Throughout the rest of the winter campaign in the Philippines the 6th Rangers were involved in various patrols and a further amphibious landing (see Appendix 7). One significant raid during this period sums up much of the concept of Special Forces, with their commando-style training for rapid movement over difficult and defended country, and their ability to work with irregular forces. The American Sixth Army had reached Guimba in its drive south-east across Luzon’s central plain, having landed on the west coast at the head of the Lingayen Gulf on 9 January 1945. It was across these beaches of this northern island of the Group that, almost four years earlier, the Japanese had landed in their invasion of the Philippines. The Japanese in 1945 had insufficient forces to hold the plain, but they planned to delay the American advance, while at the same time withdrawing into prepared mountain strongholds, one of which was north of the Americans thrust. As these and other Japanese forces moved across their front, the Americans learnt of a prisoner-of-war camp near Cabanatuan in the eastern part of the plain, and the 6th Rangers were detailed to rescue the prisoners before they could be evacuated or worse.
Henry Mucci chose C Company, commanded by his ‘wonderful Captain’ Robert W. Prince. How often a particular Company or Troop appears throughout this history doing key jobs, frequently for the very good reason that their captain had created an extremely reliable unit. The colonel went with C Company, reinforced by the 2nd Platoon of F Company—121 men in all—with some borrowed bazookas and anti-tank grenades from the US 6 Infantry Division. By January 1945, Special Forces found no great difficulty in acquiring the tools they needed for a particular job, although they were still essentially light infantry. The reinforced Company set out at 0500 hours on Sunday, 28 January, in trucks that took them to the guerrilla headquarters of Captain Joson near Lobong, where his 80 men joined the force before they moved into enemy territory about three miles (5km) south of Baloc. Fording the Talavera river at midnight, they reached the Rizal road by 0400 hours next morning (Monday). American combat patrols covered fire or so miles (about 8km) into the area, while on Sunday 28 January two reconnaissance patrols had probed a further 10 miles (16km) into the flanks of the Japanese withdrawl through guerrilla country.
During Monday, 29 January, the rangers bivouacked after reaching Balingcari at 0600 hours. They were given a meal by the villagers—roast chicken served in banana leaves. Captain Pajota commanded the guerrillas in this area, and 90 of his armed men, with 160 others who would act as porters, joined the force. However, they did not have all the information Henry Mucci needed to know about the prison stockade, and so he decided to wait until the return of the Alamo Scouts—American soldiers specially trained for reconnaissance often behind enemy lines. In the evening, about 1800 hours, these two scouts came into Plateros, where the raiders were now concentrated, and reported that 500 Japanese were guarding the camp. They had also discovered a Japanese division moving up the road through Cabu, so no raid could be made until these troops had passed to the north. The action was put off until next day. In the morning, Tuesday 30 January, the Alamo Scouts and Lieutenant Tombo of the guerrillas made a detailed recce of the prison defences and, with the help of local civilians, were able to bring back details for a sketch plan of the camp. The Colonel made his plans that afternoon, knowing that the prisoners were in a fenced enclosure at the north-eastern part of the camop; its pill-boxes covered the north-east and north-west corners of the stockade around all the camp buildings, and there was a guarded main northern gate, plus guards at the rear gate and a guard tower on the eastern stockade perimeter.
To seal off the raiders from interference, two roadblocks would go in, with Captain Joson’s guerrillas and a six-man ranger bozooka team under Sergeant White blocking the road 800 yards (.8km) south-west of the camp. It would be their job to stop any Japanese traffic moving north from Cabanatuan a town of some 9,000 people. While Captain Pajota’s guerrillas blocked the road near Cabu bridge, a mile (1.6km) north of the camp, from where they could hold off the 800 Japanese in Cabu, F Company’s 2nd Platoon (Lieutenant John F. Murphy), coming from the south, were to invest the guards’ quarters behind the enclosure just west of the inner wire, with Staff-Sergeant Millican and six men taking the north-west pill-box. Lieutenant William J. O‘Connell’s 1st Platoon (C Company) would attack the front entrance, one Section attacking the gate and guardroon while the second Section gave covering fire through the stockade to the right (west). Other details were worked out so that each man knew exactly which enemy building he was specifically to attack or fire into. Such careful planning made in the field without the aid of a large staff had become a feature of Special Forces, but it was not the everday practice of regular forces, although they certainly had officers capable of such feats. However, with the commandos and rangers, every officer was trained to plan in the field for out-of-the-ordinary roles.
