The Führer understands the shaky (Vorschwanken) situation of the 14.SS-Div. at the border position of H(erres) G(ruppe) South. (Fegelein’s clarification of the interpretation of the order of the Reichsführer SS to the Division could not be made because he was not present. [it] Was discussed with Fegelein’s adjutant)239
Combat in Styria
Having decided to ignore the order received from the SS-FHA, on 3 April the Division immediately commenced its main attack to close the Soviet breach north of Straden in the Gleichenberg sector.240 Simultaneously, the remnants of the 5 ‘Wiking’ Division (part of 6 Army) advanced on its left flank against the Soviet forces attacking along the Raab Valley towards Feldbach,241 whilst on its right was the 3 Cavalry Division (1 Cavalry Corps).
Divisional headquarters relocated from St Peter to Gnas for a short period before finally moving south-east to the village of Straden. Later, the HQ of the Artillery Regiment was also located in this village which was an excellent tactical observation point, from which the Division’s command could oversee the deployment of most of its fighting echelons in the field.
Behind the front the Pioneer Battalion, assembled east of Trautmannsdorf in the vicinity of Gnas where it was temporally held as the Divisional reserve.242
In the vanguard of the advance, the initial attacks of all three battalions of WGR 29 had made good progress. Having met with only weak enemy forces which were quickly overcome, the regiment seized its main objective—the high ground in the vicinity of Gleichenberg Kögel (598 m) which included Gleichenberg Schloss situated at a height of 414 m and the hill named ‘Sulz’ (348 m). On the eastern side of the Sulzbach Valley elements came under concentrated fire from fortified Soviet positions at Gleichenberg Dorf and the Austrian resort town of Bad Gleichenberg. In the heavy fighting that followed for Gleichenberg Dorf, the Ukrainian soldiers were unable to capture and hold the whole of the village. During this action Waffen-Obersturmführer Ostap Czuczkewycz243 demonstrated both personal bravery and exemplary leadership which later won him the Iron Cross I. Class. Similarly, having been forced to retreat from Bad Gleichenberg, other elements of the regiment regrouped under cover of darkness in a wood just outside the town and the next morning with artillery support, attacked the position in strength, but were unable to dislodge the Red Army units entrenched there.244
As WGR 29 successfully halted the breakthrough and closed the gap in the Gleichenberg sector, in the night of the 4/5 April 1945, the bulk of WGR 30 was alerted for an immediate move in the direction of Straden245 and given the assignment of capturing Stradner Kögel (609 m) and occupying the front line directly to the south of WGR 29. Starting at dawn on what was already a hot day, the regiment’s forced march from Maribor via Mureck to its assigned positions lasted until 2300 hrs on 5 April .246
After their officers had first been given a short briefing on the situation,247 the regiment took up holding positions without the customary preparations and planning. The results bore all the hallmarks of an ill-prepared deployment.
The III battalion commanded by SS-Sturmbannführer248 Wittenmeyer, occupied the foremost part of the line around Kolldorf, whilst the I and II battalions moved into position in the vicinity of Wilhelmsdorf/Hochstradener Kögel. In so doing WGR 30 had occupied what ultimately proved to be a tactically very poor line which it had no realistic prospect of defending.
