Although the original intention had been to keep WGR 31 in reserve, because of the casualties already sustained by WGR 30, it was necessary to move the regiment into the front immediately without rest or respite. Company commander Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Herasymowych:
[…] On 7 April 1945, Red Army units started probing our positions—artillery and infantry activities (on this day 1./I./WGR 30 suffered two casualties). During the night of the 7 April 1945, 1./I./WGR 30 was relieved by WGR 31. A full battalion took up the positions of the 1 company. I./WGR 30 was relocated back (west) to the village of Stallhans as Divisional reserve .…]286
The next day, there was a full scale assault on the Ukrainian positions by the 61 Guards Rifle Division. The Division’s command re-committed elements of WRG 30 and with limited artillery support initially its infantry units held fast. Amidst shouts in Russian of ‘Prepare to attack!’ and ‘Hurrah!’ the Ukrainian battle cry of ‘Slava’ (Glory!) could be heard as both sides locked in close combat, however despite the courageous efforts of individuals such as Waffen-Untersturmführer Philip Trotch (14./WGR 30), whose personal bravery won him Iron Cross II. Class,287 after strong attacks the inexperienced Ukrainians were dislodged from their positions.
The veteran 3 Cavalry Division came to their assistance, attacking and seizing the villages of Wilhelmsdorf and Frutten before storming Stradner Kögel with a broad assault from the south. With no direct contact with the Ukrainians to coordinate the attack, on the mountain they encountered both Red Army units and Ukrainians. In his account, the commander of the II Abteilung/Reiterregiment 32, Rittmeister288 Franz Rudolph Zilm stated that in the darkness complete confusion prevailed and it was impossible to identify friend from foe. As a result at some point the Germans found themselves fighting against the Soviets and the Ukrainians by mistake, as did the Ukrainians, who in turn also fought both the Soviets and the Germans and in the ensuing confusion the Ukrainians accidentally injured 5 Germans.289
The counter-attack was however successful and the Red Army units were forced off the heavily wooded mountain east, to the village of Plesch. The 3 Cavalry Division which had in the interim lost its self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and suffered heavy casualties in dead and wounded, was then moved into the reserve in the village of Haag for re-supply and the Ukrainian infantry then moved back into the line and retook responsibility for the whole Kögel.
Skirmishes continued along the entire sector during the night as the enemy scouts and reconnaissance units attempted to approach the Ukrainian positions, only to be driven back by concentrated fire. Those who were manning the isolated forward defence posts (‘Vorgeschobener Stützpunkt’) had to remain alert at all times and the Soviet use of explosive bullets which exploded on impact and echoed in the terrain further unsettled the sentries and ensured extra vigilance.290
Once they had regrouped, and before the Ukrainians had prepared their defensive positions the Red Army units launched another furious counterattack preceded by a bombardment by heavy artillery and Katyushas, opening several breaches in the Ukrainian lines, through which groups of enemy assault troops advanced. According to the Division’s 1a Major Heike this was because ‘the Ukrainian soldiers were much more susceptible to strong artillery fire than Germans and were easier to flush out of defensive positions’.291 In an effort to seal the numerous penetrations with its own forces, all three companies of the Pioneer Battalion were committed to the fighting at the foot of Stradner Kögel as regular infantry292 together with the 2 and 3 companies of the Fusilier Battalion. As the casualties continued to mount the Division was unable to stop the Soviets from temporarily regaining control of the elevation as Waffen-Untersturmführer Volodymyr Mykula of 2./I./WGR 31 later noted in his diary:
[…] On 9 April at 0800 hrs, the enemy started a fierce artillery and Katyusha rocket bombardment of our positions in preparation for an infantry attack. The shelling lasted for two hours. Then the attack started on two flanks. During the bombardment, the 2 company commander Waffen-Hauptsturmführer Hennadij Salessky, a former Red Army officer who had been appointed to that position only three weeks earlier, was mortally wounded at his station at the edge of the forest, about 500 metres behind the front line and died. He was replaced immediately by Untersturmführer Poresch, a young, 21 year old inexperienced German from Slovakia who was the adjutant to the I battalion commander Sturmbannführer Kurzbach.
