Tobruk ‘Twin Pimples’
53
Torre Fili (28 May, SBS)
38
1942
Algiers (60 miles east of, 21 Oct, SBS)
2
ALGIERS (8 Nov, Torch)
2
Antsirane (by RMs, 6 May) not located
ARZEW (8 Nov, Torch) near Oran
1
BIZERTE (30 Nov to 3 Dec)
8
BONE (11 Nov)
3
Calato, Rhodes (Aug/Sept, SBS et. al., Anglo)
62
Gibralter as a Cdo base—not numbered
Gulf of Genoa (29 Nov, SBS)
31
Herakleion (13/4 June, Free French)
56
Kastelli (9/10 June, SBS)
57
Kupho Nisis (15/6 Apr, Lighter) not located
MATEUR VALLEY (Dec)
4
Maritza, Rhodes (Aug/Sept, SBS et. al., Anglo)
62
ORAN (8 Nov, Torch)
1
Rhodes (Aug/Sept, Anglo)
62
Tabaka (30 Nov) see Bizerte
8
TOBRUK (14 Sept, Agreement)
53
1943
Aegean raids began†
AGONE (13/4 July)
17
BAGNARA (3 Sept, Hooker)
21
Bova Marina (27/8 Aug)
19
BROLO (11 Aug, US infantry)
14
CAP D’ALI (15 Aug)
16
CAP MILAZZO (15 Aug)
15
DJEBEL EL ANK (21/2 Mar)
7
GARIGLIANO (29 Dec)
25
GELA (9/10 July, Husky)
11
GOUBELLAT PLAIN (winter/flspring 1943)
5
LAMPEDUSA (June, by infantry)
10
LICATA (9/10 July, Husky)
12
NAPLES-FOGGIA (Dec, ‘North Americans’)
35
PANTELLARIA (June, by infantry)
9
PORTO DI SAN VENERE (7 Sept, Ferdy)
22
PUNTA CASTELAZZO (9/10 July, Husky)
18
Salerno (29 July-4 Aug. COPPs)‡
23
SALERNO (9 Sept, Avalanche)
23
Scaletta—see Cap d’Ali
SENED PASS (Feb, Rangers)
6
Sicily (26 Feb, Swimmers’ recces) included
11 & 13
SICILY (9/10 July, Husky) see refs. Husky above
TERMOLI (3/6 Oct, Devon)
34
1944
Aegean†
ANCONA (24/5 May, Darlington II)
28
Anzio (COPP recces)
26
ANZIO (22 Jan, Shingle)
26
ANZIO (Feb-May, ‘North Americans’)
26
Brac (12 Mar, recce)
45
BRAC (1/3 June, Flounced)
45
Cherso Isl (9 Aug, Gradient)
48
CISTERNA (30/1 Jan, Rangers)
27
Crete (4 Apr, Rdg Forces ME) not numbered
Dalmatian Isl (summer, COPPs)‡
47
ELBA (June, French infantry)
30
HVAR ISL (27 Jan)
43
Hvar (28 & 30 Jan, 3 & 26 Feb, partisans with US Ops Group)
43
HVAR (Jelsa on, 22 Mar, Endownment IV)
43
HVAR (12 July)
43
ISLE D‘HYERES (14 Aug, ‘North Americans’)
32
KORCULA (23 Apr, partisans with cdo support)
42
KORCULA (1 Aug)
42
Leros (17 June, Sunbeam)
60
MLJET (21 Apr, partisans)
41
MLJET (23 May, Farrier)
41
MONTE FAITO (2/3 Feb)
24
Pireaus area (COPPs)†
58
Salonika area (COPPs)†
59
SARANDE (9 Oct, Mercerised)
39
Sardinia (18 July, Hawthorn) not numbered
SOLTA (17 Mar, Detain I)
46
SOLTA (10 May)
46
SOUTHERN FRANCE (14 Aug—see ISLE D’HYERES)
32
SPILJE (29 July, Healing II)—approx.
40
VIZ (June to Sept)
44
1945
COMACCHIO (1 Apr, Roast)
33
* not on this map
† Raiding Forces Middle East landed on some 70 islands in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean (for examples see ‘Greek islands’ map and Appendix 7), these raiders concluded their 381 separate operations with a landing on Rhodes, 2 May 1945.
‡ COPP No. 10 operated in the Med from 1 June 1943 to 30 Nov 1944 and with other COPPs surveyed beaches of southern France, not all the locations of these and other COPP recces are shown in this diagram.
The raid did draw some German units from their lines further east, and several early lessons came from this raid. The difficulty of moving quietly and quickly over rough ground was clear, although a man moving quickly at night
is a much harder target for defenders to hit. The carrier ships—HMS Glengyle, Glenroy, and Glenearn—were specially equipped Landing Ships Infantry (Large), LSI(L)s, able to carry more than 1,000 troops but able to land only about 400 with the full complement of their LCAs in one flight. This proved a handicap and smaller LSIs came to be used for raids; there was little point in hazarding a 10,000 tonner when a ship half this size could land 400 men and do so with easier ship-handling. The Glen carriers were taken from the commandos, however, and transported troops for the campaign in Greece.
11 Commando was moved to Cyprus and the rest of Layforce ordered to Crete in late May. They could not get ashore on 25 May because of heavy weather but were landed from a fast mine-layer on 26-27 may at Suda Bay on the island’s north-west coast. Here, near the German’s most westerly of three airborne landings six days earlier, the commandos held positions astride the road going south to the evacuation port of Sphakia. They experienced their first dive-bombing attack, less physically dangerous than nerve-shattering to troops in slit-trenches. The men’s nerve stood this test, and in the next few days they fought a rearguard action. Bob Laycock sent small fighting patrols, seven or eight men, to counter-attack the Germans just before dark each night, discouraging the enemy from too-aggressive night actions. A bayonet attack by G Troop of 7 Commando showed this enemy—no less than many other troops—had a distaste for cold steel. In the flurry of such skirmishes the Commando headquarters was overrun on 28 May. Bob Laycock and the Brigade Major jumped into a nearby tank and drove off these Germans, the tank rumbling forward still in its swath of camouflage netting. A foretaste of Bob Laycock’s positive leadership.
Commandos and Rangers of World War II Page 18