Having arrived at the front which was under constant Soviet observation, the regiment initially constructed its positions in total darkness so that company and platoon commanders could not select the most suitable places to dig their emplacements. The deployment was so rushed that there were hardly any maps available of the locality,249 as a result of which the Vorgeschobener Stützpunkt (forward defence posts) were over-extended along this hilly and heavily wooded section of the front. As there had not even been enough time to lay any telephone lines and with insufficient radio sets, the crucially needed immediate communication between its units was exceptionally difficult. With the regimental and battalion headquarters situated 1 to 2 km away, often messengers had to be employed to deliver orders to companies by hand, consequently as later events were to prove, the regiment was not able to effectively co-ordinate its forces in the event of an attack.250 Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Herasymowycz. who commanded 1./I. WGR 30:
[…] at 0500 hrs on 6 April 1945 the company advanced towards its assigned positions—a gap in the front between Bad Gleichenberg and Straden. 1./I./WGR 30 took positions on a 3 km segment of a hilly, wooded area around Stradner Kögel on the left flank of the battalion. The long segment (50 metres between positions) made supervision difficult and maintaining communications within the company, with the battalion or with neighbouring units was impossible. Nevertheless the first day and night were very quiet with no casualties.[…]251
The third combat element to be committed with the first wave was the 14.Feld Ersatz Bataillon which had marched north independently from Spielfeld to the district south west of Feldbach. Being largely composed of recruits who had not completed their training, this unit could not under any circumstances have been classified as ‘combat ready’ and consequently it was the weakest of the divisional elements to deploy. As the extreme left flank of the Division, it formed part of an emergency force assembled from various Kampfgruppen by 6 Army (General Balck) and Wehrkreis XVIII (Befehlshaber General Ringel), for a counter-attack in the Raab Valley. For this purpose, it was subordinated to the overall command of Panzerofficer Oberstleutnant Wolf of 6 Army.252
Lacking infantry support weapons such as artillery and mortars, on 5 April at 0500 hrs the approximately 1,200 men of the battalion launched an attack en masse from its staging area at Unterwiessenbach in an easterly direction through Oedt253 towards Burgfried, a suburb of Feldbach. Its insertion in this area relieved the pressure on the right flank of the Fallschirmjäger troops that were advancing eastwards along both sides of the Feldbach/Leiterdorf road.
One company received the order to clear the town of Feldbach in which individual houses were already on fire and several stray horses were running loose, with support from four 7.62 cm self-propelled Pak guns. The Red Army units who were well entrenched, had far superior firepower at their disposal with artillery, mortars and strong anti-tank defences. At the appointed hour the self-propelled guns had still not arrived and they could not be located by the messengers sent to find them so the advance commenced without their support and with limited ammunition. During the attack which had some success, the Ukrainians who had to negotiate a minefield and well prepared emplacements, knocked out an enemy machine gun with Panzerfausts. An hour late, the self-propelled guns finally arrived and with their support the company reached the waterworks where it took ten Red Army soldiers prisoner before advancing and establishing itself in positions along the railway dam.254 Their participation in the successful recapture of the town was a very creditable outcome given the prevailing circumstances.255
Overall the Division’s general line of advance, in particular that of WGR 29 appeared to have shown good progress in all areas which raised morale and boosted the confidence of the Ukrainian soldiers.
By 6 April WGR’s 29 and 30 held positions which stretched from Gleichenberg Schloss to Hochstraden just north of Frutten. This sector which as later events would prove was too ambitious for its limited resources, included the Gleichenberg and Stradner Kögels, situated in a north to south line approximately 6 kms apart and the strategically important Gleichenberg Schloss, a castle set high on a rocky forested hill with views that extended for miles around.256 The entire area however remained unsettled and volatile particularly around the precarious positions recently occupied by WGR 30.
Nevertheless the Division had achieved its general objective of capturing and securing the two elevations, thereby temporarily sealing the important breach between the German 2 and 6 Armies which enabled 1 Cavalry Corps to move the 3 Cavalry Division off the frontline and into a reserve position. The achievement was summarised in the secret dai
ly report of the OKH for 6 April 1945, as follows: […] ‘2. Pz. Army: An attack in a north-easterly direction by the 14.SS.Div. on the left flank of the army reached the region three kms south of Gleichenberg’.257
With the units holding the front temporarily cut off from their supply units in the rear, as the front settled the soldiers took it in turns to explore the locality for food, searching deserted private homes and outlying farms in the vicinity of Gleichenberg, many of which bore the unmistakeable marks of already having been broken into after their civilian inhabitants had fled. Typically they found apples in the basement storage areas and ‘Most’ (a fermented apple juice with low alcohol content produced by the local farmers) stored in large barrels.258 They also took the opportunity to investigate the nearby settlements such as Trautmannsdorf which had become proverbial ‘ghost towns’ with many of the properties in them having been ransacked and shops stripped bare and vandalised.