Top: 6th Rangers’ route to Japanese Cabanatuan prison camp, January 1945. Bottom: Layout of Cabanatuan prison camp, January 1945.
In developing the Company’s attack, the 1st Platoon’s Weapon Section would follow the rifle Section through the gate to fire bazooka rockets into the tank sheds, corrugated buildings which also held trucks in which Japanese reinforcements might—and did—use to reach their alarm stations. As the bazooka teams moved forward, the covering fire for the gate party would lift, and the covering Section would move quickly into the camp to prevent any guards breaking through from the west into the prisoners’ enclosure. The 2nd Platoon (Lieutenant Melville D. Schmidt) was to pass through the gate, break open the enclosure, and fire into the buildings already under fire from the platoon to the south. The 2nd Platoon’s Weapon Section would bring out the POWs. The whole operation demanded a stealthy approach to ensure surprise, but once John Murphy’s platoon opened fire from the rear (south) of the camp, saving the prisoners depended on speed. This difficult stealthy approach, followed by an action too quickly brought off for the enemy to react, epitomises the commando-style operation when every man had to be fit enough and skilled enough to play his part. Had one group of rangers failed, the Japanese could have killed their prisoners, or most of them in moments.
With the guerrillas protecting their flanks, the rangers began to move into position around the camp stockade at about 1800 hours that Tuesday evening. The going was slow for the ground was open, but in the gathering darkness C Company reached the ditch about 20 yards across the road in front of the main gate and were ready to go by 1925 hours. They had 20 minutes of tense waiting under cover until John Murphy’s platoon opened fire. Guerrillas cut the camp telephone wires at this moment.
The Japanese in the north-west pill-box were killed, as were those on the main gate, in the living-quarters, and on the watch-tower. The tower sentry remained upright for a split second after he was hit, then he crumpled backwards flinging his rifle involuntarily from the tower. The assault platoons broke through the main gate. Four tanks and two trucks—loading with men at the time—were knocked out. Everything went to plan, the prisoners being guided down to the main entrance while several rangers destroyed the radios they had been detailed to find. Many of the prisoners were extremely ill and had to be carried pickaback from the camp; most were silent when the rangers first arrived—years of Japanese camp life had taken its effect—but freedom quickly revived the fitter men. Although the rangers’ dress was unfamiliar to those who had been prisoners since 1942, the gentleness of their rescuers revived memories of a happier life and soon the prisoners shouted ‘They’re Americans’. The buildings had been searched before Bob Prince (CO of C Company) fired the first red flare signalling the start of the withdrawl at 2015. The raid had been completed in 30 minutes.
When the column was a mile from the camp, Bob Prince fired the second red flare, telling the guerrillas the roadblocks could withdraw. Captain Joson brought his men out of the southern block, coming in behind the rangers, but the the north Captain Pajota’s men were fighting off a strong force—not 800 but 2,000 by one report. T
his was held for another hour till the column was clear of the Cabu road, then the guerrillas formed a second flank rearguard. Local civilian caraboa carts were ready for the disabled ex-prisoners across the Pampanga river, but first the rangers and their guerrilla helpers had to get these men across the waist-deep, swift-flowing river. The invalids survived this crossing but two men died of heart attacks on the journey to safety, despite the care of the guerrilla Doctor Layug and his teams’ medical treatment in the school building at Plateros.