The 1 and 3 platoons were scattered by the bombardment and the two Scharführers leading them disappeared. In order not to be encircled, the battalion had to retreat to the western foot of the mountain’.293
The 3 Cavalry Division was again brought in from the reserves to counter-attack, this time approaching from Rosenberg (four kms south of Straden). By the evening a mixed force of riders from the 31, 32, 41 and 5 Cavalry regiments and Ukrainian infantry pushed the Red Army units back and secured the mountain which was once again in German hands.294 The most notable casualty on this day was the commander of WGR 31 SS-Standartenführer Rudolph Pannier who was shot whilst visiting the positions of 2./I./WGR 31.295 His place as regimental commander was taken by SS-Sturmbannführer Wittenmeyer who commanded III./WGR 30, which was dissolved on this day because of heavy losses.296
On the issue of Pannier’s wounding Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Hawrylak who commanded the Jagdzug WGR 13:
[…] I was called by Pannier who said ‘come with me Hawrylak, I want to inspect our front line’. We got in his Volkswagen which was chauffeured by a German NCO. We approached on a field road as close as possible to the front line, left the car and continued the rest of the way on foot. Finally we came to the front line which had not yet stabilised and was constantly changing due to Soviet attacks and our counter-attacks. Therefore our soldiers did not have time to dig in or develop shelters or cover but were lying flat on the ground or hiding behind trees or small mounds. While everyone was trying to find cover here comes Pannier upright, with a dangling, shimmering, Knights Cross around his neck. He made no attempt to find cover but continued to pace along the frontline slowly and with dignity. His chauffeur and myself were following him also walking upright otherwise we would have had to crawl and it would been unthinkable for us to have sought cover while he remained exposed.
Finally Pannier approached a soldier who was hiding behind a tree and ordered him to bring the company commander. The soldier, obeying the order, jumped up and ran from tree to tree or hit the ground to take cover when it was available, in other words behaving exactly as he should in the proximity of the enemy who was firing at us. Seeing this Pannier said ‘Look Hawrylak, what a theatrical spectacle that man is making!’ Before he had even finished what he was saying we heard a burst of machine gun fire aimed at us. In a split second I was falling on the ground and saw some retreating Soviets with a machine gun in the underbrush. Our soldiers responded immediately with dense fire. Examining myself I found that I was not injured but Pannier had a badly smashed leg and the German chauffer caught a few bullets in the chest. Both were carried away by our medics.[…]297
The secret daily report of the OKH for 9 April 1945, recorded the fighting for this day: ‘2. Pz. Army: […] The enemy succeeded in penetrating the front line in the sector of the 14. SS-Gren. Div. and occupying the mountainous terrain five kms wide to the south east of Gleichenberg. Part of the 3. Cavalry Division was engaged in a counterattack’.298
The next day, again preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment the Soviets attacked in such overwhelming strength that they forced a general retreat of all units approximately 2 kms west to the Sulzbach Valley to the line Waldsberg—Dirnbach—Stainz. Waffen-Untersturmführer Zenon Kuk commanded the 5./II./WGR 30 which was completely overcome in this attack:
[…] About 30 kms east of the Maribor/Graz main road, some of the units of our division took up new positions attempting to straighten out the frontline. About 0300 hrs the 5 company WGR 30 took up positions near an Austrian farm on a rise. We were about 300 metres in front of it. To the right wa
s Waffen-Untersturmführer Mychailo Tarnavetsky’s 8 heavy company and to the left a little behind us was a Wehrmacht unit. The order was given to dig in well. The platoons and groups took up their positions and started working feverishly for experience had taught them that a deep narrow hole was the best insurance. Having finished digging in, some of the boys were taking a nap. Daylight was beginning to dawn and as contours of the surroundings became clearer we were trying to penetrate the unknown in front of us. Finally the sun had risen.
