In the morning we found the dead man in German uniform, like the other captured partisans but on closer inspection I recognised him as an NCO from the communication platoon of the regimental company. It looked as if one of our detachments had inadvertently stumbled in our way in the dark and both groups had taken the other for the enemy. After this, I decided to end the mission and return to our regiment to make a report.
We made a stretcher for the dead German and began a slow and exhaustive trip back to regimental headquarters. Late at night we arrived and found SS-Untersturmführer Hubert Krimbacher, who had reported that his platoon had encountered overwhelming enemy forces which tried to encircle them. They had managed to escape but had to leave the dead or gravely wounded man behind. He was astonished when he learned that we had been his ‘enemies’.
It transpired that Pannier, together with his adjutant SS-Hauptsturmführer Günter Weis had started to interrogate the captured partisans with the help of an interpreter. One of them appeared to be very co-operative and indicated that he knew the location of the partisan headquarters and was willing to take Pannier’s troops there. Without any previous notice, at night and without any radio communication, Pannier immediately sent the communication platoon which consisted exclusively of Germans on this mission, believing that German troops were more likely to succeed. The plan was to attack the partisan stronghold in the middle of night in order to surprise them and capture them easily. Two partisans had led Untersturmführer-Hubert Krimbacher’s platoon directly towards us, and then ran away as soon as the battle started leaving us to fight it out.
In the investigation which followed everything was properly recorded but no charges were ever made. The German NCO paid with his life for Pannier’s mistake. As a result of this incident one could hear the enlisted men comparing the respective fighting spirits of the Ukrainians and the Germans. Until then the Germans had boasted of their superiority in battle, often belittling the Ukrainians.63
At a time when the smallest transgression on the part of a Ukrainian resulted almost inevitably in the death penalty as an example to maintain discipline, Pannier’s gross ineptitude was overlooked.
After a number of such actions, within a ten day period the Division’s district remained quiet and Marshal Tito’s forces kept at a safe distance and the main road from Maribor to Celje on which military columns and convoys had previously been under constant threat from attack, had also been cleared for all traffic day and night.64
At the beginning of March a letter arrived at Divisional headquarters enquiring as to its current operational status to which Freitag replied that he did not yet consider it to be fully combat effective and based on his experiences at Brody, that it would be ‘unreliable’ in battle.65 Shortly thereafter, Freitag issued a secret internal directive to his unit commanders instructing them to discharge ‘Unbrauchbare Elementen’ (unwanted elements).66 Having been told that they were to be released from military duty into civilian life, a significant number of these soldiers were later redirected to Arbeitsbattalions (construction battalions).
Amongst the approximately 400 men67 selected from WGR 31, was Waffen-Rottenführer Jaroslav Senchyna, a clerk serving with the 11./III./WGR 31. By his account one afternoon in early March his company commander Waffen-Obersturmführer Roman Bachynsky read out approximately 15 names and told them that they were discharged from military service. Having handed back rifles, belts, bayonets, Soldbuchs and insignia (they retained their uniforms), at about 0200 hrs the entire group marched in the direction of Maribor, on the way encountering others in the same position until their number grew to approximately 50 men. At 0900 hrs they arrived in the regiment HQ in St Lawrence where the regiment commander SS-Standartenführer Pannier inspected them before they marched to Maribor. Later, they travelled by train under escort to Feldbach in Austria where they were split into companies and as a larger labour force supervised by the Organisation Todt, were put to work building defensive positions and fortifications.68
On this issue, based on his diary entry Vasyl Veryha recalled the arrival of the order at his unit:
An order came to 9./II./WGR 30 where I served as Rechnungsführer,69 that anybody who wanted to be demobilised to civilian life may do so at this time. I could hardly believe it! As a result of this from 9 company, 10 soldiers70 volunteered and the next day they were led by the only German NCO in the company Unterscharführer Blume, to the regiment. In fact they were not sent to a civilian camp but redirected to an ‘Arbeitsbattalion’. At least 200 soldiers were transferred from WGR 30 in this way.71
In at least one instance, this same order was implemented by subterfuge as recalled by Waffen-Obersturmführer Bohdan Pidhayny. According to his account 150 men were transferred to Arbeitsbattalions having been told that they could ask for a transfer to another unit in which friends or relatives from home were serving.72
The Advent of the Ukrainian National Army
During this period there was a marked decline in the morale of the Ukrainian soldiers which began with the decision by the German authorities to move the Division to a theatre of operations remote from Ukraine which was once again being subjected to the brutalities of Soviet occupation. The situation in this respect was further exacerbated by Freitag’s order to discharge the ‘unwanted elements’ to labour battalions. The only remaining source of immediate encouragement was the continuing developments with the ‘Ukrainian National Committee’, which in late February/early March had entered into a decisive stage.