At 2100 hours, the first 115 ex-prisoners were on the move to Balingcari, many in carts: in all there were 513 ex-prisoners to be brought the 25 miles (40km) from their old camp to the American lines. By 0200 hours as the column passed through Matasna Kahog, there were 51 carts in a one and a half mile (2.4km) column winding its way towards the Rizal road. The column’s route took them for half a mine down this highway, which the 1st Platoon sealed off with road-blocks 800 yards each side of the crossing and one 400 yards (365m) south of the point where the column left the road. Through this defence screen the carts took an hour and a half to clear the road, the last man coming through at 0430 hours. An hour later a short halt was made in a small village area (bario) but several attempts to establish radio contact with the Sixth Army units failed. This was not achieved until after the column reached Sibil at 0800 (Wednesday, 31 January), and then a fleet of ambulances was brought up the dusty road to evacuate the rescued. When the ex-POWs were safe, the rangers were the first to pay tribute to the Filipino guerrillas who had enabled them to reach and leave the camp, and to the local population who fed them and gave other help. The Ranger Platoons had lost one man killed at the camp, and another 26—including guerrillas and the Rangers’ doctor, the very popular Captain Fisher—were killed in the withdrawl.
Six months later the war ended and commandos and rangers began to be demobilised; the first 139 men left the 6th Rangers on 20 August within a week of the Japanese surrender, and in the United Kingdom the Commando Demobilisation Centre had been set up at Wrexham. For the 6th Rangers there was a spell in Japan; they loaded their gear—typically under pouring rain—on 15 September, leaving Luzon a few days later, and landing near Honshu in Japan, wet shod over the Wakayama beach, in the late afternoon of 25 September. Their victory was not contested during the following weeks: the ‘people are very docile and cooperative’, the 6th Battalion’s unit history records. Although the barracks allocated to them were ‘lousy with fleas and rats’, these were soon cleaned up to be renamed Camp Fisher after their late medical officer. Near the end of November, the 6th Rangers had their final parade before General Krueger and General Eddleman, and were stood down—became inactive—on 30 December. The Army’s Commando Brigades were disbanded, the last, 1/5 Commando, during January 1947 in Hong Kong—but the Royal Marines carry on the commando tradition to this day.
ONE ENEMY’S REACTION TO THE COURAGE OF RAIDERS
Ten canoeists, including survivors of a fighting retreat after an SBS raid attempted to sink Singapore shipping, were sentenced to death on 5 July 1945. Amoung them were Australian and British soldiers, sailors and marines of whom the Japanese prosecutor said:
‘With such fine determination they infiltrated into the Japanese area. We do not hesitate to call them real heroes of a forlorn hope … when we fathom their intention and share their feelings we cannot but spare a tear for them. The valorous spirit of these men reminds us of the daring enterprise of our heroes of the Naval Special Attack Corps. The respect … the Australian people showed to those heroes we must return to these heroes in our presence. When the deed is so heroic, its sublime spirit must be respected, and its success or failure becomes a secondary matter …’
The prisoners were executed on 7 July and ‘every member of the party went to his death calmly and composedly and there was not a single person there who was not inspired by their fine attitude.’
This statement has subsequently proved to be a deliberate fiction to pacify the Allied War Crimes Commission. Nevertheless there is ample documentary evidence that most enemies of the Commandos and Ranger Battalions feared their fighting abilities.
CHAPTER 14
Achievements And
Limitations
There is no doubt of the commandos’ rangers’ and other Special Forces’ great courage. The doubts expressed in 1940 and in some quarters today (1977) are whether this wealth of human valour should be concentrated in elite units or spread more evenly through conscript battalions. The judgement must be made, I believe, in the context of wartime campaigns and not in comparisons with peacetime regiments able to select recruits to ‘carry out any operational task with little special training’ and be ‘raiders organised as a standard infantry regiment’ suiting operational planners. The wartime battalions included—as they do in all global wars—some reluctant soldiers, some not fully fit, and men over forty years of age. But when every man had to keep up in a speed march, every rifleman react quickly and correctly to counter enemy fire, then the disinterested, the unfit and the old are weak links that can break a chain around enemy positions. This may not be important when other battalions were close by, but is vital an independent actions. Special Forces also spurred on many a unit to adopt commando training methods in preparation to emulate their feats for the Normandy invasion. While the Ranger Battalions’ example was followed by so-called ranger squads trained within infantry battalions for the more difficult parts of infantry actions.