In front of our company positions at a distance of about 800 metres there was a dale and beyond that we could see some buildings on the rising terrain. Everybody was looking intently in that direction from which we expected the enemy to come. In the forefield the noise of the battle was increasing although it was not possible to recognise anything for the distance was too great, even for binoculars. In two hours everything grew quiet. From time to time a canon shot sounded, rifle shots wailed or sub-machine guns cracked. The Soviets were liquidating the last nests of resistance.
Soon we saw the remnants. It was a Wehrmacht unit. Tired and frightened they were leading and carrying their wounded comrades. They passed us retreating to the rear. ‘Ivan’ continued to move forward and stopped in the positions just won, but his artillery told us he would be coming. Coming soon.
Then all hell broke lose. Our position occupied some 300 m × 200 m and ‘Ivan’ was firing seven heavy calibre cannons, eleven heavy mortars and an innumerable number of smaller calibre weapons at us. I remember this well because sitting in my foxhole I counted them by the sound of their firing (artillery) and the explosions (mortars). Our artillery was silent. It lasted for hours. All around us was dust, smoke and roar. The sound of the enemy’s heavy weapons merged together with their explosions into one indescribable hellish noise. The soldiers pressed themselves deep down into their foxholes, some smoking one cigarette after another, others laughing and still others with each explosion not believing that they were still alive. Time passed slowly.
Suddenly everything grew silent. Only late shells were heard flying through the air and hurriedly exploding. Dispatchers appeared, soldiers showed their heads from foxholes, medics attended to their job. With one word the line came to life. But this respite did not last long. In 30 minutes or so everything started anew. First mortars then artillery. The worst was the ‘rach-baum’—an anti-tank gun standing near a barn on a neighbouring hill. An artillery observer reported it to me. I pointed out to him the gun’s position. A brief order, a few numbers into the radio and I heard the whistle of an artillery shell and an explosion near the barn. A small correction and the barn was on fire. A yell of approval came from the soldiers who ‘followed’ this operation. However careless behaviour on the part of the artillery observer betrayed his position and in a few minutes ‘Ivan’ gave us to understand that he had found him. A deadly load came flying over our heads. Too far. The second and third shots came perilously close and our artillery observer had to change positions. Clearly he wanted to avenge his comrades.
For a time there was quiet—the kind of quiet before the storm. From the forefield came an undetermined noise. Suddenly we saw a mass of grey figures moving towards us with a long ‘hurrah!’ The shooting began and the grenades were flying, when suddenly Tarnovetsky’s 8 heavy company entered the battle. His heavy machine guns and mortars hit the attacking Bolsheviks with all their firepower. They had not expected this and so with Tarnovetsky’s help the attack was repulsed. The Bolsheviks retreated, but not for too long. They decided to get rid of this unexpected obstacle. A few direction light signals flew in Tarnovetsky’s direction and the barrage of heavy weapons to which we had just been subjected hit him. As he told me later all his heavy weapons (machine guns and mortars) were destroyed. He was practically helpless.
Then our turn came again. I was just making the rounds of our positions when the first shell came flying in. Not able to get to my foxhole I jumped into a machine gun nest which was very deep and well dug out. I was very lucky for two splinters came flying in from the incoming shell some 10 cms above my head and embedded themselves into the wall. I dug those splinters out and saved them but later in my wanderings they were lost.
Again we prepared for an attack. It came within 30–45 minutes. The same mass of soldiers came moving towards us. At first we tried to resist but when we saw their overwhelming number we retreated through the forest which they shelled for a while with their artillery until they could no longer observe us.
Our company had been overwhelmed. There were wounded. I don’t know how many soldiers were killed. With a few dozen men I retreated in the general direction of the hinterland.[…] when we got back to the regiment we saw that we had been badly mauled. From our four companies only one or two platoons were left.299
The daily report of the OKH for 10 April 1945, noted:
2. Pz. Army: […] In the sector of the [1] Cavalry Corps north of Radkersburg, the enemy could only achieve small penetrations. However at the right flank and in the middle of the 14. SS. Div. the enemy broke through. The creation of a new front line by 3. and 4. Cavalry Divisions is in progress.300
Around this time the commander of the 1 Cavalry Corps General de Kavallerie Harteneck, was at the Division’s HQ when reports arrived from the front which so perturbed Freitag, that he acted instinctively and announced his resignation as Divisional commander. As he had done previously at Brody, by so doing he again sought to absolve himself of responsibility for the Division’s performance in action, but General Harteneck refused Freitag’s resignation and ordered him to remain at his post.301 A few hours later with additional support primarily from the veteran 3 Cavalry Division, the crisis passed, the penetrations were successfully repelled and the front was restored.