After months of negotiations, at a time when the western Allied armies had already crossed the German frontier and were poised to cross the Rhine and the Red Army was a mere 64 km from Berlin, a ‘Ukrainian National Committee’ independent of Vlasov’s authority came into being.73 On 23 February 1945, Alfred Rosenberg as the representative of the German Government formally empowered Shandruk to head the ‘Ukrainian National Committee’ which was to be the sole representative of the Ukrainian people.74 The official act of recognition was promulgated seventeen days later in writing by Rosenberg on 12 March 1945. It read:
Reichsminister Alfred Rosenberg
Berlin, 12 March 1945
Herrn
General Pavlo Schandruk,
Berlin-Charlottenburg,
Kant Hotel
In order to maximise the effect of all anti-Bolshevik national forces in this decisive phase of the war, and in the interests of a just order of the nations in Europe, I recognise on behalf of the German government, the working staff of Ukrainians national representatives called into existence by you as the Ukrainian National Committee,
I confirm that:
The Ukrainian National Committee is recognised by the German government as the sole representative of the Ukrainian people.
The Ukrainian National Committee has the right to represent its views of the future of the Ukraine and to express this in declarations and manifestos
When the question is finally settled as to how the Ukrainians fighting in the German Wehrmacht are to be organised, I will intercede in favour of Ukrainian troops in their entirety forming the Ukrainian Liberation Army.75
Signed Rosenberg
The practical consequences of Rosenberg’s declaration which was made in his now impotent capacity as Reichsminister for the Occupied [sic] Eastern Territories were necessarily limited76 nevertheless, following receipt of this authorisation, Shandruk was able to proceed with his plans which he had already initiated. These involved the organisation of the committee and the establishment of a Ukrainian National Army, the nucleus of which was to be the ‘14. Waffen Grenadier Division der SS [ukrainsche Nr.1]’. The committee’s executive positions were duly filled and Prof. Volodymyr Kubijovych and Oleksander Semenenko appointed as his first and second deputies.77 Priority was then given to the unification of all Ukrainian military formations into the ‘Ukrainian National Army’, of which General Shandruk himself became Commander in Chief.78
Towards this end, a projected 2 Ukrainian Divisio
n had already begun to take shape at the Nimek (Niemegk) training camp near Berlin from around 500 Ukrainian men who formed the 1 company of the Vil’na Ukraiina Anti-tank Brigade.79 To boost the strength of these units and the ‘14. Waffen Grenadier Division der SS [ukrainsche Nr.1’ (which was to become the ‘1 Division of the Ukrainian National Army’), the Germans, without consulting Shandruk, the Military Board or any other Ukrainian body, began a recruiting drive. Former members of various Schützmannschaft battalions who had fled with the retreating Germans, disillusioned forced labourers and former prisoners of war held in camps in Germany, many of whom had unknown antecedents and service histories, sought to join the ‘14. Waffen Grenadier Division der SS [ukrainsche Nr.1]’, as individuals or in groups80 although not all succeed in doing so. As far as possible, given its already overstretched resources, it undertook limited screening and rejected those who were either unfit or unsuitable for enlistment, while others preferred to return from whence they came.81
The Incorporation of the Volhynian Legion