Commandos also provided opportunities for individuals to use their initiative, while in the necessarily more hidebound battalions such independence of mind may have to be discouraged. The conscripts’ training and fighting it to tight rules suited to those without imagination, but creating an atmosphere of regulations the independent spirits find stifling. Yet in a major war you need every man to give of his best, and forming commando-type units is one of the few ways some men with imagination and an independent mind may be drawn into infantry service. There is also the advantage of their special units providing a source of specialists for small units like COPPs, the SBS and other small-scale raiding forces. But there are obvious limitations to the extent to which you can denude conscript battalions of men with initiative, who are the main source of junior leaders.
The criticisms of the commando idea of elite troops trained for special roles all turn on matters of degree: the numbers you bring together as commandos or rangers in one operational unit. While larger formations, like the 18,000 or so Chindits, can—as Field Marshall Slim has written—encourage the idea that certain operations of war were so difficult that only a specially equipped corps d’élite could be expected to undertake them … [yet] armies do not win wars by means of a few bodies of super-soldiers but by the average quality of the standard unit’. That said, the Field Marshal made no criticism of the independent operations of a Commando with less than 500 although he considered that ‘any single operation in which more than a handful of men were engaged should be regarded as [a] normal [operation]’, in this regard he appears to have considered a ‘handful’ to be a few hundred men as at St Nazaire, Dieppe coast batteries, Port en Bessin, Brac, Alethangyaw, at Pointe du Hoc and Cabanatuan. Each was an operation needing skills a conscript battalion would have found hard to learn well enough for success in the time available to mount the operations. While the limited number of Commando units and Ranger Battalions in World War II—never more than the equivalent of 20 infantry battalions at any one time—can hardly be said to have impaired the officer corps in the Allied armies of several millions.
Taking the Commando-type operation as one of a special nature in night infiltration, perhaps, or with difficult cliff climbing routes, or unexpected political complications, the men engaged need more than the run-of-the-mill leadership found in most conscript battalions. For most men may be trained to shoot straight and many can learn to react quickly in a given situation, but there are special qualities of leadership needed to ensure every man holds his fire for the certain kill, or to
plan an unexpected foray in something more than a conventional raid. Qualities some officers in every regiment posses, but not found in conscript battalions with the consistency essential for commando operations. Since the war, the British solution has been happily found in Royal Marine Commandos with both a Corps and commando tradition.
The Royal Marines also have the advantage of manning their own landing craft as they did in many minor craft flotillas of World War II, but at that time there was no practical way of providing the commandos with their own craft nor with their own air support. They did not have organic artillery a battery of guns integrated with a Commando. At first they were expected to capture enemy guns, but this was only partially successful when at Vaagsö, for example, a captured 75mm (3in) gun was turned against German trawlers. Brigadier D.W. O’Flaherty, CBE, DSO, in a letter to the author has traced the development of light artillery support as an integral part of a Commando Brigade. The Brigadier as a junior officer was wounded at Vaagsö served in north-west Europe, in Korea in the 1950s and elsewhere in post-War Commando operations. The Raiding Support Regiment provided one of the first integrated fire support units during the Adriatic operations of 1944, but in the invasion of Normandy and elsewhere the commandos fire support was only part of a general fire plan for the parent formation of which they were part. However, in 1945 ‘the 1st Mountain Regiment supplied B.C. and OPs to 1 Commando Brigade for the Rhine crossing’, with a battery commander attached to the brigade’s staff. After the war the Brigadier was a leading advocate of organic artillery for commando brigades, especially for the defence of beachheads, bridges, or air fields they had seized ahead of the main forces. In the summer of 1962 he commanded 29 Commando Light Regiment RA on its formation, and set down ‘a simple rule: wherever the Commando Brigade went, by whatever means, so too should its affiliated regiment’. Trained as commandos this Regiment could ‘move their guns by helicopter, sea, air, or even its own flat feet’. In 1963, 95 Commando Light Regiment RA was incorporated into the RM Commando Brigade, for the modern commando no longer dodges the issue of landing guns.
Commandos and Rangers of World War II Page 36