It was around this time that the Division received the welcome boost of the arrival of 86 young Ukrainian officers fresh from graduating from German academies with the rank of Waffen-Untersturmführer.259 These newcomers who were referred to by their comrades by the colloquial term ‘Pistolets’, reported for service at its HQ near Straden in the second week in April and were greeted by the Divisional commander and Dr Wächter who offered a few words of encouragement.260 After Brigadeführer Freitag had addressed them concerning the need for officers at the front, individuals were assigned as far as possible to their original regiments. Amongst them was Waffen-Untersturmführer Osyp Holynsky:
I was among the approximately 80 young, new officers that arrived in Maribor, Yugoslavia from a special training camp in Czechoslovakia, looking to find the Division’s headquarters. We couldn’t find it so we temporarily stationed ourselves in an abandoned school, seemingly forgotten. We didn’t have any food or any way to contact our Division because we did not know its whereabouts. We were all very hungry and for about a week our only goal was to survive. Farmers around the school did their best to feed us, mostly with apples. My friend Walter Motyka and I walked about a mile to a Yugoslavian farmer who welcomed us into his home. He was very friendly, somewhat surprised and probably a bit scared. His daughter was not as friendly. The farmer brought us some ‘good’ wine and after a few glasses we almost forgot where we were. He gave us a couple of bottles for the road and told us that we could take as many apples as we wanted, along with some cigarettes. We stumbled back to the school and shared the wine with the other soldiers.
Finally, one day, trucks arrived and loaded all of us without telling us where we were going. After travelling for a short time, we were very surprised when we saw trucks heading in the opposite direction. We started seeing wounded men. Motyka recognised one of his friends from our Division so we knew that we were on the front line. We were all a little bit shocked and saddened by the sight but this was the reality of war.
We arrived to the Division’s headquarters late at night where we were met by the Division’s commander, SS-Brigadeführer Freitag. He was surprised because nobody had informed him about our arrival but at the same time, glad to receive so many healthy, fresh officers. He briefed us about the Division’s attack on the front line. In the distance we heard artillery activity. He said, ‘Enjoy your Marketenderwaren’261 and we’ll meet again tomorrow morning.’ It just so happened that the Division had just received a new supply, which included sweets, chocolates and bottles of wine, along with some necessities. We consumed everything, as we were all extremely hungry from not having eaten properly for a week.
That night I remember sleeping really well but we were awoken very early the following morning to be greeted by the Division’s commander as well as Dr Wächter—former governor of Galicia and the actual creator of the Division. All 80 odd officers lined up in a row and Freitag divided us into 3 groups. Once selected, each group headed off to one of the 3 regiments that were stationed at different points along the front line.262
Immediately integrated into its various sub-units as platoon or company commanders, many went sent straight into combat situations. Often without any previous battle experience and with the Red Army snipers searching specifically for officers, predictably some such as Waffen Untersturmführers Bohdan Sajevytsch and Michael Hrab quickly lost their lives in the days to come.263
Dr Wächter then left for Italy to continue with his plans to transfer the Division, the Cossack Corps and the eastern Turkish formations to northern Italy, via the small town of Tolmezzo in the Carnian Alps. With the help of Field Marshal Kesselring’s successor as the Commander in Chief of the German forces in Italy, General Heinrich Freiherr von Vietinghoff, Wächter proposed to hand these formations over to the Western Allies.264 To assist with this, he advised the Division’s command to try and obtain the necessary food supplies especially livestock, that would be needed for a lengthy journey across the Alps. Before he left, Wächter also gave notice of the impending arrival of General Shandruk.265
The Soviet Counterattack (Lost Ground, Regained)
The Red Army units which had been caught off balance, acted quickly to take back the ground that they had recently conceded. In the second week of April 1945, facing 1 Cavalry Corps was the Soviet VI Guards Rifle Corps266 and elements of LXIV Rifle Corps.267 The main attacks in the Galician Division’s sector were spearheaded by the 20 Guards Division, 61 Guards Rifle Division, (VI Guards Rifle Corps) and 10 Guards Division (LXIV Rifle Corps)268 with the estimated ratio of infantry at this time being four or five to one in favour of the Soviets.269 The relative strength of the heavy weaponry and artillery was considerably worse and the huge disparity in this respect was compounded by the fact that on the German side a crippling shortage of ammunition for all the artillery, anti-tank guns and even the heavy mortars prevailed. For example the 13./WGR 30 went to the front with 92 shells for 2 Infanterie Geschütz guns and did not receive any further supplies of ammunition before the final capitulation.270 Indeed it was in such short supply that these weapons could only be fired with special permission271 while in complete contrast the Red Army artillery units in the area expended massive amounts of ammunition especially in support of their infantry attacks.