Concurrently at the end of February 1945, plans were made to incorporate the Volhynian Self-Defence Legion into the Division. The Volhynian Legion was originally a partisan unit belonging to the Melnyk faction of the OUN82 which specialised in anti-partisan warfare and was comprised of formidable, battle-hardened and experienced men. Since October 1943, it had been under the direct control of the Sicherheitdienst (SD) as the Schützmannschaft Bataillon der SD Nr.31 or the Ukrainian Legion of Self Defence.83 Commanded since July 194484 by SS-Sturmbannführer Biegelmeyer,85 at its peak it reached a strength of approximately 600 officers and men including a few German SD officers and NCOs .86 The Legion had undertaken several independent anti-partisan actions at various locations in the Volhynia and Cholm regions of the General Government from February 1944, until the end of October 1944.87 In August 1944, one reinforced company under the command of Oberst Petro Diachenko was utilised with other German forces in the suppression of the Warsaw rising.88 This was done in the face of objections from the Legion’s political leader Mychailo Soltys known by the pseudonym ‘Cherkasy’, which ultimately cost him his life.89
The Legion was then deployed in its entirety at the railway station at Klaj (between Cracow and Bochnia) before being moved again to the Austrian side of the Yugoslav/Austrian border by train in late February 1945.90 Here, in the first week in March SS-Brigadeführer Freitag met several times with the SS-Sturmbannführer Biegelmeyer in the village of Unterschwarz where the Legion had its HQ, for discussions on the merger of the two units. For his part Biegelmeyer was supposed to brief the Legion’s personnel about the nature of the intended amalgamation into one single Ukrainian combat formation which evidently he failed to do.91 Pending full integration the unit was to remain in the region as a separate entity.
Unaware of the plans to unify all Ukrainian units, some of the Volhynians opposed the merger, concerned that they would lose their separate Ukrainian identity and independence. Amongst them were several who had previously served as officers in the Division and whom the Germans had subsequently been eager to dismiss as unsuitable, such as Waffen-Sturmbannführer Jaroslav Litvin, Waffen-Obersturmführer Evgeini Popivsky, Waffen-Hauptsturmführers’ Mychailo Kaschuk, Vasyl Lychmanenko and Borys Bazylevych.
According to the testimony of Fedir Tsymbaliuk (an NCO with the Legion), on the afternoon of Saturday 3 March 1945, platoon commanders ‘Klen’ and ‘Chalyi’ came to his quarters and informed him that a group of approximately 80 men was being organised under the command of Lieutenant Roman Kyveluk, (‘Voron’), which originally intended to go over to the Western Allies. To accomplish this they had made contact with the local Chetniks who had agreed to help them cross the River Mur by ferry and act as guides. The rumour quickly spread that the group would in fact return to the Carpathian Mountains where they planned to join with the existing Ukrainian resistance movements active in that area. As a result the numbers quickly grew and during the night the group which now numbered approximately 200 men slipped away.92
In early March 1945, Schutzmannschaft Bataillon der SD Nr.31 or the ‘Volhynian Self-Defence Legion’ was incorporated into the Galician Division. Part of their number made an abortive attempt to join up with local Chetnik forces. This renegade group was eventually forced to surrender and merge with the Galician Division on 9 March 1945 in the village of Frauheim, Slovenia. In front row the legions NCO’s including master sergeant Orest Horodysky (wearing white sheepskin jacket).
Five officers of the Legion in the village of Oberschwarze Austria on the River Mur Sergeant Domarackyj, 1st Lieutenant Lytwyn (previously dismissed from the Galician Division) captain Oksentijiw, Lieutenant Roman Kyveluk (leader of the renegade group later shot on Freitag’s orders) and Lieutenant Charvicky.
March 1945, part of the Schutzmannschaft Bataillon der SD Nr.31 or the ‘Volhynian Self-Defence Legion’ made an abortive attempt to join up with local Chetnik forces. This renegade group was eventually forced to surrender and merge with the Galician Division on 9 March 1945, in the village of Frauheim, Slovenia.
Heike (left) and Waffen-Hauptsturmführer Lubomyr Makarushka (right) oversaw the merger.
Consequently, when Major Heike and the senior regimental commander together with the Divisional band arrived at the Legion’s camp for the scheduled official incorporation ceremony, they found only two thirds were present. The remaining third of the Volhynians together with their portable weapons, equipment and horses were nowhere to been seen.