Stradner Kögel was finally lost for good on 11 April302 but despite this the intensity of the fighting showed no sign of abating, although this time it was the veteran 3 Cavalry Division which bore the brunt. Close to the village of Stallhans east of Frutten, Reiterregiment 32 was unable to contain a breakthrough of the German line by elements of the 61 Guards Rifle Division and on this occasion was saved by the timely intervention of Ukrainian infantry units. In the previously cited account, the commander of the II Abteilung, Rittmeister Zilm states that when on 12 April the 6 and 8 squadrons came under heavy pressure, an assault group led by Lieutenant Jürgen was only partly able to control the enemy penetration when ‘without having to be asked the Ukrainians came to help us. They wanted to show that they were not inferior to us’.[author’s emphasis]303
In the interim, the slow-moving Artillery Regiment had by now relocated by forced march to Austria,304 accompanied by the 2 and 3 companies of the Fusilier Battalion which were operating under the leadership of the commander of the 3 company W.Obstuf. Stephan Hulak.
The remainder of the Fusilier Battalion comprising of its staff together with the 1 company (W.Ustuf. Ivan Sarytsky), 4 company (Kdr: W. Ostuf. Roman Bojcun) and Jagdzug,305 (Kdr. W.Ustuf. Orest Liashevych) had been subordinated to the 23 Panzer Division and had been ordered into the German bridgehead at Radkersburg306 for which they departed on the evening of 31 March.307
Marching all night and stopping only a couple of times to rest and eat, they arrived at Spielfeld and continued until they reached a village near Radkersburg. Here they were ordered to take positions in the second line adjacent to the village on the east side, where they stood all night in pouring rain until they were soaking wet. The following morning orders were issued to change position and by 1120 hrs they had reached Radkersburg where they stopped briefly before continuing to move eastward. As they did so, while crossing an exposed open field they were caught by an enemy mortar bombardment which wounded one soldier from the first company.308 The commander of the heavy mortar platoon in the 4 company W.Ustuf. Volodymyr Kudla:
[…] The battle line for the heavy machine gun platoon of the fourth company was in the forest to the south side of the road no more than 300 m away. The road we we
re on was mined against tanks. If an enemy mortar hit a mine we would have been in big trouble. We decided to go through the field to the battle line. A Wehrmacht lieutenant who watched this scenario said ‘Don’t you know that field is mined?’ no one told us and that was the only way we could reach our destination. He also told us ‘the line you are going to was abandoned by the Wehrmacht one day earlier’.[…]309
On 6 April the detachment was in place holding a line about two kms in length where, together with other German and Cossack units in the area, it became embroiled in bitter defensive fighting against elements of the Soviet 73 Guards Rifle Division and the 113 Rifle Division310 around Murauen by Radkersburg. On 7 April the detachment took part in an attack near the village of Zelting as recalled by Waffen-Unterscharführer Petro Cisarsky commander 2 platoon 1 company:
The 1 and 4 companies received the order to proceed by forced march from Slovenia to the front in Austria. For transportation the commander Sturmbannführer Bristot had a VW Kübelwagen (and a motorcycle ridden by Waffen-Sturmmann Felper from L’viv) at his disposal. In addition each company had a field kitchen and supply and ammunition carts which were pulled by horses. The remainder of the column set out on foot in daylight on a sunny day on the main road in the direction of Austria. We crossed the Mur by bridge at night and were billeted in barns and other buildings on the way.
Around 3 April we arrived in a settlement and occupied secondary positions. The weather was sunny and we were able to sit and relax for a few hours. In the early morning of 5 April we received the order to move as quickly as possible but we were not told where our destination was to be.
Stalin's Nemesis Page 24