Although the 1 Cavalry Corps had neither tanks nor aircraft at its disposal, comparatively few Soviet tanks were in evidence in this area which did not easily lend itself to the deployment of armour.272 Moreover, the nature of the mountainous terrain with its thick forests was not conducive to the utilisation of aircraft, depriving the Soviets of capitalising on their total air-superiority.
In WGR 29’s locality, the main thrust by 20 Guards Rifle Division struck in the direction of Trautmannsdorf forcing elements of the regiment to retire from their exposed positions in the Sulzbach Valley on the outskirts of Bad Gleichenberg and from Gleichenberg Dorf which was recaptured by the Red Army. It was also necessary to abandon Gleichenberg Kögel which changed hands several times.
I./WGR 29 pulled back to ‘Sulz’, with orders to hold the hill at all costs however the 4 (heavy) company of SS-Obersturmführer Schneller began receiving sniper fire from the flank and lost communication with battalion headquarters. Under these circumstances Schneller felt its position had become untenable and he ordered the company to retreat back to Trautmannsdorf.273 Waffen-Grenadier Volodymyr Keczun from 4./I./WGR 29:
[…] When we reached the front line we found out that our troops there were in a very precarious position because their positions were on the lower slopes and the Red Army held the ridge and snipers were causing havoc. We deployed into an attacking formation and advanced. We managed to get roughly half way up to the ridge, luckily without serious casualties, when an order came to retreat and rush back to Trautmannsdorf because it was threatened by the Red Army. The company which relieved us retreated under the enemy onslaught to the top of the ridge and the Red Army again occupied the small village.
When we got back to Trautmannsdorf it was chaos. Our transport retreated further back as did nearly all the i
nhabitants.[…]274
The Soviets then pressed forward without respite and by 10 April after heavy fighting, had retaken Trautmannsdorf village and station,275 in the process by-passing ‘Sulz’ on which two companies reinforced with a Jagdzug, were still entrenched in defensive positions.276 Newly arrived Waffen-Untersturmführer Volodymyr Motyka who had been assigned to command the 1 platoon of the 1 company was part of this force wrote:
[…] The Soviets started bombarding our hill with heavy artillery and Katyushas which made a tremendous noise and inflicted a lot of damage and quite a few casualties. The wounded were taken to the field hospital.
We defended our position well but our own artillery was not very effective in helping us so that by the evening our hill was practically cut off. We also lost telephone and radio contact with our battalion command. Our ammunition supply was now running low and we were beginning to get hungry. There were five Ukrainian officers; Waffen-Obersturmführer Volodymyr Kosak, and four Waffen-Untersturmführers, Orest Yarymovych, Omelan Kulchysky, Jurij Kushnir and myself Volodymyr Motyka, about a dozen NCOs and approximately two hundred men. The situation was grave. After a short discussion among the officers and an evaluation of our situation, we concluded that our best chance would be to try and break through. This could not be accomplished during the day so we had to wait for nightfall. In the meantime we suffered more casualties, among them my good friend Waffen-Untersturmführer Jurij Kushnir, so Waffen-Obersturmführer Kosak ordered me and another Waffen-Untersturmführer to cover the break through with our platoons.
Most of our troops broke out during the night. By morning about forty of us were still on the hill ‘Sulz’. Our supplies of ammunition were practically gone leaving us no choice but to run down the hill no matter what and to cross the railway tracks on which the enemy was concentrating his mortar fire.
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