In the course of the following days, having crossed the Mur without the promised help, the renegade group was met by Chetnik liaison officers in the St Leonard district east of Maribor who promptly betrayed the location of the Volhynians to the German security Polizei in Maribor. They were then given instructions to deliver the group to a previously determined location where they would be met by a detachment from the Division which was to oversee the forcible merger.93
This took place on 9 March when the Volhynians were surrounded by a detachment from the Division in company strength. There was a brief exchange of fire and one Legion member was lightly wounded in the leg.94 Representing the Ukrainian contingent of the Division were Waffen-Untersturmführer Father Levenetz, Waffen-Obersturmführer Pidhayny and the Liaison Officer Waffen-Haupsturmführer Makarushka95 who acted as interpreter and appeared carrying a white flag.96 To mollify their apprehensions, the Volhynians were offered surrender terms on Freitag’s behalf and assured that there would be a full amnesty for all those involved. After careful deliberation this offer was accepted by their leader Roman Kyveluk and shortly thereafter the merger went ahead in the village of Frauheim.
Sergeant Orest Horodysky who was amongst the rebels and who acted as their interpreter recalled:
When we were surrounded, Makarushka sent a Slovenian boy with the message to surrender without any penalty. At the same time myself and ‘Koval’ as ‘parliamentarians’ had a conversation with the Major from the anti-tank company [SS-Sturmbannführer Hermann Kaschner] who ordered us to surrender. I returned by myself to the camp, ‘Koval’ was retained. I reported to ‘Voron’ [Lieutenant Roman Kyveluk] and at a meeting of all the soldiers [we] decided to join the Division. The German NCOs took our guns from us. When Major Heike and Makarushka told us that we could keep our weapons I approached the Oberscharführer and demand my gun which he returned.97
In this way around 600 Volhynians including two doctors and two priests98 were absorbed into the ‘14. Waffen Grenadier Division der SS [ukrainsche Nr.1]’, in early March 1945. The officers and NCOs (numbering approximately 80) were permitted to retain their ranks. They were subsequently put through a brief training course supervised by Untersturmführer Walter Kohlstedt during which they were given instruction in the handling of weapons (i.e. Panzerfaust) and tactics. As a rule they were brave, well trained in partisan warfare, independent and they were not afraid of anything. Later, together with the enlisted men they were divided up between the sub-units,99 where, because of th
eir expertise they were often used as ‘search platoons’ in subsequent actions against partisans. For example around fifty were sent to the Fusilier Battalion from which a Jagdzug was formed commanded by Waffen-Untersturmführer Orest Liashevych, which was under the direct orders of the battalion commander.100
Shortly after the amalgamation had taken place, Kyveluk, who had led the rebel group, was summoned to Divisional Headquarters on Freitag’s orders. Orest Horodysky wrote: ‘[…] When Kyveluk was summoned to the division [HQ] he stopped by our company and I urged him not to go but to run away. His answer was “his officers honour did not permit him to do this”.’101 En route he was shot (purportedly for theft). On this issue Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Hawrylak later wrote in his memoirs: ‘[…] Much later we learned that our Divisional commander had ordered ‘Voron’ Kyveluk shot. I was sorry to hear that because I knew him to be an outstanding and noble person’.102
As a result of their reputation, although they received a warm welcome from their Ukrainian comrades, the Germans remained sceptical of their new charges and were generally distrustful of them but nevertheless sought to exploit their presence as Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Kolisnyk recalled:
[…] When the platoon of Volhynian Legion ‘partisans’ came to us, they were ‘welcomed’ by the battalion commander (I./WGR 31) SS-Sturmbannführer Heinz Kurzbach. They were dressed in different uniforms: some wore civilian riding trousers and boots, some were in German military uniforms: they had different kinds of weapons. It was evident that Kurzbach looked at this ‘army’ without great enthusiasm. He couldn’t resist repeating sarcastically to himself the word ‘commander’ when he heard that they called their NCOs ‘commanders’. (In the German Army the term commander was used only for those who commanded battalions or larger military units), but we soon made friends with them. For us, they were our soldiers even without German weapons and uniforms. They told us interesting stories of their actions in Volhynia. They remembered their leader lieutenant ‘Voron’ whom the Germans shot when the Legion first came to the Division and didn’t want to join it, when they saw the German commanders.103
Stalin's Nemesis Page 17
